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Abstract 
 
The thesis assesses risks to the Saudi Arabia oil supply chain employing Bayesian 
methodology.  The geopolitical impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade 
Centre introduced potential new risks to the Saudi oil supply chain.  The thesis will 
identify a series of risks and determine the likelihood and magnitude of potential 
disruptions the threats could cause.  Thorough testing is undertaken employing 
Bayesian methodology.   
 
Bayesian methodology assists in discounting implied, overstated and misplaced 
threats.  Data is collected from a number of various sources including current 
academic literature, experts in the shipping, security and oil field services industry.  
The data is arranged and the results tested in order to reveal live or benign threats to 
the Saudi oil supply chain.    
 
Final analysis reveals that there are six major threats to the Saudi oil supply chain, 
dwindling skilled ex-pat workers, terrorism, new tanker design, a closure of the Strait 
of Hormuz, Saudi internal instability and developments in technology.  The six threats 
are cross referenced and analysed at depth to determine whether they would 
individually or combined have a significant disruptive impact on the Saudi oil supply 
chain. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
           
Contemporary analysis of the oil industry can quite rightly be accused of focusing on 
one main issue, namely the risks accompanying high oil prices.  However, actors such 
as political, economic, security and energy market analysts appear to struggle when 
cross-referencing each other’s data.1  As a result the conclusions, and the factors that 
influence them, overwhelm the simplicities of traditional ‘combining ideas’ theories.2  
Instead collectively they form a melange of technical, linguistic and tangential mist 
from which clarity struggles to emerge.  In short some commentators have a tendency 
to pen emotive as opposed to pragmatic analysis of the risks affecting the global 
energy supply chain.  
 
The Saudi Arabia oil supply chain is the most successful and long running oil supply 
chain in the world.  The Kingdom has consistently exported oil ever since the supply 
infrastructure went on line in the 1950’s.  Throughout the supply chain’s history Saudi 
has adapted to new threats amid periods of intense pressure.  The latest raft of threats 
to challenge the oil supply chain arrived shortly after 9/11.  The question had to be 
asked, just how can the Kingdom mitigate these new risks and overcome the threats 
they pose?  Furthermore, expectations were that the oil supply chain would become a 
lucrative target for terrorists. The sudden importance of supply chain security attracted 
acute attention from a wide range of commentators.  Unfortunately, as with the global 
energy supply chain, an alarming proportion of data concerning the Saudi oil supply 
chain is either implied, overstated, misplaced or technically incorrect. In order to bring 
clarity to a confused but vital purlieu the purpose is to undertake a Bayesian risk 
assessment of the post 9/11 Saudi Arabia oil supply chain.   
 
                                                 
1 Baumgartner and Jones argue that ‘Experts in all areas spend much of their time convincing others 
that ‘outsides’ are not qualified to make decisions in a given area.’  See Baumgartner, F and Jones, 
B.D, Agendas and instability in American politics, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1993, p. 235. 
2  Hadamard wrote ‘Indeed, it is obvious that invention or discovery, be it in mathematics or anywhere 
else, takes place by combining ideas’  Zellner, Arnold, Bayesian and Non-Bayesian Approaches to 
Scientific Modeling and Inference in Economics and Econometrics, University of Chicago, 2000, p. 4. 
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Ultimately the thesis will argue that despite potential threats from flawed technology, 
dwindling skilled ex-pat workers, terrorism and new tanker designs the two outstanding 
risks to the Saudi Arabia oil supply chain are from a closure of the Strait of Hormuz 
and a rise in domestic instability within the Kingdom.  The research will not only fill a 
gap in current literature but also potentially raise the standard of future analysis 
directed towards ‘at risk’ supply chains.  
 
Research journey 
 
On the morning of September 11th 2001 I received a text message from a friend of 
mine working in the United States of America.  The text stated that the World Trade 
Centre had been attacked and that I should turn the television on.  I had just arrived 
home from a shopping trip so I switched the TV on and remained stunned in front of it 
for the next six hours.  For my generation ‘where were you on 9/11?’ was as 
synonymous as asking the previous generation where they were when Kennedy was 
assassinated.  The following week I began my undergraduate degree in Peace Studies 
at the University of Bradford during which not surprisingly 9/11 and the subsequent 
reverberating global events dominated the programme and, if I may boldly state, a 
great deal of ongoing global policy fourteen years on.  My immediate thoughts 
however, along no doubt with many others, were how 9/11 would impact on world oil? 
 
At Bradford I broke somewhat with new found 9/11 tradition and chose to focus on my 
own interest, that of oil and the relationship between society and oil, encompassing 
among other topics: politics, economics, cultural impact, logistics and the huge 
engineering projects required to keep oil flowing.  My undergraduate dissertation 
produced a study on the impact of the oil industry on the remote island of Sakhalin in 
the Russian Far East.  I had to assess whether an oil spill could be contained, the risks 
surrounding operating a floating drilling rig and how the oil industry would affect the 
inhabitants of such a remote island. 
 
When choosing a suitable topic for my PhD the Saudi Arabia oil supply was an 
unchallenged first subject of choice.  The Saudi Arabia ‘KSA’ oil supply has managed 
to weather everything that has been thrown at it, the oil markets pulmonary artery.  At 
the time 9/11 was still dictating policy and there was still a great deal of ‘unknowns’ 
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such as the stability in Iraq and Afghanistan not to mention the true operative capability 
of Al Qaeda.  Tehran was also pressing forward with Iran’s nuclear ambition during 
which Washington cooled towards Riyadh.  I saw the opportunity to invert the topic of 
my undergraduate degree and look at society driven risks to the KSA oil supply chain 
that emerged after 9/11 whether they be for example political, economic or technical 
in nature. 
 
I wanted to examine the nature of risks, not only the possibility of a threat occurring 
but the actual likelihood of the threat being executed.  Also whether everyday ‘working’ 
risks are more or less containable than say an act of terror?  I also wanted to pose the 
‘what if’ question to scenarios that were taken for granted as being out of the question 
impossibilities to achieve.  The roots of 9/11 were supposedly reaching everywhere 
and everything.  I took the view that a risk analysis of the KSA oil supply chain, a vital 
conduit of global security, would be a justifiable topic – not to mention a plausible topic 
in depth, scope and content for a thesis. 
 
The scope of the thesis would cover the oil supply chain from drilling in the oil fields to 
export via oil tankers into the Gulf and out into the ocean via the Strait of Hormuz.  I 
knew that data would not come from traditional international relations/international 
security areas but instead gathered from industry sources.  I was also aware that 
industry sources would contain less data on the political nature of risk and academic 
sources would provide a reduced technical content.  At this early stage a high priority 
was to choose a suitable methodology. 
 
During my initial reading I discovered a suggestion by respected Middle East expert 
Anthony Cordesman who suggested that 
 
‘There is a clear need for an assessment of...some form of Bayesian approach to risk 
analysis.’3 
 
I researched the possibility of adopting Bayesian methodology, a full description of 
which can be found later in this chapter.  Cordesman’s suggestion together with the 
                                                 
3 Cordesman, Anthony H, Al-Rodhan, Khalid, The Global Oil Market: Risks and Uncertainties, CSIS, 
Washington DC, 2006, p. 20. 
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suitability of adopting a Bayesian approach to risk analysis became the rationale for 
choosing a Bayesian methodology as being an appropriate choice. As with most PhD 
scholars my research would however be limited to available resources.  
 
The purpose of the research      
 
The purpose of the thesis is to identify short, medium and long term risks to the supply 
chain between September 11th 2001 ‘9/11’ and December 31st 2010.  The thesis will 
also highlight chronic, acute and benign factors that threaten it between these two 
dates.  Furthermore, the thesis will expose and separate implied from probable areas 
of risk. 
 
The timescale of just over nine years in which the thesis is set is justified as being a 
significant and authoritative period of time after the 9/11 Terrorist attack in New York 
to assess the scope, impact and longevity of any subsequent threats and risks to the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia ‘KSA’ oil supply chain.  Therefore the December 31st 2010 
finish date of the thesis is not significant other than to draw a suitable end to the scope 
of the study. The thesis does not however attempt to make a direct connection 
between the events of 9/11 and threats to the KSA oil supply chain. 
 
The resulting post 9/11 paradigm shift4 in global security produced an eristic aura in 
which very few key securities that had been taken for granted before the attack could, 
it would appear, be relied upon during the immediate and long term aftermath of the 
attack. It is from this mise en scène that the thesis draws its purpose.  The KSA oil 
supply chain had become an industry stalwart.  Furthermore the oil market had 
become accustom to the unquestionable reliability the supply chain offered clients. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 The concept of a post 9/11 paradigm shift has been well argued with in academia.  See Johnson, 
DDP & Madin, EMP (2008) Paradigm shifts in security strategy: why does it take disasters to trigger 
change? In: Natural Security: A Darwinian Approach to a Dangerous World (eds. RD Sagarin & T 
Taylor), Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press. 
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The principle focus of the thesis 
 
Taking into account the question mark which the US placed over Saudi Arabia and the 
wider Middle East immediately after 9/11, would the ongoing resilience of the KSA oil 
supply chain be challenged by any subsequent geopolitical or other unknown 
unspecified actions or events? The principle focus of the thesis is to identify, assess 
and quantify significant threats and risks which pre-existed or evolved after 9/11 and 
continued to be an issue before 2010, or continued during and/or after the stated 
timeframe. The thesis will therefore focus on assessing and quantifying the potential 
impact of the identified risks which emerged during the stated timescale.  To determine 
the scale of the identified risks they will be assessed and analysed in order to quantify 
their potential impact to the oil supply chain. 
 
A key purpose of assessing risks will be to determine the realistic likelihood of a 
sustained threat, as opposed to quantifying the risk emanating from an implied threat 
that proves to be exaggerated or baseless. Implied threats also encompass technically 
incorrect threats which are put forward in theories.  One area in which technically 
incorrect threats stood out occurred when commentators referred to the tanker 
shipping industry, an industry firmly entrenched in international relations, although 
experts in this area often overlook the decisive technical issues which may cause oil 
tankers to place the supply chain at risk.      
 
Bayesian approach to risk analysis 
 
As mentioned earlier in the ‘research journey’ the thesis has adopted a Bayesian 
based methodology.  Below is an explanation of Thomas Bayes who discovered Bayes 
theory, a description, with examples of Bayes theory and a justification that Bayes 
theory can be utilized for qualitative research despite being initially developed for 
quantitative data.   
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Thomas Bayes 
 
Thomas Bayes was a Presbyterian minister and mathematician who lived in England 
in the 1700’s (born circa 1702 and died April 17, 1761).5  ‘Reverend Bayes, as he is 
commonly referred to, lives on in the characterisation of modern statistical 
methodology as a consequence of the publication of ‘An essay towards solving a 
problem in the doctrine of chances’.6 The essay was posthumously delivered by 
Richard Price to the Royal Society in 1763 – three years after Bayes death. 
 
Bayes essay explained how to accumulate information to revise estimates of 
probability.  By ‘accumulate information’ Bayes described a process in which the 
assessor continually revises a probability estimate as more information comes in.7  JJ 
Martin summarised the origin of Bayes proposition as  
 
[Bayesian Theory]...is a ...structure which guides a decision maker in choosing a course 
of action in the face of uncertainty about the consequences of that choice.  The course of 
action recommended by the theory is one which is consistent with the decision maker’s 
preference for various consequences and his considered judgement about the 
uncertainties involved in the problem.8   
 
The technical result at the heart of essay is what we now know as ‘Bayes theorem’9 or 
‘Bayes theory’ 
 
Bayes theory – a brief introduction 
 
The reasons for choosing Bayes theory as a methodology for this thesis have been 
outlined above in this chapter, and a more detailed explanation and definition of the 
theory will follow in Chapter 3.  Available literature contains an abundance of examples 
and explanations of Bayes theory, the majority are highly technical mathematical 
                                                 
5 James Press, S, Bayesian Statistics: Principle, Models, and Applications, John Wiley and Sons, New 
York, 2000, p. 15. Also see Howell, David C, Statistical Methods for Psychology, Thomson, London, p 
121. 
6 Bernado, Jose M, et al, Bayesian Theory, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1998, p. 2. 
7 Howell, David C, Op cit, p. 121. 
8 Martin, JJ, Bayesian Decision Problems and Markov Chains, Krieger, New York, 1987, p. 8. 
9 Bernado, Jose M, et al, Op cit, p. 2 
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problems such as those posed by Martin, Denison, Holmes, Mallick, Smith, Maritz, 
Lwin and Smith.10 However, the thesis would benefit at this stage from a 
straightforward example11 of applying Bayes theory as stated by the ‘Economist’. 
 
The canonical example is to imagine that a precocious new born observes his first sunset, 
and wonders whether the sun will rise again or not. He assigns equal prior probabilities 
to both possible outcomes, and represents this by placing one white and one black marble 
into a bag. The following day, when the sun rises, the child places another white marble 
in the bag. The probability that a marble plucked randomly from the bag will be white (i.e. 
the child's degree of belief in future sunrises) has thus gone from a half to two-thirds. 
After sunrise the next day, the child adds another white marble, and the probability (and 
thus the degree of belief) goes from two-thirds to three-quarters. And so on. Gradually, 
the initial belief that the sun is just as likely as not to rise each morning is modified to 
become a near-certainty that the sun will always rise.12 
 
Or as further reduced by Saini13 
 
[C]alculates the odds of one event happening given the odds of other related events. 
 
David Howell provides a further explanation of applying Bayes theory to a problem 
which assesses a constant supply of data in order to be solved 
 
Suppose I tell you that Fred was murdered and ask you for your personal (subjective) 
probability that Willard committed the crime.  You think he is certainly capable of it and 
not a very nice person, so your probability increases.  Then I say that Willard was seen 
near the crime that night, and you raise your probability.  Then I say that Willard owns the 
right type of gun, and you raise your probability again.  Then I say that a fairly reliable 
witness says Willard was at a baseball game with him at the time so you drop your 
probability.  This is a process of accumulating information to come up with a probability 
that some event occurred.14 
                                                 
10 Martin, JJ, Bayesian Decision Problems and Markov Chains, Krieger, New York, Denison, G T, 
Holmes, Christopher C, Mallick, Bani K, Smith, Adam, FM, Bayesian Methods for Nonlinear 
Classification and Regression, Wiley, London, 2002. Maritz, JS, Lwin, T, Empirical Bayes Methods, 
Chapman and Hall, London, 1989. Bernado, Jose M, Smith, Adrian FM, Bayesian Theory, Wiley, 
London, 1989. 
11 A more formal example can be found in Martin, JJ, Bayesian Decision Problems and Markov 
Chains, Krieger, New York, p. 8. 
12 http://www.economist.com/node/382968 
13 Saini, Angela, A Formula for Justice, http://www.theguardian.com/law/2011/oct/02/formula-justice-
bayes-theorem-miscarriage 
14 Howell, David C, Op cit, p. 121. 
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So how do these examples relate to applying Bayes theory to numerous potential 
threats to the KSA oil supply chain? Assessing the threats by analysing the opinion of 
experts and evidence based data will either discount benign threats or highlight likely 
threats depending on whether they emerge.  For example, an implied threat could 
remain prevalent for some considerable time but may never emerge because the 
subsequent investigation, evidence and assessment revealing the threat to being 
inconceivable to deliver – drawing a pun from the above example – a threat from which 
the sun never arises.     
 
Bayes theory – assessing qualitative over quantitative data? 
 
At first glance Bayes theory may give the opinion that its application has been for 
quantitative mathematical data, but since the theory has been introduced over 230 
years ago Bayes theory is widely accepted as being applied to assess qualitative data 
bases – MA Meadow, A Quantitative Approach to Bayes Theorem, Gundrun Socher, 
Bayesian Reasoning on Quantitative Reasoning from Images and Speech, are but two 
proponents.  Denison et al state, ‘We should clearly be able to improve the quality of 
models we develop by incorporating whatever...qualitative knowledge we have 
available.’15  Jack Buckley further argues about Bayesian qualitative research, 
 
Mixed-methods research has a long tradition in the evaluation of social programs and 
public policies (Reichardt and Cook 1979), where the combination of qualitative and 
quantitative inquiry has long been regarded as a necessity (cf. Lincoln and Guba 1985). 
One reason for this is the context and intended audience of evaluation research: in 
addition to the techniques of on-site observation and in-depth interviews popular in 
qualitative policy evaluation.16 
 
The mention of on-site observation and in-depth interviews are well placed to 
compliment the wider operative basis of this thesis set out in the research journey 
earlier in this chapter.  
                                                 
15 Denison, David G T, et al op cit, p. 5. 
16 Buckley, Jack, Simple Bayesian Inference for Qualitative Political Research, Boston College, 
Boston, 2009, p 1. 
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A more exacting use of qualitative data in Bayes theory is found in medical research.  
The impact of disease on a certain area has for example been calculated using 
qualitative data. 
 
While decisions made according to Bayes' theorem are the academic normative 
standard...the principles can be followed without intimidating mathematics. To do so, one 
can first categorise the prior-probability of the disease being tested for as very unlikely 
(less likely than 10%), unlikely (10-33%), uncertain (34-66%), likely (67-90%) or very likely 
(more likely than 90%)...The simplicity of the method, while still adhering to the basic 
principles of Bayes' theorem, has the potential to increase its application in clinical 
practice.17 
 
The thesis will adopt a similar approach made by Meadows in order to calculate low, 
medium and high disruptions to the KSA oil supply. Despite Bayes theory being 
associated with quantitative data, the thesis, backed up by evidence of previous robust 
qualitative Bayesian research by other scholars, will confidently adopt a qualitative 
data approach in this thesis.  Research for this thesis will construct a network of factors 
that organize the supply chain by mapping out cause and effect relationships among 
key variables discussed in Chapter 4 in order to produce a prior distribution (see fig 
1.1 below). 
                    
Fig 1.1 Key variables diagram 
                                                 
17 Meadows, MA, A Quantitative Approach to Bayes Theorem, 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21862499, 2013. 
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The thesis will also not set out to compare competing research methods or theories 
on the subject.  The thesis will draw together several areas of expertise which currently 
‘standalone’ as separate disciplines. For example the oil field service industry commits 
research into security issues, as does the shipping industry but the two industries see 
no need to combine their findings as they are seen as irrelevant to one another.   The 
conclusion therefore will be solely based on evidence collected and analysed while 
researching the complete ‘from oil well to export by sea’ supply chain – an exercise 
that is distinctly lacking in current literature.  The exercise will not only appraise the 
threats, but more importantly gain insight into the dynamics required to prevent the 
threats from becoming critical.   
 
Defining the problem: the geopolitics of energy 
 
The geopolitics of energy are rarely static.  Existing responses, including those 
discussed above, aimed at reducing risk and mitigating the impacts of incidents has 
tended to be based on static models that generate preventative and defensive 
measures.  There is a growing need for dynamic assessments that can adapt and 
develop if the threat grows18.  The thesis will introduce geopolitical threats as the 
concept for calculating risk.  The underlying reason for adopting this principle over 
other factors is in the belief that geopolitics ‘preoccupy business and governments 
around the globe’19  Daniel Yergin expands on the dilemma for the energy sector, 
 
‘Although Energy Companies will be prospecting in more difficult environments, the major 
obstacle to the development of new supplies is not geology but what happens above 
ground: namely, international affairs, politics, decision-making by governments, and 
energy investment and new technological development.  It should be noted, however that 
current projections do show that after 2010 the major growth in supplies will come from 
fewer countries than it comes from today, which could accentuate security concerns’20  
 
                                                 
18 Van der Linde, Cory, Study on Energy Supply and Geopolitics-Final Report, Clingendael 
International Energy Programme, Institute for International Relations, January 2004, p. 17. 
19 Verrastro, Frank, Comments and Observations on the topic of U.S. Energy Independence, 
Testimony before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources United States Senate, 
Washington DC, 07/03/06, p. 1. 
20 Yergin, Daniel, Ensuring Energy Security, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 2, Washington DC, 2006, p. 
75. 
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Yergin’s warning that the focus of geopolitical interest will eventually fall on regions 
holding abundant reserves should not be taken lightly.  By 2030 global demand for 
primary energy (oil and gas) is expected to rise by over 60%.  The Gulf States 
collectively hold two-thirds of the world’s oil reserves.21  They also ‘want to see their 
respective fields developed to maximize production over 50 years or more’22, and are 
expected to account for most of the future demand.23 
 
The international community should therefore be increasingly more conscious of the 
need to develop new energy security strategies.  Above all there is a duty to protect 
global energy supplies in resource rich countries that are becoming increasingly more 
unstable and prone to acts of terrorism.  Michael Ross24 argues that conflict is linked 
to such factors as the price of energy, socio-economic stability, government policy and 
the ‘culture of dependency’ between major producing and consuming states.25  The 
security of the supply infrastructure and the political and economic stability of supplier 
states is consequently of major concern.26  An ongoing threat to the security of oil and 
gas supplies is the impact of the above factors on major exporting and transit states,27 
and consequently it is of growing importance that the political climate in exporting 
countries28 is monitored.  
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 For a comprehensive appraisal of Saudi reserves see Cordesman, Anthony H, US and Global 
Dependence on Middle Eastern Energy Exports: 2004-2030, CSIS, Washington DC, 2004. 
22 Marcel, Valerie, Investment in Middle East Oil: Who Needs Whom? Chatham House, London, 
2006, p. 3. 
23 Caruso, Guy F, The Geopolitics of Energy into the 21st Century, Senate Energy and Natural 
Resources Committee, Washington DC, 21/03/06. 
24 See Ross, Michael, How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War?  Evidence from 13 Cases, 
UCLA, Los Angeles, 2003, p. 36-37.  Ross, Michael, The Political Economy of Resource Curse, World 
Politics, 51, 1999, p. 307.  Ross, Michael, Does Oil Hinder Democracy? World Politics, 53, 2001, p. 
337-340. 
25 Simon Bromley also argues that the US faces a long term future of geopolitical competition with 
China, India and possibly Russia.  See Bromley, Simon, The United States, Hegemonic Strategies 
and World Oil, St. Anthony’s International Review, Vol. 2, No. 1, STAIR, Oxford, 2006, p. 64. 
26 See Franssen, H.T, Oil Security through 2010, CSIS, 2002, p. 64. 
27 Abadie, Alberto, Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism, Harvard University and 
NBER, October 2004. 
28 Levinsky, Steven, Way, Lucan A, The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism, ‘Journal of Democracy’, 
April 2002.    
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Sudden events 
 
Winston Churchill mused that ‘Safety and certainty in oil lie in variety and variety 
alone.’29  Sudden events in the Gulf have given a paradoxical twist to his theory by 
revealing how conflict and uncertainty produce ‘variety’ in the market.  To date there 
has not been a single event in the history of Middle East oil production that has been 
powerful enough to completely stop the supply chain.    
 
Oil and gas has continued to flow from the Gulf regardless of threats from revolution, 
war, terrorism, embargos and field depletion to name but a few.  In particular the US 
has a vital interest in ensuring a safe and unimpeded supply of energy not just to 
America, but to the world markets as well.30  Where the supply chain has been 
previously weakened for example during the ‘tanker war’31 the attempt to stop exports 
proved unsuccessful, largely due to foreign intervention.  
 
Supply chain literature 
 
One area that deserves special attention is the gap often found in supply and demand 
research.  Ross and other scholars are noticeable for their absence of in depth 
analysis of the role oil and gas tankers play in the supply chain.  A review of recent 
literature by Kalicki and Goldwyn, Barnes and Jaffe, Luft and Korin, Klare, Fawcett, 
Halliday, Yergin, Mitchell, Marcel and Cordesman is telling.32  Chapters devoted to 
supply issues are often filled with production and demand data.  The impact of 
escalating country risks, declining spare production capacity, strikes, sanctions and 
embargos are all vigorously argued but fall short of charging the full equation.  Where 
                                                 
29 Yergin, Daniel, op cit, 2006, p. 69. 
30 Barnes, Joe and Jaffe, Amy Myers, op cit, 2006: 145. 
31 The ‘tanker war’ will be examined later in the paper. 
32 Kalicki, Jan H and Goldwyn, David, Energy Security: Towards a new foreign policy strategy, 
Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington D.C, 2005.  Barnes, Joe and Jaffe, Amy Myers, ‘The 
Persian Gulf and the geopolitics of oil’, Survival, 48 (3) Spring 2006: 143-163.  Luft, Gal and Korin, 
Anne, ‘Terrorism Goes to Sea’, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2004.  Klare, Michael, Blood 
and Oil, Penguin, London, 2004.  Fawcett, Louise (Ed), International Relations of the Middle East, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005.  Halliday, Fred, The Middle East in International Relations, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005. Yergin, Daniel, op cit, 2006, p. 69-82.  Mitchell, John, 
et al, The New Economy of Oil: Impacts on business, Geopolitics and Society, London, RIIA, 2005.  
Marcel, Valerie, Oil Titans, Chatham House, London, 2006. Cordesman, Anthony, Energy 
Developments in the Middle East, CSIS, Washington DC, 2004.       
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threats to the infrastructure are discussed, attacks on pipelines are the predominate 
issue.  Such analysis is benign without considering the role of oil and gas tankers.  
Unfortunately, in cases where tankers are discussed, the reasoning can be oblique or 
based on supposition.33  The net effect leans towards smoke and mirrors.  The reader 
is led to believe that individual producer states can fail for one reason or another but 
pride and trust in the international delivery of oil and gas, regardless of any crises, is 
a foregone conclusion 
 
The method and structure of the thesis 
 
Chapter 2 analyses historical disruptions in the Gulf.  The analysis and data draw 
attention to patterns which develop as a result of these disruptions. While not delving 
too far into the methodology, H Bradford Westerfield argues that ‘One way to test the 
usefulness of Bayes’ Theorem...is to...replay history.’34  An exercise held within this 
chapter. Westerfield further argues that effective assessment usually occurs after 
changes to the status quo have occurred35. A key finding is that in order to compensate 
for the threats that cause disruptions the supply chain often, as a result, develops new 
challenges which it must overcome – often in patterns.  The continual introduction of 
new threats is a prime reason for employing Bayesian methodology. 
 
Chapter 3 introduces Bayesian methodology.  A full explanation sets out how the 
thesis will benefit from the flexibility and analytical aspects of the methodology.  The 
chapter also contains a report of the field trip I made to Dammam where I attended the 
2008 SAOGE (Saudi Arabia Oil and Gas Exhibition).  During my visit I recorded several 
interviews, excerpts of which can be found in the thesis.  The full transcripts are placed 
in the appendices.  
 
In chapter 4 the chosen Bayesian methodology will be tested against a data set in 
order to produce a posterior distribution.  The process is explained in the empirical 
                                                 
33 For a prime example of a respected energy analyst misunderstanding the impact of a hypothetical 
incident see Yergin, Daniel, op cit, 2006, p. 79. 
34  Westerfield, H. Bradford, Inside CIA's Private World, Yale, London, 1995, p. 258. 
35 Ibid 
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stage of the research framework fig 1.2 below,36 where ‘Design’ is the prior distribution 
and ‘Test hypotheses’ is the posterior distribution.   
 
                            Literature                            Theory 
                                   ↓                                          ↓                
Research area → Topic → Questions → Hypotheses → │Design → Data collection → Data analysis → Test hypotheses 
                                   ↑  
                             Context 
 
                         Pre-empirical stage                                                                          Empirical stage 
 
Fig 1.2 Research framework 
 
In chapter 5 the posterior distribution generated in Chapter 4 will be reconstituted to 
form the final prior distribution.  A new data collecting design will also be introduced.  
The new design will switch attention away from amassing data and focus instead on 
drafting prior distribution questions, that when answered in Chapter 6 will reveal the 
likelihood of a threat materializing, and where appropriate, the extent of the disruption 
to the KSA oil supply chain.    
Chapter 6 analyses the final prior distribution, containing potential threats from 
technology, dwindling skilled ex-pat workers, terrorism, new tanker design, the closure 
of the Strait of Hormuz and domestic instability within Saudi Arabia.  At the end of the 
chapter the reasons why the first four potential threats listed above are discounted. 
There then follows reasons why the Strait of Hormuz and domestic instability within 
Saudi Arabia are retained as the greatest potential risks to the Saudi Arabia oil supply 
chain. 
 
Chapter 7, the concluding chapter rounds off the thesis with a statement on the 
empirical findings from the thesis.  An account of how the research question was 
answered.  Following this, the theoretical implications will be argued pointing to areas 
that conflicted with current thought.  A closing section will then address several policy 
implications where the research had exposed ideas to aid the decision making 
process. 
 
                                                 
36  Punch, Keith F, Introduction to Social Research Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches (Second Edition), 
Sage, London, 2005, p. 40. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Gulf geopolitics and the oil supply: a historical analysis of major disruptions 
 
Introduction 
 
Oil has performed a crucial but often troubled role in the progress of the developed 
world.37  The domestic and foreign policies of major oil consuming states are often 
considered superfluous when applied to oil producers.  The catalogue of problems that 
can arise from enacting these policies have been well documented in academic and 
industrial literature, but for the purposes of this study it can be reduced to the following 
core issues: 
 
1. Major Western consumer states are largely responsible, historically, for fixing 
the boundaries of producer states.  The boundaries often bisected long-
established tribal areas, the inhabitants of which have never fully identified or 
integrated with their adoptive country. 
2. Consumer states have consistently increased their investment in technology 
which is transported to and operated inside producer countries.  The majority 
of producer countries maintain poor social and private investment opportunities, 
resulting in the technological marginalisation of their indigenous population. 
3. Consumers are by and large diametrically opposed to the cultural, religious and 
political ideologies of their producer partners. 
4. Consumers trade arms with producers on the silent understanding that oil will 
be exported regardless of any internal strife. 
5. The oil industry commands huge start up and production costs that have led to 
mismanagement of revenues and corruption among officials. 
6. The tanker industry provides a reliable and largely independently owned service 
to the oil industry.  A fact that is often overlooked by commentators analysing 
energy security is that tankers are paramount to the oil market, in that traders 
rely on charterers38 to hire seaworthy tankers with reliable crews to physically 
                                                 
37 Juan Pablo Perez, the Co-Founder of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) referred to 
oil as ‘the devil’s excrement’. 
38 An individual or company that hires a ship. 
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deliver contracted oil to its bid destination, in order for confidence in the market 
to endure. 
7. Tanker chartering has been cited by economists as one of the very few 
examples of ‘perfect competition’.39  The price is set by negotiation between the 
buyer and seller of the service without regulation or rules.  Tankers themselves 
operate under little government or international regulation and generally employ 
crews consisting of personnel from the third world.  The combination of these 
factors has however promoted an air of ruthlessness and unaccountability 
among industry outsiders. 
8. The price and amount of oil in a conflict area can intensify the struggle for 
control of the oil fields, which are usually located away from the State capital.  
The physical and cultural distance between interested parties at each end of 
the dilemma has the potential to fuel simmering internal unrest. 
9. Tanker owners have so far avoided blame for lifting (loading) oil out of conflict 
areas where oil exports have traditionally prolonged wars and/or embargos.  
The blame is usually directed towards importing governments, by their 
predominantly (moralistic) middle class voting public.  The same middle classes 
tend not to accept that they share the blame as end users of oil, but are often 
eager to attribute blame to the end users of alcohol, tobacco and illegal drugs 
for their addictions, due to a commonly held belief that it is an addict’s ‘own 
fault’ for getting hooked in the first place.   
10. End users of crude are more inclined to identify with crude’s refined products 
than they identify with oil.  In many producer states the situation is reversed.  
11. The threat of conflict, terrorism and political violence in and among producer 
states invariably has far reaching consequences for all concerned. 
 
At any one time a single or combination of the above points are ongoing in a multitude 
of locations worldwide.  The oil market is a singular global market therefore knowledge 
about producers and consumers current state of affairs is vital to the universal security 
of all concerned.  Producers and consumers alike have struggled to find solutions to 
these complex problems, leaving the oil industry to hang in the balance: 
 
                                                 
39 Newton, John, A Century of Tankers: the tanker story, Intertanko, London, 2002, p. 52. 
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The politics, economics, and social dynamics that shape these threats are complex.  They 
are driven by political and security issues, but they are also driven by economic and 
demographic factors and a wide range of cultural factors.  It is also dangerous to 
generalize.40 
 
The oil industry has continually adapted to new, and often equally troublesome, 
diversions to its infrastructure.  The primary reason for these diversions is disruption 
to the oil supply. 
 
The Gulf exports more crude than any other oil producing region in the world.  The 
region is one of the world’s most troubled areas.  The oil/conflict relationship has driven 
a long running debate centred on whether oil or regional issues fuel conflict in the 
region.  The exact cause of conflict may not be clear but regardless of the arguments 
Gulf exporters and major importers place oil security at the top of their agendas: 
 
It is more a question of the regional geopolitics of oil in the context of global trends that 
is significant…the three main trends in oil security are, first, that most of the industrialized 
world has long been dependent on oil imports; secondly, that the United States and China 
are also becoming rapidly more dependent on oil imports; thirdly, most of the remaining 
oil is in and around the Persian Gulf.  In short there will be a scramble for the control of 
African oil reserves and Russia may use its oil-exporting power for a variety of political 
ends, mainly concerned with regaining an element of great power status after the collapse 
of the 1990’s.  Even so, this is not ‘where it’s at, so to speak.  The Persian Gulf is the focus 
and will remain so.41 
 
Conflicts in the region have led to frequent disruptions to the oil supply.  The 
disruptions are an increasing worry for oil exporters and importers alike, due to their 
size and impact on the world economy.  This chapter will chart the chronology of 
threats to the region and discuss how these threats affected the oil supply.  Recent 
events have introduced new threats to the Gulf.  The author will conclude by 
highlighting new areas of risk for closer analysis.  
 
                                                 
40 Cordesman, Anthony, The Changing Dynamics of Energy in the Middle East: volume 1, Praeger, London, p. 
65. 
41 Rogers, Paul, Why We’re Losing the War on Terror, Polity, London, 2007, p. 142.  Anthony Cordesman also 
holds this opinion; Cordesman, Anthony, The US Military and Evolving Challenges in the Middle East, CSIS, 
Washington D.C, 2002, p. 1. 
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Gulf based oil companies 
 
Six of the world’s ten largest oil companies are located in the Gulf.  They are all State 
owned entities collectively owning over 60% of the worlds known oil reserves (see 
table below).  
 
 Oil and 
Gas 
Oil Oil Total 
 Reserves Reserves Production Revenues 
Company (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Saudi Aramco – Saudi 
Arabia 
299.8 259.4 8.9 122 
NIOC - Iran 287.9 125.8 3.9 32.5 
QGPC - Qatar 172.1 15.2 0.7 12.6 
INOC - Iraq 134.0 115.0 2 12.1 
ADNOC – Abu Dhabi 126.0 92.2 2 17.5 
KPC - Kuwait 99 99 2.3 25.2 
 
Fig 2.1 The Largest National Oil Companies (as of December 31, 2004)42 
 
The oil industry is split into three distinct sectors: 
 
1. Upstream: the upstream sector includes exploration, drilling exploratory wells, 
and operating the wells that recover and bring the crude oil to the surface. The 
upstream sector is often referred to as the ‘exploration and production’ (E&P) 
sector. 
 
2. Midstream: the midstream sector processes, stores, markets and transports 
crude oil.  The evolution of the midstream has seen the greatest commercial 
risk but remained the most dynamic and challenged of the three sectors.  The 
mid-stream could be said to attract difficulties because of the size, ownership 
and commercial competition within the sector’s infrastructure.   
                                                 
42 Maugeri, Leonardo, The Age of Oil, Praeger, London, 2006, Appendix 4. 
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3. Downstream: the downstream sector includes oil refineries, petrochemical 
plants, petroleum product distribution, retail outlets and natural gas distribution 
companies. The downstream industry produces products such as gasoline, 
diesel, jet fuel, heating oil, asphalt, lubricants, synthetic rubber, plastics, 
fertilizers, antifreeze, pesticides, pharmaceuticals, natural gas and propane. 
 
To use an analogy, substituting the human body, the lungs become oil reserves, 
tankers are blood corpuscles.  Oxygen is oil carried in the corpuscles and pumped 
through the heart which is a combination of demand and the economy.  The 
oxygenated human brain acts as the government.  The stomach, intestines, liver and 
kidneys substitute for refineries that feed the body and also dispose of the waste.  The 
key to life and good living is common to both the oil industry and the human body.  The 
brain must not allow the actions committed by a healthy nourished body to interfere 
with the life support system so it develops policies.  These policies are the key to 
survival as they can lead to among other things, strength, stress and depression on 
any one organ or the body as a whole. 
 
Geology and recovery methods 
 
One common assumption concerning the Gulf is that oil literally poured out of the 
ground, which although technically correct in isolated areas, it is a semi-myth that 
needs further explanation.  For example, engineers have explored over a dozen rock 
formations in Saudi Arabia, although surprisingly, only a few of these formations that 
were expected to have oil deposits ever produced a significant amount of oil:  
 
Saudi Arabia’s Jurassic-age Arab carbonate rock formation has produced almost all the 
highly valued light and extra light oil in Saudi Arabia…On the long list of known geologic 
formations in Saudi Arabia , the Arab formation is almost hard to find.  This remarkable 
reservoir rock is divided into A, B, C and D zones.  Virtually all the oil produced…has come 
from the Arab D oil column…In total, the Arab D oil column was commonly about 250 feet 
thick at locations near the centre of the field and grew thinner towards the edges of the 
field, or flanks, where it was in contact with the underlying aquifer, referred to as the 
oil/water contact.43 
                                                 
43 Simmons, Matthew, Twilight in the Desert, Wiley, Hoboken, 2005, p. 21. 
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More often than not once the drill pierced the deposit pressure alone forced the oil 
upwards.  Later on, engineers pumped desalinized water or gas down the well which 
in turn built up pressure underground and forced up the oil.  The oil/water mix was 
separated from the gas with the oil being run off for processing and the water and gas 
reintroduced back into the well (see diagram below).  Other recovery methods include 
water flooding, whereby water is injected into a depleted oil reservoir so that the water 
sweeps some of the remaining oil to nearby producing wells.  Chemical flooding 
follows the same methodology as water flooding except that chemical flooding can 
only be used for sandstone reservoirs (due to absorption issues), and employs a 
cocktail of different fluids to flush out the remaining oil.44   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 2.2 Oilfield Brine and Solution Gas Disposal Diagram45 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
44 Hyne, Norman, J, Nontechnical Guide to Petroleum Geology, Exploration, Drilling, and Production, 2nd Edition, 
PennWell Corporation, Oklahoma, 2001, p. 445. 
45 Hyne, Norman, J, ibid, PennWell Corporation, Oklahoma, 2001, p. 427. 
 
23 
 
Reserves 
 
Reserves are those quantities of oil which are anticipated to be commercially 
recovered from known accumulations from a given date forward.46  The reserves 
quoted are as accurate as possible given the amount of reliable geologic and 
engineering data available at the time of the estimate.  The relative degree of 
uncertainty that accompanies reserve estimates may be conveyed by placing reserves 
in to one of two principle classifications, proved or unproved.  Unproven reserves are 
less certain to be recovered using technology available at the time of the estimate than 
proven reserves are.  It is left to the discretion of the countries or companies involved 
to make public their unproven reserves.  Proven reserves may be further sub-classified 
as probable and possible reserves, to emphasize the progressively increasing 
uncertainty in their recoverability.  Reserves estimates will generally be revised as 
additional geologic or engineering data becomes available, or as economic and 
techno-engineering processes change.  The prevailing classification system for 
assessing reserves has been devised by the Society of Petroleum Engineers (SPE) 
and the World Petroleum Congress (WPC)47: 
 
Proven reserves - In general reserves are considered proved if the commercial viability 
of the reservoir is supported by actual production or rock formation tests.  Reserves 
may also be classified as proved if the logistics for carrying those reserves to market 
are in, or expected to be in, place.  Reserves can also be classified as proven if 
successful testing of a pilot project on a similar reservoir has taken place and it is 
reasonably certain that the pilot project will succeed. 
 
Unproven reserves – Unproven reserves are based on the same estimates as proven 
reserves except that technical, contractual, economic or regulatory uncertainties 
preclude the reserves being classified as proven.  Unproven reserves may be further 
classified as probable reserves and possible reserves. 
    
                                                 
46 For a detailed explanation see www.world-
petroleum.org/publications/Petroleum%20Reserves%20Definitions%20doc1.doc 
47 Maugeri, Leonardo, ibid. 
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Probable reserves – Probable reserves are those unproven reserves which analysis 
of geological and engineering data suggests are likely to not be recoverable. 
 
Possible reserves – Possible reserves are those unproven reserves which analysis or 
geological and engineering data are less likely to be recoverable than probable 
reserves.    
 
British Petroleum (BP) is widely quoted as a credible source of global oil reserves.  BP 
estimates that the Gulf and Yemen hold 61.4 percent of the world’s oil reserves.  For 
25 years reserve estimates in the region have increased steadily, for the reasons given 
above, plus the inevitable ‘propaganda’ increases proffered by producer states when 
they feel threatened.  The United States Geological Survey (USGS) not only estimates 
proven reserves but also the potential growth in reserves in known fields and the 
probable size of undiscovered fields.  USGS indicate that the Gulf production could 
shrink after 2035.  This is an important long-term possibility, but one with little practical 
importance for current midterm energy policies.48 Oil is a strategic commodity and 
many Gulf States have used their reserve estimates to stress and enhance their 
strategic importance and gain outside aid: 
 
 Kuwait’s reserves jumped from 65.4 billion barrels in 1982 to around 90.0 
billion in 1985. 
 Iran claimed a ‘propaganda’ increase from 58.0 billion barrels in 1982 to 100.0 
billion in 1987. 
 Abu Dhabi’s reserves increased from 58.0 billion barrels to 92.9 billion in the 
same period. 
 Saudi Arabia increased its reserve estimates from 163.4 billion barrels in 1982 
to 257.5 billion in 1989. 
 Iraq currently lays claim to 78 billion barrels and further claims that it has an 
additional 100 billion waiting to be discovered in the Western Desert region. 
 
 
 
                                                 
48 Cordesman, Anthony, Op cit, p. 17. 
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Properties and transport considerations of oil 
 
Crude oils have a number of slightly different characteristics.  The discussion will 
benefit from a brief explanation of the range and properties of these characteristics, 
particularly when applied to the transportation of crude in oil tankers.  The table below 
lists the different types of crude exported from the Gulf.  The ‘benchmark’ crude’s 
highlighted in bold are those quoted on the market to calculate the average price of 
oil.  ‘Light’ refers to an oil’s density and is expressed for all crude oil grades in degrees 
API (American Petroleum Institute).  Light oils are more valuable and range from 38 
degrees to 34 degrees API.  Medium oils have an API gravity of about 32 degrees, 
and heavy oils start at about 29 degrees.  As API gravity decreases, the oil thickens 
until it becomes tar that will not flow at normal temperatures.  
 
Port Country Crude API Gravity 
Banias Iraq Imeg A 36.10 
Banias Iraq Imeg B 35.10 
Ceyhan Iraq Kirkuk 35.10 
Das Island Abu Dhabi Umm Shaif 37.46 
Das Island Abu Dhabi Zahum 40.60 
Dubai Dubai Dubai Export 33.50 
Jebel Danna Abu Dhabi Murban 40.50 
Kharg Island Iran Light 33.80 
Kharg Island Iran Heavy 31.00 
Mena Al Ahmadi Kuwait Kuwait 31.40 
Mena Al Fahal Oman Oman Blenn 36.30 
Mena Saud Neutral Zone Ecoene 16.50 
Ras al Khafji Neutral Zone Khafji 28.60 
Ras Tunura Saudi Arabia Light 33.40 
Ras Tunura Saudi Arabia Medium 30.80 
Ras Tunura Saudi Arabia Heavy 27.90 
Tripoli (Lebanon) Iraq Imeg A 36.10 
Umm Said Qatar Qatar 41.80 
     
Fig 2.3 Table of Gulf Crudes49 
                                                 
49 Akaki, Tony, The Transportation of Oil by Sea, iUniverse, New York, 2005, p. 26-27. 
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The tanker industry operates on very thin margins.  Although vessels are available for 
‘spot’ hire, a particular tanker will usually only load a certain range of products for 
reasons of safety and quality assurance.  The climate in the Gulf is ideal for loading, 
or ‘lifting’, oil.  The average temperature in the region is well above the pour point (the 
lowest temperature at which oil is observed to flow) of crude’s found there.  Some 
tanker owners prefer to specify which type crude they are prepared to load in a bid to 
reduce corrosion in the cargo tanks caused by sulphur and other metallic properties 
such as nickel and vanadium suspended in the oil. 
 
Refined products fall into two categories; leaded and unleaded.  Products that leave a 
lead-based residue behind after unloading are classified as being ‘dirty’.  Tankers 
carrying unleaded or ‘clean’ products generally will not load leaded consignments, 
because the lead deposited in the hold would contaminate any future unleaded cargo.  
The contract, or ‘charter party’ between the exporter and importer can be invalidated 
if the cargo is contaminated, leading to lengthy and expensive insurance claims.          
 
Oil and Modernity 
 
By the turn of the 20th Century oil and its derivatives were being used in an increasing 
number of highly technical industrial processes.  The commercial opportunities open 
to investors in oil-based technologies and dependent industries heavily contributed 
towards the success of modernity.50  Oil encouraged a lifestyle that remains to this 
day, generally in tune with human desires of affordability, convenience, and 
independence.  Oil became the choice resource of the middle classes, which made it 
all the more important to democratic governments, as the middle classes held the 
majority of votes across the population.     
  
By 1900 there were approximately 200 by-products of crude oil in daily use.  The 
versatility of oil was however eclipsed by its use as a fuel for the internal combustion 
engine.  The petrochemical and manufacturing industries followed closely afterwards.  
Petrol powered the world’s first car and aeroplane flight.  Plastics on the other hand 
have undergone a more subtle revolution.  Plastic entered the market at roughly the 
                                                 
50 Other resources such as iron, steel, copper, tin, cobalt and Tungsten also contributed but not as consistently 
as did oil.  Rogers, Paul, Op cit, p. 50. 
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same time as petrol.  Plastic or Bakelite as it was then known slowly replaced many 
wood and metal objects to become the material of choice in the ‘throw away’ age of 
disposable utility.  Investors realised that commercial success in the transport and 
manufacturing sectors depended on a guaranteed supply of oil to maintain demand 
and consumer confidence.  Supply however should not be confused with demand.  
Their characteristics are quite different: 
 
Supply is unlike demand.  The amount of the oil demanded results from independent 
choices of millions of households and firms…a few governments make the most important 
supply decisions.51 
   
The burgeoning infrastructure formed the backdrop to Winston Churchill’s often quoted 
‘Safety and certainty in oil lie in variety and variety alone.’  Churchill spoke on the eve 
of World War I as he switched the Royal Navy’s ships from coal to oil fired boilers.  He 
also stated that: 
 
If we cannot get oil, we cannot get corn, we cannot get cotton and we cannot get a 
thousand and one commodities necessary for the preservation of the economic energies 
of Great Britain.52 
 
US President Calvin Coolidge was to later take Churchill’s argument higher: 
 
Developing aircraft indicate that our national defence must be supplemented, if not 
dominated, by aviation.  It is even probable that the supremacy of nations may be 
determined by the possession of available petroleum and its products.53 
 
Churchill and Coolidge both realised that success depended on a reliable and 
trustworthy oil supply chain.  From this point forth inventors gave way to geologists, 
business chiefs, and politicians who took on the heavy burden of providing industry 
with a continuous supply of crude.  Furthermore, the supply needed to be dynamic as 
demand for oil was rapidly increasing.  Geologists were pulled from obscurity to 
declare that crude oil was known to be found naturally in the Russian Far East, Central 
Asia and the Middle East.  With the Soviets controlling Russia and Central Asia they 
                                                 
51 Claes, Dag Harald, The Politics of Oil-Producer Cooperation, Westview, Oxford, 2001, p. 30. 
52  Maugeri, Leonardo, Op cit, p. 24. 
53 Maugeri, Leonardo, ibid, p. 25. 
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were off limits to the US.  The UK was already producing in Iran so America hedged 
its future development on striking oil in the remaining Gulf States.    
 
Early oil discoveries in the Middle East 
 
The super-giant oil fields associated with the Gulf were not discovered until after World 
War II.  Oil was first discovered in the Gulf in 1920.  It was found in Bahrain on the 
western side of the Gulf.54  The first tentative negotiations about prospecting for oil in 
Saudi Arabia began as early as 1923.55  The negotiations took place surrounded by 
the eccentric milieu often associated with British imperialism.  Chief negotiator was 
Major Frank Holmes who secured the first Saudi oil concession after convincing Saudi 
King Abdul Aziz that there was oil in the Kingdom.56  Holmes later sold the concession 
which found its way into the hands of the Standard Oil of California (SOCAL).57 
 
The technology required to explore the Gulf had to be imported from the US.58  
Equipment was installed and maintained in a region that had yet to benefit from 
running water or public telephones. Notwithstanding the technology gap, the Gulf’s 
portfolio increased with strikes in Kuwait’s giant Burgan field and further discoveries 
at Agha Jari in Iraq.59  The first oil engineers were US or European expatriate (expat) 
personnel who worked on a temporary basis in the Gulf.  They worked in desperate 
conditions but with few distractions although solidarity among them ran high.  The 
expats shared similar cultures, expectations and adopted English as a common 
language.60  They were operating in countries that generally had little or no use for oil 
themselves, save for Iran.  Their hosts took no interest in their craft and appeared 
passive about the presence of foreigners.  Furthermore, the oil industry is not labour 
intensive.  The success of oil companies did not depend on the economic enslavement 
of generations of indigenous workers carrying out menial tasks.  The safety of early 
ex-patriot oil workers was directed more towards shielding them from the stifling heat 
and unavoidable boredom that accompanied their work more than anything else.61 
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SOCAL eventually struck oil in the Kingdom’s Eastern Province in 1938 and in doing 
so unwittingly introduced Saudi Arabia to the rentier state, meaning a state “that 
economically supports society and is the main source of private revenues through 
government expenditure … supported by revenue accruing from abroad’.62  This new 
form of income impacted downwards on the merchant class and their culture of 
political influence:   
 
Oil produced a new kind of economy, built on rents-a rentier economy.  Such an economy 
is heavily reliant on the export of [oil] the production of which requires little contact with 
the rest of the economy.  Most critically for politics, these revenues, rents, are paid directly 
to the state or, in the gulf, the rulers… [I]t gave rulers direct access to revenues, revenues 
generated outside the local economy.  Where once these revenues had to be squeezed 
from the population, through the merchants, who in turn exacted a political price, the 
rulers now received revenues independently.63  
 
Until then the majority of the Kingdom’s income had come from fees charged to 
Muslims on the annual pilgrimage to Mecca.  The Global depression in the 1930’s had 
reduced the pilgrimage to a trickle almost tipping the House of Saud towards 
bankruptcy.  The new rentier income however stabilized the economy. 
 
Geologists discovered that oil was concentrated in a sweeping ark around the Gulf 
coast roughly stretching from Bahrain to the Iran-Iraq border in length, and continuing 
for about a hundred miles deep inland (see fig 2.4 map of the Gulf oil deposits) 
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Fig 2.4 map of the Gulf oil deposits 
 
Exploration everywhere was hampered by the lack of infrastructure in the desert 
interior, although it was aided by the fact that the oil region in Saudi Arabia is well 
away from the Holy shrines of Mecca and Medina in the more conservative west of the 
country.  As a result personnel were unlikely to be caught falling foul of Islamic law.  
What did become noticeable was the high quality of oil extracted from some fields.  
However, the productive relationship between geology and commerce only comes 
alive when cost effectiveness is reached.  Morris Adelman’s blunt explanation of 
exploration economics condenses economics, cutting edge technology and often 
fraught politics: 
 
The total mineral in the earth is an irrelevant non-binding constraint.  If expected finding-
development costs exceed the expected net revenues, investment dries up, and the 
industry disappears.  Whatever is left in the ground is unknown, probably unknowable, 
but surely unimportant: a geological fact of no economic interest.64 
   
SOCAL’s investment was tenuous to say the least.  The great depression had dropped 
crude to a lowly $0.10 a barrel.  Just as the price of oil was set to fall further 
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simultaneous events in the Gulf and US rescued their investment.  In Iraq engineers 
tapped the huge Kirkuk oil field just as Henry Ford underscored modernity with a car 
production line.  Timothy Amen argues that ‘the economics of oil influence the politics 
of oil and vice versa’, and Fords motor car is a good motivator for this cycle. 
 
Suddenly oil became socio-political in that it formed an intrinsic part of the ‘American 
Dream’.  The oil industry and automobile manufactures began a highly productive 
relationship.  One US Secretary for Defence stated quite openly that ‘What’s good for 
General Motors is good for America.’65  But the boom did not end with transport.  
Chemical engineers discovered Nylon, Teflon and Lycra.  Polythene followed shortly 
afterwards.  Oil was becoming far more important to society than just fuel for the Navy.  
Just before World War II broke out SOCAL and Texaco formed the mighty Arabian 
America Oil Company or ARAMCO.   
 
Just before the outbreak of war US President Roosevelt passed the Shipping 
Neutrality Act which forbade American Flag ships from trading with belligerents, in 
particular Roosevelt passed the Act to dissuade Italy from invading Ethiopia.  The Act 
failed in this respect and left Roosevelt in an awkward political position.  Roosevelt 
could not risk repealing the Act so he silently allowed American Flag ship owners to 
reflag their vessels to fly the Panamanian flag.  By 1939 Panama had a total of 52 
tankers totalling 700,000 tons on her books.66  Panama, and soon afterwards Liberia, 
had become ‘Flag of Convenience’ (FCO) States in that American owned ships were 
no longer operating under US regulations but those of the country the vessel is 
registered to: 
 
[B]y far the most important feature of these Flags of Convenience is that essentially all of 
the Flag State inspection duties were turned over to the Classification Societies [Class].  
The Flag State appoints the ship’s Class as its agent for inspection.  At the same time, the 
link between a major maritime Flag and a Classification Society was broken.  A UK ship 
was Classed by Lloyds Register (LR).  An American Flag ship was Classed by American 
Bureau of Shipping (ABS).  A Norwegian ship was Classed by Det Norske Veritas (DNV).  
And so on.  That was understood.  But if your ship is Liberian, which Class do you hire?  
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66 Devanney, Jack, The Tankship Tromedy: The impending disasters in tankers, CTX Press, Tavernier, 2006, p. 
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The answer is: you shop for the best deal.  Now the Classification Societies had to 
compete with each other for business.  If a Class surveyor proved unreasonably inflexible, 
you complained to his boss; and, if that didn’t work, you switched Class.67  
 
Almost immediately it became apparent that American Flagged ships with American 
crews could not compete in this environment.  US labour unions refused to allow non-
American crews to sail on American Flagged ships so the US government opted for 
quiet but strong support of FOC’s which were deemed to be under effective US control.  
 
World War II 
 
World War II ground development of the oil fields to a halt.  The absence of large scale 
oil production during World War II was a blessing for the region in that Hitler’s main 
thrust for oil was targeted towards the Caucasus instead.  German U-boats made a 
larger, all be it indirect, impact on Gulf oil.  The number of tankers hit by U-boats in the 
Mediterranean and North Atlantic were so high that few spare tankers were able to lift 
oil from the Gulf.  ARAMCO were worried that falling revenues may tempt the King to 
revise their concession so its directors turned to Washington for help.  In 1942 US 
President Roosevelt reviewed the Saudi oil concession and declared it crucial to the 
nation’s security, stating that ‘the defence of Saudi Arabia is vital to the defence of the 
United States.’  Roosevelt’s declaration took into account that on the eve of war Saudi 
Arabia was producing 60,000 barrels of oil a day and growing (at the end of hostilities 
this had grown to over 300,000 barrels a day).  To signal their deepening commitment 
to the Kingdom’s prosperity and security America made two promises.  US President 
Roosevelt made Saudi Arabia eligible for Lend Lease assistance and ARAMCO drew 
up plans to construct the Trans-Arabian Pipeline (Tapline) from Dhahran to the 
Mediterranean. Towards the end of the war Roosevelt and King Abdul Aziz held an 
historic meeting in Egypt: 
 
No records were kept and no American save Roosevelt took part in the discussion…Just 
how far Roosevelt and the King’s discussion of security affairs went we will never know.  
Most historians and government officials think the two leaders forged a tacit alliance-one 
which obliged the United States to protect Saudi sovereignty and independence in return 
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for a Saudi pledge to uphold American firms’ dominance of the oil fields.  Whether or not 
this was the case, the leaders of both countries have acted as if it were.68 
 
The ‘special relationship’ between the US and Saudi Arabia had begun.  Peace 
brought with it a new set of challenges.  A major re-evaluation of global military 
strategies and priorities relied on oil to be effective.  Oil was needed to fuel huge 
motorised divisions, power heavy bombers and feed the military-industrial complex 
that fought the Cold War. 
 
During the war the British government developed the ‘Worldscale Index’ for paying the 
owners of requisitioned tankers.  After the war the tanker industry adopted the system 
which has been progressively revised over the years, the last amendment being in 
January 1989 when ‘New Worldscale’ was introduced: 
  
The Worldscale index is published in a book which is used as the basis for calculating 
tanker…rates.  The book shows, for each tanker route, the cost of transporting a metric 
tonne of cargo using the standard vessel on a round voyage.  This cost is known as 
‘Worldscale 100’.  Each year the Worldscale Panel meet in London to update the 
book…The Worldscale system makes it easier for ship owners and charterers to compare 
the earnings of their vessels on different routes.69 
 
For example to calculate a journey from Jubail in the Gulf to Rotterdam at Worldscale 
50 in 1997:70 
 
Worldscale 100 from Jubail to Rotterdam = $17.30 per metric tonne 
Worldscale 50 (half of Worldscale 100)    = $8.65 per metric tonne 
Vessel capacity 250,000 metric tonnes  
Revenue: 250,000 multiplied by $8.65     =$2,162,500 
 
It is also important to note that rates are quoted and usually paid in dollars, as are the 
crew’s wages, bunkering (fuel) costs and port charges making the dollar the (un)official 
currency of the tanker industry. 
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In 1948 the International Maritime Organization (IMO) was formed.  The IMO is part of 
the United Nations (UN).  It is important to note that the IMO has no legal, regulatory 
or inspection powers.  A member country is a member of the IMO by virtue of the ships 
that are registered under its Flag.  Voting is based on the size of each country’s fleet.  
Currently this means that the FOC Marshall Islands Flag has three times the voting 
power of the US.  IMO regulations are only effective if they are adopted and enforced 
by a ‘Port State’ (the Port State is the country where a ship loads or discharges).  If 
one or two major Port States enforce an IMO regulation then tanker owners must 
comply or lose business.71 
 
Post-war Gulf until 1951 
 
Post World War II geopolitics affirmed the creation of Israel.  By fault rather than design 
the creation of Israel was not hamstrung by the question of Arab oil.  Israel’s existence 
put several pipelines running from Iraq to Haifa out of action but as far as oil went, that 
was about all.  Elsewhere the Gulf pipeline network was beginning to take shape.  As 
mentioned earlier the regions oil deposits are located close to the Gulf coast.  With 
scant internal infrastructure to service, the pipelines generally flow outward to export.  
In the main they were constructed along the most economical ‘as the crow flies’ route.  
The Tapline is no exception.  It was eventually built in an almost straight line between 
Abqaiq in Saudi Arabia and Sidon in Lebanon, to an export terminal on the 
Mediterranean Coast. 
 
It should also be noted that scant attention is played to the amount of American 
personnel employed in the KSA.  There is little if any analysis of their role and 
importance in international relations or international security literature.  Only in books 
written by ex-pats is any insight available – yet US oil field personnel play a key role 
in servicing the supply chain.  Questions such as are they easy to replace?  Are young 
engineers entering into the industry? And, are there any challengers to the status quo 
such as Europe or China (as discussed later in Chapter 6)?  The assumption appears 
to be that not only are US personnel adjunct to KSA, but their presence as an 
insurance against any possible disruptions was overlooked and not mentioned. This 
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may all seem irrelevant, but the position of American personnel employed on huge 
projects72 was not a reported factor during the cooling of relations and air of suspicion 
between Washington and the KSA after 9/11.   
 
The US has predominantly supplied parts and equipment for the KSA oil fields with 
European manufacturers in second place.  Saudi itself supplies a small inventory of 
parts, as the Kingdom has not invested in its own heavy industry manufacturing sector.  
Above all else the quality of the parts has maintained the constant running of the oil 
supply chain. American manufacturers are unlikely to lose control of the service and 
maintenance of the KSA supply chain.  The knowledge transfer alone would be a 
formidable task for a new provider, and huge American companies such as Halliburton 
and Bechtel are among the few private companies which possess the resources to bid 
and deliver for oil infrastructure contracts tended by the KSA. 
 
One area that American service providers have found problematic is the rise in 
counterfeit parts which have entered the market since China’s economic rise to 
prominence.  This aspect will be discussed later in the thesis in Chapter 6, but again, 
considering that ‘security of supply’ has increased the previous remit of government 
to government deals to now incorporate the security of the physical supply 
infrastructure, the influence and impact of China on the physical infrastructure is as 
yet unreported among IR and Security Studies commentators. 
 
In 1949 the US became a net importer of oil.  Fortunately the tilt was accompanied by 
a number of hugely successful wells sunk by ARAMCO.  Engineers discovered 
Ghawar, the largest onshore oil field in the world.  The size of ARAMCO’s operation 
in the Gulf grew accordingly, and suffice to say that the profuse super-giant Ghawar 
and its copious neighbour Abqaiq supplied enough crude for the American, European 
and Far Eastern markets.  Unfortunately the post-war period was to be the last time 
the Gulf producers provided the developed world with a reliable free flowing supply of 
oil.  Disruptions were soon to become commonplace (see Fig 2.5). 
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Date of oil 
Duration of 
supply 
Average 
gross supply 
Reason for oil supply 
disruption 
supply 
disruption 
disruption (in 
months) 
shortfall (in 
MMBD)   
3/51-10/54 44 0.7 Iranian oil fields nationalized 
11/56-3/57 4 2 Suez War 
12/66-3/67 3 0.7 Syrian transit tax dispute 
6/67-8/67 2 2 Six Day War 
5/70-1/71 9 0.8 Damage to Tapline 
3/73-5/73 2 0.5 
Unrest in Lebanon, damage to 
transit facilities 
10/73-3/74 6 2.6 
October Arab-Israeli War; Arab oil 
embargo 
4/76-5/76 2 0.3 
Lebanese Civil War, disruption to 
Iraqi exports 
5/77- 1 0.7 Damage to Saudi oil fields 
11/78-4/79 6 3..5 Iranian revolution 
10/80-
12/89 3 3..3 Iran-Iraq War 
03/90-
10/91 7 1 Kuwait oil well fires 
09/11/01 - - World Trade Centre attacked 
3/03-9/04 19 1 Iraq war and continued unrest 
 
Fig 2.5 Global oil supply disruptions: 1951-200473 
 
Iranian oil fields nationalized 
 
The background to Anglo-Iranian oil industry is steeped in colonial tradition.  The 
atmosphere prior to nationalization saw domestic Iranian employees suffering dire 
working and social conditions.  Their British masters took the view that the oil industry 
would not have been built had it been left to the Persian government or people.  In 
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1951 Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh incurred the British wrath when 
he nationalized the Iranian oil industry.  Mossadegh was eventually placed under 
arrest after a coup.  Britain’s response was double standards as the British 
government had just nationalized its own coal, electricity, railways, transport and steel 
industries.  The incident produced a total shortfall of 924 million barrels spread over 
three and a half years.  There is no evidence to suggest that it was the disruption’s 
effect on the economy that brought about Mossadegh’s removal, but rather the 
inconvenience he caused.  The situation was easily ameliorated by bringing a willing 
Shah to office.  The coup has been cited as the root of the 1979 Iranian revolution.     
 
1956 Suez Crisis 
 
The ‘Suez Crisis’ began when the US officially informed President Nasser of Egypt 
that they would not finance his ambitious Aswan Dam project.  Nasser retaliated a few 
days later by announcing the nationalization of the Suez Canal with a view to using 
the tolls to fund the project instead.  To the detriment of the international community 
Nasser chose to freeze traffic in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aqaba, thereby effectively 
cutting off a significant amount of Gulf exported oil.  Europeans, having almost no oil 
of their own were asked to only make essential journeys, railways switched from diesel 
back to steam locomotives, holiday resorts lay deserted and the spectre of rationing 
loomed high.  The British in particular feared a return to life similar to that lived during 
the war years.   
 
The Canal was also an important source of income for Britain and France.  As owners 
of the Canal Company they stood not only to lose out financially, but hand over the 
geopolitical importance of the canal to Nasser.  Britain, France and Israel decided to 
take the Canal back by force but the operation failed when the US refused to support 
the plan.  To the delight of the Egyptians the Anglo-French coalition found no other 
supporters among the international community for their intended act.  Moreover, the 
crisis competed for international attention along with the shock Soviet invasion of 
Hungary.74   
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The US decision not to get involved in either Suez or Hungary is the subject of vigorous 
historical debate, but the manner by which America dealt with the two events did 
indirectly impact on oil industry investment.  On the one hand the US had just finished 
the Korean War against its nemesis, communism, and wished to avoid a further 
ideological war over Hungary.  On the other hand the US was, at the time, behind in 
the arms race.  The Soviets were clearly ahead. Soviet scientists had successfully 
tested a deliverable hydrogen bomb,75 and given Hungary’s geographical location, 
Moscow was well placed to use the bomb in anger during any intended invasion by 
US troops.  Other considerations to take into account were the sudden rise, after the 
passing of the GI Bill76, of the US civil rights movement.  In turn the civil rights 
movement rose, alongside ordinary Americans increasing awareness of America’s 
place in the world following World War II and impact of the Marshall Plan.  The 
possibility of a revolt by black Americans over the draft, combined with the rise of post-
war liberalism among America’s middle classes may well have tipped the balance 
away from US participation in either Suez and/or Hungary. 
 
Regardless of the debate, by fault or design the outcome further strengthened US 
hegemony, although the full economic benefits would be felt much later.  The benefits 
abroad lay in the US eventually befriending and empowering Egypt (with Israel in 
mind). Egypt was the Middle East’s first Arab quasi-democracy. Washington was 
influential in choosing Egypt’s leadership that were shored up with US backed 
interests.  At home US segregation laws were overturned allowing millions of black 
Americans to compete for jobs, deposit savings and apply for credit to buy homes and 
cars.  All of which were possible by maintaining healthy industrial investment in US 
commercial interests, including the oil industry, both at home and abroad.  Among the 
benefactors to make new investments as a result of the Suez crisis were the tanker 
owners.  They invested heavily in new bigger vessels:     
 
                                                 
75 The Soviet deliverable device was built by a team of scientists based at Arzimas-16 led by Igor Kurchatov and 
Andrei Shakharov.  Mathematician Vitaly Ginzburg proposed using Lithium 6 to induce a thermonuclear 
explosion.  The device was dropped from a plane over the Semipalatinsk-21nuclear test site on November 22nd 
1955 and detonated successfully yielded 1.6 Megatons (1.6 million tons of TNT).  The US had tested similar 
devices in the South Pacific but they were undeliverable installations weighing up to 250 tons each.     
76 The G.I. Bill (officially titled Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, PL345) provided for college or vocational 
education for returning World War II veterans (commonly referred to as GIs or G.I.s) as well as one year of 
unemployment compensation. It also provided loans for returning veterans to buy homes and start businesses. 
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It was during the 1956 Suez crisis that [tanker] owners made their biggest killings.  When 
the canal was closed and tankers had to be rerouted round the Cape of Good Hope there 
was not enough available to carry the oil that was needed, and charter rates rose 
astronomically.  The companies, believing like everybody else that the Egyptians would 
be incapable of running the canal after it had been cleared, thought the shortage would 
last well into the 1960’s until new ships had been built.  They therefore signed contracts 
in which they not only hired tankers for immediate work at the high prevailing rate but 
also agreed terms for chartering ships which had not yet been built for work in the 
1960’s…When the Egyptians showed they could operate the canal efficiently the bottom 
fell out of the tanker market, but the companies were stuck with the contracts.77 
 
The immediate losers in terms of aggravation and economic loss were the major 
importers, especially the neutral US.  The markets reflected the overall uncertainty 
prompted by the canal’s closure.  In New York shares dipped on the Dow-Jones except 
for in the steel industry.  Manufacturers of steel plate used in shipbuilding saw their 
shares jump to record highs.  The circumstances surrounding the sudden activity in 
the steel plate market serve as a clear example of the incongruity that oil posed to 
major importers. 
 
The rise of steel plate was twofold.  Firstly, US shipbuilders were signing new deals, 
struck on the back of the detour the Suez Canal’s closure was expected to cause.  
Shipbuilders began to receive orders for bigger ‘Cape size’ tankers which grew into 
Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCC) or more colloquially ‘Supertankers’ by the late 
1960’s.  The decision to build larger tankers was business minded.  Tankers routed 
via the Cape of Good Hope took longer to reach the west and therefore made less 
voyages per year.  To make up for the shortfall in cargo oil ship owners ordered larger 
tankers to remain competitive, but there was not enough steel stock to meet demand.  
Shipbuilders had new vessels requiring up to 60,000 tons of steel each, almost twice 
the usual size, in their order books. 
 
Secondly, the downside was that steel requires a great deal of energy, including oil, 
to manufacture.  Oil was scarce in the developed world because of the drop in supply 
from the Gulf, but nevertheless demand for oil in the production of steel was rising.  
Another abrasive factor to consider is that the situation was a unique consequence of 
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the Suez closure.  It could be said that the situation was artificially created and could 
therefore not have been foreseen, as opposed to a situation where demand for steel 
plate grew along with the slower paced natural development of oil tankers.  The bottom 
line for the US was that the sudden increase in steel plate production (and oil needed 
in the manufacturing process) was down solely to the drop in supply caused by the 
canal’s closure, and as such the way out of the Suez crisis marked the start of an 
uncertain self-perpetuating cycle, aptly described later by Robert Putnam as a 
mechanism for generating even bigger quandaries:    
 
Domestic politics and international relations are often somehow entangled, but our 
theories have not yet sorted out the puzzling tangle.  It is fruitless to debate whether 
domestic politics really determine international relations, or the reverse.  The answer to 
that question is clearly ‘both sometimes’.78 
 
Paul Wolfowitz later remarked on US-Gulf policy: 
 
[T]here is a circle that describes how American capability in the Gulf depends on 
cooperation from Gulf countries.  That cooperation depends on their estimate of our 
capability, and you end up with a circle-which can be a virtuous circle, when things are 
going well, or a vicious circle when things are going badly.79 
 
Putnam’s theory and Wolfowitz’s practice are evident in the US response to the crisis.  
The US countered by increasing its domestic oil production to supply the steel industry 
and also supply allied Europe with oil as well.  As a result US supply became 
overstretched and looked set to further deplete US reserves.  To relieve the pressure 
on its domestic supply the US invested long term in prospecting for oil abroad.  The 
underlying risk was that these new sources could leave America further aligned to 
similar repercussions, or worse, from future disruptions caused by the new suppliers, 
countries that tended to be diametrically opposed the western values of democracy, 
capitalism and freedom of speech.   
 
Suez fired a shot across the bows of major consumer states but the reaction from the 
oil industry, despite the inconvenience to the public, was muted.  Oil prices edged up 
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and tanker rates climbed 38% to a record high of 150% above the previous year.  The 
rates did not hold up when the canal surprisingly reopened.  Tanker operators were 
suddenly plunged into a recession.  The disruption cost 240,000,000 barrels of oil over 
four months, a proportion of which was not ‘lost’ as such but only late arriving after 
being re-routed via the Cape.  If viewed stoically the Suez crisis was the first of a 
number of incidents overcome by conforming to the problems the disruption created, 
and developing the oil industry accordingly.  In this case it was the mid-stream tanker 
industry that compromised and adapted. 
 
The major producers rallied.  In 1960 they formed the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC).  Gulf producers dominated OPEC.  For the sake of this 
thesis the author acknowledges that OPEC has played a major role in setting quotas.  
However, the author takes the view that OPEC is a regulatory body and as such can 
be argued as ‘disruptive’ but not in itself a ‘disruption’.   
      
1966-1967 Syrian Transit Tax Dispute 
 
The Syrian transit tax dispute marked the first of a number of similar disputes that 
eventually led to the demise of the Middle East’s inter-state pipeline network.  The 
dispute resembles a multi-facetted brawl.  The dispute affirms the important role that 
mid-stream logistics often play in sustaining market stability, but conversely it 
underlines the role economic factors, such as transit taxes as opposed to political 
action, play in creating disruptions.  Further analysis of the dispute reveals the flinty 
pre-nationalization public/private sector relationship evident in Iraq before the oil 
industry was nationalized in 1972.  The philosophical output of the dispute is more 
ominous.  It draws attention to Iraq’s isolated position among its neighbours for 
allowing a domestic argument to become an international issue.  The dispute serves 
as a lesson in reason.  It warns exporting government against sealing their own fate 
(and oil supply) by pushing fiscal sine qua non to the point where oil companies curtail 
exports in sympathy against payment.      
 
Abd al Karim Qasim brought Iraq to revolution in 1958.  The pro-western monarchy 
was overthrown and replaced by a Republic.  Prior to the revolution Iraq’s British 
owned oil industry, the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC) enjoyed cordial relations with 
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the government.  Their post revolution position was less blinkered.  The prevailing 
mood among the general public was that the IPC was a drain on their resources.  In 
order to appease the people, Qasim exerted his authority to great effect and at little 
cost, by raising the transit tax from the Basra oilfields in the south to the export 
terminals in the Gulf.  The IPC retorted by cutting back on Basra exports and 
increasing production at Mosul for export via Syria to a number of Mediterranean 
export terminals.  The situation held until December 1966 when the Syrian government 
exploited the situation and fell into dispute with the IPC over transit taxes: 
 
Syria demanded an increase of IPC’s royalty payments in addition to retroactive payment 
[s]…the Syrian government claimed it was due…When the IPC balked at these demands, 
the Syrian government on 8 December impounded all IPC property in its territory, 
including 300 miles of pipeline, several pumping stations, and the terminals at Banias.  
Syria banned the loading of tankers with IPC oil.  When the IPC’s storage tanks filled on 
12 December, the oil from Iraq stopped flowing. 80 
    
By then Iraq was exporting 60% of its oil via the Mediterranean.  The sudden loss and 
seeming lack of a quick remedy was decisive.  The market reacted accordingly and 
the price of crude went up.  The IPC and Iraqi government were therefore dealt a 
double blow.  First, the IPC could not capitalise on the higher price because their 
exports were vastly reduced.  Second, a 60% cut in production equated to losses in 
revenue for both parties.  Gulf exporters detached from Iraq’s predicament were 
unsympathetic.  Iraq’s neighbours quickly gained the trust of importers by increasing 
production to make up for the shortfall.  The dispute had unwittingly made the 
inexperienced Iraqi government a victim of its own success.  In order to compensate 
for fiscal (transit tax) losses the government ordered the IPC to settle with Syria and 
resume production.  The IPC countered, to the government’s chagrin, by ignoring the 
threats.  Instead the IPC entered into an agreement with Syria, on its own terms, thus 
bringing the dispute to an audacious end.     
 
Michael Brown finds evidence of a further twist.  He theorises that the IPC could well 
have used the dispute to gain access to the government owned Rumaila oilfield in the 
south of Iraq.  Brown posits that the Iraqi government claimed at the time that the 
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dispute was artificial and the IPC were being unnecessarily stubborn in its negotiations 
with Syria.  The assumption being that the resultant pressure from loss of revenue 
would force the government to hand over the Rumaila oilfield for development.  Brown 
concludes that it is quite possible that the IPC utilized the opportunity to pressurize the 
Iraqi government over the issue, but with little effect as in the end Rumaila was not 
handed over to the IPC.  The dispute lasted for twelve weeks and cost 63,000,000 
barrels in lost production.  But the real damage lay in strained inter-state relations.  
Besides further disengagement between the IPC and Iraqi government the dispute 
drew attention to a greater ill.  The whole affair cast serious doubt on states offering 
their land to exporters in return for the exposure to the chicanery now associated with 
transit taxes and pipeline politics in general.      
 
1967 Six Day War 
 
The Six Day War redrew the Gulf export map.  The synchronised surprise attack by 
Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian forces on Israel has been the cause of resentment 
ever since.  Israel took a mere six days to repel the attack during which the Israeli’s 
took ground from all three warring parties.  The war did not damage the regions oil 
infrastructure but it did make a lasting difference to mid-stream logistics. 
 
Before war was declared the Arab nations were unusually united.  They were all 
adamant in causing a disruption so big that it would deter importers from supporting 
Israel during the war.  Collectively they initiated the first Arab oil embargo: 
 
Right after the outbreak of the Six Day War the representatives of the oil producing and 
transporting countries met on June 4-5 and decided to stop the flow of oil to the world 
markets and prevent Arab oil from reaching directly or indirectly any country which 
supported or was obligated to support Israel.  On June 6, Syria announced that she had 
closed all the pipelines from Iraq and Saudi Arabia which crossed her territory.  On the 
same day Lebanon announced that she had banned the loading of…tankers at the 
terminals in her territory.  On the following day Saudi Arabia announced that she had 
banned the loading of tankers bound for countries which supported Israel, and prohibited 
export of oil.81 
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Less than a week later the situation was vastly different.  In view of the Arab defeat 
Kuwait, Libya and Iraq reversed the decision and resumed exports.  Saudi Arabia also 
began loading tankers except those destined to the US and Great Britain but this 
arrangement only lasted until the end of June.  The geopolitical outcome of the war 
impacted on Suez again.  It was closed once more but this time the tanker industry 
was prepared:  
 
So many ships were ordered in the aftermath of the 1956 crisis that for several years 
before the canal closed again in 1967 there was a considerable surplus of tankers, and 
many of them had to be converted to grain carriers to find employment.  As a result the 
ship owners were unable to repeat their coup.  Within a few weeks of the closure some 
200 tankers totalling 5m tons had been brought back into oil carrying, and Europe’s 
supplies were assured.  The companies therefore refused to charter vessels for more than 
two or three voyages at a time, instead of for several years ahead.  Nevertheless, the crisis 
was highly profitable for owners…82 
 
The mid-stream proved itself to be highly adaptable again.  A further development 
arose when oil companies decided to hand over their shipping business to 
independent owners.  The reason behind the move came from the oil industries 
reaction to the fear of maintaining supply during the Suez Crisis.  Oil companies 
decided to develop new fields in Africa, Alaska and the North Sea.  However, exports 
from these new fields were smaller and spread about the globe.  This caused logistical 
problems for the oil companies that had traditionally lifted oil from the Gulf.  Faced with 
the prospect of incorporating such a change into their operational budgets companies 
chose to sell their fleets to smaller operators. 
 
The Tapline also became a victim of the Six Day War when Israel occupied twenty-
five miles of the pipeline’s route over the Golan Heights: 
 
The…war…created enormous new problems for ARAMCO.  When Israelis seized Syria’s 
Golan Heights on 9 June…The Saudis retaliated by shutting down ARAMCO’s operations 
at Dhahran, but within days the firm persuaded its old friend King Faisal to reverse 
himself.  Saudi crude continued to flow through the Israeli-occupied no-mans-land 
without incident until 30 May 1969, when Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
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(PFPL) commandoes…dynamited Tapline, spewing hundreds of tons of oil into the Sea 
of Galilee. 83      
 
Israel ordered ARAMCO to pay for the clean-up operation before allowing pumping to 
resume.  Later in 1969 the PFPL fired rockets into Tapline’s Sidon terminal causing 
yet more damage and mayhem. 
 
During this period Saudi Arabia discovered its last great oilfield.  In 1969 geologists 
found the massive Shaybah complex, 400km into the Kingdom’s Empty Quarter.  
Since then no other field the size of Shaybah has been discovered in the Kingdom.  A 
further tremor of unease can be detected in that the field did not come online for 
another thirty years due to the huge start-up costs.84   
 
In 1969 tanker owners faced an unanticipated but critical problem.  In the space of 
three weeks in December 1969 three new Supertankers85 had massive cargo tank 
explosions while they were in the process of tank cleaning.  Shell instituted a crash 
research programme: 
 
[T]he conclusion [was that] the high speed jets of water impinging of the steel surface of 
the tank were creating static electricity, in somewhat the same way that rain drops in a 
thunderstorm do.  When enough static electricity builds up, it produces a spark that is full 
of hydrocarbon vapour.  The process is tank sized dependent and didn’t really make itself 
obvious until tanks grew to VLCC [Supertanker] size. 86   
 
From this point forth tanker operators ‘inerted’ the cargo tanks by pumping exhaust 
gas into the vessels tanks.  Inerting was to save countless lives but the onus was 
on the owners and operators to conform.  In 1979 fifty French merchant seamen 
were killed after their ship, the Betelgeuse, exploded due to a mixture of corrosion 
and un-inerted tanks while discharging at Bantry Bay in Ireland.  The deaths and 
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the complete destruction of Total Oil’s Bantry Bay terminal did not move the Irish 
government to pass any more safety laws other than were already in place at the 
time.  Salvage experts took two years to remove the hull from the scene.  To this 
day Classification Society inspectors can issue a certificate of seaworthiness 
without inspecting a vessels cargo tanks.  
  
1970-1971 Damage to Tapline 
 
In May 1970 a Syrian bulldozer damaged the Tapline at Derra on the Syrian-Jordanian 
border during repairs to telephone cables.  The damage appeared to be light and the 
consensus was that it would take about 24 hours to fix.  The Syrian government saw 
political opportunity escalating out of the crisis and refused to allow work to begin.  
Tanker rates tripled overnight when Tapline dried up as there were no vessels in place 
to lift oil diverted from Tapline at Saudi’s Ras Tunura terminal.  It took almost a year 
of negotiations before Syria finally sanctioned the repairs.  During this time Syria had 
seen a change of government but the financial demands on Tapline remained.  The 
final deal included a doubling of the current transit fee and $9 million to cover other 
claims.  Paul Stevens offers further insight to Syria’s motivation to block Tapline 
exports: 
 
Libya was in dispute with its oil companies over posted prices.  As part of this process 
the Libyan government had constrained production resulting in rising price of 
Mediterranean crude.  The closure of Tapline aggravated the tendency thereby making it 
more attractive for the companies to accede to Libyan demands which they eventually did.  
In 1971, Libya made a substantial aid payment to Syria.87 
     
Lebanon was also unhappy about Syria’s stance.  The closure had deprived Beirut of 
transit taxes and crude for Sidon’s Medreco Refinery.  Saudi Arabia stirred the disquiet 
with rumours that they were considering closing Tapline.  The disruption cost 
216,000,000 barrels of oil and re-enforced earlier fears regarding the dangers in 
topping up trust from the economic drain of interstate pipelines.  A year later Tapline 
was embedded in another quarrel, this time with Jordan.  In what was to be a unique 
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show of teamwork, the line remained open during the dispute as both sides had 
decided to suspend payments to each other until they settled their differences. 
 
By the mid 1960’s it was apparent that the US economy was struggling to compete 
against the growing economic strength of Western Europe, and also stem the soaring 
US public deficits as President Johnson escalated the war in Vietnam.  Uncertainty 
over the Vietnam War led to many European countries, starting with France, to redeem 
their dollars for gold.  By the summer of 1971 the US Federal Reserve’s gold stocks 
had become critical.  On August 11th 1971 the Nixon administration opted to abandon 
the dollar-gold link entirely, thereby going to a system of floating currencies.  At the 
same time OPEC began discussing the viability of pricing oil trades in several different 
currencies under the watchful eye of the governor of the Saudi Arabian Monetary 
Authority (SAMA). 
 
 The Nixon administration was keen to prevent this monetary transition to a basket of 
currencies.  Washington entered into high level talks with Riyadh, requesting them to 
unilaterally price international oil sales in dollars only.  The US made assurances to its 
European and Japanese allies that such a unique monetary/geopolitical arrangement 
would not transpire, but regardless the Saudi government met America’s request and 
began posting all their oil sales in dollars, thereby effectively re-branding the dollar 
away from gold and substituting (their) oil instead. 88   
 
1973 Unrest in Lebanon 
 
In April 1973 terrorists blew up a storage tank at Sidon, Lebanon.  They managed to 
damage a further three tanks before fleeing.  A couple of days later terrorists attempted 
to blow up Tapline but succeeded in only denting the pipe.  The disruptions cost 
30,000,000 barrels of oil and left the future of Tapline hanging by a thread.    
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1973-1974 Arab-Israeli (Yom Kippur) War and oil embargo 
 
The 1973 Arab-Israeli War and subsequent second Arab oil embargo proved to be a 
seminal event for Gulf producers.  Western support for Israel during the war led to Gulf 
exporters upholding an OPEC embargo on the US and Dutch exports.  A great deal 
has been written about the political and economic effects of the embargo but in-depth 
analysis would be out of place here.  John Mitchell’s observations capture the mood 
well.  He points out that one of the less politically endearing qualities of the embargo 
were newsreel pictures of motorists sitting in lines waiting to fill their tanks with petrol.  
Adelman is less dramatic arguing instead that the oil supply was in fact unaffected by 
the embargo ‘It was not loss of supply, but fear of possible loss that drove up prices.’  
During the embargo the oil market reacted to what is now referred to as the ‘fear 
factor’, whereby it reacts to the embellished content of the threat and ups the price of 
oil accordingly.  In the case of the embargo the fear factor was the grey area in which 
the fear of a disruption taking place was treated as if it had done so to its worst case 
scenario.  It should also be noted that the markets relied on antediluvian 
communication technology and were not yet globally linked.  During the embargo 
market sensitive information arrived in the form of telex and telegram transmissions, 
initially received in England by the General Post Office at the ‘Radio Portishead’ Long 
Wave Station near Bristol.  A situation no doubt seen as wholly unsatisfactory in 
today’s climate.    
 
Saudi Arabia, the original protagonist called off the embargo for seemingly geopolitical 
reasons.  The Kingdom stood to break its relations with the US over the issue, a fate 
that would have left Riyadh exposed to its more radical neighbours still high on 
‘embargo bravado’.  The embargo caused a great deal of tension between producers 
and their customers, to the extent that producers began to nationalize their respective 
oil industries.  Certain exporters however were not so keen and disagreed with 
nationalization on objective grounds: 
 
In spite of the general agitation in the Arab world, or perhaps because of it, for 
nationalization of the oil industry, the Saudi Arabian Oil Minister Yamani, stated at the end 
of April 1973, that since the industrial world depended on oil, Saudi Arabia was ready to 
do everything in her power to guarantee the flow of oil to its destinations.  He stated that 
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the producers must not nationalize their oil, for they were not qualified to wrestle with the 
two most crucial aspects of the industry: exploration and marketing.89 
 
Saudi Arabia eventually nationalized its oil industry but, along with most other 
exporters, they upheld Yamani’s strategy regarding leaving the upstream and 
downstream sectors in the traditional hands of expat workers and international oil 
companies respectively.  The nationalized oil industries were left with the mid-stream 
infrastructure and management of human resources, consisting of pipeline gathering 
systems, pumping stations, export terminals, refineries, office blocks and staff 
compounds.   
 
The net result of the embargo and the subsequent December OPEC meeting was 
damning.  The Organization pushed the price of crude up by a staggering 400%.  
Benjamin Shwadran dampens any elation by concluding: 
 
An analytical examination of the outcome of the attempt would reveal that the embargo 
was a failure-its political goals were not realized-except for one real achievement: 
tremendously large increases in the posted prices of oil…the size of the increases alarmed 
Saudi Arabia, the leader of the embargo movement; the Saudis feared that in the end the 
increases might defeat the purpose of the undertaking.90 
 
The embargo is often referred to as an example of oil being used as a weapon, when 
in reality the antagonists ended up falling on their sword.  It was a bitter paradox for 
OPEC in that the embargo had the effect of increasing the supply of non-OPEC oil to 
OPEC customers.  The mechanism for which is described here by Matthew Simmons: 
 
At the time, Saudi Arabia’s cost to produce its oil was extremely low since all of the 
producing fields had been discovered and developed 10 to 30 years earlier.  But by 1973, 
the real cost to create a new oilfield in Saudi Arabia had already grown to far more than 
an incidental expense.  Moreover, it had suddenly become rather difficult to find great new 
oilfields…At $2 or $3 per barrel [post-embargo] oil was so cheap that no one had any 
reason not to use it to its fullest.  Demand was quickly outstripping supply, putting 
constraints on consumption.  This is why the price of oil never came back to the $2-to-$3 
range that many oil observers considered normal and expected to see again…the Alaskan 
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Pipeline and most of the North Sea’s first generation of giant oilfields were already being 
planned or were under construction when oil prices exploded…Had oil prices remained 
low, the cost overruns that these massive projects incurred would have brought their 
owners to their economic knees.  Many extremely expensive new energy projects became 
rational and commercially viable only because oil prices soared so high.91     
 
Later disruptions were to follow a similar pattern.  Prior to the embargo the tanker 
industry was enjoying a boom due to a rise in demand.  Owners were therefore 
prepared to pay a premium to introduce new vessels to their fleet.  Tankers ordered 
for $11 million in 1970-71 were changing hands for between $25-30 million on the eve 
of the war.  The post embargo situation found owners in severe debt after buying 
vessels at these inflated prices.  Not surprisingly the drop in demand caused by the 
rise in oil prices placed the tanker industry in a depression.  Falling tanker rates also 
affected the Tapline.  Post embargo rates were low enough for importers to lift directly 
from the Gulf rather than pay Tapline’s erratic transit taxes and load from the 
Mediterranean.  Tankers began making Gulf cycles but when Tapline eventually 
reopened again rates increased because importers chose to break the Gulf cycle and 
charter tankers to lift oil from Sidon again. 
 
The embargo was also partly tempered by emergency stockpiles held after previous 
lessons learned by importers to carry them over disruptions.  The embargo caused a 
shortfall of 468,000,000 barrels of oil over six months.  Regardless of the loss and 
resulting high prices US oil consumption rebounded by 1974, to eventually peak at a 
record breaking 18.5 million barrels per day (most of which was domestic) in 1978.  
The effect of high oil prices on the tanker industry were nothing short of devastating.  
The price of a newly built VLCC fell from $52 million in 1973 to $5 million by mid-1977.  
Many owners laid up their vessels and those left in the market could barely command 
a rate large enough to cover the cost of the voyage. 
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Post-embargo petrodollar recycling 
 
It was the post-embargo high oil price, as opposed to a shortage of oil that motivated 
the world’s top financiers and policy makers into action. Initially the dollar/oil 
partnership caused a great deal of inflation in the US, which came to an end soon after 
the US and UK (London being the world’s financial centre) began the craft of 
‘petrodollar recycling’92 following the 1973 oil embargo.  In May 1973 a select group of 
internationally well respected governors and regulators of the world economy met in 
Sweden to develop a plan by which their representative countries would gain from the 
current high price of oil.93  Six months later President Nixon was embroiled in the 
Watergate affair leaving Henry Kissinger as America’s de facto President: 
 
In 1974 an agreement was reached with New York and London banking interests that 
established what became known as ‘petrodollar recycling’.  That year the Saudi 
government secretly purchased $2.5 billion in US Treasury Bills with their oil surplus 
funds, and a few years later Treasury Secretary Blumenthal cut a secret deal with the 
Saudi’s to ensure that OPEC would continue to price oil in dollars only.94 
 
Washington installed an investment banker, David Mulford,95 as director of the Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), the central bank of Saudi Arabia.  Mulford was well 
placed to give investment advice to the Saudi authorities.  To ease the process, New 
York based Citibank (with close ties to ARAMCO) were able to operate in the Kingdom, 
the only wholly privately owned bank ever to do so.  In 1974 Saudi Arabia invested 
$57 billion directly into US and UK financial institutions: 
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By successful recycling, these surpluses could be returned to the consuming nations.  
But what about the constantly increasing oil prices?  How to live with them?  An important 
element in the recycling solution was to transfer to the producing countries the inflation 
that the high prices had caused in the consuming countries by charging the oil producers 
high prices for their imports from the industrialized countries.96    
 
In December 1974 Washington established the US-Saudi Arabian Joint Commission 
on Economic Cooperation.  Under the agreement SAMA purchased new US Treasury 
securities with maturities of at least one year.  The interest on Treasury securities were 
pre-set and were therefore not accountable to the fluctuations that arise from 
traditional investment banking.  The securities arrangement formed part of the main 
recycling device and went some way to ensuring that the US had a controlled stake in 
the rate of inflation in Saudi Arabia.  From this point forth the rising oil price took on a 
different meaning in the US and UK and became more of an investment opportunity 
than an economic disaster.97  The four main recycling devices adopted by the US and 
UK were:98 
 
a) As mentioned above, producers were encouraged to invest in their customers 
financial markets such as government bonds and securities, corporate stocks 
and shares, and bank deposits and real estate. 
b) Gulf producers were approached with attractive trade deals from major 
consumers.  Trade included goods and services, and ranged from food to the 
construction of factories, schools and hospitals. 
c) Major consumers offered the most advanced and sophisticated arms and 
ordnance to Gulf producers.  Gulf producers were a ready market as they were 
eager to protect their assets from rival neighbours. 
d) Producers sanctioned huge development projects managed by consumer 
countries.  These projects escalated from a few hundred million dollars before 
1973 to hundreds of billions of dollars by the late 1970’s.  The multi-million dollar 
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contracts could reduce balance of payments deficits, stabilize currency, reduce 
unemployment, and raise economic growth levels.  
 
Despite the obvious benefits, upholding these four devices became the bane of 
successive western governments and the fallout habitually impacted on election 
results.  The main causes of controversy among voters ranged from petrodollars 
appearing to; buy favourable financial treatment and endless luxury goods, create a 
corrupt arms trade and induce jealousy with their spectacular projects.  Geopolitical 
comparisons at the time are stark.  In the UK for example, the population was coming 
to terms with decimalization, revolt in the Colonies, entering the Common Market, 
suffering hardship because of crippling industrial strikes and fast approaching Heath’s 
death Nell, the three day week.  Conversely the picture painted by one UK 
businessman on a visit to Saudi Arabia was seemingly idyllic:    
 
[In]…1975…[Jeddah] gained a more modern appearance. Numerous wide avenues were 
constructed to handle the increased traffic, lined with freshly planted palm trees. The old 
city became surrounded by new residential districts with palatial residences for the newly 
rich Arabian businessmen and officials. All of these new mansions were surrounded by 
tall walls to maintain their privacy. The old crowded, hot airport was replaced with a new 
modern palatial air-conditioned structure with opulent marble floors and walls.99 
 
The developing world faired less favourably.  It experienced a severe economic 
downturn which led to the 1974 world food crisis.  The crisis prompted developing 
countries to heavily borrow dollars on the international financial markets, resulting in 
the Third-World debt crisis of the 1980’s and 1990’s.  In the US the mood among 
Washington’s more astute military circles was measured: 
 
[T]he combination of increasing oil import dependency and the ability of oil-producing 
countries to exercise over such a resource was salutary.  The United States economy 
could be subject to a vulnerability that was as unexpected as it was serious.100 
 
America’s exposed post-embargo position left open the possibility for US military 
intervention in future disruptions abroad.  The process of petrodollar recycling was to 
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underpin America’s economic domination that funds its military supremacy.  
Petrodollars gave the US a unique ability to sustain yearly current account deficits, 
pass huge tax cuts, build a massive military empire of bases worldwide and still have 
others accept the dollar as a medium of exchange for their imported goods and 
services.101    The embargo period left its official mark in that it provided the initiative 
for the US to form the International Energy Agency (IEA) based in Paris.  As with 
OPEC the author classifies the IEA as a regulator/commentator rather than a 
disruption to the oil supply.   
 
1976 Lebanese Civil War 
 
1976 saw the end of Tapline as an international export route.  Civil war in Lebanon 
together with general unrest in the region played a considerable part in the decision to 
close the line.  But there were other economic factors to consider.  The line could not 
compete with a tempting combination of importer friendly market positions.  The 
collapse of tanker rates following the 1973 war, the new generation of VLCC’s coupled 
with the opening of the Ju’ayma export terminal in Saudi Arabia formed a coterie that 
lowered the price of Gulf exports to the point where they pushed the cost of Tapline 
Mediterranean exports up into the red.  The subsequent loss of custom made the line 
redundant, with the exception of supplying the Syrian and Lebanese domestic 
markets. 
 
 The line typically bowed out as an export route during a further dispute with Lebanon 
over transit taxes.  The final dispute cost 18,000,000 barrels spread over two months.  
Ironically Tapline reopened again shortly afterwards to supply refineries in Jordan and 
remarkably Sidon in Lebanon again.  Tapline ceased to be, per se, after Israel invaded 
South Lebanon in December 1983.102  The lines asset’s in the Levant were abandoned 
during the assault and in so doing brought to a close a line that Stevens wearily asserts 
was an operating experience ‘abysmal in terms of interruptions to flow.’103  Anthony 
Cordesman argues that Tapline could be reopened as an ‘economically viable 
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alternative’ to lifting oil from the Gulf.104  While the possibility cannot be completely 
dismissed consideration should be made to existing interstate relations along the 
route.  However cordial they may be it might only take Tapline’s potential for attracting 
trouble to regress these relations back to where they were thirty years ago.  Tapline 
aside the rest of the Gulf pipeline network is built on a parochial system.  None of the 
exporting states share a common pipeline or export terminal.  Although the pipeline 
network promotes independence, it is also a good excuse for not supporting 
neighbours when they are in trouble.  Past examples have shown that when one 
producer goes down, for whatever reason, they suffer alone while the others benefit 
from making up the shortfall.  
 
1977 Damage to Saudi Oil Fields 
 
The damaging effects of the overproduction of Saudi Arabia’s main oilfields are a rare 
departure from the ‘above ground’ political and economic threats that are more 
traditionally associated with Gulf supply disruptions.  While trying to keep pace with 
rising demand Saudi Arabia probably inadvertently caused the damage which resulted 
in oil becoming irrecoverable.  Two accidental fires at the Abqaiq pumping centre also 
contributed to the predicament and set disturbing precedents.  Damage to the field 
and pumping centre caused a shortfall of 700,000 barrels a day for about one month 
making a total of 21, 000,000 MB.   
 
1978-1979 Iranian Revolution 
 
The Iranian revolution was preceded by a term of strikes and unrest targeting the oil 
industry.  The revolution prompted the Shah to flee into exile and turned Iran into a 
fundamentalist state.  Given that Iran was the world’s second largest oil exporter after 
Saudi Arabia the US declared that the loss of Iran’s 3,500,000 barrels of oil a day was 
potentially more serious than the 1973 embargo.  Over a thousand foreign workers 
employed in Iran’s oil industry left the country, severely damaging production.  A 1978 
Rockefeller Foundation report provided an ominous warning: 
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Political and security consequences likely to flow from a situation in which the deepening 
involvement of governments in the importing as well as exporting of oil - the consequence 
of anticipating shortage in such a strategic commodity – may too easily be accompanied 
by the sort of divisive competition among industrial countries (and also with and among 
developing countries) which corrodes relationships and endangers security.105 
 
As with previous shortages it was left to the remaining Gulf producers to make up the 
market shortfall during 1978, which they accomplished, but not before OPEC put the 
price of crude up.  But the oil market was about to change forever.  The Iranian 
revolution is notable for creating the ‘competition among industrial countries’ referred 
to in the Rockefeller report by altering the way oil is bought and sold. 
 
Prior to the revolution the oil market traded on a fixed price capacity set by OPEC.  
The post-revolution market has centred on the volatile spot market: 
 
Energy trading involves both the physical wet barrel trading of crude oil and petroleum 
products as well as the financial trading of oil on the futures exchange and on the over-
the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets.  The spot market is the physical daily market to 
buy and sell oil that is not under a long-term contract.106 
 
The spot market grew around refining centres.  Oil and product surplus to 
requirements is sold to the highest bidder.  The market is based around five major 
centres although the trading often takes place at locations around the globe.  The five 
centres are: the Gulf of Mexico (the largest, out of Houston), North-west Europe 
(based around the ARA - Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp area, with the cargo market 
based in London), the Mediterranean (based on Italy’s west coast), the Caribbean (the 
smallest) and the most recent and fastest growing member, Singapore.  The market 
is driven by teams of brokers and traders.  Brokers do not take a position in the market.  
They solely act on a commission basis as intermediary between a buyer and seller, 
often keeping the identities of the buyer and seller a secret until the deal is arranged.  
Traders take positions on the market.  They expose themselves to large financial risk 
and equally large reward, buying and selling speculatively rather than just to offset 
supply and demand.  Oil bought by traders is stored in huge tank farms until it is finally 
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sold and collected.  Crude oil, as cargo on the market, can move through as many as 
thirty trades before delivery.107  The unpredictable nature of the spot market was 
further increased when markets began utilizing new satellite communication 
technology to gather information.  Transmissions were much faster than before and 
the volume of traffic threw traditional decision making practices into disarray. 
 
The switch to the spot market started when Iran began to falter.  This caused certain 
smaller independent oil companies to be caught short, so they bought oil from the spot 
market, which at the time accounted for only 8% of the total market share until:  
 
In 1978, the changing structure nature of the physical spot market for oil presaged the 
development of energy futures with the successful launch of the New York Mercantile 
Exchange (NYMEX) heating oil futures contract, which was tied to physical delivery in New 
York Harbor.  Successive oil futures contracts and the development of an active OTC 
market for forward oil trading in the early 1980’s significantly increased price 
transparency, and thereby boosted both physical and financial trading of crude oil and 
petroleum products globally.108 
 
As the spot and futures market developed, it pushed the price of crude up to the point 
where many new agreements that would have been sealed under the traditional fixed 
price contracts became economically unviable for producers to enter into.  Iran saw 
opportunity, defied OPEC, and began selling its oil almost exclusively on the spot 
market. 
 
Iran’s policy reversal spun producers and consumers worldwide into a ‘Putnam like’ 
spin, where sales became ‘very erratic, and...[where]…market prices vary daily, thus 
making any planning by the consuming nations or the oil companies impractical.’109   
Serendipity literally shone on the Iranians.  The spot market offered a number of other 
unwelcome complications for major consumers.  The market gave rise to a subtle 
putsch in which traders, acting for consumers, openly competed commercially against 
one another for a share of the market, as opposed to governments competing for the 
individual favours of producers.  However, individual consumers had to take particular 
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care that their government policies, aimed at individual producers, did not clash with 
the policies of rival consumer states or the business policies of their own traders, to 
create a conflict of interest or ‘mutually assured disruption’ of a particular producer’s 
supply.  
 
The KSA oil infrastructure is a vast long term investment opportunity and in its simplest 
form works on a cycle of profit from oil sales being fed back into Research and 
Development ‘R&D’ projects, from which more oil can be extracted from depleting 
fields.  Foreign companies can only invest in R&D projects if the oil fields will remain 
productive for long enough to pay off the initial outlay.  Therefore the continuing and 
unhindered flow of export oil serves as a guarantee that any loans to finance R&D 
projects will be paid off.  If, for any reason, the KSA oil supply chain were to be 
seriously disrupted, the result may be a reluctance for financers to agree loans to 
service providers developing tools for projects in the KSA. 
 
Developing countries on the brink of socio-economic investment were the unfortunate 
casualties of the spot market.  They could not afford to gamble their meagre economic 
security on an uncertain futures market.  The fortunate were spared stagnation, but 
the price paid by those countries can appear meretricious.  The cost involves 
sustaining a dynamic economy.  However, the dynamics required to fund a 
participant’s stake in the game quickly led players to open and close their political jaws 
on, for example, a fluctuating employment market, a switch from manufacturing to 
service industries and disproportionate mortgage interest rates and house prices in 
order to generate enough capital for banks to hedge on the market.  The price exalted 
later laid waste to generations of previously productive workers, heaped debt on the 
shoulders of the younger generation and accepted that State benefits are in fact a 
form of income in order to obtain credit.  In short, the lifestyle choices of major 
consumers altered as a result of absorbing these new dynamics.  Lifestyles now 
offered new opportunities such as ‘two car families’, extra cash from tax cuts due to 
reduced public expenditure, a shorter working week offering more leisure time and 
cheap foreign package holidays.  These opportunities promoted independence from 
the state but impacted on the demand and consumption rate of the oil supply – both 
determining factors of oil and wider market stability.     
 
59 
 
The period suffered two further shocks.  Iranian exports eventually stopped 
completely, leaving behind a vibrant and continuing spot market, and Saudi Arabia 
announced a 9.5 million barrel per day cut in production for the first quarter of the year.  
The Saudi cut underscored the point that US had far less influence over Saudi Arabian 
policy than they may previously have believed.  By February 1979 the spot prices were 
double official prices which led to other producers joining the spot market in a free for 
all.  Representatives at a G7 summit held in Tokyo later that year declared: 
 
[The] unwarranted rises in oil prices mean more worldwide inflation and less [economic] 
growth.  That will lead to more unemployment, more balance of payment difficulty, and 
[will] endanger stability.110 
   
Inflation, lack of growth, unemployment and economic instability spelt ruin for both 
customers and producers alike.  Saudi Arabia appeared to understand.  It tried to 
alleviate the situation by appealing to the US for a reduction in consumption but the 
appeal inevitably failed. 
 
Tanker rates increased slightly but the rise did little more than cover the cost of the 
voyage.  Once again the tanker industry had to conform, this time to the new trading 
patterns caused by the spot market: 
 
[T]he oil trade had changed from a predictable trade for which transport was carefully 
planned by the oil companies to a volatile and risky business in which traders played a 
substantial part and transport was, to a large extent, left to the market place to manage.111 
 
The traders, with little or no assets of their own, had a different approach to risk which 
affected transportation rates.  Five years later a well-respected industry journal 
commentated on the difficulties faced by tanker owners trading on the spot market: 
 
The last ten years of capital drain in the tanker industry have no historical precedent and 
we have witnessed a decimation of shipping companies which has probably no parallel in 
modern economic history…The surviving members of the independent tanker fleets must 
be akin to those of the world’s endangered species whose survival appeared questionable 
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in a changing and hostile environment, but have instead shown a remarkable ability to 
adapt. 112  
 
Unfortunately the following decade was to be even worse for tankers, their owners and 
crews alike.  The 1979 Iranian revolution cost the world 3.6 million barrels per day in 
lost production, induced the rise of the spot market and introduced a regime that fast 
became a nemesis to the US and later Israel.  
 
1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War 
 
In December 1979 the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.  In doing so the Soviets 
encroached on the Gulf region.  The invasion prompted the previously mild Carter 
administration to issue the following proclamation which subsequently became known 
as the ‘Carter doctrine’: 
 
Any attempt by outside forces to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded 
as an assault on the vital interests of the United States, and such an assault will be 
repelled by any means necessary, including military force.113    
 
The statement proved to be ambiguous.  In 1980 Iran and Iraq declared war on each 
other in order for the winner to, ironically, gain control on the Gulf.  Rather than choose 
direct involvement in the war the US and other western powers chose instead to back 
Iraq against Iran in the 8 year long conflict. 
 
The two warring parties further involved the international community when they 
decided to target their adversary’s oil exports in order to weaken each other’s 
economic position.  The resulting ‘tanker war’ will be discussed in greater detail in a 
later chapter but Farzin Nadimi provides the following commentary in relation to the oil 
supply: 
 
The Iranian oilmen showed extraordinary skill and courage in dealing with superior 
airpower which was supported by all world powers.  Their actions in keeping the flow of 
oil running…disrupted or delayed most of Iraq’s plans…The Iran-Iraq War clearly 
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demonstrated that while oil facilities may be highly vulnerable to attack individually, the 
oil production and shipping infrastructure itself is less vulnerable even under the shadow 
of an occasionally determined campaign.114 
 
Tankers proved to be particularly resilient especially when loaded.  Hooton and Navias 
argue that ‘The sub-compartmentalization of tankers made them especially difficult to 
sink.’115  Following penetration of the hull, the impact of missiles tended to be absorbed 
by the oil in the cargo tanks which were further protected by inert gas.   They also 
argue that in many cases tankers hit and then certified total losses for insurance 
purposes were victims of the economics of ‘the shipping market rather than the 
damage inflicted.’116   
 
Tankers have over the years played a crucial part in exporting oil from the Gulf.  Again, 
discussion of the tanker industry in the IR, Security Studies and wider Social Sciences 
has been moot.  Tankers have developed alongside major conflicts in the Middle East.  
Earlier I postulated that ‘one problem solved is often another waiting to happen’, which 
is exemplified in development of modern oil tanker design. After the closure of the 
Suez Canal in 1967 oil tankers were enlarged to carry more oil on the longer route to 
the west via the Cape of Good Hope. 
 
Shipping companies therefore chartered bigger vessels until the Very Large Crude 
Carrier ‘VLCC’ became the norm on the Gulf – West route, so much so that the vessels 
are so big that they cannot fit into most loading berths at other loading terminals in 
other export states. Security within the shipping industry is often levelled at the 
potential for radicalization among crew members, the condition of Flags of 
Convenience vessels and environmental factors, when in fact a major disruption to 
shipping in the Gulf available tonnage would result in a severe shortage of vessels 
able to load oil elsewhere (as discussed in chapter 6). The tanker industry was aware 
of the situation and would probably capitalise on the situation – overlooked by the 
social sciences. Nonetheless, attacks on vessels during the Tanker War were 
sobering: 
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A typical [sic] attack on a tanker is recounted by Captain Bruce Ewen, master at the time 
of the 412,000 dwt World Petrobras which was bombed by Iraqi jets on 22 December 1987.  
At the time the tanker was providing floating storage off Iran’s Larak Island in the northern 
part of the Strait of Hormuz.  Two Russian made 500 lb bombs with parachute drogues 
attached dropped onto the main deck during the attack by Mirage jets, which also hit two 
other tankers off the island 
 
World Petrobras was at the time transferring oil from one tanker, Free Enterprise, onto 
another, British Respect.  ‘When the bombs struck,’ Ewen recalls, ‘the rubber hoses 
attaching us to the British Respect were set afire and a large amount of shrapnel from our 
deck fittings blew through the side of the British Respect.  Since we were both inerted and 
had our inert gas plants running, an explosion was avoided.  However, we needed to get 
British Respect away from us so we could get firefighting tugs alongside. 
 
‘We cut her aft ropes and her master went ahead on the engines and ran the forward ropes 
off the reels.  When she parted the hoses, a large amount of oil was dumped into the water 
which caused a large fire and set the rubber fenders ablaze.  Although this rendered our 
lifeboat and life raft on the post side beyond use, the current was fairly quick so the danger 
passed in a fairly short time.  The World Petrobras resumed operations 42 hours later. 117 
 
Although individual attacks were horrific fortunately in all only about 2% of shipping 
was affected during the conflict.  In 1984 Saudi Arabia opened a new export terminal 
at Yanbu on the Red sea coast.  Oil for export is pumped 745 miles from Abqaiq along 
the Petroline pipeline.  The terminal is now reported to be under developed.     
  
The war ended a stalemate in 1988.  Iran and Iraq’s production levels wavered at the 
outbreak of war costing 297,000,000 barrels of oil per day between them however the 
total output from the Gulf was unaffected.  Saudi Arabia acted as a ‘swing producer’ 
again to make up for the shortfall.  Saudi also made it plain that they were able to 
increase production while coping with the stress of possible attack.  It would appear 
that, exposure to conflict aside, Gulf producers kept their customers happy enough to 
stave off their direct involvement.  At no time during the War were any of the Gulf 
States invaded or occupied by armies controlled by major consumer states.   
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The rise of Al-Qaeda 
 
The period also gave rise to the world’s most infamous terrorist group.  Al-Qaeda, 
headed by Osama Bin Laden formed in 1989 as Soviet troops withdrew from 
Afghanistan.  The highly motivated and battle hardy group began looking for new holy 
wars or ‘jihads’ to wage. 
 
 Also in 1989 the tanker Exxon Valdez ran aground in Prince William Sound, Alaska.  
The resulting oil spill proved to be a hugely expensive public relations disaster for 
Exxon.  More importantly the US government passed the Oil Pollution Act which called 
for the phasing out of single hulled tankers in US waters between 1997 and 2000, in 
favour of double hulled ships (see fig 2.6 cross section of a double hull tanker).     
 
 
Fig 2.6 Cross section of double hull tanker 
 
However, an oversight occurred after the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill. US and 
European Law decreed that only double hulled tankers would be able to enter their 
respective ports. As such tanker design changed again to incorporate these new 
environmentally driven laws. The new double hull design has not been discussed 
among available literature in relation to the damage sustained by oil tankers during the 
1988 tanker war in the Gulf. The overall resilience of tankers, taking into account the 
frequency and impact of attacks was surprisingly good – but how the double hull 
design will react is not mentioned. 
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1991 Kuwait Oil Well Fires 
 
Iraq had always laid claim to Kuwait being its nineteenth province.  During the run up 
to war Iraqi President Saddam Hussein blamed Kuwait, among other issues, for 
frenetically pumping crude from its Rumaila oilfield that straddles the Kuwait-Iraq 
border.  Kuwait found security by increasing its proven reserves.  No sooner had Iraq 
invaded Kuwait when a coalition of western forces led by the US had formed to repel 
the Iraqi forces and prevent them from marching into Saudi Arabia and on to the 
Emirates.  US President George Bush explained why America could have never 
accepted Iraq’s threat to the Gulf: 
 
Our jobs, our way of life, our own freedom and the freedom of friendly countries around 
the world would all suffer if control of the world’s great oil reserves fell into the hands of 
Saddam Hussein.118 
 
It took the coalition forces just under one hundred hours to liberate Kuwait.  Shortly 
afterwards the troops withdrew from the region.  Iraqi forces retreated back to Baghdad 
leaving behind an abhorrent crime.  Upon their retreat Iraqi troops set fire to Kuwait’s 
oil wells thereby causing one of the worlds worse environmental disasters.  
    
Iraqi troops had packed plastic explosive around the well heads or ‘trees’ and covered 
them with sandbags.  The force of the explosion was tremendous.  In some cases the 
blast took the head clean off the stem but in others the casing just fractured slightly 
and oil sprayed out of the cracks at obtuse angles.  The Kuwaiti government 
implemented the Al-Awda project to extinguish almost 700 well fires.  Before leaving 
the Iraqi’s removed all the tools, vehicles and housing from the fields so everything 
necessary to cap the wells had to be imported.  Teams arrived from the US, Canada, 
Britain, Russia, Romania, China, France, Hungary and Iran to join forces with the 
resident Kuwaiti team of fire fighters. 
 
Engineers faced enormous challenges such as building roads and sourcing 
equipment.  The wind was a severe problem, although the oil spilled onto the desert 
floor held the sand down during squalls.  The gathering system was pumped full of 
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water to create huge artificial lakes.  Water was played on the fire before it was finally 
extinguished and capped.  Capping methods ranged from plugging the well vertically 
with a huge metal spike, to a Hungarian invention that literally blew out the fire using 
a pair of jet engines mounted on the body of an old Soviet tank.  Teams also had to 
work around unexploded bombs and discarded military ordnance.119  
 
It was expected that the fires would take years to extinguish but the project surpassed 
all expectations.  The reigning Emir of Kuwait ceremoniously extinguished the last well 
fire in the Burgan field only 229 days after the first teams began work.  Cordesman 
remains resolute.  He argues that: 
 
Though fires can be set in many areas of a working field, including at oil wells, fires do 
not produce critical and lasting damage.  Unless wells are attacked with explosives deep 
enough in the wellhead to result in permanent damage to the well, most facilities can be 
rapidly repaired.120  
 
The disruption lost approximately 250,000,000 barrels of oil plus the cost of the project 
which ran to approximately $3 million a day or $708,000,000 overall.  The project was 
a model of international cooperation.  More than 10,000 non-military personnel from 
40 countries supported the fire fighters.  
 
Attacks on pipelines are reasonably easy to repair as long as the environment is safe 
to work in.  The oil supply can be shut off without damage to the rest of the 
infrastructure. Available literature does not place emphasis on the key installations 
which could potentially create a larger disruption if they were to fail or come under 
attack. For example the retreating Iraqi army destroyed the Kuwaiti oil fields because 
the Iraqi’s knew that the Kuwait National Petroleum Company had omitted to fit blow 
out prevention devices down in the oil wells.  Had Kuwait done so then the Iraqi army 
would have been less successful (as discussed in Chapter 6).  
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Events following the Gulf War were less encouraging.  Osama Bin Laden focused his 
jihad on America and Saudi Royal family.  In 1995 Al-Qaeda bombed the Saudi 
Arabian National Guard Headquarters in Riyadh.  A year later they attacked the 
Khobar Towers US Air Force residential complex in Dhahran killing nineteen American 
servicemen.  Almost a decade after the end of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait Saddam 
Hussein invited Washington’s wrath when he announced that Iraq would transition its 
oil export transactions in the Euro currency, but future events were to prevent the Iraqi 
dollar-Euro shift.121       
 
September 11th 2001 
 
The September 11th 2001 ‘9/11’ terrorist attacks on New York and Washington DC 
placed the US-Saudi alliance under considerable stress.  Fifteen of the nineteen 
terrorists were Saudi nationals.  It is still unclear how far reaching the impact of these 
events will be but the overarching message attached to the response has been that 
the US was largely unprepared for such an attack.  Furthermore the attacks are a 
brutal reminder of the importance of Middle Eastern politics to the rest of the world, 
not only because of oil.  The period following 9/11 was dominated by the War on 
Terror, a US led coalition to bring Al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden to justice and 
also rid Afghanistan of the Taliban.   
 
The Bush administration began to broadcast its growing unease towards Saddam 
Hussein.  Congress succeeded in introducing a raft of security related international 
laws, such as the International Maritime Organization backed International Ship and 
Port Security Code (ISPS) together with a complete overhaul of security procedures 
relating to the civil aviation industry.  None of the 9/11 targets were directly oil related.  
However the shock waves created by the incidents percolated quickly up into the oil 
industry and made a substantial impression on the market.  Analysis of this 
mechanism and that of subsequent published material relating to 9/11 is best covered 
elsewhere in the thesis. 
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Al-Qaeda has instigated surprisingly few large scale attacks against the oil 
infrastructure although the group have succeeded in hitting a number of important 
targets.  A year after 9/11 Al-Qaeda attacked a VLCC off the coast of Yemen.  The 
tanker was built to the new environmentally friendly ‘double-hulled’ design.  The event 
was followed with a great deal of interest by insurance companies and ship owners 
alike, as until this point it was unknown how a double-hulled tanker would react in a 
combat situation. 
 
The post 9-11 mistrust between the US and Saudi Arabia, coupled with extreme 
resistance within Saudi towards stationing US troops on Saudi soil, resulted in US 
military forces leaving Saudi Arabia for neighbouring Qatar.  Fear also drove an 
exodus of ex-pats from the region.  Cordesman argues that as a result of the changing 
dynamics of the region, visiting businessmen can also become terrorist targets 
because they ‘seek to put economic pressure on local regimes or prove their status 
and power.’122  Business however was not all bad.  As the US began to distance itself 
from Saudi Arabia, China moved in to fill the gap.  China soon overtook Japan to 
become the world’s second largest importer of oil with an agenda to foster stronger 
ties with Saudi Arabia.  A further development was the unprecedented rise in the price 
of oil.  The rise can be partly attributed to the extra cost of providing security for the oil 
infrastructure, but the market has been sympathetic to applying the ‘fear factor’.  It can 
also be argued that in sustaining the high price of oil the market is displaying an overall 
loss of confidence in the region.  A key international post 9/11 Ministerial seminar 
identified this loss of confidence in four main geopolitical problems namely; increased 
instability in Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq, pressure from the US, managing the younger 
generation and Islamic fundamentalism.123 
 
Iraq disarmament programme 
 
The problems connected with 9/11 increased when Iran announced it was actively 
pursuing a nuclear programme and if attacked by the US it would close, without 
explaining how, the Strait of Hormuz.  The ambiguity continued.  In October 2002 the 
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US Senate voted in favour of utilizing military force against troublesome Iraq, all be it 
on the back of some challenging evidence.  The evidence displayed in front of the 
Senators is still viewed as being supported by either rafts of overwhelming, or 
misbegotten, intelligence (depending on one’s own individual standpoint regarding the 
legality of the impending war).  In November Iraq accepted UN Resolution 1441 which 
it responded to a month later with a 12,000 page weapons declaration.  However, the 
UN and US stepped up the pressure because they both felt that the dossier still failed 
to account for Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons.  In February 2003 Tony Blair’s 
UK Labour government dramatically released a glossy dossier of evidence supporting 
the need for war, namely that Iraq almost certainly did indeed possess weapons of 
mass destruction.  The manner by which journalists digested this and other Anglo-
American treatise only added to the confusion.  Global communication corporations 
were duly routed into broadcasting, leading investigations starring colourful politicians 
interviewing lines of ‘A’ list celebrities to discuss political guile, just war theory and 
Saddam Hussein (but rarely the Ba’ath Party).  The media further compounded the 
issue by programming non-shock exposes dealing with the black art of government 
reports, official inquiries and spin doctors.  Blair later marshalled: 
 
The truth is faced with this struggle on which our own fate hangs, a significant part of 
Western opinion is sitting back — if not half-hoping we fail — certainly replete with 
schadenfreude at the difficulty we find.124 
 
Regardless of the media attention viewers on both sides of the Atlantic were powerless 
to do anything much except continue to tune in and watch the situation marshal further 
towards conflict which eventually became a reality on March 20th 2003. 
 
Just before the Invasion in November 2002 the Bahaman registered tanker Prestige 
broke up and sank in the Bay of Biscay.  Irate Fishermen in Northern Spain took to the 
streets in protest over marine pollution, prompting Spain’s new Labour government 
into action.  As a result the IMO moved the final phase out of single hulled tankers in 
European waters back from 2015 to 2010.  The move was immediately effective in 
that all new build tankers from 2003 onwards would be double hulled tankers.  
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Ironically the double hulled design included large areas of un-innerted hull space which 
could ignite (especially if the circumstances such as those found in the ‘tanker war’ 
repeated themselves). 
 
2003 War in Iraq 
 
The ongoing ethical debate concerning the US led invasion of Iraq is now almost 
comparable to the debate that still surrounds the atomic explosions at Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki.  The invasion lived up to the US goal of the capture and eventual execution 
of Saddam Hussein but the subsequent regime change failed to unite Iraq.  The 
country fractured and its oil infrastructure eventually broke down: 
 
In 2003 the US and UK Occupying forces abolished the army and the police without 
providing a substitute to restore security and enforce law and order.  The impact on the 
oil industry of the lack of security has been devastating.  Iraq oil industry has suffered 
from continuous sabotage of oil installations and pipelines, reducing the ability of Iraq to 
export its crude oil; kidnap and killing of oil engineers, technicians and employees 
resulting in the loss of human capital needed to run the industry; and the smuggling of 
crude oil and products by militias and gangs and corruption at all levels, which has 
deprived the government from revenues needed for necessary maintenance and 
investment.125   
  
The pipeline between Kirkuk and Ceyhan was damaged by terrorists so badly that it 
was closed completely.  Elsewhere, Al-Qaeda attacked a housing complex in Saudi 
Arabia and attempted to penetrate the Abqaiq pumping station.  The assailants were 
repelled before they could do any damage.  The incident played testimony to the heavy 
security that now protects Saudi’s oil infrastructure. 
 
Post-War events in Iraq further reshuffled the threats.  Shia/Sunni politics semi-
eclipsed the Arab-Israeli question and Al-Qaeda capitalized on the continuing unrest.  
In 2004 a video tape broadcast on Qatar’s Al Jazeera TV station Osama Bin Laden 
ordered his followers to ‘stop the greatest theft in history’ by focussing future 
operations on ‘[oil production], especially in Iraq and the Gulf area, since this [lack of 
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oil] will cause them to die off [on their own].’126  Regardless of the threats China 
increased its Gulf imports and the oil market remained buoyant which in turn increased 
supply: 
 
Oil’s commoditization also has influenced the broader energy economy.  Today, the price 
of oil on a forward curve for NYMEX or London’s International Petroleum Exchange (IPE) 
affects drilling activity more profoundly than may be commonly realised.  The markets 
react to continuous price volatility, which is a function of commodity markets in a situation 
of supply/demand imbalance.  The influence of the commodity markets is undeniable, no 
matter how reluctant OPEC producers are to become actively involved with either 
exchange-traded futures contracts or OTC financial oil price swaps.  Producers of oil are 
evidencing a newfound appreciation of the significance of price volatility and the role of 
hedging in their own short-term strategies.127 
 
Lord Browne, Chairman of BP assured (international) shareholders: 
  
£1 out of every £6 that goes to UK pension funds in terms of dividends comes from BP. 
The profits of BP and other companies support pension funds that are not in a very good 
shape.128 
 
Lord Browne’s remarks could almost be said to have shifted Putnam’s well-oiled 
mechanism into gear.  Tanker rates soared and the hurricanes that battered the Gulf 
of Mexico, shutting production, helped to raise the price of oil again.  There was an 
overall shortage of tankers due to Chinese imports draining the market.  The price for 
hiring a VLCC on a Middle East-Far East cycle was pegged at $82,300 a day.129  In 
October and November 2004 the rate hit an unprecedented $200,000 a day.130  Again, 
the Gulf awoke to a dawn of new challenges, the shadows of which were to cool 
previously warm friendships.   
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129 Morrison, Kevin, Tanker owners strike black gold as freight rates climb, Financial Times, London, 23/03/04, p. 
36. 
130 Wright, Robert, GMC would welcome cash shipment, Financial Times, London, 22/01/05, p. 8. 
71 
 
Conclusion 
 
In general pre-9/11 threats predominantly impinged upon the mid-stream, namely 
tankers or pipelines, as opposed to affecting other sectors of the oil industry.  However, 
it is noticeable from existing literature that technical analysis of the mid-stream is 
severely lacking among current published work.  The overriding interest concerning 
most current literature lies in analysis of issues contributing to the high price of oil.  
The sustained high price of oil has certainly laid great weight to the decision making 
process, but is the price of oil representative of the threats?     
 
Scholars and analysts of the Gulf region are already advancing thirty year forward 
projections concerning supply and demand.  The accuracy of the exercise is 
questionable.  After all it would have been truly exceptional if just before the 1973 oil 
embargo a forward projection incorporating all the above disruptions were advanced.  
But maybe that would be expecting too much.  It’s probably more realistic to argue 
that regardless of disruptions enough oil has managed to flow out of the Gulf to meet 
demand and keep the US on top of the world economy.  So far success appears to 
derive from producers being periodically challenged, but never overcome, by a 
succession of political and/or economic threats which were fairly predictable until 9/11. 
 
9/11 shifted America’s stake in the Gulf away from direct imports and on to the 
complexities surrounding market security.  America freely admits that it remains 
dependent on Gulf oil, although the dependency is opaque.  Its dependency can just 
as easily be interpreted as a reliance on Gulf oil reaching the market.  The market in 
turn drives the global economy of which the US contributes the greatest percentage.  
Conversely China and other Far Eastern customers have confidently usurped 
America’s export share.   
 
Analysis infers that during the 1960’s and 70’s disruptions centred on the closure of 
Suez due to the Arab-Israeli conflict.  Today it is highly unlikely that Suez will close for 
any significant length of time.  Emphasis on closures has shifted east.  The Strait of 
Hormuz has always been a key strategic waterway.  Maintaining free passage through 
the Strait is key to preserving market stability.  China also has a greater stake in 
Hormuz than it did five years ago.  Iran is the protagonist.  Iran has threatened to close 
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the Strait if the US acts against its nuclear programme.  Oil Tankers are virtually 
irreplaceable as a mode of transport and will continue to play a capital role in market 
stability.  But the industry has undergone a substantial structural change that has yet 
to be fully examined. 
 
From the 1980’s onward Iraq’s assertions replaced the Arab-Israeli conflict in terms of 
disruptions.  Iraqi forces have fought against Iran, Kuwait and a two US led coalitions.  
Recently war has given way to terrorism.  It is difficult to predict whether Al-Qaeda will 
win or lose support in the region.  The prospect of further terrorist action would 
challenge the safety of foreign ex-pat oil workers across the industry sectors.  
 
Finally, culture within Gulf States has come under scrutiny.  Fundamentalism and the 
younger generation have been identified as areas of concern along with 
unemployment, education, mass communication and high expectations.131  The 
significance of these issues towards maintaining political stability in Saudi Arabia 
remains unsure.  
 
Supply disruptions in the Gulf are primarily viewed as negative due to the resulting rise 
in the price of oil.  However, disruptions do have the desirable effect of opening up 
new resources, although not without additional analytical discord exemplified here in 
the 1973 Arab oil embargo.  Paul Wolfowitz cites the embargo as the first and only 
time that Gulf oil was seriously used as a political weapon.132  He further argues that 
although the embargo was short and had a limited effect, the political ramifications 
were far greater.  The US made a threatening response to the incident which Wolfowitz 
claims ‘drove a wedge between the United States and its European Allies…that 
lasted…right up until the Gulf War.’133  Giacomo Luciani disagrees, he argues that ‘oil 
was never used as a weapon’ instead he declares that the ‘embargo was 
fictional…[although]…commentators still refer to…[it]…as…a…dangerous precedent 
                                                 
131 One Gulf national, an oil industry manager, exclaimed ‘We must think differently now.  That is a real challenge 
for us and states like us.  When I look at my office, my house, I think, have we created this?  No, we have imported 
it.  Importing is not bad in itself, but we have to create things as well.  This will bring jobs.  It is certainly difficult for 
this generation.  The wealth is decreasing with the declining population. 
132 Or a tool of foreign policy.  See Mitchell et al, op cit, 2005, p. 261. 
133 Bloomfield Jr, Lincoln P, Global Markets and National Interests: The new geopolitics of energy, capital, and 
information, CSIS, Washington DC, p. 188. 
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and proof of unreliability of Gulf oil supplies.’134  The same embargo did however 
guarantee the development of the North Sea oil fields although it was not nearly as 
favourable to the shipping industry as Intertanko reported,    
 
‘The demand for tanker transport suddenly collapsed. Oil companies who had also been 
building up their fleets had little enough work even for their own ships. Bunker fuel shot 
up in price and also became harder to obtain, and naturally the oil companies prioritized 
bunkering their own ships. So even where charters were to be had, independent owners 
had no certainty of obtaining the bunker fuel to prosecute the voyage.’135 
 
The tanker market only recovered when price and demand stabilized.  The disruption 
caused by the Iranian Revolution lifted the price of oil enough to make Angola’s 
offshore oil fields ripe for exploitation.  Control of the oil though sparked off a war but 
the geographical location of the fields ensured a safe loading environment for 
exporting tankers.  It is also hard to deny that the 1990 Gulf War allowed Russia to 
pitch her Siberian and Sakhalin fields to private investors as a viable alternative to 
Middle East oil and gas.  Disruptions in the Gulf are also responsible to some extent 
for the Research and Development of new technology currently being used to exploit 
the Canadian tar sands, Russian Arctic and deep sea drilling worldwide.  Disruptions 
initially hurt but do eventually open up further opportunities – at a price!  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
134 Luciani, Giacomo, Oil and Political Economy in International Relations of the Middle East, International 
Relations of the Middle East, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, p. 89. 
135 Anon, The Oil World In Turmoil-Jorgen Jahre 1973-1976, 
http://www.intertanko.com/templates/Page.aspx?id=1073 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Bayesian methodology 
 
As highlighted in chapter two the risks facing the oil supply chain were dynamic.  
Threats were both accidental and intentional, and could be primarily targeted directly 
at the supply chain or impacts of a secondary nature where the supply chain was not 
the primary target.  In the case of oil tankers, threats emerged as their design evolved.  
This being the case when selecting a suitable methodology to calculate risk to the 
Saudi oil supply chain the methodology will need to be indefatigable and pragmatic for 
the results to display reason and accuracy. 
 
Data for the thesis was also gathered during a field trip to the SAOGE 2008 Exhibition.  
A brief summary of the field trip can be found at the end of this chapter.  A full account 
of the field trip is placed in an annex at the end of the thesis. 
 
Research methods 
 
Keith Punch indicated that there are five main factors that should be taken into account 
when selecting a suitable research method. 
 
The first factor is the research question itself. Punch states that the research question 
is at the core of every individual study, and must be addressed adequately. Punch 
argues that ‘different questions require different methods to answer them’.137 It is 
necessary therefore to ensure that the research question remains the most important 
factor throughout the process and not methods to which research questions are 
adapted to. 
 
The second factor to consider is the nature of the research outcome. This thesis 
required detailed study and analysis of the topic as opposed to comparing numeric 
data. 
 
                                                 
137 Punch, Keith F, Ibid, 1999. P. 244. 
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The third factor is a review of available literature on the topic including previous 
academic studies on the same topic or topics aligned to the thesis. Available literature 
pertaining to this thesis came from a variety of academic and industry sources. In 
some cases the there was no clear record of subject matter except from data collected 
during interviews. 
 
The fourth factor concerns practical issues. The consideration of finance, time 
management, access to and the cooperation of key individuals and places had to be 
accounted for during the project.138 
 
The fifth factor determines approach. Which approach would produce appropriate 
knowledge about the topic and which approach would generate the required 
information about the topic? The thesis would require widespread analysis of the KSA 
oil supply chain and potential risks that threaten it. The results of the analysis will then 
be assessed in a scaling process. 
 
The five factors are all incorporated in the research framework below. 
 
Research framework 
 
The disruptions highlighted in chapter two vary in their causation so the chosen 
methodology will have to be flexible enough in its structure to accommodate emerging 
and unforeseen threats. Keith Punch provides a suitable research framework fig 3.1 
below139  
 
        Literature                            Theory 
              ↓                                          ↓                
Research area → Topic → Questions → Hypotheses → │Design → Data collection → Data analysis → Test hypotheses 
              ↑ 
        Context 
 
     Pre-empirical stage                                                                                   Empirical stage 
 
Fig 3.1 Research Framework 
                                                 
138 Punch, Keith f, Op cit, 1999. P. 244. 
139  Punch, Keith F, Introduction to Social Research Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches (Second Edition), 
Sage, London, 2005, p. 40. 
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Due to the diverse nature of the threats analysed, the thesis will not be limited to a 
particular set method of data collection. Data will be gathered from existing literature, 
interviews and exhibitions (pre-empirical stage).  Data collected for this stage required 
a field trip to the 2008 Saudi Arabia Oil and Gas Exhibition (SAOGE) in Dammam.  A 
field trip report can be found at the end of this chapter. 
 
As the thesis will not attempt to quantify and calculate the amount of oil transiting the 
supply chain, the research will centre on threats to the physical infrastructure namely 
the oil wells, pipeline delivery system, oil tankers and associated personnel. Research 
will take into account the persuasive self-interest that can accompany the oil industry’s 
attitude to threats and risk which are often played down to pacify shareholders. 
Therefore the methodology selected for the analytical (empirical) stage must be robust 
and impartial.  
 
Selecting a suitable research method 
 
The thesis could benefit from several methods of collecting and analysing data. A 
review of available literature is mandatory but there are a number of alternative 
methods for collecting data from individuals. However, two examples, focus groups 
and a Delphi questionnaire140 appeared too adventurous when similar results were 
obtained by requesting individual interviews. Organizing experts into a focus group 
would require a great deal of time and coordination. Constructing a Delphi 
questionnaire would require similar input to a focus group, with no guarantee of any 
replies. Interviews proved to be an adequate substitute for both methods. 
 
Anthony Cordesman’s suggestion to utilize Bayesian methodology came to light 
during research for the initial literature review at the beginning of the project. After 
further examination and research Bayesian methodology became a strong contender 
for processing the expected data and providing accurate results thereafter.     
 
 
 
                                                 
140 http://www.rand.org/topics/delphi-method.html 
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Applying Bayesian methodology 
 
Taking the above into account, the thesis will adopt a Bayesian methodology deriving 
from Bayes theory.  Cordesman suggests that, 
 
‘There is a clear need for an assessment of what kinds of sudden events or 
discontinuities are critical and for some form of Bayesian approach to risk analysis.’141 
 
Anthony Cordesman’s plea for clarity could be seen as a response to the vicissitudes 
following 9/11.142  Contemporary analysis of the oil industry can quite rightly be 
accused of focusing on one main issue, namely the risks accompanying high oil prices.  
However, in shaping this drama, actors such as political, economic, security and 
energy market analysts appear to struggle when cross-referencing each other’s 
data.143  It may be that the data is commercially sensitive but as a result the 
conclusions, and the factors that influence them, overwhelm the simplicities of 
traditional ‘combining ideas’ theories.144  Instead the heady confluence forms a 
melange of technical, linguistic and tangential conjecture from which clarity, as 
Cordesman argues, struggles to emerge.  In short the dramatists have a tendency to 
pen emotive, as opposed to pragmatic, analysis of the risks affecting the global energy 
supply chain as, among other factors, it could well be in their business interest to do 
so. 
 
The Bayesian approach to risk 
 
Colin Howson and Peter Urbach posit that the decision making process is frustrated 
because scientists discriminate between possible explanations.  They ‘typically pick 
                                                 
141 Cordesman, Anthony H, Al-Rodhan, Khalid, The Global Oil Market: Risks and Uncertainties, CSIS, 
Washington DC, 2006, p. 20. 
142  The quote is taken from research under the heading ‘Inadequate modelling based on inadequate 
understanding’.  Cordesman also cites under the same heading: parametric analysis, Economic 
growth rates, Country plans, indirect imports, Technological improvements, Relation of oil prices to 
demand for alternatives and conservation and supply and demand elasticities.  Ibid, p. 18.  
143 Baumgartner and Jones argue that ‘Experts in all areas spend much of their time convincing others 
that ‘outsides’ are not qualified to make decisions in a given area.’  See Baumgartner, F and Jones, 
B.D, Agendas and instability in American politics, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1993, p. 235. 
144  Hadamard wrote ‘Indeed, it is obvious that invention or discovery, be it in mathematics or 
anywhere else, takes place by combining ideas’  Zellner, Arnold, Bayesian and Non-Bayesian 
Approaches to Scientific Modeling and Inference in Economics and Econometrics, University of 
Chicago, 2000, p. 4. 
78 
 
out just one, or at any rate relatively few, as meriting serious attention.’145  A further 
difficulty arises when choosing which method to make decisions with.  Harold Jefferies 
lists his fundamental criteria for decision making as:  
 
[S]cientific induction involves (1) observation and measurement and (2) generalization 
from past experience and data to explain the past and predict future outcomes.  
 
Bayes theorem has proved to be a popular choice for decision makers who prefer 
Jefferies reasoning.  Charles Annis proposes that ‘Bayesian thinking considers not 
only what the data have to say, but what your expertise tells you as well.’146  Samuel 
Schmitt sums up the evaluation process, 
 
‘When we make our analysis we have at hand a probability distribution for the alternatives 
which expresses our accumulation of knowledge to that point.  This is called the prior 
distribution, the one that comes before the observation or experiment [assessment].  Then 
we make an observation intended to tell us something about the relative merits of our 
alternatives.  On the basis of this information we modify the prior probability distribution 
and obtain a new one, the posterior distribution, the one that comes after the observation.  
If we then have another experiment [assessment] to make, this posterior distribution 
becomes the prior distribution for the next step in the analysis.  The words prior and 
posterior are relative words: they refer to the states before and after any observation.’147 
 
Bayesian methods have been applied to a wide range of theoretical and applied 
problems in many fields.  The scope includes providing solutions involving estimation, 
prediction, testing, model selection and control.148  A good example of Bayesian 
methods being used to solve a complex problem occurred during the first years of 
North Sea oil exploration, 
 
‘The first oil-drilling platforms in the North Sea were designed according to a minimax 
principle. In fact, they were supposed to resist the conjugate action of the worst gale and 
the worst storm ever observed, at the minimal record temperature. This strategy obviously 
gives a comfortable margin of safety but is quite costly. For more recent platforms, 
                                                 
145 Howson, Colin and Urbach, Peter, Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach, Open Court, Chicago, 1993, 
p. 162. 
146 Annis, Charles, Bayesian Thinking, http://statisticalengineering.com/bayes_thinking.htm, (accessed 07/10/06). 
147 Schmitt, Samuel, Measuring Uncertainty: An Elementary Introduction to Bayesian Statistics, Addison-Wesley 
Publishing Company, London, 1969, p. 62. 
148 Zellner, Arnold, op cit, undated, p. 6. 
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engineers have taken into account the distribution of these weather phenomena in order 
to reduce the production cost.’149   
 
Lawrence Philips points out though that social science based research will rely mainly 
on ‘derived measurements with little underlying theory and few laws.’150  Bayesian 
methods are able to compensate for this consideration and are still said to produce 
results ‘as good as or better than those provided by other approaches, when they 
exist.’151         
 
The philosophy is based on the idea that more may be known about a physical 
situation than is contained in the data from a single assessment or observation.  The 
Bayesian approach also allows for combining results, or ‘pooling information from 
different sources’,152 to update the prior state of knowledge on the subject being 
tested.  The approach can also anticipate predispositions from people advancing 
pronounced theories that remain eccentric even with a large volume of data.153   On 
the subject of data collection Robert Winkler argues 
 
‘[A]n important decision may involve uncertainty about a large number of events and may be of 
concern to quite a few people.  For instance, some events may involve the stock market, in which 
case a financial analyst should be consulted; some of the events may involve sales of a certain 
product, in which case the sales and advertising managers should be consulted; and so on.  The 
point is that a large-scale problem may involve many uncertainties, and numerous experts may be 
consulted regarding many uncertainties.154   
 
Winkler does however concede that the eventual decision taken may not ‘accurately 
reflect the preferences of each individual involved in the decision-making problem.’155  
Howson and Urbach argue that disregarding the data source, ‘with all things being 
equal, the larger the apparent effect, the more decisive the inference.’156   
                                                 
149 Anon, Bayesian Decision Theory, http://userwww.sfsu.edu/~efc/classes/biol710/bayes/Decision_Theory.html 
(accessed 15/09/06). 
150 Derived measurements are related to the quantity being measured only through some law, for example 
temperature relates to height of the column of liquid through the operation of laws describing the expansion and 
contraction of liquids and solids brought about by changes in temperature. See Phillips, Lawrence D, Bayesian 
Statistics for Social Scientists, Nelson, London, 1973, p. 2. 
151 Zellner, Arnold, op cit, undated, p. 6. 
152 Morales, J-A, Bayesian Full Information Structural Analysis, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1971, p.1. 
153 Howson, Colin and Urbach, Peter, op cit, 1993, p. 381. 
154 Winkler, Henry, Introduction to Bayesian Inference and Decision, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc, New York, 
1972, p. 26. 
155 Winkler, Henry, op cit, 1972, p. 266. 
156 Howson, Colin and Urbach, Peter, op cit, 1993, p. 380. 
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In the long run consumers who endure short term disruptions in the Gulf, by default, 
widen their choice of producers afterwards.  Unfortunately, in doing so they 
inadvertently add momentum to a disparaging conundrum.  In Bayesian language the 
energy sector (prior), rightly or wrongly, benefits from conflicts (resulting in a posterior 
distribution).  Given that so much oil and gas is to be found in conflict areas such as 
the Gulf, it is a sad fact that the energy sector will never be short of opportunities, 
some of which will unavoidably conflagrate into strife requiring international 
intervention.  Bayesian analysis will show that Gulf supply disruptions have caused 
the energy sector to weep crocodile tears over a steady passing of priors and 
posteriors during the last thirty years.  Without these disruptions however it is highly 
likely that the share price of most energy companies would be weaker than they 
currently are and consumers would have less choice and more to worry about in terms 
of security of supply than they do today. For the purposes of this thesis there is no 
better data analysis method available than Bayes given the problem to be solved.     
 
Bayesian supply chain literature 
 
A wide literature search for evidence of the Bayesian approach being applied to the 
oil industry failed to produce any specific research on supply chain risk.  However, a 
paper by Valtorta et al provided some insight.  The exercise involves utilizing 
theoretical data to construct a Bayesian network in order to model hypothetical attacks 
on pipelines in Iraq.  Other examples range from adopting Bayesian analysis during 
wildcat drilling and oil spill management to calculating the degree of corrosion in 
pipelines.157  The material was deemed inappropriate to model this thesis on.  
However, Paul Hewson’s study on child accident prevention did offer better insight into 
how a Bayesian model for social science can be created.  Hewson quotes the 
Department for Transport, Local Government and the Regions model for child accident 
rates as being:158 
 
                                                 
157 Schuenemeyer, John H and Drew, Lawrence J, Uncovering Influences on the Form of Oil and Gas Field Size 
Distributions, Natural Resources Research, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1999.  Pelizzari, Sonia and Dias, Jose M. Bioucas, 
Bayesian Adaptive Oil Spill Segmentation of SAR Images via Graph Cuts, Instituto de Telecomunicacoes, 
Lisboa.  Ainouche, A, Future Integrity Management Strategy of a Gas Pipeline Using Bayesian Risk Analysis, 
23rd World GAS Conference, Amsterdam, 2006. 
158 Hewson, Paul, Child Pedestrian Accidents in the UK, Monitoring the UK Government’s Road Safety Strategy, 
Radical Statistics, No. 79, p. 8. 
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Time on Street x Degree of hazard presented by the environment 
Ability to deal with risk 
 
At a glance the model does appear to be quite straightforward and relatively simple.  
The text below explains how the in-depth analysis required for compiling the ‘Ability to 
deal with risk’ element was collated, 
 
Johnson et al, (2001) reviewed a wide range of published studies examining individual 
proneness to road accident involvement over the last forty years. Potentially relevant 
social and psycho-social factors reviewed in this report that have been raised at some 
point include family size, birth order, female head of household, maternal education level, 
inability to speak English, indices of child stress or family stress, divorce or marital 
discord, physical or mental illness, poor or ineffectual child-rearing, atypical lifestyle, 
maternal pre-occupation (either through work or pregnancy). The list of factors reveals as 
much about government research prejudices over the last four decades as it does about 
factors which may have some bearing on child pedestrian accident rates, for example do 
the studies examining the mothers' role reflect on lower car ownership and driving by 
females or a more significant role in child-rearing. More recent work (Christoffel et al, 
1996) suggested a number of specific factors, children with higher aggression, 
hyperactivity and anti-social behaviour ratings experienced greater risk, as did children 
from families with higher family stress and lower levels of family supportiveness and 
cohesion. This identifies children who may exhibit more risk-taking behaviour, but 
whether this associates with low socio-economic status or ethnic grouping is 
questionable…White et al (2000) have suggested that areas with high child pedestrian 
accident involvement tend to have low car ownership rates.159  
 
The material was used to produce the element’s initial prior distribution.  A similar 
approach to data research will be taken when analysing sudden events and 
discontinuities in this thesis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
159 Hewson, Paul, ibid, p. 9-10. 
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Field Trip Summary 
 
 Introduction 
 
On 14-16 November 2008 I attended the first Saudi Arabia Oil and Gas Exhibition 
(SAOGE) in Dammam, KSA.  My aim was to interview company representatives about 
their views on the recent arrival of China as a supplier of goods and services to 
Aramco. 
 
Ethical issues 
 
The issue of ethics did present a problem that was overcome by anonymity.  It became 
apparent, due to the ‘sensitive nature’ of the questions I proposed to ask that if I were 
to have a frank discussion on the subject any interviewees would have to remain 
anonymous.   
 
Conducting the interviews 
 
I decided to structure the interviews with a list of specific questions that would produce 
data relative to my enquiry and ‘open’ questions that would allow the interviewee to 
offer a personal and often more philosophical response.  Once the five interviews were 
completed I was able to introduce ‘overall perspective’ to the subject by interviewing 
the Operations Manager (OM).    
 
Results 
 
I conducted five in depth interviews with representatives A, B, C, D and E.  Reps A to 
D were all employed by US or European based Small/Medium Enterprises (SME).  A 
summary of their answers can be found in the Field Trip annex at the end of the thesis.  
The full extent of the data in the table is presented later in Chapter 6.      
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Analysis 
 
The field trip achieved the expected key objectives.  The quality of the data gathered 
during the field trip was very high.  The suppliers themselves were particularly open to 
my subject matter as the introduction of China into the oil field service sector was met 
by a degree of emotions ranging from scepticism to opportunity.  The SME suppliers 
tended to view China as a threat to the long-term future of their product due to China’s 
flagrant breach of copyright.  This view changed among larger suppliers who saw 
China as a prospective partner, all be it a partner that would have to adhere to stricter 
quality control standards.   
 
Conclusion 
 
The SAOGE Exhibition was an excellent choice of venue to collect quality data.  It 
would be very difficult to reciprocate the amount of choice and freely available 
knowledge available in any other setting.  The only concession I had to make was to 
assure the anonymity of the reps I interviewed.  I was assisted in my aims by the fact 
that I was gathering data that was of interest to the industry in general and on a topic 
that I did not hold a pre conceived bias.    
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Chapter 4 
 
First Prior Distribution 
 
In this chapter the chosen Bayesian methodology will be tested against a data set in 
order to produce a posterior distribution.  The process is explained in the empirical 
stage of the research framework fig 4.1 below160 where ‘Design’ is the prior distribution 
and ‘Test hypotheses’ is the posterior distribution.                                            
 
                          Literature                            Theory 
                                 ↓                                          ↓                
Research area → Topic → Questions → Hypotheses → │Design → Data collection → Data analysis → Test hypotheses 
                                 ↑ 
                          Context 
 
                Pre-empirical stage                                                                                   Empirical stage 
 
Fig 4.1 Research framework 
 
 
Forming the first prior and posterior distribution 
 
The factors by which it is possible to calculate a prior distribution of risks to the KSA 
oil supply chain are held in the equation, a modification of Hewson’s example161, 
below: 
 
Oil: Time in the supply chain x Degree of hazard presented by the environment 
Ability to deal with risk 
 
Below is a list of headings and sub headings for the chapter based on the above 
equation: 
 
1. Oil: Time in the supply chain 
                                                 
160  Punch, Keith F, Introduction to Social Research Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches (Second Edition), 
Sage, London, 2005, p. 40. 
161 Hewson, Paul, Child Pedestrian Accidents in the UK, Monitoring the UK Government’s Road Safety Strategy, 
Radical Statistics, No. 79, p. 8. 
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2. Degree of hazard presented by the environment: Bayes theory and supply 
chain risk 
- Data collection 
- List of interviewees and perceived threats 
- Prior distribution risks 
- Prior distribution data table 
 
3. Ability to deal with risk 
- Categorizing the risks 
- The scoring process and analysing the results 
- Prior distribution summary graph 
- Prior distribution threat table 
- Prior distribution summary 
- Forming a posterior distribution 
- Posterior distribution threat table 
 
Oil supply chain 
 
The thesis is primarily concerned with risks that could affect upstream and midstream 
operations of the KSA supply chain.  The downstream element, from tanker to 
forecourt is seen as being more the responsibility of the importer.  
In regard to Saudi Arabia’s oil supply chain crude is pumped from the well through a 
network of pipelines to a tank storage farm from where it is exported by tanker through 
the Strait of Hormuz and onward for delivery to the importer.  The oil may also pass 
through pipeline gathering systems, pumping stations, destabilizing plants which 
remove gasses from the crude and refineries, but in essence the logistics involve oil 
being pumped out of the ground (upstream), pipelines, storage, pumping on board a 
tanker and steaming out of the Gulf into the deep sea (midstream). 
Saudi Aramco run the upstream and land based mid-stream element of the supply 
chain.  This element is managed and maintained by a mixture of Saudi nationals, 
western ex-pat technicians and engineers, and migrant workers.  Once the crude has 
been pumped on board a tanker the supply chain becomes the responsibility of the 
shipping industry. 
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Oil tankers are owned by individuals or form part of a fleet owned by a shipping 
company.  All vessels are required to be registered to a state and fly the flag of the 
state to which the tanker is registered.  The country to which the tanker is registered 
does not have to be the same state to which the owner is a citizen or resident.  Tanker 
crews are generally hired from third world countries with a long tradition of supplying 
labour to the shipping industry.   
 
Degree of hazard presented by the environment: Bayes theory and supply chain risk  
 
It is worth being reminded of Harold Jefferies list of fundamental criteria for decision 
making:  
 
[S]cientific induction involves (1) observation and measurement and (2) generalization 
from past experience and data to explain the past and predict future outcomes.162  
 
As discussed in detail in Chapter 2 previous disruptions to Gulf exports have been to 
various degrees caused by war, civil war, regime change, accidents or fiscal 
disagreements See table fig 4.2 below).  Three predominate patterns, Jefferies 
‘generalization’163, emerged, the double closure of the Suez Canal, war that targeted 
oil production and transportation and civil war that damaged infrastructure.  In the case 
of war and civil war western owned oil field support services were also withdrawn.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
162 Zellner, Arnold, Bayesian and Non-Baysian Approaches to Scientific Modeling and Inference in Economics 
and Econometrics, University of Chicargo, Chicargo, p. 3. 
163 See above. 
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Date of oil 
Duration of 
supply 
Average 
gross supply Reason for oil supply disruption 
supply 
disruption 
disruption (in 
months) 
shortfall (in 
MMBD)   
3/51-10/54 44 0.7 Iranian oil fields nationalized 
11/56-3/57 4 2 Suez War 
12/66-3/67 3 0.7 Syrian transit tax dispute 
6/67-8/67 2 2 Six Day War 
5/70-1/71 9 0.8 Damage to Tapline 
3/73-5/73 2 0.5 
Unrest in Lebanon, damage to 
transit facilities 
10/73-3/74 6 2.6 
October Arab-Israeli War; Arab oil 
embargo 
4/76-5/76 2 0.3 
Lebanese Civil War, disruption to 
Iraqi exports 
5/77- 1 0.7 Damage to Saudi oil fields 
11/78-4/79 6 3..5 Iranian revolution 
10/80-12/89 3 3..3 Iran-Iraq War 
03/90-10/91 7 1 Kuwait oil well fires 
09/11/01 - - World Trade Centre attacked 
3/03-9/04 19 1 Iraq war and continued unrest 
 
Fig 4.2 Table of Gulf oil disruptions 1951-1991 
 
The 9/11 Al Qaeda terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre in 2001 introduced new 
threats to the region, about which there was little pre-existing data to refer to.  Even 
the subsequent 2003 Iraq war differed in that Washington were implicit in regime 
change, as opposed to organizing a coupe by overtly removing Saddam Hussein from 
power and installing a new democratic government. 
 
Previously during conflict Washington had chosen to back one side or another, 
ironically Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War, by way of political pressure, arms procurement 
and support services.  Therefore in order to predict Jefferies ‘future outcomes’ as well 
as drawing from previous disruptions a new data set is required to form a ‘prior 
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distribution’ that incorporates possible post 9/11 threats to the oil supply chain.  We 
can be reminded at this point of Samuel Schmitt’s evaluation process: 
 
‘When we make our analysis we have at hand a probability distribution for the alternatives 
which expresses our accumulation of knowledge to that point.  This is called the prior 
distribution, the one that comes before the observation or experiment [assessment].164     
 
In order to collect enough data to analyse and form a prior distribution with it was 
necessary to interview a number of willing participants on the subject of KSA oil supply 
chain security.   
 
Data collection 
 
In line with Bayesian methodology the scope and diversity of experts and the 
‘estimation, prediction, testing, model selection and control’ within their comments 
would play a key role in determining an initial prior distribution.  Winkler again: 
 
‘[A]n important decision may involve uncertainty about a large number of events and may 
be of concern to quite a few people.  For instance, some events may involve the stock 
market, in which case a financial analyst should be consulted; some of the events may 
involve sales of a certain product, in which case the sales and advertising managers 
should be consulted; and so on.  The point is that a large-scale problem may involve many 
uncertainties, and numerous experts may be consulted regarding many uncertainties.165 
 
In June 2008 seven interviews were conducted with experts.  Where the interviewee 
wished to remain nameless the company or institution name has been substituted.  
Colin Howson and Peter Urbach argue that the decision making process is frustrated 
because scientists discriminate between possible explanations.  They ‘typically pick 
out just one, or at any rate relatively few, as meriting serious attention.’166  For this 
reason not only scientists and academics were interviewed but also industry 
                                                 
164 Schmitt, Samuel, Measuring Uncertainty: An Elementary Introduction to Bayesian Statistics, Addison-Wesley 
Publishing Company, London, 1969, p. 62. 
165 Winkler, Henry, Introduction to Bayesian Inference and Decision, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc, New York, 
1972, p. 26. 
166 Howson, Colin and Urbach, Peter, Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach, Open Court, Chicago, 1993, 
p. 162. 
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specialists.  Industry experts benefit from a ‘working knowledge’ as opposed to the 
structural approach attributed to scientists.  
 
 For the purposes of the data set the experts and the knowledge they held we classed 
as equal in merit, and each individual expert equal among the group.  The interviewees 
were from diverse areas, academia, consultancy, industry and journalism therefore 
fulfilling Morales criteria of ‘pooling information from different sources’.167  The 
interviews were not recorded and any comment that appeared directly relevant to the 
KSA oil supply chain was noted, as was any comment that appeared seemingly 
irrelevant but provoked thought on the subject.                   
 
Selecting the experts 
 
The experts for the first prior distribution questions were selected because of a 
combination of expertise, response to interview request, availability and their 
willingness to discuss issues around their subject of expertise. 
 
The prior distribution required a significant number of possible risks and threats to the 
KSA oil supply chain. Initially a large number of experts were approached by email 
and directly by telephone. For various reasons, some were unable to become involved. 
The experts listed below responded positively to an interview request. During 
interview, they expressed fact based opinions about their own area of expertise and 
discussed at length contributing factors which should also be taken into consideration. 
The aim of the first prior distribution was therefore met in that the scope of threats 
included low, medium and high risks and threats to the KSA oil supply chain. The 
range of experts and their input effectively widened the data source. This would not 
have been possible or had the desired effect if the opinion of only a handful of single 
source experts were presented. The experts who were eventually chosen provided 
data which adequately met the criteria for a robust first prior distribution.   
 
 
                                                 
167 Morales, J-A, Bayesian Full Information Structural Analysis, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1971, p.1. 
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List of interviewees and perceived threats 
 
The seven interviews produced a total of sixty five comments listed below for analysis. 
 
E.A. Gibson (Global oil tanker shipping company) 
 
Gibson shipbroking service goes back over 115 years. Gibson chartering services to 
clients in over 90 countries with a leading presence in London, and offices in 
Houston, Hong Kong, China and Singapore.  Gibson did not have a specific interest 
in the Saudi oil supply chain but as Saudi are a major exporter the reliability of oil for 
export is of interest to Gibson. 
 
Mamoun Fandy (Fellow at the Institute of International Security Studies) 
 
Dr Mamoun Fandy is an Egyptian-born American scholar. He is president of the think 
tank London Global Strategy Institute, a former senior fellow at the Baker Institute, the 
United States Institute of Peace, and at the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies in London. Before that Fandy was a research professor of politics at 
the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at the School of Foreign 
Service of Georgetown University, as well as of Arab politics at the National Defense 
University. He is frequently seen on American television, and is a columnist for Al-
Ahram and the Asharq Al-Awsat. 
 
Dr David Glenn (Lecturer in Shipping at London Metropolitan University) 
 
David Glenn was a lecturer in Shipping at London Metropolitan University specialising 
in oil tankers.  Previously he worked for a chartering company in the oil tanker market. 
 
Ted Hooton (Marine consultant) 
 
E.R. (Ted) Hooton has been a journalist for 40 years and a defence journalist for 
about 25 years.  Hooton is an expert on the tanker wars having co-written Navias, 
Martin S, and Hooton, E.R, Tanker Wars: The Assault on Merchant Shipping During 
the Iran-Iraq Crisis, 1980-1988, Tauris Academic Studies, London, 1996. 
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David Butter (Economist Middle East Expert) 
 
David Butter was the regional director for the Middle East at the Economist Intelligence 
Unit, and prior to that worked for MEED magazine, where he was editor between 2000 
and 2002. He holds an MA in comparative politics from Sussex University and a BA in 
Arabic and Persian from Oxford University. In 2013 Chatham House published his 
briefing paper on the political economy of Egypt. 
 
Fred Halliday (London School of Economics – now deceased) 
 
Fred Halliday was Professor of International Relations, in the Centre for the Study of 
Human Rights, at the London School of Economics and at the time of the interview 
was visiting professor at CIDOB, Barcelona, for 2004-05. Halliday was a former 
chairman of the Research Committee of the Royal Institute of International Affairs and 
was on the Advisory Council of the Foreign Policy Centre. Halliday was scholar and 
activist who has profound knowledge of the Middle East.  
 
Centre for Global Energy Studies 
 
Founded in 1990 by Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani, the Centre for Global Energy Studies 
(CGES) is a non-profit think tank, specialising in oil market analysis and forecasting, 
and the economics and politics of energy. CGES expertise lies in oil price movements, 
the futures market, OPEC policy, oil and gas demand and supply, geopolitics of the 
Middle East, the FSU and West Africa. CGES offer advice and consultancy, publish 
oil market reports and hold regular energy-related events.  
 
Interview questions 
 
No Expert Threat Interpretation Justification Status 
1 Butter Robust dependable 
supply chain is an 
unfortunate 
contribution to 
continuing unrest in 
the M/E168 
 
If the supply chain 
were to be heavily 
disrupted how would 
the US be affected 
by a drop in supply? 
 
US will remain 
dominant in Gulf 
security 
Ongoing 
                                                 
168 Jones C, Toby, America, oil, and war in the Middle East, The Journal of American History, 
http://jah.oxfordjournals.org/content/99/1/208.full 
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2 Glenn IMO-tried to improve 
crew training.169 
 
Will crew issues 
affect supply? 
 
Traditional methods 
of crewing and 
recruitment may be 
challenged 
Ongoing 
3 Glenn ISPS-caused tension 
among crews and 
nationalities.170  
 
An ongoing issue 
regardless of tanker 
design. 
 
Traditional methods 
of crewing and 
recruitment may be 
challenged 
Ongoing 
4 Halliday Limburg-insurance 
levels-attack to 
destabilize Yemen 
(Halliday)171. 
 
A similar event could 
occur originating 
from a Gulf State. 
 
Increased insurance 
as damaging as 
physical damage 
Ongoing 
5 Butter Iraq pipeline damage 
a ‘carefully calibrated 
scam’ (Butter)172. 
 
Attack(s) on 
pipelines 
 
Attacks on pipelines 
appear worse than 
they really are? 
Ongoing 
6 Butter Al-Qaeda damaging 
to Saudi-ex-pats 
leaving173. 
 
Shortage of qualified 
engineers 
 
Terrorism causes 
intellectual as well as 
physical damage 
Ongoing 
7 Hooton Overlooked point-
USA is an 18th 
Century nation-said 
to want power but not 
be responsible for 
it174. 
 
Continued policy 
friction 
 
US does not always 
intervene175 
Ongoing 
8 Hooton M/E Policy deeply 
religiously 
motivated176 
How will Sunni and 
Shia live side by 
side? 
Non-political conflict 
difficult to politically 
manage 
Ongoing 
9 Hooton Christian 
fundamentalists in 
USA driving policy 
towards Israel177. 
 
US enacts a policy 
which becomes 
detrimental to 
production 
 
US Foreign Policy 
tries to please 
domestic voters 
Ongoing 
10 Hooton Saudi/Islamic society 
in M/E Gulf difficult to 
adapt178 
Will the Gulf states 
adapt to a 
Sunni/Shia divide? 
Level of conflict 
between Shi/Sunni 
communities 
unknown 
Ongoing 
                                                 
169 Perez, Jose, Manuel, Diaz, The IMO Standard Communication Phrases, IMO, 
http://www.imla.co/imec/SMCP%20history.pdf 
170 Balbaa, Alsnosy, Protecting seafarer’s rights – The need to review the implementation of the ISPS code, 
Nautical Department, College of Maritime Transport and Technology Arab Academy for Science, Technology and 
Maritime Transport,  Alexandria, Egypt, http://iamu-edu.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/s2-balbaa.pdf 
171 Smith, Craig S, Fire on French Tanker off Yemen Raises Terrorism Fears, New York Times, 07/10/2002, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/07/world/fire-on-french-tanker-off-yemen-raises-terrorism-fears.html 
172 David Butter’s personal opinion. 
173 MacAskill, Ewan, Danger money for expats as the Saudi exodus grows, The Guardian, London, 24/06/2004, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jun/24/alqaida.saudiarabia 
174 Ted Hooton’s personal opinion. 
175 For example in the Suez crisis. 
176 Casertano, Stefano, Delayer in Chief, The European, 13/06/2013, http://www.theeuropean-
magazine.com/stefano-casertano--3/7022-us-policy-in-the-middle-east 
177 Monboit, George, US Christian fundamentalists are driving Bush’s Middle East policy, The Guardian, London, 
20/04/2014,  https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/apr/20/usa.uselections2004 
178 Anon, Adapt or die, Economist, London, 04/03/2004, http://www.economist.com/node/2482168 
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11 Hooton Religious decrees 
are state policy179 
Will Gulf state policy 
result in friction? 
Saudi policies often 
clash with US policies 
Ongoing 
12 Hooton Cannot adjust-
spoken work-
illiteracy180. 
 
Potential terrorists 
easier to influence 
and recruit 
 
Potential rise in 
terrorism 
Ongoing 
13 Hooton No Arab states 
(except Egypt) have 
the infrastructure to 
build weapons or 
capability to destroy 
Israel181. 
If this changes will it 
be easier for 
terrorists to procure 
arms? 
 
Regardless the US 
take Iranian threats 
seriously 
Ongoing 
14 Hooton Naval operations in 
the Gulf are marred 
by a 30 metre haze 
on the surface of the 
sea182 
How would this 
affect a future 
closure of the Strait 
of Hormuz? 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Ongoing 
15 Hooton Iran cannot protect 
itself183 
Would Iran therefore 
not attempt to 
disrupt supply? 
Regardless the US 
take Iranian threats 
seriously 
Ongoing 
16 Glenn Saudi reserves 
higher now than in 
the 70’s184 
The reserves may 
be higher but is the 
technology available 
to extract the oil? 
Can Saudi Spare 
Production Capacity 
meet demand? 
Ongoing 
17 Butter Oil marker works on 
the Dollar185 
Do the Iranians 
resent this? 
Regardless the US 
take Iranian threats 
seriously 
Ongoing 
18 Glenn Past behaviour – 
OPEC on full power 
– market share of 
M/E oil fell 
dramatically186 
Could OPEC 
compensate for a 
major M/E 
disruption? 
Can Saudi Spare 
Production Capacity 
meet demand? 
Ongoing 
19 Glenn Production ‘peaks’ 
are local and field 
based – not global187 
Can western 
technology continue 
to extract oil in time 
with demand? 
Can Saudi Spare 
Production Capacity 
meet demand? 
Ongoing 
20 Glenn Shipping reactive 
not ‘in 
anticipation’188 
Will shipping react 
quickly enough to 
prevent losses in a 
combat situation? 
Technical risk to 
tankers unknown 
Ongoing 
21 Glenn ‘Prestige’ 
accelerated phase in 
Will double hull 
tankers be easier to 
sink/disable than 
single hull tankers? 
Technical risk to 
tankers unknown 
Ongoing 
                                                 
179 Ayoob, Mohammed, Kosebalaban, Hasan (eds), Religion and Politics in Saudi Arabia – Wahhabism and the 
State, Lynne Riennes Publishing, Boulder, Colorado, 30/01/2009. 
180 Saudi has taken significant steps to raise the level of literacy in the Kingdom. See, Anon, Kingdom achieves 
96% literacy rate, Arab News, 10/09/2013, http://www.arabnews.com/news/464118 
181 Ted Hooton’s personal opinion. 
182 Navias, Martin S, and Hooton, E.R, Tanker Wars: The Assault on Merchant Shipping During the Iran-Iraq 
Crisis, 1980-1988, Tauris Academic Studies, London, 1996, p.85. 
183 Ted Hooton’s personal opinion widely shared by other commentators. 
184 Fattouh, Bassam, Sen, Anupama, Saudi Arabian Oil Policy: More than meets the eye?, Oxford Institute for 
Energy Studies, Oxford, 06/2015, p. 8. 
185 Ellyatt, Holly, Will Saudi Arabia now abandon its dollar peg? CNBC, 29/12/2015, 
http://www.cnbc.com/2015/12/29/will-saudi-arabia-now-abandon-its-dollar-peg.html 
186 David Glenn’s personal opinion. 
187 Jackson, James S, Global and Local Peaks in Oil and Gas Production, Portland State University, Portland, 
Oregon.  
188 David Glenn’s personal observation. 
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of double hull by 5 
years189 
 
22 Glenn IMO-minimize 
impact on owners 
who have got it in 
hand190 
Will owners refuse to 
send new double hull 
tankers into a 
terrorist area? 
 
Technical risk to 
tankers unknown 
Ongoing 
23 Glenn Titanic triggered 
SOLAS 
SOLAS was 
reactionary.  Will 
there be a 
reactionary action to 
double hull tankers if 
they are susceptible 
to terrorist 
damage?191 
 
Technical risk to 
tankers unknown 
Ongoing 
24 Glenn ‘Herald of Free 
Enterprise’ and 
‘Estonia’ moved 
regulation forward 
If double hull tankers 
move regulation 
forward will the 
regulation impact on 
their ability to steam 
in the Gulf?192 
 
Technical risk to 
tankers unknown 
Ongoing 
25 Butter Algeria-little 
disruption during 
civil conflict193 
Will the opposite 
prove true in the 
Gulf? 
 
Regardless the US 
take Iranian threats 
seriously 
Ongoing 
26 Glenn Technology driven 
industry can 
increase/develop 
extraction194 
Will Western 
technology endure? 
Can Saudi Spare 
Production Capacity 
meet demand? 
Ongoing 
27 Glenn Club of Rome 
(ceased in 1995) did 
not allow for 
technical 
revolutions195 
Will other 
predictions omit 
important factors? 
Technical risk to 
tankers unknown 
Ongoing 
28 Butter Production risks 
added to supply 
risks196 
Will disruptions 
occur through 
conflict or technical 
failures?  
Can Saudi Spare 
Production Capacity 
meet demand? 
Ongoing 
29 Glenn Current high price 
maybe due to low 
refining capacity197 
Are refineries the 
key target for 
disruptions 
Can Saudi Spare 
Production Capacity 
meet demand? 
Ongoing 
30 Butter No real M/E 
leadership figure198 
If a leader were to 
emerge, would they 
restrict supply? 
 
Regardless the US 
take Iranian threats 
seriously 
Ongoing 
                                                 
189 OECD, Impact of International Safety and Environmental Regulation on the Shipbuilding Industry, 18/12/2006. 
190 David Glenn’s personal opinion 
191 Rynn, Philip G, Structural Defects on Double Hull Tankers, American Bureau of Shipping. 
192 Rynn, Philip G, Ibid 
193 Glasser, Charles L, Kelanic, Rosemary A, Crude Strategy: Rethinking the US Military Commitment to Defend 
Persian Gulf Oil, Georgetown University Press, Georgetown, 12/07/2016, p. 131. 
194 Anon, Oil and Gas Technology Development, National Petroleum Council, 18/07/2007. 
195 David Glenn’s personal opinion. 
196 Raval, Anjili, Oil Investors bet on Future Supply Risks, Financial Times, London, 21/07/2014, 
https://www.ft.com/content/7c9cf8b2-2909-11e4-9d5d-00144feabdc0 
197 David Glenn;s personal opinion. 
198 David Butter’s personal opinion. 
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31 Glenn Few State 
owned/private 
players199 
Narrow industry 
decision making 
Will western 
technology endure? 
Ongoing 
32 E.A. 
Gibson 
Attack on Limburg 
thought to be an 
internal explosion 
which worried 
insurance 
companies.  Said to 
be a relief that the 
blast was caused by 
terrorists200 
Internal explosion 
could potentially 
affect every double 
hull tanker.  
Terrorism only 
affects the targeted 
tanker 
Technical risk to 
tankers unknown 
Ongoing 
33 Glenn Forward projections 
too assuming201 
Assumption is based 
on free flow of 
exports 
Can Saudi Spare 
Production Capacity 
meet demand? 
Current 
34 Hooton Iran’s nuclear 
ambition is a 
statement202 
Doubt over Iran’s 
capability to develop 
nuclear power 
and/or weapons 
Regardless the US 
take Iranian threats 
seriously 
Current 
35 Hooton Iran’s nuclear 
program is a threat 
reduction exercise203 
At what point will 
Iran’s nuclear 
program be 
considered too big a 
risk to destroy by 
hostile forces 
Regardless the US 
take Iranian threats 
seriously 
Current 
36 Butter Iranian decision 
making process 
difficult-Mullahs 
have overruled the 
President204 
Will Iran decide to 
block the Strait of 
Hormuz? 
 
Regardless the US 
take Iranian threats 
seriously 
Current 
37 Butter US dependency on 
M/E oil overstated in 
political debate205 
Just how important 
will spare production 
capacity be in the 
future? 
 
Can Saudi Spare 
Production Capacity 
meet demand? 
Current 
38 Butter Iran-adverse 
pressure has 
depressed 
production (4MMBD 
for next 5 years206 
Will any adverse 
pressure be applied 
to any of the Gulf 
States?  If so, will the 
pressure reduce 
production? 
 
Can Saudi Spare 
Production Capacity 
meet demand? 
Current 
39 Butter Iranian gas projects 
suffered as a result 
of nuclear program 
and internal 
politics207 
How much will the 
Gulf States invest in 
future projects? 
 
Will western 
technology endure? 
Current 
                                                 
199Dlouhy, Jennifer A, Big Oil’s Footprint in Washington Shrinks with the Price of oil, Bloomberg, 08/06/2014, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-08/big-oil-s-footprint-in-washington-shrinks-with-price-of-crude  
200 E.A, Gibson personal observation. 
201 Fattouh, Bassam, The Drivers of Oil Prices, SOAS, London, 03/2007. 
202 Ted Hooton’s personal opinion 
203 Ted Hooton’s personal opinion 
204 Choksy, Jamsheed K, Tehran Politics: Are the Mullahs Losing their Grip? World Affairs, 05/2012, 
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/tehran-politics-are-mullahs-losing-their-grip 
205 Tisdall, Simon, Saudi Arabia and the West: how a cosy relationship turned toxic, The Guardian, London, 
27/01/2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/27/saudi-arabia-and-the-west-how-cosy-relationship-
turned-toxic 
206 David Butter’s personal opinion 
207 David Butter’s personal opinion 
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40 CGES Iranian agricultural 
industry returns as 
much to GDP as the 
oil industry208 
Belief that Iran 
depends on oil alone 
Regardless the US 
take Iranian threats 
seriously 
Current 
41 E.A. 
Gibson 
Shell proven 
reserves crisis 
motivated interest in 
the industry as well 
as 9/11.209 
 
Are Iran’s proven 
reserves accurate? 
 
Regardless the US 
take Iranian threats 
seriously 
Current 
42 Fandy Re-flagging-
Between 
communities-Shia 
flag/Sunni flag?210 
 
Will the widening 
Sunni/Shia divide 
affect supply? 
 
Will Iran influence the 
Shia/Sunni conflict?  
Current 
43 Hooton Any attempt to mine 
the Straits of 
Hormuz would 
attract international 
retaliation211 
To what extent 
would the 
international 
community retaliate? 
Regardless the US 
take Iranian threats 
seriously 
Current 
44 E.A. 
Gibson 
Saudi’s building 3 
refineries in the 
Gulf212 
Increased traffic of 
finished product. 
Increases tanker 
traffic 
Emerging 
45 Glenn 2010 double-hull 
phase in complete213 
Tanker industry 
struggling to adapt 
to change in 
legislation. 
Technical risk to 
tankers unknown 
Emerging 
46 E.A. 
Gibson 
Shortage of tankers 
for a ‘shuttle 
service’214 
Oil industry would 
have to rethink 
previous 
arrangements for 
exporting oil from 
the Gulf during 
conflict. 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Emerging 
47 Glenn If safer fields are 
found and 
commercially viable 
deposits become 
exploited the interest 
in M/E oil may fall215 
Gulf security may 
fall as interest shifts 
elsewhere 
Fall in Gulf security Future 
48 Hooton The planned Iranian 
Bourse?216 
Which currency 
would the Bourse 
trade in?  And if it 
were not the dollar 
Increased sanctions 
against Iran 
Future 
                                                 
208 CGES personal observation 
209 Donovan, John, 9/11 Terror Attack and the Shell Reserves Scandal, 05/02/2013, 
http://royaldutchshellplc.com/2013/02/05/59955/ 
210 Mamoun Fandy’s personal opinion. 
211 See Chaper 6, 
212 El Gamal, Rania, Saudi Arabia adds to oil power with new Refineries, Reuters, 04/11/2014,  
http://uk.reuters.com/article/saudi-oil-refineries-idUSL5N0SQ3UH20141104 
213 IMO, Construction Requirements for Oil Tankers – Double Hulls, 
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/PollutionPrevention/OilPollution/Pages/constructionrequirements.as
px 
214 E.A. Gibson personal opinion 
215 Thompson, Loren, What Happens When America No Longer Needs Middle East Oil? Forbes, 03/12/2012, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2012/12/03/what-happens-when-america-no-longer-needs-middle-
east-oil/#5a5cb22264fa 
216 Whitney, Mike, Iran’s Oil Bourse Could Topple the Dollar, 02/05/2008, 
http://www.rense.com/general80/topple.htm 
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then how would the 
US react 
 
49 Glenn There may not be 
enough UK 
seafarers to call on 
in the event of an 
emergency217 
How would the 
international 
community provide 
personnel if a large 
scale deployment to 
the Gulf was 
needed? 
 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Future 
50 Glenn Meeting of 
Commodores in 
1996-Crisis if 
number of Officers 
fell below 10,000 
(Glenn).218 
 
How would the 
international 
community provide 
personnel if a large 
scale deployment to 
the Gulf was 
needed? 
 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Future 
51 Glenn Age profile-diminish-
who replaces them-
Indian seafarers 
retire at 50 (made 
money by then)219 
Could long term 
crewing problems 
affect supply? 
 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Future 
52 Hooton Japan-no foreign 
military 
experience220 
Major Gulf oil 
customers may not 
be deployed to 
defend their 
interests 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Future 
53 Hooton Japan-constitutional 
problems in sending 
troops abroad221 
Major Gulf oil 
customers may not 
be deployed to 
defend their 
interests 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Future 
54 Hooton Is China capable of 
defending the 
Gulf?222 
Questionable foreign 
involvement too 
risky to rely on. 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Future 
55 Hooton How much religious 
‘feeling’ remains 
after Iraq war?223 
Level of future 
unrest unknown 
Potential rise in 
terrorism 
Future 
56 Hooton How will the affected 
generation grow 
up?224 
Level of future 
unrest unknown 
Potential rise in 
terrorism 
Future 
57 Hooton Iranian attack on 
Jerusalem unlikely-
Iranians are not 
If Iran were to attack 
Israel would this act 
affect supply? 
 
Regardless the US 
take Iranian threats 
seriously 
Future 
                                                 
217 David Glenn’s personal opinion 
218 David Glenn’s personal opinion 
219 David Glenn’s personal observation 
220 Teslik, Lee Hudson, Japan and it’s Military, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington D.C, 13/04/2006. 
221 Teslik, Lee Hudson, Ibid 
222 Douglas, John Keefer, How China’s Energy Demands are Transforming the Middle East, Tufts University, 
Medford, Spring 2007, p. 7. 
223 Lipka, Michael, The Sunni-Shia Divide: Where they live, what they believe and how they view each other, Pew 
Research Centre, 18/06/2014, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/06/18/the-sunni-shia-divide-where-
they-live-what-they-believe-and-how-they-view-each-other/ 
224 Howard, Michael, Children of War: the generation traumatised by violence in Iraq, The Guardian, London, 
06/02/2007, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/feb/06/iraq.topstories3 
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Jews, Arabs or 
Christians225 
58 Hooton Mine’s in shallow 
waters only, in the 
deep middle the 
current is too 
strong226 
Shipping lanes may 
not be mined 
Technical risk to 
tankers unknown 
Future 
59 Hooton Submarines-greatest 
threat227 
How far do Iran’s 
capabilities extend? 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Future 
60 Hooton Anti-sub ships-India, 
Pakistan and China 
would join in228 
Support from 
international 
community 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Future 
61 Hooton Russia would join in 
for the money229 
Support from 
international 
community 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Future 
62 Hooton May result in 
convoys of 
tankers230 
Conflict in the Strait 
of Hormuz would 
present a crisis 
situation. 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Future 
63 Hooton Anti-ship missiles 
can be detected231 
Detection 
technology has 
improved since the 
tanker war. 
Technical risk to 
tankers unknown 
Future 
64 Hooton Missile technology 
has not been 
directed at tankers-
propulsion and 
guidance 
development not 
warhead232 
Weapons directed at 
oil tankers have not 
changed since the 
tanker war. 
Technical risk to 
tankers unknown 
Future 
65 Glenn There may not be 
enough UK 
seafarers to call on 
in the event of an 
emergency233 
How would the 
international 
community provide 
personnel if a large 
scale deployment to 
the Gulf was 
needed? 
 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Future 
 
 
 
                                                 
225 Rafizadeh, Majid, Will Iran attack Israel? Al Arabya, 05/07/2016, 
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2016/08/05/Will-Iran-attack-Israel-.html 
226 Khan, Sabahat, Iranian Mining of the Strait of Hormuz: Plausibility and Key Considerations, Institute for Near 
East and Gulf Military Analysis, 01/2010, http://www.inegma.com/Admin/Content/File-29122013113155.pdf  
227 Ted Hooton’s personal opinion 
228 Agence France Press, Iran Stages Military Exercises in the Strait of Hormuz, 25/02/2016, 
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/international/mideast-africa/2015/02/25/iran-stages-military-
exercises-strait-hormuz/24025383/ 
229 Agence France Press, Ibid 
230 Ted Hooton’s personal opinion 
231 Ted Hooton reiterates a common defence understanding 
232 Ted Hooton’s personal observation 
233 David Glenn’s personal observation 
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Although not an authority on the subject there is one further although wider reference 
to the degree of hazard presented by the environment in the 2006 Centre for Energy, 
Petroleum, Mineral Law and Policy (CEPMLP) report entitled ‘Security of International 
Oil and Gas: Challenges and Research Priorities’.  The report provides table 4.3 
below234 which states the perceived vulnerability to the supply chain at a global scale. 
 
 
 
Fig 4.3 Vulnerability to the global oil supply chain235 
 
                                                 
234 Centre for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy, Security of International Oil and Gas: Challenges 
and Research Priorities: A Project for the Economic and Social Research Council. CEPMLP, Dundee, 2006, 
 p.11. 
235 Centre for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy, Security of International Oil and Gas: Challenges 
and Research Priorities: A Project for the Economic and Social Research Council. CEPMLP, Dundee, 2006, 
 p.11. 
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The data obtained from the interviews combined with the degree of risk displayed in 
the above table will greatly assist in forming a prior distribution. A further point to 
consider is whether the validity of the issues that form the prior distribution are relevant 
to the overall question of supply chain risk.   O. D. Duncan argues that: 
 
‘All measurement…is social measurement.  Physical measures are made for social 
purposes…their origins seem to represent attempts to meet every day human needs, not 
merely experiments [assessment] undertaken to satisfy scientific curiosity.’236 
 
In this context it is appropriate that the prior distribution consists of issues measured 
from a social standpoint, regardless of whether the issue at question is of a physical 
nature.  The specific task of forming the prior distribution concerning risk to the KSA 
oil supply chain will be drawn from data held in the historical analysis, interview 
questions, vulnerability table above and current relevant literature. In effect this is the 
‘Oil: Time in the supply chain x Degree of hazard presented by the environment’ 
element of Hewson’s equation. 
 
So as to test the methodology against the data, eight potential areas of risk will be 
tested.  These risk areas will be split into four categories.  The four categories, politics, 
supply, technology and demographics represent the social, industrial, technological 
and cultural economy of the Gulf region.  The eight areas of risk or ‘issues’ that form 
the prior distribution are listed under their category below along with an explanation 
as to why they were chosen.  
 
Prior distribution risks 
 
• Politics 
 
1. Boundary disputes 
 
Boundary disputes have been a continuing cause of disruptions to the Gulf oil 
supply.  The closure of the Suez Canal in 1956 and 1967, the Iran-Iraq War and 
                                                 
236 DeVellis, Robert F, Scale Development: theory and Applications, Second Edition, SAGE Publications, London, 
2003. 
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1991 Kuwait war all involved conflict over borders.  Halliday stated that 
boundary disputes could be a contributing factor towards future disruptions. 
 
2. Saudi instability 
 
Post 9/11 the issue of terrorism in Saudi Arabia was an unknown quantity.  
However, NATO placed the possibility of escalating terrorism high on the 
agenda regarding the future security of Saudi Arabia.  The introduction of 
terrorism is a discontinuation of the relative peace that was previously afforded 
to the Kingdom.  Of the interviewees E.A Gibson, Hooton, Butter and Halliday 
all state terrorism as being a factor for current and future consideration.  
CEPMLP also warn on a global scale that terrorism could be responsible for 
future short term low or long term medium disruptions.  Ever since 9/11 
Terrorism has generally been considered to be a threat that will intensify.  With 
this in mind the inclusion of terrorism as a threat to the KSA is viewed as a key 
addition.   
 
3. Iran at a geopolitical premium. 
 
David Butter pressed this key point at interview.  Ever since 1979 Iran has been 
a threat to Gulf oil producing States.  During the Iran-Iraq War Tehran 
repeatedly threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz and targeted oil tankers 
carrying crude from exporting States.  Iran’s potential has increased with the 
continual development of Tehran’s nuclear programme.  Tanker traffic through 
the Straits of Hormuz is projected to rise from the current level of 14 million 
barrels a day (MMBD) to 42 MMBD by 2020, a relative increase from 14 to 42 
Very Large Crude Carriers per day.237  Since 9/11 however, the Gulf region has 
been of particular concern.  Iran has recently posted anti-ship missiles at both 
entrances to the Straits.238  Iran’s ongoing nuclear programme may also have 
the potential to cause major supply disruptions in the future.  These threats 
pose the question of whether or not sea lanes through the Straits of Hormuz 
                                                 
237 Cordesman, Anthony, op cit, 2004, p. 92. 
238 Klare, Michael, op cit, 2004, p. 108. 
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need to be protected.239  Indeed, Michael Klare calls for the ‘establishment of a 
multilateral oil tanker escort fleet’240 to aid the so far unimpeded export of Gulf 
crude.  Iran also featured highly in comments from all interviewees.  The 
perceived threats however range from improbable to highly likely.  Due to Iran’s 
geopolitical position and Tehran’s conflicting decision making process, previous 
threats have often been benign.  This position could change if Tehran manages 
to gain political leverage through Iran’s nuclear program.  The expectation is 
therefore that assessing the threats will highlight exactly where Iran’s 
geopolitical premium lies.    
 
• Supply 
 
4. US-Saudi oil dependency overstated, most oil going to the East. 
 
David Butter and David Glenn provided this insightful question during interview.  
The issue of overstated US dependency on Saudi oil opens a debate as to 
whether Washington would continue to intervene, as it did in Kuwait, during a 
sizable disruption or not.  Rather than simply be a question of supply and 
demand, the threat posed is one of changing spheres of interest.  The position 
taken in the study hinges on how important an unimpeded flow of oil is to the 
market as opposed to America relying on Saudi oil. 
 
5. Lack of spare production capacity (SPC). 
 
Saudi Arabia holds the unique position of being able to regulate production to 
meet demand.  In the past the Kingdom’s SPC has prevented the oil price from 
rising and in doing so stabilized the economies of major importers. The question 
arises as to whether post 9/11 threats could cause a further decline in SPC.  
The actual production of oil relies on the infrastructure whereas the decision to 
regulate production is political.  The inclusion of SPC covers both physical and 
political threats.  There is also the shipping of oil to take into consideration.  The 
                                                 
239 Caruso, Guy F, op cit. 
240 Klare, Michael, op cit, 2004, p. 192. 
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range and scope of perceived threats to KSA SPC is potentially high and 
encompass threats mentioned by all the interviewees.  For this reason only 
realistic threats will be pursued.  Improbable and inconceivable threats will be 
discounted.  The overall expectation is that any perceived threats to SPC may 
be absorbed into other more appropriate risk factors in the further study.   
 
• Technology 
 
6. Double Hulled tankers.   
 
The discontinuation of single hull tankers over to the continuation of double hull 
tankers deserves investigation.  There is a gap in academic literature regarding 
this comparison.  Although E.A. Gibson, Hooton and Halliday advance threats 
directed at oil tankers, collectively they, as well as existing literature, do not 
offer an opinion regarding the impact and consequence between single and 
double hull tankers.   
 
Historically the Iran-Iraq War proved to be the greatest threat to tanker traffic. 
Iraq tried unsuccessfully to stop foreign tankers from loading Iranian oil. 
Between 1982 and 1986 one hundred and sixty one tankers were damaged 
during the ‘tanker war’ killing over one hundred crewmen.241 The tankers were 
mainly hit from the air by rockets or Exocet missiles. All the vessels involved 
were insured, even those damaged without a cargo bill of laden received 
compensation.   Several of the vessels were declared total losses, but by way 
of a testimony to their resilience only a few sank completely. The Saudi flagged 
Safina-Al-Arab for example suffered a 240 square foot hole in the starboard 
side but managed to stay afloat.242  Double hull tankers had not been 
introduced at the time of the Iran-Iraq War.  Single hull tankers were hit and 
damaged.  Under similar circumstances how would double hull tankers fare?   
 
   
                                                 
241 Hooton, B.R, Navias, Martin S, Tanker Wars, Tauris, 1996, p.2. 
242 http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/9005lessonsiraniraqii-chap14.pdf 
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7. Western technology. 
 
The US and Europe have provided oil field services and expertise ever since 
the discovery of oil in the region.  However after 9/11 Washington placed Saudi 
Arabia under suspicion, at the same time as China’s economic rise.  This poses 
the question of China’s future involvement in Saudi oil field technology, a 
discontinuation of previous US and European dominance in the area.  Of the 
interviewees Glenn, Hooton and Butter expressed a view that technology could 
pose a threat to production.  Therefore the issue of technology cannot be 
ignored.  Not discounting the interviewees the key area of oil field technology 
is particularly underrepresented in academic literature focusing on energy 
security.  
 
• Demography 
 
8. Sunni/Shia divide 
 
Mamoun Fandy advanced the Sunni/Shia divide as a perceived threat.  The 
interviews were conducted before the advent of the ‘Arab Spring’ revolutions so 
although the topic was not at its peak the inclusion of this factor is fortunate.  
However due to the timing of the study and for that matter the CEPMLP data 
regarding the Sunni/Shia divide was less than complete.  For this reason it is 
important to note that a low overall threat rating does not discount the risk factor 
if the available data to score the threat rating is incomplete or emerging.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
105 
 
 Environment Risk Status Expected 
likelihood 
1 Political Boundary 
disputes 
Continuation Medium 
2 Political Saudi instability  Discontinuation ? 
3 Political Iranians at a 
geopolitical 
premium 
Continuation/Discontinuation 
(nuclear programme) 
? 
4 Supply US-Saudi oil 
dependency 
overstated 
Continuation Low 
5 Supply Lack of spare 
production 
capacity 
Continuation Low 
6 Technology Double hull 
tankers 
Discontinuation ? 
7 Technology Western 
technology  
Discontinuation ? 
8 Demography Shia/Sunni divide Discontinuation ? 
 
Fig 4.4 Prior distribution data table 
 
When placed in tabulated form the prior distribution is split between continuities and 
discontinuities, although Iran holds both.  Taking into account historical data the 
possibility of the issues causing a disruption ranges from low to high but with five 
unknown quantities due to lack of data, or in the case of the Shia/Sunni divide the 
issue was quickly gaining momentum. 
 
Ability to deal with risk: calculating a posterior distribution 
 
Following Samuel Schmitt’s explanation, the prior distribution will be tested to form a 
‘posterior’ distribution: 
 
[W]e [then] make an observation intended to tell us something about the relative merits of 
our alternatives.  On the basis of this information we modify the prior probability 
distribution and obtain a new one, the posterior distribution, the one that comes after the 
observation.  If we then have another experiment [assessment] to make, this posterior 
distribution becomes the prior distribution for the next step in the analysis.  The words 
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prior and posterior are relative words: they refer to the states before and after any 
observation.’243 
 
Before the sixty five interview comments were applied to the eight issues that formed 
the prior distribution to produce a posterior distribution they were split into four risk 
categories, ongoing, current, emerging and future risks (see list below).  Splitting the 
results into the four categories will assist in assessing a timescale in relation to the 
individual risks.   
 
The scoring process 
 
When plotting the graphs or ‘observation’ the impact, consequence and probability to 
a supply disruption was applied to all sixty five comments provided by the 
interviewees.  Bayes theory does not favour one form of measurement over another.  
The measurement can be qualitative or quantitative or a combination of both.  What is 
important is that the factor being measured is measured against an appropriate 
indicator relevant to the factor and an appropriate scale. 
 
Threat factors were scored out of 10 against each of their perceived indicators of 
impact, consequence and probability – scoring a possible total of 30 per individual 
threat.  The scores are perceived scores.  They are scored based on a general 
posture.  Due to the amount of data being collected, if a comment is misinterpreted 
and an incorrect or unrealistic score applied, then this score alone is unlikely to effect 
the overall distribution enough to corrupt the outcome.  The aim of plotting the graphs 
is to calculate risk – all threats considered. 
 
Consideration also includes taking into account that all the threats (factors) are unlikely 
to happen simultaneously and be universally successful in their impact (variable) and 
consequence (variable).  In order to calculate overall possibility (variable) of a threat 
realistically materializing a ‘likelihood’ of low, medium and high was also applied to the 
threat.  The likelihood is based on historical data patterns, current literature and 
reasoning that if the threat were to be executed, the executor would expect to field the 
                                                 
243 Schmitt, Samuel, Measuring Uncertainty: An Elementary Introduction to Bayesian Statistics, Addison-Wesley 
Publishing Company, London, 1969, p. 62. 
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consequences.  Overall the likelihood is based on the distinct and conceivable 
possibility of the threat occurring should circumstances arise, as opposed to the 
probability of multiple threats, however realistic, remote or implied, being advanced.  
The likelihood acts as a ‘plausibility’ filter to the probability variables through which 
realistic threats are sorted from the unrealistic ones.   
 
The probability (of the disruption happening) is scored on the probability of the 
conditions required for the impact to occur as stated in the comment.  For example it 
may be held that an event could occur such as a meteor strike that impacts on supply, 
the consequence of which would be devastating but the probability of the 
circumstances causing the initial impact will only occur if there is a certainty the 
meteorite will hit a target that could affect supply.  The likelihood is that a meteor will 
strike earth, as they do occasionally, but a meteor will not be big enough, because 
historically they tend to be small, to cause substantial damage or fall on its intended 
target. The likelihood therefore of a meteor affecting supply is extremely low but not 
non-existent, as small meteors do hit earth occasionally.    Conversely, the failure of a 
seal in a pipeline joint will have a very low impact on supply.  The consequences of 
replacing the seal will shut off supply for a very short time but the probability of a failure 
of this kind is far higher than a meteor strike because such failures are well 
documented.  The circumstances surrounding such an event are likely to reoccur but 
production takes theses failures into account, however the likelihood remains high for 
this type of disruption to be an ongoing risk. 
 
The case for separating the probability of a threat from occurring as opposed to the 
likelihood of a threat happening is to deter the inclusion of implied threats.  Implied 
threats may sound plausible but on reflection the likelihood of them ever being 
assembled is low enough for the threat to be discounted.  For example, the impact of 
a nail in a car tyre may only deflate the tyre, which can be repaired.  The consequence 
however may be that the driver misses a plane to an important meeting.  The 
probability of running over a nail and missing a flight depend largely on how often the 
car driver travels to the airport to catch a flight (the ‘event’).  If the driver undertakes 
this task once a year then the likelihood of a nail causing a flat tyre is low but the 
likelihood rises if the driver increases the events (frequency they drive to the airport) 
under which the circumstances above could arise.  Therefore, the impact, 
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consequence and probability may theoretically exist but may only occur if the event is 
likely to take place.  In other words, a nail can puncture a car tyre during any journey 
but a driver will only miss a flight if the tyre bursts on the way to the airport. 
 
A deeper analysis of the treats took place than in the example above.  Just as Hewson 
examines a multitude of factors to calculate car accidents such as speed, visibility, 
road surface244 etc. this study benefited from the list of perceived threats put forward 
by experts.  During the scoring process threats that relied on improbable events in 
order to succeed were discounted in the final analysis of the graph.  The key data in 
every graph is broken down into tabulated form at the end of the analysis.      
 
As will be apparent from the analysis the scoring of the comments did not take place 
at face value.  If the comment had no merit but did provoke or prompt thought when 
viewed in a different context it was the reconstituted comment that was scored (see 
fig 4.5 ‘Scoring methodology’ below). 
 
Fig 4.5 Scoring methodology 
 
                                                 
244 Hewson, Paul, op cit 
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This is also the case where the same comment appears scored on several graphs.  
The comment may accrue a different impact score depending on how the original 
comment is reconstituted in relation to the eight different risk factors.  The impact and 
consequence scores were marked as they would in a worst case scenario situation. 
When scoring the ‘consequence’ element, the score is based on the consequence of 
the impact. 
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I found that four points could possibly cause a supply disruption due to potential 
boundary disputes. 
 
Ongoing 
15. Iran cannot protect itself (Hooton). 
30 No real M/E leadership figure (Butter). 
 
Current 
37 US dependency on M/E oil overstated in political debate (Butter). 
 
Future 
47 If safer fields are found and commercially viable deposits become exploited the 
interest in M/E oil may fall (Glenn). 
 
Taking into account the scoring process applied to the four comments relevant to 
potential boundary disputes is explained below: 
 
In comment (15) Hooton argues that Iran cannot protect itself.  However the impact 
score was calculated as if Tehran were able to retaliate over the intrusion of the Iranian 
seabed border in the Gulf this may at worst case cause a small supply disruption. 
 
Butter states in comment (30) that the Middle East has no real leadership figure.  The 
statement was turned around and scored as if there will be a leadership figure and 
that being the case a leader could choose to interfere between neighbouring states 
and disrupt supply for political reasons aimed against consumers. 
 
Butter further states in comment (37) that US dependency in oil is overstated. This 
being the case the comment was scored after taking into consideration that the US 
would probably not interfere with a minor disruption to supply caused by neighbouring 
states arguing over border demarcation as Washington did not personally depend on 
the product. 
 
Glenn argues in comment (47) that if oil is found elsewhere then interest in Middle 
East oil might fall.  This comment was scored along the lines of disruptions caused 
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between Gulf producing states if they were left to fight their own battles between 
neighbouring states. 
 
Analysis  
 
Disruptions caused by boundary disputes had prior to 9/11 featured quite prominently.  
However, since the threat of interstate war since the removal of Saddam Hussein 
ongoing threats centred on the possibility of seabed infringements and the possibility 
of a dominant figure replacing Saddam.  Current risks would rely on the US deciding 
not to become involved in a border dispute and a future risk would see the US relax 
security in the Gulf because abundant oil could be found elsewhere.  The 
consequences of any of these threats materializing range from low to high while the 
probability is also high if the right conditions were allowed to manifest themselves.  
Boundary disputes, despite the above do not appear to be a live threat because the 
likelihood of any of the events taking place is small, and the likelihood of multiple 
events taking place simultaneously is even smaller. 
 
Risk 
(Political) 
Threat Impact Consequence Probability Likelihood 
Boundary 
disputes 
(Political) 
Interstate 
War 
(Political) 
Medium Low/Medium Low Low 
 
Fig 4.7 Boundary disputes risk table
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No Expert Threat Interpretation Justification Status 
3 Glenn ISPS-caused 
tension among 
crews and 
nationalities.  
 
An ongoing issue 
regardless of tanker 
design. 
 
Traditional methods of 
crewing and 
recruitment may be 
challenged 
Ongoing 
4 Halliday Limburg-insurance 
levels-attack to 
destabilize Yemen 
(Halliday). 
 
A similar event could 
occur originating 
from a Gulf State. 
 
Increased insurance 
as damaging as 
physical damage 
Ongoing 
5 Butter Iraq pipeline 
damage a ‘carefully 
calibrated scam’ 
(Butter). 
 
Attack(s) on 
pipelines 
 
Attacks on pipelines 
appear worse than 
they really are 
Ongoing 
6 Butter Al-Qaeda damaging 
to Saudi-ex-pats 
leaving. 
 
Shortage of qualified 
engineers 
 
Terrorism causes 
intellectual as well as 
physical damage 
Ongoing 
7 Hooton Overlooked point-
USA is an 18th 
Century nation-said 
to want power but 
not be responsible 
for it. 
 
Continued policy 
friction 
 
US does not always 
intervene 
Ongoing 
8 Hooton M/E Policy deeply 
religiously 
motivated 
How will Sunni and 
Shia live side by 
side? 
Non-political conflict 
difficult to politically 
manage 
Ongoing 
9 Hooton Christian 
fundamentalists in 
USA driving policy 
towards Israel. 
 
US enacts a policy 
which becomes 
detrimental to 
production 
 
US Foreign Policy 
tries to please 
domestic voters 
Ongoing 
10 Hooton Saudi/Islamic 
society in M/E Gulf 
difficult to adapt 
Will the Gulf states 
adapt to a Sunni/Shia 
divide? 
Level of conflict 
between Shi/Sunni 
communities unknown 
Ongoing 
11 Hooton Religious decrees 
are state policy 
Will Gulf state policy 
result in friction? 
Saudi policies often 
clash with US policies 
Ongoing 
12 Hooton Cannot adjust-
spoken work-
illiteracy. 
 
Potential terrorists 
easier to influence 
and recruit 
 
Potential rise in 
terrorism 
Ongoing 
13 Hooton No Arab states 
(except Egypt) have 
the infrastructure to 
build weapons or 
capability to destroy 
Israel. 
If this changes will it 
be easier for 
terrorists to procure 
arms? 
 
Regardless the US 
take Iranian threats 
seriously 
Ongoing 
22 Glenn IMO-minimize 
impact on owners 
who have got it in 
hand 
Will owners refuse to 
send new double hull 
tankers into a 
terrorist area? 
 
Technical risk to 
tankers unknown 
Ongoing 
23 Glenn Titanic triggered 
SOLAS 
SOLAS was 
reactionary.  Will 
there be a 
reactionary action to 
double hull tankers if 
Technical risk to 
tankers unknown 
Ongoing 
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they are susceptible 
to terrorist damage? 
 
24 Glenn ‘Herald of Free 
Enterprise’ and 
‘Estonia’ moved 
regulation forward 
If double hull tankers 
move regulation 
forward will the 
regulation impact on 
their ability to steam 
in the Gulf? 
 
Technical risk to 
tankers unknown 
Ongoing 
25 Butter Algeria-little 
disruption during 
civil conflict 
Will the opposite 
prove true in the 
Gulf? 
 
Regardless the US 
take Iranian threats 
seriously 
Ongoing 
43 Hooton Any attempt to mine 
the Straits of 
Hormuz would 
attract international 
retaliation 
To what extent 
would the 
international 
community retaliate? 
Regardless the US 
take Iranian threats 
seriously 
Current 
44 E.A. 
Gibson 
Saudi’s building 3 
refineries in the Gulf 
Increased traffic of 
finished product. 
Increases tanker 
traffic 
Emerging 
46 E.A. 
Gibson 
Shortage of tankers 
for a ‘shuttle 
service’ 
Oil industry would 
have to rethink 
previous 
arrangements for 
exporting oil from the 
Gulf during conflict. 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Emerging 
47 Glenn If safer fields are 
found and 
commercially viable 
deposits become 
exploited the 
interest in M/E oil 
may fall 
Gulf security may fall 
as interest shifts 
elsewhere 
Fall in Gulf security Future 
51 Glenn Age profile-
diminish-who 
replaces them-
Indian seafarers 
retire at 50 (made 
money by then) 
Could long term 
crewing problems 
affect supply? 
 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Future 
52 Hooton Japan-no foreign 
military experience 
Major Gulf oil 
customers may not 
be deployed to 
defend their interests 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Future 
53 Hooton Japan-constitutional 
problems in sending 
troops abroad 
Major Gulf oil 
customers may not 
be deployed to 
defend their interests 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Future 
54 Hooton Is China capable of 
defending the Gulf? 
Questionable foreign 
involvement too risky 
to rely on. 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Future 
55 Hooton How much religious 
‘feeling’ remains 
after Iraq war? 
Level of future 
unrest unknown 
Potential rise in 
terrorism 
Future 
56 Hooton How will the 
affected generation 
grow up? 
Level of future 
unrest unknown 
Potential rise in 
terrorism 
Future 
57 Hooton Iranian attack on 
Jerusalem unlikely-
Iranians are not 
If Iran were to attack 
Israel would this act 
affect supply? 
Regardless the US 
take Iranian threats 
seriously 
Future 
116 
 
Jews, Arabs or 
Christians) 
 
58 Hooton Mine’s in shallow 
waters only, in the 
deep middle the 
current is too strong 
Shipping lanes may 
not be mined 
Technical risk to 
tankers unknown 
Future 
59 Hooton Submarines-
greatest threat 
How far do Iran’s 
capabilities extend? 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Future 
60 Hooton Anti-sub ships-
India, Pakistan and 
China would join in 
Support from 
international 
community 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Future 
61 Hooton Russia would join in 
for the money 
Support from 
international 
community 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Future 
62 Hooton May result in 
convoys of tankers 
Conflict in the Strait 
of Hormuz would 
present a crisis 
situation. 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Future 
63 Hooton Anti-ship missiles 
can be detected 
Detection technology 
has improved since 
the tanker war. 
Technical risk to 
tankers unknown 
Future 
64 Hooton Missile technology 
has not been 
directed at tankers-
propulsion and 
guidance 
development not 
warhead 
Weapons directed at 
oil tankers have not 
changed since the 
tanker war. 
Technical risk to 
tankers unknown 
Future 
65 Glenn There may not be 
enough UK 
seafarers to call on 
in the event of an 
emergency 
How would the 
international 
community provide 
personnel if a large 
scale deployment to 
the Gulf was 
needed? 
 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Future 
 
 
Analysis 
 
Ongoing risks to the Saudi oil supply chain include potential recruitment of terrorists, 
attacks on pipelines, refineries and the wider infrastructure.  This conclusion concurs with 
the CEPMLP prediction.  The possible infiltration of tanker crews by terrorists and attacks 
on shipping also feature.  In the longer term disapproval aimed at the United States could 
attract more recruits.  The implausible threats pointed towards terrorism causing 
Washington to source oil elsewhere, which is thoroughly unrealistic.  The potential impact 
on the supply chain peaks where shipping becomes the target. 
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Saudi Arabia relies on oil tankers to export crude and any challenge to the security of 
these vessels is of paramount importance.  The limitations are that terrorists do not have 
unlimited resources and manpower so it is unlikely that multiple events will take place 
simultaneously.  However, it is just as unlikely that the Saudi oil infrastructure will not be 
targeted by terrorists at some point due to the global importance and publicity such an 
attack would bring regardless of the impact and consequence.  For this reason the threat 
Saudi Arabia affords lies in the likelihood that the Kingdom will adopt an unfortunate 
position as a terrorist recruiting ground and the potential for terrorist attacks aimed at the 
Kingdom’s oil infrastructure will become high.  
 
Risk 
(Political) 
Threat 
 
Impact Consequence Probability Likelihood 
 
Saudi 
instability 
 
Recruitment of 
terrorists 
(Demographic) 
Low/Medium 
 
 
Medium/High 
 
High 
 
High 
 
Acts of 
terrorism 
(Political) 
Medium/High 
 
 
Medium/High 
 
High 
 
High 
 
 
Fig 4.9 Saudi instability risk table 
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No Expert Threat Interpretation Justification Status 
5 Butter Iraq pipeline 
damage a ‘carefully 
calibrated scam’ 
(Butter). 
 
Attack(s) on 
pipelines 
 
Attacks on pipelines 
appear worse than 
they really are 
Ongoing 
6 Butter Al-Qaeda damaging 
to Saudi-ex-pats 
leaving. 
 
Shortage of qualified 
engineers 
 
Terrorism causes 
intellectual as well as 
physical damage 
Ongoing 
7 Hooton Overlooked point-
USA is an 18th 
Century nation-said 
to want power but 
not be responsible 
for it. 
 
Continued policy 
friction 
 
US does not always 
intervene 
Ongoing 
8 Hooton M/E Policy deeply 
religiously motivated 
How will Sunni and 
Shia live side by 
side? 
Non-political conflict 
difficult to politically 
manage 
Ongoing 
9 Hooton Christian 
fundamentalists in 
USA driving policy 
towards Israel. 
 
US enacts a policy 
which becomes 
detrimental to 
production 
 
US Foreign Policy 
tries to please 
domestic voters 
Ongoing 
10 Hooton Saudi/Islamic 
society in M/E Gulf 
difficult to adapt 
Will the Gulf states 
adapt to a 
Sunni/Shia divide? 
Level of conflict 
between Shi/Sunni 
communities unknown 
Ongoing 
11 Hooton Religious decrees 
are state policy 
Will Gulf state policy 
result in friction? 
Saudi policies often 
clash with US policies 
Ongoing 
12 Hooton Cannot adjust-
spoken work-
illiteracy. 
 
Potential terrorists 
easier to influence 
and recruit 
 
Potential rise in 
terrorism 
Ongoing 
13 Hooton No Arab states 
(except Egypt) have 
the infrastructure to 
build weapons or 
capability to destroy 
Israel. 
If this changes will it 
be easier for 
terrorists to procure 
arms? 
 
Regardless the US 
take Iranian threats 
seriously 
Ongoing 
14 Hooton Naval operations in 
the Gulf are marred 
by a 30 metre haze 
on the surface of 
the sea 
How would this 
affect a future 
closure of the Strait 
of Hormuz? 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Ongoing 
15 Hooton Iran cannot protect 
itself 
Would Iran therefore 
not attempt to 
disrupt supply? 
Regardless the US 
take Iranian threats 
seriously 
Ongoing 
16 Glenn Saudi reserves 
higher now than in 
the 70’s 
The reserves may 
be higher but is the 
technology available 
to extract the oil? 
Can Saudi Spare 
Production Capacity 
meet demand? 
Ongoing 
17 Butter Oil marker works on 
the Dollar 
Do the Iranians 
resent this? 
Regardless the US 
take Iranian threats 
seriously 
Ongoing 
18 Glenn Past behaviour – 
OPEC on full power 
– market share of 
Could OPEC 
compensate for a 
major M/E 
disruption? 
Can Saudi Spare 
Production Capacity 
meet demand? 
Ongoing 
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M/E oil fell 
dramatically 
29 Glenn Current high price 
maybe due to low 
refining capacity 
Are refineries the 
key target for 
disruptions 
Can Saudi Spare 
Production Capacity 
meet demand? 
Ongoing 
30 Butter No real M/E 
leadership figure 
If a leader were to 
emerge, would they 
restrict supply? 
 
Regardless the US 
take Iranian threats 
seriously 
Ongoing 
31 Glenn Few State 
owned/private 
players 
Narrow industry 
decision making 
Will western 
technology endure? 
Ongoing 
33 Glenn Forward projections 
too assuming 
Assumption is based 
on free flow of 
exports 
Can Saudi Spare 
Production Capacity 
meet demand? 
Current 
34 Hooton Iran’s nuclear 
ambition is a 
statement 
Doubt over Iran’s 
capability to develop 
nuclear power 
and/or weapons 
Regardless the US 
take Iranian threats 
seriously 
Current 
35 Hooton Iran’s nuclear 
program is a threat 
reduction exercise 
At what point will 
Iran’s nuclear 
program be 
considered too big a 
risk to destroy by 
hostile forces 
Regardless the US 
take Iranian threats 
seriously 
Current 
36 Butter Iranian decision 
making process 
difficult-Mullahs 
have overruled the 
President 
Will Iran decide to 
block the Strait of 
Hormuz? 
 
Regardless the US 
take Iranian threats 
seriously 
Current 
37 Butter US dependency on 
M/E oil overstated 
in political debate 
Just how important 
will spare production 
capacity be in the 
future? 
 
Can Saudi Spare 
Production Capacity 
meet demand? 
Current 
38 Butter Iran-adverse 
pressure has 
depressed 
production (4MMBD 
for next 5 years 
Will any adverse 
pressure be applied 
to any of the Gulf 
States?  If so, will the 
pressure reduce 
production? 
 
Can Saudi Spare 
Production Capacity 
meet demand? 
Current 
39 Butter Iranian gas projects 
suffered as a result 
of nuclear program 
and internal politics 
How much will the 
Gulf States invest in 
future projects? 
 
Will western 
technology endure? 
Current 
40 CGES Iranian agricultural 
industry returns as 
much to GDP as the 
oil industry 
Belief that Iran 
depends on oil alone 
Regardless the US 
take Iranian threats 
seriously 
Current 
41 E.A. 
Gibson 
Shell proven 
reserves crisis 
motivated interest in 
the industry as well 
as 9/11. 
 
Are Iran’s proven 
reserves accurate? 
 
Regardless the US 
take Iranian threats 
seriously 
Current 
43 Hooton Any attempt to mine 
the Straits of 
Hormuz would 
To what extent 
would the 
international 
community retaliate? 
Regardless the US 
take Iranian threats 
seriously 
Current 
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attract international 
retaliation 
44 E.A. 
Gibson 
Saudi’s building 3 
refineries in the Gulf 
Increased traffic of 
finished product. 
Increases tanker 
traffic 
Emerging 
45 Glenn 2010 double-hull 
phase in complete 
Tanker industry 
struggling to adapt 
to change in 
legislation. 
Technical risk to 
tankers unknown 
Emerging 
47 Glenn If safer fields are 
found and 
commercially viable 
deposits become 
exploited the 
interest in M/E oil 
may fall 
Gulf security may fall 
as interest shifts 
elsewhere 
Fall in Gulf security Future 
48 Hooton The planned Iranian 
Bourse? 
Which currency 
would the Bourse 
trade in?  And if it 
were not the dollar 
then how would the 
US react 
 
Increased sanctions 
against Iran 
Future 
49 Glenn There may not be 
enough UK 
seafarers to call on 
in the event of an 
emergency 
How would the 
international 
community provide 
personnel if a large 
scale deployment to 
the Gulf was 
needed? 
 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Future 
50 Glenn Meeting of 
Commodores in 
1996-Crisis if 
number of Officers 
fell below 10,000 
(Glenn). 
 
How would the 
international 
community provide 
personnel if a large 
scale deployment to 
the Gulf was 
needed? 
 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Future 
51 Glenn Age profile-
diminish-who 
replaces them-
Indian seafarers 
retire at 50 (made 
money by then) 
Could long term 
crewing problems 
affect supply? 
 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Future 
52 Hooton Japan-no foreign 
military experience 
Major Gulf oil 
customers may not 
be deployed to 
defend their 
interests 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Future 
53 Hooton Japan-constitutional 
problems in sending 
troops abroad 
Major Gulf oil 
customers may not 
be deployed to 
defend their 
interests 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Future 
54 Hooton Is China capable of 
defending the Gulf? 
Questionable foreign 
involvement too 
risky to rely on. 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Future 
55 Hooton How much religious 
‘feeling’ remains 
after Iraq war? 
Level of future 
unrest unknown 
Potential rise in 
terrorism 
Future 
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56 Hooton How will the 
affected generation 
grow up? 
Level of future 
unrest unknown 
Potential rise in 
terrorism 
Future 
57 Hooton Iranian attack on 
Jerusalem unlikely-
Iranians are not 
Jews, Arabs or 
Christians) 
If Iran were to attack 
Israel would this act 
affect supply? 
 
Regardless the US 
take Iranian threats 
seriously 
Future 
58 Hooton Mine’s in shallow 
waters only, in the 
deep middle the 
current is too strong 
Shipping lanes may 
not be mined 
Technical risk to 
tankers unknown 
Future 
59 Hooton Submarines-
greatest threat 
How far do Iran’s 
capabilities extend? 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Future 
60 Hooton Anti-sub ships-
India, Pakistan and 
China would join in 
Support from 
international 
community 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Future 
61 Hooton Russia would join in 
for the money 
Support from 
international 
community 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Future 
62 Hooton May result in 
convoys of tankers 
Conflict in the Strait 
of Hormuz would 
present a crisis 
situation. 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Future 
63 Hooton Anti-ship missiles 
can be detected 
Detection 
technology has 
improved since the 
tanker war. 
Technical risk to 
tankers unknown 
Future 
64 Hooton Missile technology 
has not been 
directed at tankers-
propulsion and 
guidance 
development not 
warhead 
Weapons directed at 
oil tankers have not 
changed since the 
tanker war. 
Technical risk to 
tankers unknown 
Future 
65 Glenn There may not be 
enough UK 
seafarers to call on 
in the event of an 
emergency 
How would the 
international 
community provide 
personnel if a large 
scale deployment to 
the Gulf was 
needed? 
 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Future 
 
 
Analysis 
 
Iran’s geographical and political position in the Gulf ascribes potential ongoing, current, 
emerging and future threats to the Gulf oil supply chain.  The predominant themes 
running through all timescales are threats posed by the Iranian regime and its aggressive 
stance towards the US, Tehran’s nuclear ambitions, targeting of oil tankers and the ability 
of opposing nations to respond to these threats.  Howson and Urbach argue that ‘with all 
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things being equal, the larger the apparent effect, the more decisive the inference.’245   
The inference being that due to the threatening nature of Tehran’s policies towards 
Washington and the wider West, Iran has the potential to cause disruptions enacting or 
defending them.  It is also quite possible for multiple events to occur, skirmishes in the 
Gulf could run parallel with the development of the nuclear programme and politico-
religious posturing.  Furthermore, the political climate could bring forward the probability 
of events commented on by interviewees occurring resulting in a high likelihood of events 
taking place.  This said, the threat from Iran fell into three main areas, Tehran’s nuclear 
program, threats to oil tankers and the threat of closing the Strait of Hormuz.  In other 
cases threats were either unrealistic or imbalanced threats that would require a great 
deal of planning to create a small impact. 
 
The Iranian regime is in position to cause disruptions in particular by carrying out a threat 
to close the Strait of Hormuz although the likelihood remains low as the threat is ongoing 
and has yet to be realized.  The potential threat the nuclear programme poses is quite 
different.  The impact could be enormous but a question mark hangs over the probability 
due to the unknown status of the development of a nuclear weapon.  The likelihood of 
Tehran developing a nuclear weapon is high although once developed the weapon is 
likely to be used to gain political leverage rather than be launched against a target.  Iran 
has targeted oil tankers in the past but the effect was limited.  Nevertheless the threat is 
a possibility.  The question of whether the response by opposing nations towards Tehran 
would exasperate a disruption, would depend on the nature of the response. This is 
unknown, as would be the likelihood of such a response ever being needed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
245 Howson, Colin and Urbach, Peter, op cit, 1993, p. 380.  
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Risk 
(Political) 
Threat 
 
Impact Consequence Probability Likelihood 
 
 
Iranians at 
a 
geopolitical 
premium  
(Political) 
Nuclear 
programme 
(Political) 
High High ? Low 
Targeting 
oil tankers 
(Political) 
Low Low High Medium 
Closure of 
the Strait of 
Hormuz 
(Political) 
 
 
High 
 
 
High 
 
 
Medium 
 
 
Medium 
 
Fig 4.11 Iranians at a geopolitical premium risk table
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No Expert Threat Interpretation Justification Status 
1 Butter Robust dependable 
supply chain is an 
unfortunate 
contribution to 
continuing unrest in 
the M/E 
 
If the supply chain 
were to be heavily 
disrupted how would 
the US be affected 
by a drop in supply? 
 
US will remain 
dominant in Gulf 
security 
Ongoing 
2 Glenn IMO-tried to improve 
crew training.. 
 
Will crew issues 
affect supply? 
 
Traditional methods 
of crewing and 
recruitment may be 
challenged 
Ongoing 
3 Glenn ISPS-caused tension 
among crews and 
nationalities.  
 
An ongoing issue 
regardless of tanker 
design. 
 
Traditional methods 
of crewing and 
recruitment may be 
challenged 
Ongoing 
4 Halliday Limburg-insurance 
levels-attack to 
destabilize Yemen 
(Halliday). 
 
A similar event could 
occur originating 
from a Gulf State. 
 
Increased insurance 
as damaging as 
physical damage 
Ongoing 
5 Butter Iraq pipeline damage 
a ‘carefully calibrated 
scam’ (Butter). 
 
Attack(s) on 
pipelines 
 
Attacks on pipelines 
appear worse than 
they really are 
Ongoing 
13 Hooton No Arab states 
(except Egypt) have 
the infrastructure to 
build weapons or 
capability to destroy 
Israel. 
If this changes will it 
be easier for 
terrorists to procure 
arms? 
 
Regardless the US 
take Iranian threats 
seriously 
Ongoing 
14 Hooton Naval operations in 
the Gulf are marred 
by a 30 metre haze 
on the surface of the 
sea 
How would this 
affect a future 
closure of the Strait 
of Hormuz? 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Ongoing 
15 Hooton Iran cannot protect 
itself 
Would Iran therefore 
not attempt to 
disrupt supply? 
Regardless the US 
take Iranian threats 
seriously 
Ongoing 
23 Glenn Titanic triggered 
SOLAS 
SOLAS was 
reactionary.  Will 
there be a 
reactionary action to 
double hull tankers if 
they are susceptible 
to terrorist damage? 
 
Technical risk to 
tankers unknown 
Ongoing 
25 Butter Algeria-little 
disruption during civil 
conflict 
Will the opposite 
prove true in the 
Gulf? 
 
Regardless the US 
take Iranian threats 
seriously 
Ongoing 
26 Glenn Technology driven 
industry can 
increase/develop 
extraction 
Will Western 
technology endure? 
Can Saudi Spare 
Production Capacity 
meet demand? 
Ongoing 
27 Glenn Club of Rome 
(ceased in 1995) did 
not allow for 
technical revolutions 
Will other predictions 
omit important 
factors? 
Technical risk to 
tankers unknown 
Ongoing 
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28 Butter Production risks 
added to supply 
risks 
Will disruptions 
occur through 
conflict or technical 
failures?  
Can Saudi Spare 
Production Capacity 
meet demand? 
Ongoing 
29 Glenn Current high price 
maybe due to low 
refining capacity 
Are refineries the 
key target for 
disruptions 
Can Saudi Spare 
Production Capacity 
meet demand? 
Ongoing 
30 Butter No real M/E 
leadership figure 
If a leader were to 
emerge, would they 
restrict supply? 
 
Regardless the US 
take Iranian threats 
seriously 
Ongoing 
31 Glenn Few State 
owned/private 
players 
Narrow industry 
decision making 
Will western 
technology endure? 
Ongoing 
32 E.A. 
Gibson 
Attack on Limburg 
thought to be an 
internal explosion 
which worried 
insurance 
companies.  Said to 
be a relief that the 
blast was caused by 
terrorists 
Internal explosion 
could potentially 
affect every double 
hull tanker.  
Terrorism only 
affects the targeted 
tanker 
Technical risk to 
tankers unknown 
Ongoing 
33 Glenn Forward projections 
too assuming 
Assumption is based 
on free flow of 
exports 
Can Saudi Spare 
Production Capacity 
meet demand? 
Current 
34 Hooton Iran’s nuclear 
ambition is a 
statement 
Doubt over Iran’s 
capability to develop 
nuclear power 
and/or weapons 
Regardless the US 
take Iranian threats 
seriously 
Current 
35 Hooton Iran’s nuclear 
program is a threat 
reduction exercise 
At what point will 
Iran’s nuclear 
program be 
considered too big a 
risk to destroy by 
hostile forces 
Regardless the US 
take Iranian threats 
seriously 
Current 
37 Butter US dependency on 
M/E oil overstated in 
political debate 
Just how important 
will spare production 
capacity be in the 
future? 
 
Can Saudi Spare 
Production Capacity 
meet demand? 
Current 
38 Butter Iran-adverse 
pressure has 
depressed 
production (4MMBD 
for next 5 years 
Will any adverse 
pressure be applied 
to any of the Gulf 
States?  If so, will the 
pressure reduce 
production? 
 
Can Saudi Spare 
Production Capacity 
meet demand? 
Current 
39 Butter Iranian gas projects 
suffered as a result 
of nuclear program 
and internal politics 
How much will the 
Gulf States invest in 
future projects? 
 
Will western 
technology endure? 
Current 
42 Fanday Re-flagging-Between 
communities-Shia 
flag/Sunni flag? 
 
Will the widening 
Sunni/Shia divide 
affect supply? 
 
Will Iran influence the 
Shia/Sunni conflict?  
Current 
43 Hooton Any attempt to mine 
the Straits of 
Hormuz would 
To what extent 
would the 
international 
community retaliate? 
Regardless the US 
take Iranian threats 
seriously 
Current 
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attract international 
retaliation 
44 E.A. 
Gibson 
Saudi’s building 3 
refineries in the Gulf 
Increased traffic of 
finished product. 
Increases tanker 
traffic 
Emerging 
45 Glenn 2010 double-hull 
phase in complete 
Tanker industry 
struggling to adapt 
to change in 
legislation. 
Technical risk to 
tankers unknown 
Emerging 
46 E.A. 
Gibson 
Shortage of tankers 
for a ‘shuttle service’ 
Oil industry would 
have to rethink 
previous 
arrangements for 
exporting oil from 
the Gulf during 
conflict. 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Emerging 
47 Glenn If safer fields are 
found and 
commercially viable 
deposits become 
exploited the interest 
in M/E oil may fall 
Gulf security may fall 
as interest shifts 
elsewhere 
Fall in Gulf security Future 
65 Glenn There may not be 
enough UK 
seafarers to call on 
in the event of an 
emergency 
How would the 
international 
community provide 
personnel if a large 
scale deployment to 
the Gulf was 
needed? 
 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Future 
 
 
Analysis 
 
Whether US-Saudi oil dependency is overstated or not, Washington relies on an 
unimpeded supply of oil to the market.  In this respect the concerns facing supply which 
encompass ongoing, current, emerging and future risks include the full spectrum of 
political, supply, technological and demographic threats.  The nature of these threats 
ranges from Tehran’s nuclear programme, possible attacks on oil tankers and managing 
the personnel of tanker crews, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and conflict arising 
from the Shia/Sunni divide.  It must be said that the first three of these threats also applied 
to Iran’s geopolitical premium and may well be adopted as such in the further study.  
 
Some of these threats have been recorded being attributed to previous risks.  For 
example in the case of Iran attacks on oil tankers is just one of many threats, but in the 
case of supplying oil to the market, oil tankers are a key component so the impact would 
be far greater.  The only new risk involves technology in that oil field technology drives 
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the ability to export crude to both the US and elsewhere.  Although multiple events are 
unlikely there is always the possibility of conflict in the Gulf involving oil tankers which 
could in turn affect the security of oil field support workers.  The likelihood of the nuclear 
threat remains unknown, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz less so and the possibility of 
oil tankers being attacked also remains a possibility.  The overall likelihood of threats 
occurring against Gulf oil supply probably relies on the actions of Iran. 
 
Risk 
(Political) 
Threat Impact Consequence Probability Likelihood 
 
 
 
 
US-Saudi 
oil 
dependency 
overstated 
Nuclear 
programme 
(Political) 
High High ? Low 
Closure of 
the Strait of 
Hormuz 
(Political) 
High High Medium Medium 
Attacks on 
oil tankers 
(Political) 
Low Low High Medium 
 
Fig 4.13 US-Saudi oil dependency overstated risk table 
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No Expert Threat Interpretation Justification Status 
4 Halliday Limburg-insurance 
levels-attack to 
destabilize Yemen 
(Halliday). 
 
A similar event could 
occur originating 
from a Gulf State. 
 
Increased insurance 
as damaging as 
physical damage 
Ongoing 
5 Butter Iraq pipeline damage 
a ‘carefully calibrated 
scam’ (Butter). 
 
Attack(s) on 
pipelines 
 
Attacks on pipelines 
appear worse than 
they really are 
Ongoing 
6 Butter Al-Qaeda damaging 
to Saudi-ex-pats 
leaving. 
 
Shortage of qualified 
engineers 
 
Terrorism causes 
intellectual as well as 
physical damage 
Ongoing 
25 Butter Algeria-little 
disruption during civil 
conflict 
Will the opposite 
prove true in the 
Gulf? 
 
Regardless the US 
take Iranian threats 
seriously 
Ongoing 
26 Glenn Technology driven 
industry can 
increase/develop 
extraction 
Will Western 
technology endure? 
Can Saudi Spare 
Production Capacity 
meet demand? 
Ongoing 
27 Glenn Club of Rome 
(ceased in 1995) did 
not allow for 
technical revolutions 
Will other predictions 
omit important 
factors? 
Technical risk to 
tankers unknown 
Ongoing 
28 Butter Production risks 
added to supply 
risks 
Will disruptions 
occur through 
conflict or technical 
failures?  
Can Saudi Spare 
Production Capacity 
meet demand? 
Ongoing 
29 Glenn Current high price 
maybe due to low 
refining capacity 
Are refineries the 
key target for 
disruptions 
Can Saudi Spare 
Production Capacity 
meet demand? 
Ongoing 
30 Butter No real M/E 
leadership figure 
If a leader were to 
emerge, would they 
restrict supply? 
 
Regardless the US 
take Iranian threats 
seriously 
Ongoing 
31 Glenn Few State 
owned/private 
players 
Narrow industry 
decision making 
Will western 
technology endure? 
Ongoing 
36 Butter Iranian decision 
making process 
difficult-Mullahs have 
overruled the 
President 
Will Iran decide to 
block the Strait of 
Hormuz? 
 
Regardless the US 
take Iranian threats 
seriously 
Current 
37 Butter US dependency on 
M/E oil overstated in 
political debate 
Just how important 
will spare production 
capacity be in the 
future? 
 
Can Saudi Spare 
Production Capacity 
meet demand? 
Current 
38 Butter Iran-adverse 
pressure has 
depressed 
production (4MMBD 
for next 5 years 
Will any adverse 
pressure be applied 
to any of the Gulf 
States?  If so, will the 
pressure reduce 
production? 
 
Can Saudi Spare 
Production Capacity 
meet demand? 
Current 
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39 Butter Iranian gas projects 
suffered as a result 
of nuclear program 
and internal politics 
How much will the 
Gulf States invest in 
future projects? 
 
Will western 
technology endure? 
Current 
43 Hooton Any attempt to mine 
the Straits of 
Hormuz would 
attract international 
retaliation 
To what extent 
would the 
international 
community retaliate? 
Regardless the US 
take Iranian threats 
seriously 
Current 
46 E.A. 
Gibson 
Shortage of tankers 
for a ‘shuttle service’ 
Oil industry would 
have to rethink 
previous 
arrangements for 
exporting oil from 
the Gulf during 
conflict. 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Emerging 
47 Glenn If safer fields are 
found and 
commercially viable 
deposits become 
exploited the interest 
in M/E oil may fall 
Gulf security may fall 
as interest shifts 
elsewhere 
Fall in Gulf security Future 
65 Glenn There may not be 
enough UK 
seafarers to call on 
in the event of an 
emergency 
How would the 
international 
community provide 
personnel if a large 
scale deployment to 
the Gulf was 
needed? 
 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Future 
 
 
Analysis 
 
As was the case when analysing US-Saudi oil dependency, SPC produced replicated 
threats that would be better absorbed into other risk factors in the further study.  Again 
there were a high number of implausible or imbalanced threats.  Overall the analysis 
highlighted the need for the risk factor to be more specific in content.  
 
Threats to spare capacity realistically fall on two areas, technology and damage.  A lack 
of technology such as maintenance and parts would affect supply, as would damage 
inflicted by terrorists of conflict.  Infrastructure failures are common and vary in size but 
failures are an accepted and, as much as can be expected, anticipated event in 
operations. 
 
The issue of terrorism is a relative unknown although the likelihood remains high 
regarding an attack on the infrastructure.  The same can be said of damage due to 
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conflict, but this would depend on the infrastructure being a target.  The likelihood is that 
spare capacity would fall if the infrastructure is damaged although spare capacity in itself 
is unlikely to be the reason why the infrastructure is targeted.  
 
Risk Threat Impact Consequence Probability Likelihood 
 
 
Lack of 
spare 
productio
n capacity 
(Supply) 
Terrorism 
(political) 
High High High High 
Oil 
infrastructure 
failures 
(Technology
) 
Low/Mediu
m 
Low High High 
Conflict with 
Iran 
(Political) 
Medium Medium Medium/Hig
h 
Low 
 
Fig 4.15 Lack of spare production capacity risk table
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No Expert Threat Interpretation Justification Status 
1 Butter Robust 
dependable supply 
chain is an 
unfortunate 
contribution to 
continuing unrest 
in the M/E 
 
If the supply chain 
were to be heavily 
disrupted how would 
the US be affected by 
a drop in supply? 
 
US will remain 
dominant in Gulf 
security 
Ongoing 
2 Glenn IMO-tried to 
improve crew 
training.. 
 
Will crew issues affect 
supply? 
 
Traditional methods of 
crewing and 
recruitment may be 
challenged 
Ongoing 
3 Glenn ISPS-caused 
tension among 
crews and 
nationalities.  
 
An ongoing issue 
regardless of tanker 
design. 
 
Traditional methods of 
crewing and 
recruitment may be 
challenged 
Ongoing 
4 Halliday Limburg-insurance 
levels-attack to 
destabilize Yemen 
(Halliday). 
 
A similar event could 
occur originating from 
a Gulf State. 
 
Increased insurance 
as damaging as 
physical damage 
Ongoing 
36 Butter Iranian decision 
making process 
difficult-Mullahs 
have overruled the 
President 
Will Iran decide to 
block the Strait of 
Hormuz? 
 
Regardless the US 
take Iranian threats 
seriously 
Current 
37 Butter US dependency 
on M/E oil 
overstated in 
political debate 
Just how important 
will spare production 
capacity be in the 
future? 
 
Can Saudi Spare 
Production Capacity 
meet demand? 
Current 
42 Fanday Re-flagging-
Between 
communities-Shia 
flag/Sunni flag? 
 
Will the widening 
Sunni/Shia divide 
affect supply? 
 
Will Iran influence the 
Shia/Sunni conflict?  
Current 
43 Hooton Any attempt to 
mine the Straits of 
Hormuz would 
attract 
international 
retaliation 
To what extent would 
the international 
community retaliate? 
Regardless the US 
take Iranian threats 
seriously 
Current 
44 E.A. 
Gibson 
Saudi’s building 3 
refineries in the 
Gulf 
Increased traffic of 
finished product. 
Increases tanker 
traffic 
Emerging 
45 Glenn 2010 double-hull 
phase in complete 
Tanker industry 
struggling to adapt to 
change in legislation. 
Technical risk to 
tankers unknown 
Emerging 
46 E.A. 
Gibson 
Shortage of 
tankers for a 
‘shuttle service’ 
Oil industry would 
have to rethink 
previous 
arrangements for 
exporting oil from the 
Gulf during conflict. 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Emerging 
57 Hooton Iranian attack on 
Jerusalem 
unlikely-Iranians 
are not Jews, 
If Iran were to attack 
Israel would this act 
affect supply? 
 
Regardless the US 
take Iranian threats 
seriously 
Future 
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Arabs or 
Christians) 
58 Hooton Mine’s in shallow 
waters only, in the 
deep middle the 
current is too 
strong 
Shipping lanes may 
not be mined 
Technical risk to 
tankers unknown 
Future 
59 Hooton Submarines-
greatest threat 
How far do Iran’s 
capabilities extend? 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Future 
60 Hooton Anti-sub ships-
India, Pakistan 
and China would 
join in 
Support from 
international 
community 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Future 
61 Hooton Russia would join 
in for the money 
Support from 
international 
community 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Future 
62 Hooton May result in 
convoys of tankers 
Conflict in the Strait 
of Hormuz would 
present a crisis 
situation. 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Future 
63 Hooton Anti-ship missiles 
can be detected 
Detection technology 
has improved since 
the tanker war. 
Technical risk to 
tankers unknown 
Future 
64 Hooton Missile technology 
has not been 
directed at 
tankers-propulsion 
and guidance 
development not 
warhead 
Weapons directed at 
oil tankers have not 
changed since the 
tanker war. 
Technical risk to 
tankers unknown 
Future 
65 Glenn There may not be 
enough UK 
seafarers to call 
on in the event of 
an emergency 
How would the 
international 
community provide 
personnel if a large 
scale deployment to 
the Gulf was needed? 
 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Future 
 
 
Analysis 
 
It is highly likely that the resilience of double hull tankers will be tested in combat, or by 
terrorists, or by both.  There was not enough generated data to confirm or deny the 
resilience of a double hull compared to a single hull design.  The high likelihood therefore 
leaves a series of unknowns regarding impact, consequence and probability which needs 
to be explored, as a threat to tankers arises in a number of different areas.  The possibility 
of a closure of the Strait of Hormuz would have a greater effect on the tanker shipping 
industry than individual tankers.  The consequence of a closure is however unknown as 
it would rely on the effectiveness and length of time the Strait was closed to tanker traffic.  
Given that further study on terrorism and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz will be carried 
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forward by other risk factors examining the resilience of double hull tankers will remain a 
priority.  
 
Risk Threat Impact Consequence Probability Likelihood 
 
 
 
Double hull 
tankers 
(Technology) 
Resilience of 
design during 
combat 
(Technology) 
? ? ? High 
Terrorism 
(Political) 
Low Low High High 
Closure of the 
Strait of 
Hormuz 
(Political) 
High High Medium Medium 
 
Fig 4.17 Double hull tankers risk table 
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No Expert Threat Interpretation Justification Status 
16 Glenn Saudi reserves 
higher now than in 
the 70’s 
The reserves may 
be higher but is the 
technology available 
to extract the oil? 
Can Saudi Spare 
Production Capacity 
meet demand? 
Ongoing 
17 Butter Oil marker works on 
the Dollar 
Do the Iranians 
resent this? 
Regardless the US 
take Iranian threats 
seriously 
Ongoing 
25 Butter Algeria-little 
disruption during civil 
conflict 
Will the opposite 
prove true in the 
Gulf? 
 
Regardless the US 
take Iranian threats 
seriously 
Ongoing 
26 Glenn Technology driven 
industry can 
increase/develop 
extraction 
Will Western 
technology endure? 
Can Saudi Spare 
Production Capacity 
meet demand? 
Ongoing 
27 Glenn Club of Rome 
(ceased in 1995) did 
not allow for 
technical revolutions 
Will other predictions 
omit important 
factors? 
Technical risk to 
tankers unknown 
Ongoing 
30 Butter No real M/E 
leadership figure 
If a leader were to 
emerge, would they 
restrict supply? 
 
Regardless the US 
take Iranian threats 
seriously 
Ongoing 
31 Glenn Few State 
owned/private 
players 
Narrow industry 
decision making 
Will western 
technology endure? 
Ongoing 
43 Hooton Any attempt to mine 
the Straits of 
Hormuz would 
attract international 
retaliation 
To what extent 
would the 
international 
community retaliate? 
Regardless the US 
take Iranian threats 
seriously 
Current 
44 E.A. 
Gibson 
Saudi’s building 3 
refineries in the Gulf 
Increased traffic of 
finished product. 
Increases tanker 
traffic 
Emerging 
45 Glenn 2010 double-hull 
phase in complete 
Tanker industry 
struggling to adapt to 
change in legislation. 
Technical risk to 
tankers unknown 
Emerging 
46 E.A. 
Gibson 
Shortage of tankers 
for a ‘shuttle service’ 
Oil industry would 
have to rethink 
previous 
arrangements for 
exporting oil from the 
Gulf during conflict. 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Emerging 
47 Glenn If safer fields are 
found and 
commercially viable 
deposits become 
exploited the interest 
in M/E oil may fall 
Gulf security may fall 
as interest shifts 
elsewhere 
Fall in Gulf security Future 
63 Hooton Anti-ship missiles 
can be detected 
Detection technology 
has improved since 
the tanker war. 
Technical risk to 
tankers unknown 
Future 
64 Hooton Missile technology 
has not been 
directed at tankers-
propulsion and 
guidance 
development not 
warhead 
Weapons directed at 
oil tankers have not 
changed since the 
tanker war. 
Technical risk to 
tankers unknown 
Future 
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65 Glenn There may not be 
enough UK 
seafarers to call on 
in the event of an 
emergency 
How would the 
international 
community provide 
personnel if a large 
scale deployment to 
the Gulf was 
needed? 
 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Future 
 
 
Analysis 
 
The subject of technology is not widely credited with being a key area of energy security 
discussion among political scientists.  Industry data tends not to examine the geopolitical 
aspect of oil exploration in much detail so it is difficult to reach an overall consensus on 
the issue.  Fortunately the study did identify China as being a potential emerging threat 
to traditional US and European suppliers to the KSA.  This discovery and the lack of 
current data indicate a need to pursue this issue. 
 
The US and Europe have held a long running relationship supplying technology to Gulf 
oil exporting states.  It is unlikely that the US and Europe will withdraw from this 
arrangement.  This leaves China as being the main threat to the status quo.  The 
possibility that Saudi Arabia may decide to procure Chinese technology and technical 
services in the future could affect the supply chain.  Local technology is available but not 
on a large scale.  There is a high likelihood that China will enter the oil field technology 
market but the impact is unknown.  
 
Risk Threat Impact Consequence Probability Likelihood 
 
Western 
Technology 
(Technology) 
Is Chinese 
technology 
able to 
replace 
Western 
technology 
(Technology) 
? ? ? High 
 
Fig 4.19 Technology needed from the west risk table 
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No Expert Threat Interpretation Justification Status 
7 Hooton Overlooked point-
USA is an 18th 
Century nation-said 
to want power but 
not be responsible 
for it. 
 
Continued policy 
friction 
 
US does not always 
intervene 
Ongoing 
8 Hooton M/E Policy deeply 
religiously motivated 
How will Sunni and 
Shia live side by 
side? 
Non-political conflict 
difficult to politically 
manage 
Ongoing 
9 Hooton Christian 
fundamentalists in 
USA driving policy 
towards Israel. 
 
US enacts a policy 
which becomes 
detrimental to 
production 
 
US Foreign Policy tries 
to please domestic 
voters 
Ongoing 
10 Hooton Saudi/Islamic 
society in M/E Gulf 
difficult to adapt 
Will the Gulf states 
adapt to a Sunni/Shia 
divide? 
Level of conflict 
between Shi/Sunni 
communities unknown 
Ongoing 
11 Hooton Religious decrees 
are state policy 
Will Gulf state policy 
result in friction? 
Saudi policies often 
clash with US policies 
Ongoing 
12 Hooton Cannot adjust-
spoken work-
illiteracy. 
 
Potential terrorists 
easier to influence 
and recruit 
 
Potential rise in 
terrorism 
Ongoing 
54 Hooton Is China capable of 
defending the Gulf? 
Questionable foreign 
involvement too risky 
to rely on. 
Conflict in the Gulf 
stretch the armed 
forces 
Future 
55 Hooton How much religious 
‘feeling’ remains 
after Iraq war? 
Level of future unrest 
unknown 
Potential rise in 
terrorism 
Future 
 
 
Analysis 
 
As discussed earlier the Sunni/Shia divide was an emerging issue at the time of the study.  
Subsequent events dictate that the subject must be carried forward in the further study. 
 
The Shia/Sunni divide is likely to affect the oil supply chain if the situation results in violent 
unrest that either targets the infrastructure or in cases where the infrastructure is 
damaged but not directly targeted during unrest.  The question of whether unrest 
increases could be linked to policies directed by ruling families who can be both religious 
and political leaders. 
 
Risk Threat Impact Consequence Probability Likelihood 
Shia/Sunni 
divide 
Politico-
religious 
policies 
(Political) 
Low Medium High High 
 
Fig 4.21 Sunni/Shia risk table
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Risk factors 
 
Threat Impact Consequence Probability Likelihood 
Boundary 
disputes 
(Political) 
Interstate War 
(Political) 
Medium Low/Medium Low Low 
 
 
Saudi instability  
(Political) 
Recruitment of 
terrorists 
(Demographic) 
Low/Medium 
 
 
Medium/High 
 
High 
 
High 
 
Acts of terrorism 
(Political) 
Medium/High 
 
 
Medium/High 
 
High 
 
High 
 
 
 
Iranians at a 
geopolitical 
premium 
(Political) 
Nuclear 
programme 
(Political) 
High High ? Low 
Attacks on oil 
tankers 
(Political) 
Low Low High Medium 
Closure of the 
Strait of Hormuz 
(Political) 
High High 
 
 
Medium 
 
 
Medium 
 
 
 
 
US-Saudi oil 
dependency 
overstated 
(Supply) 
Nuclear 
programme 
(Political) 
High High ? Low 
Closure of the 
Strait of Hormuz 
(Political) 
High High Medium Medium 
Attacks on oil 
tankers 
(Political) 
Low Low High Medium 
 
 
Lack of spare 
production 
capacity 
(Supply) 
Terrorism 
(political) 
High High High High 
Oil infrastructure 
failures 
(Technology) 
Low/Medium Low High High 
Conflict with Iran 
(Political) 
Medium Medium Medium/High Low 
 
 
Double hull 
tankers 
(Technology) 
Resilience of 
design during 
combat 
(Technology) 
? ? ? High 
Terrorism 
(Political) 
Low Low High High 
Closure of the 
Strait of Hormuz 
(Political) 
High High Medium Medium 
Western 
technology 
(Technology) 
Is Chinese 
technology able 
to replace 
Western 
technology 
(Technology) 
? ? ? High 
Shia/Sunni 
divide 
(Demographics) 
Politico-religious 
policies 
(Politico-
religious) 
Low Medium High High 
 
Fig 4.23 Prior distribution threat table 
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Prior distribution summary 
 
The prior distribution summary graph contains the amalgamated impact, consequence 
and probability total of each of the eight individual risks measured.  The prior distribution 
threat table (above) lists the number of realistic threats posed to each risk.  The summary 
does not include improbable threats that were identified when the graphs were analysed. 
 
The prior distribution graph points to some risks being greater than others where the 
probability is higher than the impact and consequence.  In cases where the probability is 
just above the impact and consequence, it is unlikely that the impact would occur.  In the 
case of double hull tankers the probability is between the impact and consequence 
indicating that in this case there is not enough technical data to calculate the probability 
of an event occurring. 
 
The table contains an indication of the likelihood of an event from realistically happening.  
The logic being that even if the right conditions for a threat were to occur, the actual 
likelihood of the event realistically happening given historical and other known evidence 
is low, medium or high.     
 
Given that each of the eight risk factors were tested against sixty five perceived threats, 
overall the total threat rating score applied to each of the eight risk factors on the graph 
is representative of the results on the Prior Distribution Threat Table.  Both the Prior 
Distribution Graph and Prior Distribution Threat Table qualify themselves in that the data 
is compatible.  Below is a summary of the eight risk factors.  The summary will discuss 
whether the individual risk factor is worthy of further study or not and if the threats 
associated with a risk factor will be absorbed by a more appropriate risk factor in the 
group.  
 
Boundary disputes 
 
At the beginning of the exercise boundary disputes were calculated as being a medium 
threat to the oil supply chain.  The observation records that there is a low likelihood that 
an event will take place.  Although a boundary disputes were fought over during the Iran-
Iraq war and led to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq causing a large supply disruption, the 
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removal of Saddam Husain has significantly removed the threat towards boundary 
disputes.  Given the available data, boundary disputes as a stand-alone risk need not be 
included in any further study. 
 
Saudi instability 
 
The two main threats to the supply chain if terrorism increases in Saudi Arabia are the 
recruitment of terrorists and acts of terror.  The data pointed to any other threats as being 
unlikely.  Existing knowledge indicated that there is a high likelihood of recruitment and 
acts of terror already taking place and will continue to do so in the future.  Immediately 
post 9/11 terrorism was viewed as a discontinuation away from traditional methods of 
conflict in the Gulf region.  Terrorism has to some extent endured.  For this reason 
terrorism will be viewed as a continuation, in that acts of terror continue to be a current 
ongoing political threat. 
 
Iran at a geopolitical premium 
 
The observation indicated that Iran posed three main threats to the oil supply chain.  
Tehran’s nuclear programme has a high likelihood of succeeding but whether Tehran will 
use a nuclear weapon in anger or keep their arsenal as a deterrent is unclear.  There is 
a low likelihood that Iran will target oil tankers even though Tehran has previously carried 
out attacks in the ‘tanker war’ and retains the means and ability to do so again.  Tehran 
has threatened to attack tankers on many occasions since the tanker war but has failed 
to execute the threat.  The regime could disrupt supply by closing the Strait of Hormuz.  
Iran has threatened to close the Straits before but as yet Tehran has yet to act or revealed 
how they could close the Strait.  In all three cases the probability is that conditions for an 
event could materialise however the likelihood of the threat being executed is low.  Iran 
continues to hold the latent capability to threaten KSA oil exports.  Tehran’s nuclear 
program was a discontinuation away from traditional ordnance.  However, the program 
has endured against international pressure and will be cited as a continuing ongoing 
program leading to a future political threat.     
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US-Saudi oil dependency overstated 
 
As discussed earlier the threats identified will be absorbed by other risk factors in further 
study. 
 
Lack of Spare Production Capacity (SPC) 
 
As discussed earlier the threats identified will be absorbed by other risk factors in further 
study. 
 
Double hull tankers 
 
Analysis of the graph identifies the need for further study to determine whether the 
consequence of an impact will be any better or worse than to a single hull tanker.  Double 
hull tankers were a discontinuation away from single hull tankers.  Double hulls face two 
major threats, being targeted in combat and the resilience of their design.  Further study 
will cite double hull tankers as a continuing ongoing technological risk.  How double hull 
tankers react in combat depends largely on their resilience.  However, the unknown data 
in this area has created a collapse in the graph, where there is a distinct probability of 
impact but a void in determining the consequence.  Given that there is a high future 
likelihood of tankers being targeted by terrorists, and in combat, this knowledge is key to 
determining risk.  The threats of terrorism and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz would 
be better absorbed by other risk factors in later study.  Absorbing and merging threats 
will not alter the overall results.  Duplicating threats will only produce unnecessary data 
to analyse.     
 
Western technology 
 
The graph indicates that threats to the traditional US and European providers of 
technology could impact on supply.  The introduction of China to the oil field service sector 
has already gained momentum.  The extent, quality and reliability of Chinese products in 
the market is currently unknown.  Given that China is identified as having a prolific 
problem breaching copyright and producing cheap counterfeit items, the threat China 
poses to traditional suppliers and the oil supply chain has potential.  China’s introduction 
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was a discontinuation away from traditional US and European suppliers.  China has to 
some extent established itself as a supplier.  This being the case China is viewed in 
further study as a continuing ongoing technological threat.  Data on this subject has not 
been discussed among current energy security academic literature and as such requires 
further investigation.  
 
Shia/Sunni divide 
 
As mentioned earlier the ‘Arab Spring’ revolutions took place after the study was 
performed.  The Sunni/Shia divide was gaining prominence due to the continuing violence 
in Iraq.  The threat to the KSA oil supply chain may appear vicarious but the growing 
prominence of inter (Muslim) sect unrest has increasingly become politically complex in 
nature.  For the sake of this study the Sunni/Shia divide has shifted from being a 
discontinuation of the previously relative peace to an ongoing, politico-religious 
continuation.  In further study the Sunni/Shia divide would be better placed in such a 
context where the perceived threat the divide holds could be better measured against the 
Saudi oil supply chain. 
 
Forming a posterior distribution 
 
The initial prior distribution contained eight risk factors that were each tested against sixty 
five perceived threats of varying impact, consequence, probability and likelihood.  
Improbable and imbalanced threats were discounted as were threats that no longer 
realistically exist.   The scores were plotted on individual graphs and analysed. 
 
During the analysis process it was discovered that some threats were duplicated and 
would be best absorbed or merged together into the common origin of the threat.  The 
data regarding realistic threats that have a low, medium or high likelihood of impacting 
on the KSA oil supply chain were tabulated at the end of the analysis of each of the eight 
risk factors.  The category, be it political or technology etc., was applied to determine the 
social ‘driver’ behind the threat.  The Posterior Distribution Threat Table (below) displays 
all the threats identified in the Prior Distribution Threat Table except duplicated threats 
that have been merged or absorbed into four or the original eight risk factors. 
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Risk factors 
 
Threat Impact Consequence Probability Likelihood 
 
 
Saudi instability  
(Political) 
Recruitment of 
terrorists 
(Demographic) 
 
Low/Medium 
 
 
 
Medium/High 
 
 
High 
 
 
High 
 
Politico-religious 
policies 
(Politico-
religious) 
 
Low 
 
Medium 
 
High 
 
High 
Acts of terrorism 
(Political) 
Medium/High 
 
 
Medium/High 
 
High 
 
High 
 
 
Iranians at a 
geopolitical 
premium 
(Political) 
Nuclear 
programme 
(Political) 
High High ? High 
Closure of the 
Strait of Hormuz 
(Political) 
 
High 
 
High 
 
High 
 
 
? 
  
Double hull 
tankers 
(Technology) 
Resilience of 
design during 
combat 
(Technology) 
 
? 
 
? 
 
? 
 
High 
Western 
technology 
(Technology) 
Is Chinese 
technology able 
to replace 
Western 
technology 
(Technology) 
 
? 
 
? 
 
? 
 
High 
 
 
Fig 4.24 Posterior distribution threat table 
 
Overall the success of the assessment cannot be understated.  The results have not 
produced unsubstantiated assumptions or implied threats that scatter reason.  The 
results have instead produced a clear, realistic and focussed posterior distribution that is 
in line with current academic discussion regarding threats to the region.  More importantly 
the assessment has exposed perceived threats to two new areas, double hull tankers 
and oil field technology that are not represented in current literature. 
 
Given the role that double hull tankers and oil field technology play in the KSA oil supply 
chain it is of key importance that these two areas are examined in greater depth in the 
final prior distribution assessment.  Data from all areas of the posterior distribution table 
will therefore be carried forward to assist in forming the final prior distribution to determine 
risk to the KSA supply chain.     
150 
 
Chapter 5 
 
Final Prior Distribution 
 
In this chapter the posterior distribution generated in Chapter 4 will be reconstituted to 
form the final prior distribution.  A new data collecting design will also be introduced.  
The new design will switch attention away from amassing data and focus instead on 
drafting prior distribution questions that when answered in Chapter 6 will reveal the 
likelihood of a threat materializing and where appropriate the extent of the disruption 
to the KSA oil supply chain.     
 
Reducing unnecessary data 
 
In order to reduce the amount of unnecessary data generated during the first prior 
distribution a new empirical stage design will be constructed (see fig 5.1: research 
framework below).246   
 
                             Literature                            Theory 
                                   ↓                                          ↓                
Research area → Topic → Questions → Hypotheses → │Design → Data collection → Data analysis → Test hypotheses                          
                                   ↑ 
                             Context 
 
                    Pre-empirical stage                                                                                   Empirical stage 
 
Fig 5.1 Research framework 
 
In order to arrive at the results in the first posterior distribution, 65 perceived threats 
were measured against 3 variables (impact, consequence, probability) against each 
of 8 risk factors producing a total of 1560 measurements.  This method produced a 
great deal of data to analyse which also included a large number of improbable threats.  
As the previous assessment revealed all manner of threats are probable although far 
fewer are likely to materialise. 
 
                                                 
246 Punch, Keith F, Introduction to Social Research Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches (Second Edition), 
Sage, London, 2005, p. 40. 
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New empirical stage design 
 
The data collection design in Chapter 4 concedes to the point that the risk factors in 
the first prior distribution were static in that they did not apply specific questions for the 
enquiry to produce relative data.  Instead the assessment amassed both specific and 
a large amount of unnecessary data.   
 
PRIOR DISTRIBUTION → LIKELYHOOD → LOSS FUNCTION 
 
The empirical research design (above)247 will assign appropriate questions to the six 
prior distribution risk factors.  The questions will be specific to the threats identified in 
Chapter 4.  The ‘likelihood’ of the threats materializing and ‘loss function’ if the threats 
are executed will be determined in Chapter 6. 
 
Reconstituting the posterior distribution into the final prior distribution 
 
The first assessment produced four out of the original eight risk factors that will assist 
in forming the second prior distribution. The assessment did produce a set of robust 
results but the exercise also identified that some risks, Spare Production Capacity and 
US-Saudi oil dependency, were not specific enough to the supply chain to produce 
advantageous results and have therefore been removed.  
 
The process of reconstituting the posterior distribution into the final prior distribution is 
described from left to right in the table below.  The four remaining risk factors are listed 
in the left hand column.  On the right are listed the perceived threats to the risk factor.  
The third column lists any action to be taken regarding reconstituting the posterior risk 
into the final prior distribution.  The final column contains a list of the final prior 
distribution risk factors.  A detailed commentary beneath each table explains the logic 
behind the reconstitution process. 
 
 
 
                                                 
247 Taken from within text Alexander, Carol, Market Risk Analysis – Value at Risk Models, John Wiley and Sons, 
Chichester, 2008, p. 375. 
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FORMING THE SECOND PRIOR DISTRIBUTION 
Risk factor Threats Action Final Prior 
Distribution 
 
 
 
Saudi instability 
(Political) 
 
Recruitment of 
terrorists 
(Demographic) 
 
 
Divide the original 
risk factor into two 
new relevant risk 
factors  
 
Terrorism 
Politico-religious 
policies (Politico-
religious) 
 
 
Instability within 
the KSA 
Acts of terrorism 
(Political) 
 
 
Fig 5.2 Forming the Second Prior Distribution: Saudi instability if terrorism increases 
 
In the first instance it is apparent that despite the results the risk factor was too broad 
a subject.  The risk factor contains two elements, terrorism and instability of the KSA.  
A more satisfactory approach would be to create two new prior distribution risk factors 
that could challenge the KSA oil supply chain. 
 
The first new risk factor, fig. 5.2, will centre on the likelihood of terrorism disrupting the 
KSA oil infrastructure. 248   The second new risk factor will centre on the likelihood of 
domestic instability within the KSA disrupting the supply chain249. As mentioned 
earlier, the thesis was researched just as the ‘Arab Spring’250 revolutions spread 
through the Middle East.  With this in mind the thesis would be incomplete without the 
risk of domestic instability within the KSA being analysed. 
 
The inclusion of domestic instability in the KSA as a risk factor came as a direct result 
of the impact the ‘Arab Spring’ revolutions had on the Arab world.  The ‘Arab Spring’ 
                                                 
248 Al-Ahmed, Ali, Bond, Andrew, Morillo, Daniel, Security Threats to Saudi Arabia’s Oil 
Infrastructure,http://www.gulfinstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/11/Threats_to_the_Saudi_Oil_Infrastructure.pdf 
249 Cordesman, Anthony, Understanding Saudi Stability and Instability in a very different Nation, 
CSIS,https://www.csis.org/analysis/understanding-saudi-stability-and-instability-very-different-nation 
250 Cordesman, Anthony, Rethinking the Arab Spring, CSIS, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/legacy_files/files/publication/111102_MENA_Stability_Security.pdf 
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was a distant unprecedented event when research began on this thesis.  However, 
even though the timing of the ‘Arab Spring’ coincided with ongoing research, Bayesian 
methodology invites the inclusion of sudden new or additional risk factors in the 
problem solving process.  In this respect the thesis benefitted from a methodology that 
can adapt to an ever changing set of events.  Placing domestic instability in the final 
prior distribution is a logical and highly relevant risk factor to consider. 
 
The two new risk factors complement one another and provide room for the threats of 
terrorist recruitment, acts of terror and politico religious policies to be discussed among 
industrial and social settings.  The inclusion of instability with the KSA will also give 
room to examine the extent to which the Sunni/Shia divide could challenge the supply 
chain.  A further point is that so far the prior distribution is only represented by political 
and technology driven risks.  The addition of instability to the KSA will include data on 
how Saudi society could challenge the oil supply chain. 
 
Risk factor Threats Action Final Prior 
Distribution 
 
Iranians at a 
geopolitical 
premium 
(Political) 
 
Nuclear 
programme 
(Political) 
The closure of the 
Strait of Hormuz 
would cause the 
greatest disruption 
to the KSA oil 
supply chain 
 
Strait of Hormuz 
 
Closure of the 
Strait of Hormuz 
(Political) 
 
 
Fig 5.3 Forming the Second Prior Distribution: Iranians at a geopolitical premium  
 
Tehran’s nuclear program is yet to confirm whether a weapon has been successfully 
developed.  However the likelihood is that the program will succeed.  In regard to 
Tehran closing the Strait of Hormuz, the likelihood is unknown.  Firstly because Tehran 
has threatened to close the Strait on numerous occasions in the past but never 
executed the threat.  Secondly because any future decision to close the Strait may 
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depend on the development of a nuclear weapon which is likely to enhance Tehran’s 
posturing. 
 
In the new prior distribution, fig. 5.3, the two threats will be subsumed.  Furthermore, 
when Tehran develops a nuclear weapon it will increase Iran’s geopolitical influence.  
The most obvious threat Iran poses to the KSA supply chain is the possibility that 
Tehran will close the Strait of Hormuz.  This being the case, as shown in the table the 
Strait of Hormuz would be a more relevant risk factor to analyse in the second prior 
distribution. 
 
Risk factor Threat Action Final Prior 
Distribution 
 
Double hull 
tankers 
(Technology) 
 
Resilience of 
design during 
combat 
(Technology) 
 
 
Bring forward 
 
Double hull 
tankers 
 
Fig 5.4 Forming the Second Prior Distribution: Double hull tankers 
 
In the first assessment double hull tankers were seen to be challenged by the external 
threat of combat and the structural threat regarding their resilience.  When forming the 
posterior distribution it became clear that the key question of loss function lay with the 
resilience of the design. 
 
As data already exists regarding the resilience of single hull tankers the severity of the 
loss function rests on whether the likelihood of the structure of a double hull tanker is 
less than that of a single hull tanker.  If, as displayed in fig 5.4, a double hull tanker 
proves to be just as resilient, or more resilient, than a single hull tanker the loss 
function will be either potentially the same as or less than that of a single hull tanker.  
Not only is this measurement important to the shipping industry but the outcome could 
also affect insurance rates during times of heightened tension in the Gulf. 
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Risk factor Threat Action Final Prior 
Distribution 
Western 
Technology 
(Technology) 
 
Chinese 
technology 
(Technology) 
 
Bring forward US and European 
oil industry 
technology 
 
Fig 5.5 Forming the Second Prior Distribution: Western Technology 
 
The reason why this risk factor remains is outlined above in fig 5.5 and earlier in more 
detail in Chapter 4.  China has been quite aggressive at acquiring its market share of 
home produced goods and services.  Former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia stated 
since 9/11 ‘Aramco is now sending most of its trainees to countries other than the 
US.’251  Oil field goods and services are key to production therefore the evaluation of 
Chinese products in this market is crucial. 
 
  
Threats 
 
Action 
Final Prior 
Distribution 
 
 
Politico-religious 
policies (Politico-
religious) 
 
 
 
Introduce Ex-pats 
to the prior 
distribution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ex-pats 
Chinese 
technology 
(Technology) 
Acts of terrorism 
(Political) 
 
Fig 5.6 Forming the Second Prior Distribution: Introducing Ex-pat workers 
 
The final prior distribution, fig 5.6, will also include ex-pat workers.  Ex-pats were 
mentioned by many of the interviewees in Chapter 4.  Saudi Arabia has a huge ex-pat 
                                                 
251 McPherson, Hugo, et al, Emerging Threats to Energy Security and Stability, Springer, Dordrecht, 2005, p.120. 
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and migrant worker population.  The ex-pats fill a variety of roles from senior 
management positions to domestic help.  They are separated from the domestic Saudi 
population but collectively play a key role in Saudi society.  However, ex-pats are at 
risk to cultural, technological and terrorist threats.  The Introduction of ex-pat workers 
into the prior distribution will allow analysis as to whether the actions of ex-pats could 
in any way disrupt the KSA oil supply chain. 
 
Refocusing the prior distribution  
 
Even when specific questions are applied it may be that the true magnitude of the 
threat cannot be identified because the threat is emerging, lacks data or carries a 
stigma such as ‘it will never happen’.  In this situation the likelihood of a threat 
materializing is either unknown in the case of emerging or data deficient threats, or 
inconceivable in the case of threats that are discounted on the basis that ‘it will never 
happen’. 
 
Analysis of the data in Chapter 4 identified that the emotive nature of implied threats 
can impair judgement.  In situations where ‘it will never happen’ are applied to threats 
the prognosis is equally guilty of prejudgement.  The stigma of prejudgement can often 
become a norm in that it becomes accepted practice not to explore the consequences 
of an event if it did happen.  The consequences of challenging and breaking prejudged 
norms are well known to society through the process of law.  Legal challenges to 
ending racial segregation and legalizing abortion are two examples where pre-existing 
norms were judged to be unlawful and overturned.  In such cases the net effect of 
overturning the norm is not held in the question ‘Will the case be won?’  Instead the 
net effect is held in the unprecedented judgement ‘If the case is won – how will the 
outcome change society?’ 
 
It will never happen! 
 
In respect to the thesis there appears to be a stigma of disbelief attached to the closure 
of the Strait of Hormuz.  The lack of existing data discussing the net effect if the Straits 
were to close points towards the closure of the Straits of Hormuz as being 
inconceivable.  Disbelief that the Straits will close has become an established ‘norm’ 
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that has resulted in scant regard to calculating the consequences if the Straits were to 
close.  Inconceivability can be linked to rhetoric.  The inconceivability of the Straits of 
Hormuz ever closing may stem from Iran’s repeated threats to close the Strait which 
never materialize.  However, when a new threat is introduced, in this case the threat 
of nuclear arms, the continuity of Iran’s arsenal consisting of conventional weapons 
alone ends.  The situation requires re-evaluation.  For this reason, in order to evaluate 
the overall risk the data collection process will not only ask ‘will’ a threat materialise, 
because it may already have materialised, but where appropriate also enquire ‘if’ the 
threat became more prominent or did materialize what would be the loss?    
 
Cross referencing data 
 
A further observation of the results reveals that several of the risks could impact upon 
one another.  For example terrorism could impact on double hull tankers, as would the 
closure of the Strait of Hormuz.  The final prior distribution would benefit from a cross 
referencing exercise.  The first prior distribution contained too many risks and variables 
for a cross reference exercise to take place because the system of data collection was 
too complex.     
 
The cross referencing exercise will assist in establishing significant prior distribution 
questions by removing unnecessary data and determining whether any of the six risk 
factors could impact on each other.  Cross referencing will take place in two stages, 
firstly the question ‘will’ is asked, in that will one risk factor affect another and secondly 
the ‘if’ question, in that if it does then what will be the loss function.  In order to track 
the development of the cross-referencing exercise the risk factors have been colour 
coded.  The process is explained below. 
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Fig 5.7 Cross referencing risks process diagram 
Each of the six 
prior 
distribution 
risk factors is 
cross 
referenced 
against each 
other in the 
‘will’ and ‘if’ 
tables.
The resulting 
‘combination’ 
is numbered 
and listed 
underneath 
the table
Under each 
individual risk 
factor is a list 
of every 
‘combination’ 
that relates to 
that individual 
risk factor. 
The list of 
‘combinations’ 
is analysed and 
any realistic 
combinations or 
reconstituted 
combinations 
are listed below 
under ‘prior 
distribution 
questions’
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Fig 5.8 CROSS REFERENCING TABLE ASKING ‘WILL’ 
 
 
 
WILL 
 
 
US and 
European oil 
industry 
technology 
 
 
 
KSA instability 
 
 
 
Strait of 
Hormuz 
 
 
 
Double-hulled 
 
 
Terrorism 
 
 
 
Ex-pats 
 
 
US and European oil industry 
technology 
 
 
- 
 
4 
 
8 
 
- 
 
14 
 
18 
 
KSA instability 
 
 
1 
 
- 
 
9 
 
- 
 
15 
 
19 
 
Strait of Hormuz    
 
 
- 
 
5 
 
- 
 
13 
 
- 
 
20 
 
Double-hulled  
 
- 
 
- 
 
10 
 
- 
 
16 
 
- 
 
Terrorism  
 
 
2 
 
6 
 
11 
 
- 
 
- 
 
21 
 
Ex-pats 
 
 
3 
 
7 
 
12 
 
- 
 
17 
 
- 
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‘Will’ Combinations 
 
1. Will the endurance of US and European oil field technology cause instability in the KSA? 
2. Will US and European oil field dominance and technology in Aramco become a target for terrorists? 
3. Will ex-pat workers be safe working with US and European oil field technology in Aramco? 
4. Will domestic instability in the KSA affect the endurance of US and European oil technology in Aramco? 
5. Will domestic instability in the KSA be cause for Iran to close the Strait of Hormuz? 
6. Will domestic instability in the KSA cause terrorists to attack the oil infrastructure? 
7. Will domestic instability in the KSA threaten the safety of ex-pat oil workers? 
8. Will the closure of the Straits of Hormuz affect the endurance of US and European oil field dominance and technology in 
Aramco? 
9. Will the closure of the Straits of Hormuz cause instability in the KSA? 
10. Will the closure of the Straits of Hormuz be a threat to the safety of double-hulled oil tankers? 
11. Will the closure of the Straits of Hormuz result in an increase in terrorism aimed at the oil infrastructure? 
12. Will the closure of the Straits of Hormuz threaten the safety of ex-pat oil workers? 
13. Will the new design of double-hulled tankers cause Iran to close the Straits of Hormuz? 
14. Will terrorism aimed at the oil infrastructure affect the endurance of US and European oil field dominance and technology in 
Aramco? 
15. Will terrorism cause instability in the KSA? 
16. Will terrorists target oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz? 
17. Will terrorists continue to threaten the safety of ex-pat oil workers? 
18. Will the continued presence of ex-pat oil workers ensure the endurance of US and European oil field technology in Aramco? 
19. Will the safety of ex-pats continue to be a cause for concern in Aramco? 
20. Will the presence of ex-pat oil workers in the KSA result in Iran closing the Strait of Hormuz? 
21. Will the presence of ex-pat oil workers in the KSA be responsible for a rise in terrorism aimed at the oil infrastructure? 
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Fig 5.9 CROSS REFERENCING TABLE ASKING ‘IF’ 
 
 
 
 
 
IF 
 
 
US and 
European oil 
industry 
technology 
 
 
 
KSA instability 
 
 
 
Strait of 
Hormuz 
 
 
 
Double-hulled 
 
 
Terrorism 
 
 
 
Ex-pats 
US and European oil industry 
technology 
 
 
- 
 
26 
 
30 
 
- 
 
- 
 
40 
 
KSA instability 
 
 
22 
 
- 
 
31 
 
- 
 
37 
 
41 
 
Strait of Hormuz    
 
 
23 
 
27 
 
- 
 
35 
 
38 
 
- 
 
Double-hulled 
 
- 
 
- 
 
32 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
Terrorism 
 
24 
 
28 
 
33 
 
36 
 
- 
 
42 
 
Ex-pats 
 
 
25 
 
29 
 
34 
 
- 
 
39 
 
- 
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‘If’ Combinations 
 
22. If US and European oil industry technology endures at Aramco, will its presence contribute towards instability in the KSA? 
23. If US and European oil industry technology endures at Aramco, could its presence be a contributing factor towards Iran 
closing the Strait of Hormuz?  
24. If US and European oil industry technology endures at Aramco, will the presence of this technology result in an increase in 
terrorist attacks? 
25. If US and European oil industry technology endures at Aramco, will the lives of ex-pats be any safer? 
26. If the KSA becomes more unstable, will US and European oil industry technology endure at Aramco? 
27. If the KSA becomes more unstable, will Iran close the Straits of Hormuz? 
28. If the KSA becomes more unstable, will terrorism aimed at the oil infrastructure increase? 
29. If the KSA becomes more unstable, will ex-pats be safe? 
30. If Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz, will US and European oil field technology endure at Aramco? 
31. If Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz, will the closure be a cause for concern at Aramco? 
32. If Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz, will double-hulled tankers be a possible target? 
33. If Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz, will terrorism aimed at the oil infrastructure increase? 
34. If Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz, will Saudi based ex-pats be safe? 
35. If double-hulled tankers are more susceptible to damage than single hulled tankers, will this knowledge prompt Iran to close 
the Strait of Hormuz?   
36. If double-hulled tankers are more susceptible to damage than single hulled tankers, will this knowledge prompt terrorists to 
attack them? 
37. If terrorism aimed at the oil infrastructure increases, will the attacks cause instability in the KSA? 
38. If terrorism aimed at the oil infrastructure increases, will the attacks prompt Iran to close the Strait of Hormuz? 
39. If terrorism aimed at the oil infrastructure increases, will the safety of ex-pats be affected? 
40. If the safety of ex-pats is not assured, will US and European oil industry technology endure at Aramco? 
41. If the safety of ex-pats cannot be assured, will their situation become a concern for Aramco? 
42. If the safety of ex-pats cannot be assured, will terrorist attacks on the oil infrastructure increase?   
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Summary of prior distribution questions 
 
Analysis of the summary prior distribution questions reveals that a number of 
questions need to be reassigned to more appropriate risk factors.   
 
US and European oil industry technology prior distribution questions 
1. If Aramco introduced Chinese technology will production suffer? 
 
2. If Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz, how will the closure affect Saudi 
Aramco’s operations? (move to Strait of Hormuz) 
 
KSA instability prior distribution questions 
3. Will ex-pats cause friction among the Saudi people? (move to ex-pats) 
 
4. If terrorism in Saudi Arabia increased, would Saudi Security Forces have 
the capability to protect the oil infrastructure and oil industry ex-pat 
personnel from attack? (move to terrorism) 
 
5. If ex-pat Aramco employees fled Saudi Arabia, would Aramco be able to 
operate without them? (move to ex-pats) 
 
6. Will the presence of ex-pat oil workers in Saudi Arabia cause an increase 
in acts of terrorism aimed at Aramco and the wider oil infrastructure? 
(move to ex-pats) 
 
Strait of Hormuz prior distribution questions 
7. Will Iran close the Strait of Hormuz? 
 
8. If Iran closes the Strait of Hormuz will this affect tanker traffic? 
 
Double-hulled oil tankers prior distribution questions 
9. Will double-hulled tankers be more susceptible to damage than single 
hulled tankers?  
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10. If double-hulled tankers are more susceptible to damage than single hulled 
tankers, will this knowledge prompt Iran and/or terrorists to attack them? 
 
Terrorism prior distribution questions 
11. If terrorists discover that double-hulled tankers are more susceptible to 
damage than single hulled tankers, will attacks against double-hulled 
tankers increase? 
 
Ex-pats prior distribution questions  
12. If Saudization continues will the project result in a decrease in the number 
of Saudi based ex-pat oil industry employees? 
 
13. If the Saudi government cannot assure the safety of ex-pat oil workers, will 
they leave their posts? 
 
Re-assigned prior distribution questions 
 
The list of reassigned prior distribution questions below will form the basis for collecting 
data on the six risk factors for analysis in Chapter 6.  The diagram (below) depicts the 
inter-connections between the risk factors.  The diagram is colour coded so the 
connections between risk factors can be tracked.  The numbers assigned to each 
connection refers to the prior distribution question number. 
 
The recently introduced risk factor of instability within the KSA is left without any prior 
distribution questions.  Although fundamental drivers for KSA internal stability, the 
Saudi government, security forces and people are connected to other risk factors, the 
drivers are not pitched against each other.  This being the case suitable questions will 
be constituted to determine precisely which threats could cause instability within the 
KSA.    
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   Fig 5.10 Risk factor interconnection diagram    
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US and European oil industry technology prior distribution questions 
1. If Aramco introduced Chinese technology will production suffer? 
 
KSA instability prior distribution questions 
 
Strait of Hormuz prior distribution questions 
7 Will Iran close the Strait of Hormuz? 
 
8 If Iran closes the Strait of Hormuz will this affect tanker traffic? 
2. If Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz, how will the closure affect Saudi Aramco’s 
operations?  
 
Double-hulled oil tankers prior distribution questions 
9 Will double-hulled tankers be more susceptible to damage than single hulled 
tankers?  
 
10 If double-hulled tankers are more susceptible to damage than single hulled 
tankers, will this knowledge prompt Iran and/or terrorists to attack them? 
 
Terrorism prior distribution questions 
11 If terrorists discover that double-hulled tankers are more susceptible to 
damage than single hulled tankers, will attacks against double-hulled tankers 
increase? 
 
1. If terrorism in Saudi Arabia increased, would Saudi Security Forces have the 
capability to protect the oil infrastructure and oil industry ex-pat personnel 
from attack?  
 
Ex-pats prior distribution questions  
3 Will ex-pats cause friction among the Saudi people?  
 
13 If the Saudi government cannot assure the safety of ex-pat oil workers, will 
they leave their posts? 
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6 Will the presence of ex-pat oil workers in Saudi Arabia cause an increase in 
acts of terrorism aimed at Aramco and the wider oil infrastructure?  
 
2. If ex-pat Aramco employees fled Saudi Arabia, would Aramco be able to 
operate without them?  
 
12 If Saudization continues will the project result in a decrease in the number of 
Saudi based ex-pat oil industry employees? 
 
Assigning prior distribution questions to instability in the KSA affecting the 
oil supply chain 
 
Past and current literature has repeatedly questioned the stability of Saudi Arabia 
from a political, economic and societal perspective.  Visceral threats to internal 
stability range from the actions of the Royal family, the effect of reforms, terrorism, 
the economy, fundamentalism, young people, unemployment, Sunni/Shia 
sectarian conflict, instability among regional neighbours and pressure from foreign 
powers.  Whereas any number of these examples could affect the KSA oil supply 
chain, some would have a greater affect than others.  The sequence of ‘events’ will 
also register in that some threats require a build-up of events in order to become 
potent threats.  As the threat connection diagram highlights, threats are often 
interconnected adding yet more possibilities. 
 
When defining prior distribution questions the process has focussed on key threats 
to the physical supply chain.  Given that the threat of terrorism and ex-pat workers 
are standalone risk factors, instability within Saudi Arabia would be expected to 
come from the actions of the government, the economy or the Saudi population.  
Recent events captured during the ‘Arab Spring’ revolutions have catalogued the 
component parts which led to instability and regime change among the Arab world.  
A broad analysis would suggest that Arab Spring revolutions succeeded in 
countries where the ruling party, or family, took ownership of the army and the 
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economy, thus creating a system that prevented development of and among the 
population252.    
 
Supplementary questions 
 
If the concept above is applied to Saudi Arabia the risk factors would comprise of 
actions of the Saudi government, economic and welfare reforms and the actions of 
young people.  Due to the strategic geopolitical position of Saudi Arabia a fourth risk 
factor would be the actions of the United States.  These four risks provide headings 
under which instability will be analysed.  Each of the four risks will require a number 
of supplementary questions to determine the scope and impact of the risk. Underneath 
each risk factor are examples, although not exhaustive, of supplementary questions 
that will determine the extent of the threats to the instability of the KSA. 
 
Will the policies of the KSA government cause insatiability in the KSA? 
 
• Is instability in the KSA a result of market competition in as much as it is a 
result of internal politics or outside interference? 
• Is it not the case that the KSA need customers with dynamic economies which 
cause fluctuations and therefore competition within the market? 
 
Will economic and welfare reforms cause instability in the KSA? 
 
• Do reforms discriminate between the Sunni and Shia faith? 
• Do reforms promote entrepreneurship? 
• How deeply entrenched is the Saudi Royal family in running Saudi 
businesses?  
• To what extent are the Saudi people reliant on welfare to sustain their 
lifestyle? 
 
 
                                                 
252 Cordesman, Anthony, Rethinking the Arab Spring, CSIS, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/legacy_files/files/publication/111102_MENA_Stability_Security.pdf 
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Will the actions of the younger generation cause instability in the KSA? 
 
• What are the expectations of the young?  
• Do they differ among the Shia and Sunni population?  
• How do the uneducated pass their time?  
• What percentage attends university in their home country?  
• Are university degrees in tune with private sector employment vacancies? 
• Does public sector employment encourage development?  
• Is working in the public sector an introduction to corruption?  
• Do the uneducated take their faith seriously?  
• Do the educated take their faith seriously?  
• Is unrest expected to originate from the uneducated or educated young?  
• Are Al-Qaeda seen as hero’s  
• Is the US seen as an enemy?  
• Do the younger generation see themselves as replacements for today’s ex-
pat workforce?  
• Is oil seen as a curse?  
• Is there a coherent strategy in place if women were admitted into the 
workplace?  
• Would employing women upset the younger generation?  
• Can fundamentalism and free speech exist together?  
• Is the link between fundamentalism and terrorism over emphasised?  
 
      Will the actions of the USA cause instability in the KSA? 
• Is the supply chain any more or less at risk than it was prior to 9/11? 
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Chapter 6 
 
Technology 
 
The above research question is analysed with a combination of historical and current 
data254.  Two historical case studies are presented, the building of the Trans Arabian 
Pipeline ‘Tapline’ and the Al-Awda project to extinguish the Kuwait oil fires. The two 
case studies not only detail the commitment US companies have in Saudi Arabia and 
other Gulf producer states but also explain how the discovery of oil in Saudi Arabia 
gave Washington an opportunity to spread its hegemony to the region.  Tapline 
underscores the harder geopolitical and geo-economic aspects of hegemony backed 
up by the softer principles of culture and social interaction involved in the Al-Awda 
project.  Core to both case studies is the security afforded to the inter dollar relationship 
between the US and Saudi Arabia.   The third section reveals the attitude of oil industry 
personnel towards the recent introduction of China as a competitor in the Saudi oil 
market by way of candid interviews and commentary gathered at a recent oil and gas 
exhibition in Saudi Arabia.  
 
The Trans-Arabian Pipeline 
 
The first case study exemplifies how American technology extended US hegemony to 
Saudi Arabia and the greater Middle East. The US enshrined its commitment to Saudi 
oil with the construction of the Trans-Arabian Pipeline. The importance of Tapline 
cannot be understated.  It was built to underpin Western Europe’s political and 
economic security set against the Soviet Bloc via the US funded Marshall Plan.255  At 
the time of construction Tapline was the largest engineering project in the world.  The 
project was funded by the US based Aramco consortium with full backing and 
cooperation from Washington.  The line was to be built between Abqaiq in KSA to the 
export terminal at the Lebanese port of Sidon, a distance of 1,040 miles.256  Pumping 
oil overland saved small post war tankers a 7,200 mile journey round trip through the 
Suez Canal to the Persian Gulf, which would have made the cost of transportation 
                                                 
254 Current data is taken from interviews conducted at the 2008 SAOGE.  See Field Trip in Chapter 5.  Full text of 
interviews in the appendices.  
255 Yergin, Daniel, op cit, p. 407. 
256 Yergin, Daniel, ibid, p. 408. 
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higher than the price of the cargo.  Although constructing Tapline proved to be a 
mammoth logistical task in itself, Aramco/Washington had to deal with succession of 
complex geopolitical problems which jeopardised the lines completion.257   
 
Construction 
 
Plans for Tapline were finalised in 1946.  One of the major obstacles to overcome was 
a shortage of steel plate which was under US government control.258  The Saudi 
infrastructure was so underdeveloped that the Kingdom did not possess a deep water 
port to unload the steel pipes in.  Bechtel Engineering, the company tasked with 
building the pipeline had to construct an offshore ‘Skyhook’ in order to transfer the 
pipes and other equipment to the shore.259  The interior was no different.  Tapline 
stretched north along the remote eastern side of Saudi well away from the capital 
Riyadh in the west.  A service road was built alongside the pipeline which reached 
previously isolated Shia Bedouin communities and eventually linked the Jordanian 
capital Amman with Dammam, Kuwait and Bahrain therefore providing a key trade 
route. Due to the sheer size of the project, landing strips had to be built for spotter 
planes to carry surveyors.  These strips were eventually turned into domestic and 
military airports making the Kingdom far more accessible and manageable for the 
Royal family to begin shaping modern Saudi society. 
 
The project also provided employment for Saudi nationals, introduced skills and new 
technology to a region previously reliant on the bare necessities of life.  Construction 
camps contained medics, shops, fresh water and American goods which were 
accessed and traded with locals.  As projects went, Tapline became more than just 
the laying of a pipe.  It provided a foundation on which the US extended its hegemony 
over the region by way of introducing the ‘American way’ to an impressionable Saudi 
Arabia.  The project’s success however eventually commanded a heavy price for both 
parties.  By the time of Tapline's completion in 1950 the pipeline had already become 
a geopolitical rash through the desert.  
 
                                                 
257 Namely Israel.  For a detailed account see Yergin, Daniel. Ibid, p. 393. 
258 Yergin, Daniel, ibid, p. 393. 
259 http://almashriq.hiof.no/lebanon/300/380/388/Tapline/building-Tapline/building-Tapline.pdf 20/05/2009. 
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Geopolitical issues 
 
The tense and frustrating aspects of co-dependency regarding the Saudi-US joint 
venture are nowhere better displayed than during the creation of Israel.  At their historic 
meeting in 1945 on Egypt’s Great Bitter Lake, Saudi King Ibn Saud made it obvious to 
President Roosevelt that a Jewish homeland would cause friction in the Middle East.260  
The discovery of oil in the Kingdom was incentive enough to overcome a difference of 
opinion over Israel, but in reality the arrangement was to prove an oscillating blessing 
and a curse - at different times – for both Riyadh and Washington with the oil industry 
firmly entrenched in the middle. 
 
The construction of Tapline was well underway when the US supported and 
recognised the Jewish State of Israel.  The birth of Israel however required Tapline to 
be diverted away from its original planned export terminal at Haifa, north into Lebanon, 
but with so much at stake for Washington re-routing the pipeline was seen as nothing 
more than an occupational hazard.  Despite his enormous dislike for Israel Ibn Saud 
gave in to the self-fulfilling nature of the grand design and declared that oil royalties 
would help make Saudi ‘a stronger and more powerful nation.’261  A sentiment that his 
descendants have also pitched when challenged, much to the chagrin of Saudi’s Arab 
neighbours. 
 
The vexed issue of transit fees added further grist to the mill.  Syria began demanding 
ever increasing charges for Tapline to cross its sovereign territory.  Relations with 
Jordan became further aggrieved.  Not only did the House of Saud have Amman to 
contend with over Israel and Palestine, but the Jordanian Royal family the 
Hashemite’s, were backed by Britain as the true defenders of the faith which was an 
ongoing cause of friction with Riyadh.  It came as no surprise therefore after Syria’s 
demands when Amman too began arguing over transit taxes even before the pipeline 
crossed the Jordanian border.262 
 
                                                 
260 Yergin, Daniel, op cit, p.385-387. 
261 Yergin, Daniel, ibid, p. 387. 
262 Stevens, Paul, Pipelines or pipe dreams?  Lessons from the history of Arab transit pipelines, Middle East 
Journal, Vol. 54, Issue 2, Spring 2000, p. 224. 
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Syria and Jordan had been deeply affected by the creation of Israel.  They were firmly 
against US involvement in the region and due to their geographic position and rising 
importance as transit states, commanded mounting support from other anti-Zionist 
Arab nations.  Washington found itself in the unenviable position of having to negotiate 
highly favourable terms with acrimonious governments in order to keep the project 
alive.  Conversely Riyadh had to be seen to disagree with current US policy towards 
Israel and the larger Middle East while at the same time reassuring, i) neighbouring 
states that Saudi was doing all it could to confront the US over its support of Israel 
and, ii) Washington that it would not do anything drastic enough to upset the highly 
lucrative status quo. 
 
The Truman administration viewed Tapline as an essential instrument in the success 
of the Marshall Plan by which Saudi oil would fuel the recovery of Europe263.  Saudi 
on the other hand were ideally placed to benefit from the dollars paid in royalties by 
Aramco to buy American goods and services, while at the same time affirming their 
place as the rising power in the Gulf. 
 
Tapline could only strengthen the dollar as the world’s reserve currency, Tapline’s 
implementation provided mutual wealth to cooperating states; it’s construction 
encouraged foreign investment in private US based companies, technology transfer 
and social assistance, all for a common goal. It was under those terms that Saudi 
became key to US foreign policy and along with it America began exporting, installing 
and running the Saudi oil infrastructure under the close protection of Washington and 
the recently built Pentagon. 
 
The Al-Awda Project: the Kuwait oil fires 
 
The second case study concerns the use of US technology when things go wrong.  
Although the case study does not originate from Saudi Arabia the US technology and 
expertise used in the Al-Awda project serves as a reminder to Riyadh that if ever 
required, private American companies could rescue their oil fields and put the wells 
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back into production.264  In 1991 the retreating Iraqi army destroyed and ignited 
Kuwait’s oil wells.  Whereas there had been plans for armies to capture oil fields intact, 
as advanced by Henry Kissinger to US President Nixon in 1973265, this was the first 
time fields had been seized and rendered unusable.  The aim being that the host 
country would stop receiving any dollar revenue from the export of their oil.  The 
amount of revenue lost could therefore potentially weaken the wider dollar.  
 
Putting out the fires 
 
Iraqi troops sabotaged the wells by placing shaped charges on the capping valves or 
‘trees’ so the blast would shear the tree and ignite the pressurised crude as it 
escaped.266  There is one important fact that was suppressed by the subsequent 
media coverage of the environmental catastrophe.  The Kuwait Oil Company ‘KOC’ 
had not fitted Blow Out Preventer’s under the well heads in the Burgan field.267  Under 
normal circumstances the Blow Out Preventer would shut down the flow of oil in the 
well when met by a sudden release in pressure.  This oversight, calculated at a cost 
of two million dollars, contributed to a total loss of approximately six million barrels of 
oil.268  
 
Bechtel Engineering was given the task of supporting an international team of fire 
fighters.  The first consideration was to remove any mines and discarded ordnance 
from the area before the teams could begin work.269  American teams extinguished 
380 of the 727 burning wells in extremely dangerous conditions.270  The heat from the 
burning wells turned surrounding oil into coke.271  Huge parts of the desert had to be 
flooded with water and temporary roads were built to move heavy machinery.  The 
strong desert wind compounded the hazardous situation by quickly changing direction 
and engulfing equipment in flames272. 
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Leading authorities predicted that it would take five years to extinguish the fires.  The 
project was completed in 229 days273 and its success can firmly be laid at the feet of 
the American’s ability to not only mobilise support quickly but also their work ethic and 
contacts within the KOC. 
 
Private –v- Public work ethic 
 
Behind the success of the Al-Awda project lays a candid insight into the extent to which 
US dominance of oil industry technology has shaped and educated oil companies 
worldwide.  One of the initial planners of the project was an academic Adel Sheshtawy 
from the University of Oklahoma.274  Sheshtawy was contacted by a former Kuwaiti 
pupil who had risen up the ranks of KOC.  Sheshtawy learned about concerns 
regarding the possible destruction of the Kuwait oil fields by Iraqi troops.  KOC was in 
no position to deal with any subsequent fires itself, as Kuwait was in chaos.275  Even 
so, the difference between KOC coordinating such a project and US and other private 
enterprises needs examining. 
 
The US oil industry has always operated independently of the state although it’s plain 
to see that Washington is heavily involved in creating diplomatic support for overseas 
projects. For example the US state department issued fire fighter Red Adair with a 
fake passport and logistical support so Adair could tackle a blaze on an offshore 
Egyptian platform during the Yom Kippur war.  Adair later stated that he had to appeal 
to both Egyptian and Israeli gunboats that despite being a US citizen he was just doing 
a job for the common good.276 
 
The service providers involved in the Al-Awda project had all built up significant 
respect within the industry.  Their proven past records were partly due to the lack of 
constraints taking on work overseas.  In the true spirit of capitalism service providers 
rewarded themselves, and in so doing could attract a highly experienced and loyal 
workforce.  National oil companies tend to concentrate on their own ‘patch’ which 
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severely limits their knowledge base, as does the state policy in employing a high 
percentage of inexperienced nationals to fill managerial posts.  Beneath this 
countenance flows another more subtle reason why American companies are so keen 
to tackle disruptions, particularly in the Middle East, in that it’s in the interest of their 
own survival to do so. 
 
The stability and net worth of the US dollar is cardinal to the growth of the US economy.  
The stability has an obvious effect on domestic and US industry worldwide.  It is within 
the personal interest of US oil industry service providers to repair disruptions to supply 
so that oil can be once again be exported for dollars.  In as much as the continuing 
flow of oil is important to America, so is the flow of money to produce a stable dollar – 
therefore maintaining a mutual cost effective relationship between state oil companies 
in the Gulf and US service providers.  The price of oil rose from just under $20 dollars 
a barrel to over $30 a barrel after the wells were extinguished – the extra revenue no 
doubt helped pay for the loss of exports and the $700 million Kuwait paid Bechtel for 
the successful completion of the Al-Awda project.  
 
The dominance of American goods and services in Middle East oil remained virtually 
unchallenged until 9/11.  The attack by Al-Qaeda severely strained relations between 
Saudi and the US.  Washington was very quick to repatriate Saudi nationals but for 
Saudi to do the same with US personnel would have left its oil industry floating adrift.  
American oil industry service providers were placed in a difficult position – on the one 
hand they had overnight become unwelcome guests, but on the other they were 
providing a vital service for Saudi’s state run Aramco oil company and could not be 
dispatched for that reason.  As Riyadh looked for a solution, 9/11 provided China with 
an opportunity to enter the Middle East not only as an oil importer but as a provider of 
goods and services to the Saudi oil industry.          
 
Is a Chinese alternative to US technology a viable option for Aramco? 
 
In 2008 I attended the Saudi Arabia Oil and Gas Exhibition in Dammam.  My aim was 
to interview company representatives about their views on the recent arrival of China 
as a supplier of goods and services to Aramco.  It became apparent, due to the 
sensitive nature of the questions I proposed to ask, that if I were to have a frank 
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discussion on the subject any interviewees would have to remain anonymous.  I was 
also fortunate in that many of the reps wished to voice their opinion about China’s 
entrance to the market. 
 
I conducted five identical in depth interviews with representatives A, B, C, D and E.  
Reps A to D were all employed by US or European based Small/Medium Enterprises 
(SME) and were currently conducting between 10% and 40% of their total business in 
Saudi Arabia.  The strength of their product lay in its design.  Interviewee ‘E’ 
represented a European based global manufacturer which had a large fabrication plant 
already producing in China. A summary of their answers can be found in tabulated 
form in table (fig 1). During the interviews I had to take into account that my questions 
would be answered from the point of view of the endurance of their own products 
against Chinese competition and not existing western competitors. 
 
I was able to introduce ‘overall perspective’ on the subject by interviewing the 
Operations Manager ‘OM’ of a major US oil field service provider to Aramco.   ‘OM’ 
procured goods and services from the SME I interviewed.  I was able to discuss my 
findings with OM about the impact of China on the industry as a whole.  A brief 
summary from the table however reveals that concerns raised by representatives A to 
D revolved around the Chinese disregard for copyright laws, although it was 
universally held that working with the Chinese was a viable option in the future if the 
venture was regulated and controlled by western standards.   
 
Industry Voices 
 
My interviews were structured to reveal specific core issues and concerns.  In the 
discussion below I will ‘run through’ these issues and concerns quoting directly from 
the interviewees as their answers reveal their reasoning, personal experiences and 
gauge the general mood of the industry they serve.  Although some of their answers 
do detract away from the sole issue of China’s disregard for Intellectual Property 
Rights (IP), these ‘industry voices’ reveal a great deal more about the US/European – 
Saudi – China triangle.  
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In order to state my case regarding the influx of Chinese products I pressed the 
example of cheap Japanese cars flooding the market in the 1970’s, which soon gave 
the Japanese car industry enough capital to start designing quality models whose 
introduction eventually contributed to the near bankruptcy the US car industry.  
Interviewee C acknowledged the point 
 
[Y]ou would hope that we would be able to learn from those lessons.  I think the real 
lessons with the Japanese were that we didn’t take them seriously in their ability to 
produce a quality product and so for years and years we ignored it, and if the same thing 
were to happen in China, I don’t believe that we would ignore it nearly as long or I think 
we would take it more seriously. 
 
This impression was one held by the majority of representatives I spoke with.  The 
primary issues did not centre on the introduction of the Chinese to the market but as 
clearly shown in the table it centred on the issue of China blatantly copying other 
company’s products – the transfer of technology.  Interviewee B summed up the 
situation 
 
Yes I believe that they [the Chinese] have an official policy of technology transfer that’s 
what I was told when I was there that they want to take western technology and bring it in 
the country and that’s why they do not have laws against taking and stealing copyright 
and patents... Eventually China is going to come up with some of their own stuff and 
they’re going to want that protected... I honestly don’t blame them for the way they’ve 
been operating up till now, but I think it is time that they joined the rest of the world in 
supporting the patent laws, copyright laws and all the protections for people’s technology 
‘cause I think they’re going to, if they don’t, they’re going to have a more and more difficult 
time at becoming partners, nobody will trust them.  So I think it’s time that they changed 
their business model. 
 
The current Chinese business model not only affects products already on the shelf 
but impacts on research budgets and product development.  Interviewee D 
 
[I]t’s really self-destructing because the more product that goes away to China, the less 
profit there is for R and D.  So there comes a point where you have to make a distinct 
choice either more R and D and develop your products or risk going out of business. 
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Interviewee A voiced the same concerns stating that ‘we’ve got some specialist 
engineering services in the UK that supply the global oil and gas marketplace and 
I think it would be detrimental to the UK business if...certain aspects were to be 
taken out of the UK.’  The wider implications of introducing copied or counterfeit 
products into the oil industry have a far greater impact than commercial loss.  
Representatives offered numerous examples where cheap counterfeit Chinese 
products had failed in the field causing enormous damage and downtime.  However, 
the reporting of such incidents is often repressed in producer states.  In such cases 
the cost margin between original and counterfeit cannot be justified.  And because 
of the secrecy there is no sharing of information between producer states regarding 
counterfeit goods.  The situation is summed up well by the following two comments.   
 
Interviewee A 
 
Well there’s been a couple of incidences, one in particular was back in 1997 where I was 
working for a large well head company and we had several blow-outs in the Saudi Arabian 
marketplace that caused field fires and subsequently the Red Adair crew had to come in 
and assist by putting the fires out.  The investigation took place and found out that there 
was non-OEM, original equipment manufactured products and seal equipment or 
components were being used in those blow-out preventers.  Subsequently the 
investigation found that those products were being bought from China. 
 
Interviewee D 
 
What we’ve seen over the last ten years is some very, very big accidents that by and large 
don’t get reported.  So whichever country you go into and there’s some of these countries 
they just maintain radio silence, they’re banned by governments from printing stuff.  But 
we know within the industry what’s happening and there’s been some pretty horrific 
stories going around. 
 
Products, like service providers build up a reputation within the industry.  Some 
counterfeit components replicated so well that it is almost impossible to tell the 
difference between the counterfeit and the original.  But this is not always the case.  
One exasperated rep explained how Chinese copies of a component manufactured by 
Cameron Engineering, a well-established American company, were identical save for 
the fact that ‘Cameron’ was spelt with a ‘K’.  He later went on to state that in his opinion 
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‘I think it’s one of these things, the problem is so big, and the political or the economic 
environment drives it to a point it can’t be controlled.’  He further remarked that since 
many Chinese companies were now in private hands and making a profit, company 
directors wished to remain affluent and had a lifestyle to support.  This contributed to 
the highly inventive methods Chinese companies adopted in order to market their 
products, including forging important paperwork.  Interviewee D 
 
We’ve had first hand experiences where we have had certificates of conformity stamped, 
witnessed by reputable bodies, these people have quality control certificates from quality 
organisations.  And if you look on any website you’ll see the Chinese advertising they 
have all these quality standards and certificates but when you get it back into your factory 
and do an investigation, we’ve seen pieces with holes in them that could never have 
passed a pressure test where we have a certificate stamped and signed to say it did. 
 
Interviewee D also argued that lifestyle expectations also affected the behaviour of 
Chinese personnel working in the field 
 
[A]s you travel around oil fields, you’ll see Chinese people everywhere.  But again the 
difficulty that you find is they can work with Europeans no problem, they can learn how 
to do the job, but the difference is there is no loyalty, their whole culture is money driven 
and when you see the culture in China you understand why.  But these guys will quite 
happily leave an oil field, leave a site and move within a week or two for a few hundred 
dollars a month. 
 
The consensus was that producer countries could do more to control the importation 
of counterfeit components from China rather than the accepted culture of turning a 
‘blind eye’ to it.  Interviewee C 
 
I think it’s the responsibility of the producing states to actually try to make sure that the 
organisation that claims to be making it is actually making the product and that the dollars 
that are being spent actually go to the people who actually, who own the intellectual 
property and producing it.  So they do have a responsibility to do that. 
 
So far, the comments have come from reps of SME’s.  The same is not true from 
Interviewee E.  Interviewee E represented a large global manufacturer, a ‘Blue chip’ 
company which had the capital to build and staff its own manufacturing plant in 
China. 
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[W]e just saw [China] as a big opportunity for us and we capitalised on that, putting up 
our own fabrication site there and we catered to the Chinese market first and now we’re 
extending it to the other locations...we have our own procedures to qualify the mills from 
where we take our raw material...I would just like to make this point, China or any other 
Asian country for that matter, even India, we have good and bad companies like anywhere 
else in the world... we can go and do our own audits, our own test and random checks. 
 
Interviewee E further explained that due to the size of their investment and the terms 
of the contract it was possible for their own standards to be met and worked to, 
which he acknowledged could probably not be enforced by SME’s entering into joint 
ventures with small Chinese manufacturers.   
Despite the colourful examples stated above when I asked reps to indicate the 
threat and risk of Chinese products entering the market their assessment was more 
pragmatic 
 
Interviewee C 
[A]t the moment it’s a mild threat to a medium threat meaning there is concern in doing 
business directly with China. 
 
Interviewee B 
It’s my impression that the low technology, high volume product manufacturing would be 
at risk, I don’t see the one-offs and the very large items being something that would be a 
serious threat at this point of time in this industry. 
 
Interviewee D 
I think the main threat is going to be at the low end of the technology scale, I think the 
high end technology they’re starting to learn that their products are being banned around 
the world because they are just not safe.  So I think what we’ll see is a development back 
to basics, they’ll start I think trying to learn what to do, but how long does it take to change 
a culture?  That’s why I say I don’t think I’ll see it in my lifetime. 
 
I put my responses to the Operations Manager (OM) of a major US oil field service 
provider working with Aramco.  OM’s analysis was far more direct and provident.  
Regarding IP theft and copying, OM argued that it really only affects the lower end 
of technology and so far talk of sanctions received no quarter from western 
governments who had too much to lose by frustrating relations with Beijing. 
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On the upper side, the Chinese are keen to enter the market but in order to meet 
existing standards, cooperating Western companies needed to ‘shepherd’ the 
Chinese to improve quality.  The downside being that when a component did fail in 
the field it sent out a ‘ripple effect’ that affected reputations and future loss of sales.  
OM also stated that the manufacturing capability in China was massive and that 
any savings in this area offset the cost of failures in the field. 
 
Finally OM advanced that in his opinion the industry was under greater threat from 
failures involving counterfeit Chinese products when oil was at ‘high demand, high 
price, high requirements which equates to high risk’ because this combination of 
market forces resulted in an increase of drilling and with it, a greater usage of 
components therefore increasing the probability of a failure. 
 
Conclusion 
 
From the evidence held above there does not appear to be any current or emerging 
threat towards the Saudi oil infrastructure large enough to prevent US and 
European technology dominating and enduring in the kingdom.  The geopolitical 
and geo-economic ties between the parties are too strong to be overturned by China 
alone. 
 
US and European technology is well grounded in the Saudi infrastructure for a 
number of reasons.  Western suppliers have over the years built up trust and loyalty 
by providing competitive high quality components backed up by a fast and efficient 
service.  The US ‘business model’ of facilitating private companies in their 
endeavours is almost diametrically opposite to the Chinese ‘business model’ of 
facilitating manufacturers in the infringement of copyright and exporting counterfeit 
goods.  Given the stakes, it will be up to the Saudi customs to prevent the vast 
majority of counterfeit goods arriving in the field.  But until the current trend of 
‘turning a blind eye’, accidents, reported or not, will continue to place a question 
mark over the presence of China in the market.  China could augment their position 
in time by cooperating with western companies and developing trusted brands. 
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The reality appears to be a simple one.  The micro tenets acting against US and 
European technology surrounding downtime caused by the introduction of Chinese 
counterfeit components pale when compared to the macro policies Washington can 
impose on the region as the world’s hegemon. Riyadh’s enduring dependency on 
US goods and services, maintaining the Kingdom’s oil infrastructure, has by default 
also made maintaining a stable dollar a priority in Saudi’s best interest.    
 
Saudi instability 
 
Four main factors that challenge instability 
 
In 2003 a NATO hosted seminar identified alienated young people, fundamentalism, 
pressure from the USA and political instability (regime change) as the four key 
problems facing Saudi Arabia.277  A fifth precept is the lack of economic diversity. The 
seminar produced an accurate prediction as nearly a decade later these problems still 
remain principle in Saudi Arabia.  Demographics have continued to be a socio-cultural 
pressure point.  Approximately half of the Kingdom’s population is under the age of 
18.278  Employment issues may also explain to some degree why Saudi struggles with 
economic diversity.  But greater market forces are at work in this area. 
 
In 2005 Saudi Arabia became the 149th member of the World Trade Organisation279, 
a decision which impacted on the way business is conducted within the Kingdom – the 
scope of which will alter the dynamics of Saudi’s small group of affluent merchant 
families.280 The question of political instability must be addressed in light of the Arab 
Spring.  The possibility of regime change in the Kingdom has proved a popular moot 
point with academics – but could the Arab Spring realistically spread to Saudi?   
Underpinning the above is the ongoing but somewhat abrasive relationship between 
Washington and Riyadh.   
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There are a number of less obvious issues that could eventually challenging Saudi’s 
domestic stability such as the death of a monarch, exposure of further human rights 
abuses or policy shifts such as signing defence hardware contracts with China or 
Russia.  So the issues are therefore not necessarily military/security threats but 
business or ethical in nature.  The question remains, could political instability, a lack 
of economic diversity, demographic crisis and the expectation that US-Saudi relations 
will continue, pose a risk to the Kingdom’s oil exports?  
 
Demographic imbalance 
 
Worryingly almost half of the Saudi population is under the age of eighteen. The future 
for these young people is decidedly uncertain. Mai Yamani, among others, argues that 
the phenomenal changes that have taken place in Saudi Arabia since the 1930’s have 
implications for the political consciousness of young people that in the long term may 
result in threat to the Saudi regime.281  Again space does not allow for an in depth 
study so discussion will be kept to the two main concerns, that of employment and the 
growth in fundamentalism.  Rather than comment on employment and fundamentalism 
as two separate entities there is certainly a case which suggests that a rise in 
fundamentalism among young Saudi males may be a direct result of poor employment 
prospects.282 
 
There are a number of contributing factors to the predicament young people face. 
Young people growing up during the 70’s oil boom had a far better standard of living 
than their parents did.283 The escalating expectations of the generations did not run in 
parallel with the economy, which had tailed off by the 1980’s.284 During this time young 
Saudi’s cycling through education, employment and on to lifestyle expectations found 
themselves marooned. Although some of the blame is laid firmly at the feet of the 
individual, policy also adds to the impasse.  Young Saudi’s are accused of expecting 
managerial posts while the state stumbles on attracting investors to provide such 
posts.285 
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Tim Niblock identified that even though the Saudi educational system expanded and 
became more inclusive, the syllabus did not prepare students for work.286 In fact the 
main area of expansion was towards religious ‘Koranic’ universities. The situation is 
further complicated by gender but again space can only provide for a general overview 
so the focus will remain on young Saudi males.  A religious education in itself is not a 
threat but with so many young and impressionable Saudi males graduating into 
unemployment it is no wonder that so many young men begin to question their role in 
society – a society that appeases the situation with generous welfare payments.  The 
culture has become one where only certain jobs are worth doing. 
 
Almost one third of the population is made up of ex-pat labour, who do work which has 
become ‘untouchable’ to a Saudi national.  Furthermore ever since 9/11 world events 
have elevated the United States to a position where Washington’s foreign policy is 
seen as aggressive and damaging to Islam.  University is probably the only time when 
young Saudi’s from all over the Kingdom are housed together and as such share ideas 
and influence one another.  As they are not the first generation to struggle with finding 
a career it could be that a religious education is more in tune with the times, as 
opposed to studying for a degree in a subject that is not supported by an accessible 
career. 
 
Fundamentalism on the other hand offers unity and self-esteem to young men, and is 
hardly likely to be criticized by the state as Saudi Arabia is the world’s most prolific 
sponsor of the spread of Islam.  Young Saudi fundamentalists will after all further 
strengthen the Sunni sect.  It is often pointed out by Arabs that the West does not fully 
understand tribes and sects and this probably goes some way to explain why Sunni 
and Shia politics have become a western foreign policy concern post 9/11.  More 
importantly, the battle for hegemony between Sunni and Shia sects in the Middle East 
is currently being fought by young men, of which there will need to be a steady supply 
to further the cause.  Riyadh will condone the actions of Saudi nationals fighting 
opposing regimes in foreign countries but is powerless to prevent determined young 
men joining the fight.  If there is a case for young Saudi fundamentalists becoming a 
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security threat to the Saudi regime then it lies in the number of organized experienced 
fighters who form the opinion that the Royal family pose a threat to the continuation of 
the wider jihad.       
 
Economic diversity 
 
Speaking at Abu Dhabi in 2004 on future challenges to Gulf States former British Prime 
Minister John Major stated that multinational corporations cannot thrive ‘without the 
assets of its host country – whether raw materials, intellectual property or 
straightforward labour – and, as the influence grows, so should their commitment to 
the country.’287 The business world’s past relationship with Saudi Arabia and vice 
versa has trod a troublesome path.  
 
During the 70’s oil boom western companies supplied Saudi with everything from ice 
cream to Portland cement. The Saudi economy ran on oil and there did not seem to 
be a pressing need to diversify the economy. Since the 70’s however Saudi has 
expanded its own portfolio and allowed foreign investment into the Kingdom.  In 2005 
Saudi affirmed its commitment to the international business community with 
membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Despite the move towards 
globalization the way by which Saudi conducts business is a continuing cause of 
friction. 
 
Connections with the Royal family are still the main route into business.288 The figures 
are quite revealing. An in depth study by Tim Niblock reveals that 600 members of the 
Royal family have interests in 1044 business concerns in the Kingdom.289  Of those 
concerns they are in partnership with fourteen merchant families who control the 
private sector. Unlike the oil sector which is based in the Eastern province, Saudi 
businesses are predominantly based in the west with Riyadh fast becoming the place 
of choice. Saudi companies themselves however do have their shortcomings. Niblock 
identifies a lack of long term planning and feasibility studies, reluctance to expand, 
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unaccountability and grace and favour recruitment processes.290 Businesses in the 
private sector identified interference and competition from Saudi royals as major 
challenges, adding that royal status affords them privileges which leads to unfair 
competition.   
 
How then has WTO membership affected the balance? For a start Saudi companies 
were hit by the two key WTO membership requirements, the removal of high tariffs 
and the reduction of subsidies. Previously enough profit could be made in the domestic 
market so there was no need to push into the global market. Also lack of competition 
left some merchants unable to counter against huge marketing campaigns launched 
by well-established multi-national corporations. 
 
The downside for international business being that visa requirements are difficult to 
attain, the recruitment of women is problematic and Saudi nationals tend to expect 
higher than average salaries.291 Furthermore Saudi families who go into business are 
reluctant to seek investors as they wish to remain in full control of their business.  
Families run the further risk of inviting conflict among children and other dependents 
regarding employment opportunities and inheritance.292  Culture is therefore one area 
which struggles to accept common values and equalities present in the global 
business community.  
 
On a wider scale cooperation with the international community has triggered projects 
that run alongside the Kingdom’s own reform plans. The Saudi postal service, 
desalinization facilities and railways have been opened up to foreign investment.293 
Large projects do involve the added risk of corruption which is particularly rife in the 
construction and military procurement business. In 2007 The UK Serious Fraud Office 
decided not to prosecute BAE Systems regarding allegations that the company has 
bribed a Saudi Prince more than a billion pounds spread over a ten year period.294  
There are few countries where such an allegation would be taken seriously.  But in 
doing so as far as business in Saudi Arabia is concerned it highlights the control the 
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Saudi Royal family personally hold over clients, and the vast sums of money clients 
are prepared to spend doing business in the Kingdom. 
 
The Royal family and their trusted partners decide just how much economic diversity 
the Kingdom will merit, and as such it is up to them to invite clients and investors into 
the Kingdom.  The population therefore has little choice but to build their lifestyles on 
whatever is available to them at the time, once it has filtered through the hierarchy. 
 
Ongoing cooperation with the USA 
 
The ongoing relationship between the US and Saudi Arabia has been the focus of 
decade long academic and political discussion. It would at first appear that the regimes 
Washington and Riyadh impose on their populations are diametrically opposed to one 
another. During the post-war years Riyadh has seen the US fight ideological wars 
against communism in South East Asia, station troops in Europe, influence dictators 
in South America and Africa, not to mention the US counter insurgent role in 
Afghanistan and intelligence campaign against Iran. 
 
Topping the list is the US led regime change in Iraq, which left Saudi in no doubt that 
if need be the Kingdom could be next. Along the undercurrent flows a more pragmatic 
reason for the relationship to continue, despite the ups and downs that accompany 
any friendship, that of oil, and more importantly as Michael Klare forcefully argues, oil 
reserves.295 Saudi’s unique status as the worlds ‘swing producer’ in that the Kingdom 
retains spare production capacity with which Riyadh can ‘control’ the oil market during 
disruptions elsewhere in the world. As such oil is repackaged as security and the 
relationship is touted as one of security, in the bilateral sense of the word. 
 
There have been times when the relationship has been strained, notably during the 
intifadas, the immediate post-9/11 fallout and the Arab-Israeli wars. The most serious 
breach of trust occurred in 1973 when in response to the US backing Israel during the 
Yom Kippur war, Saudi placed an oil embargo on the United States. Recently released 
documents state that the Nixon Administration was prepared to occupy the Saudi oil 
                                                 
295 Klare, Michael, Blood and Oil, Penguin, London, 2004, p. 4-5. 
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fields if the embargo were to continue and weaken the US economy.296 Instead the 
embargo was lifted and the relationship repaired. 
 
When exploring Saudi instability there is room for discussion based around a ‘worst 
case scenario’ situation. Saudi Arabia has a modern well-funded up to date military. 
But the same situation did not stop the Shah’s Iran from being toppled by Islamic 
fundamentalists in 1979. If the Saudi Royal Family found itself facing the distinct 
possibility of regime change, or indeed if the US wished to support and preserve the 
existing regime through strife, then oil security will hold the key.  
 
Recent regime change in the Gulf 
 
The Arab Spring was not the only ‘revolution’.  Qatar has overturned its conservative 
roots and quickly become a contradiction in terms, in that Doha is now the capital of a 
cosmopolitan Wahhabi state that on the one hand sells beer and pork but on the other 
criminalises homosexuality.  The Emirate has survived a meteoric rise to compete with 
well-established nation states for offering foreign investment opportunities, hosting 
prestigious sporting events and establishing the well-respected but controversial Al-
Jazeera media group; not to mention offering Washington a vast military base after 
US troops left Saudi Arabia at Riyadh’s request. 
 
Qatar’s ‘regime change’ is a far cry from that experienced by Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, 
Egypt and potentially Syria during the ongoing Arab Spring.  Qatar began to reform 
after the current head of state deposed his father in a bloodless coup without the 
apparent assistance of a foreign power.297  After the coup Qataris were spared purges 
and sectarian violence.  The point being that in Qatar’s case there were no obstacles.  
It was the head of the regime that changed and his subjects followed – apparently 
whether they liked it or not.   
 
A key reason why the Arab Spring has provoked little tangible interest in Saudi Arabia 
is that the House of Saud distributes wealth by way of providing welfare payments to 
its subjects that heavily subsidise the population’s lifestyle.  To rise up against the 
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Monarchy would effectively sever this socio-economic bond.  Indeed, The Carnegie 
Endowment for Peace report that faced with the prospect of unrest King Abdullah 
announced a further increase in welfare payments 
 
Unlike the populist anti-regime demands in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and Bahrain, 
activists in Saudi Arabia are not calling for King Abdullah to step down. To the contrary, 
the king remains a popular figure among most of the population, regardless of a person’s 
opinion of the overall government. To defuse the situation, Riyadh is attacking the 
problem from multiple angles... and announced a $36 billion package on social welfare. 
The package includes more assistance for unemployment, housing, and finding new 
employment, and makes a 15 percent cost-of-living increase for state employees 
permanent. While people expected the king to announce some sort of public spending 
project upon his return, the scope and scale of the package was increased in light of 
developments in Tunisia and Egypt.298   
 
Could a new regime afford to continue such generous policies? But more importantly 
could a new regime mobilise a population that had grown accustomed to receiving 
salary increases regardless of productivity. Recipients of the current welfare system 
are unlikely to demonstrate against it.  The last word on Saudi regime change goes to 
Patrick Buchanan.  His rather blunt synopsis provides certitude 
 
If the Saudi monarchy goes down, who and what do we think is going to replace it? [...] 
Can anyone believe that, should the 7000 princes go to the wall, 7000 liberal democrats 
will replace them?  After Afghanistan and Iraq, do we still not know that when a state is 
destroyed, it requires years to rebuild, and the men with guns fill the vacuum? In the 
Middle East, Saudi Arabia is a Big Casino. Lose that, and we have lost the game.299 
 
The industrious debate centring on Saudi regime change looks highly likely to produce 
nothing but sore throats. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Events sometimes appear to resemble previous experiences and in the case of the 
Arab Spring and the Berlin Wall there may be certain similarities, but overall the two 
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events were not pattern forming but opaque. Further proof lies in the different 
socioeconomic reforms enacted in Eastern Europe after 1989 compared to those still 
being argued over in Arab Spring countries. The question surrounding how Saudi 
Arabia would behave if challenged by the Arab Spring was a concern. However, the 
threat has yet to have any major impact, a key reason being the relationship between 
the Saudi Royal family and the ongoing socio-economic welfare of Saudi citizens are 
so deeply entwined.  
 
Currently Riyadh has little choice but to appease the Saudi population young and old 
with state handouts.  Even if a proactive educational policy was introduced it would 
take years before the first graduates matriculated.  As to where they would be 
employed would require the restructuring of the current Saudi business and commerce 
model.  A silent but pertinent point regarding young educated professionals is that they 
may wish to have more input in not only their own, but their children’s future, and push 
for a system that gives them a choice by way of a vote. This possibility alone may 
present a latent obstacle to traditional reform. 
 
The offer and support for a religious education is again unlikely to change.  For as long 
as the Sunni and Shia sects are divided it is probable that the Saudi government will 
not dissuade young Saudi men from pursuing a fundamentalist Sunni education. This 
is regardless of whether the teachings prompts some young men to choose violence, 
the majority of it abroad, as a way to promote and protect the Sunni religion. In as 
much as political instability, business diversity and young people are a constant worry 
to Riyadh, they are monitored by Washington too. 
 
The reality for all Saudi’s whether they like it or not is that the United States is not just 
the only country in the world with enough available resources to protect Saudi from 
aggressors, but also successive US Presidents have come to the aid of Saudi and 
other Gulf states for which they have paid the ultimate price of losing subsequent 
Presidential elections.  Saudi oil will remain the ‘o’ in US – Saudi co-operation. 
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Double Hull Tankers 
 
There is currently no more cost effective alternative to transporting oil than in tankers.  
Tanker design has evolved alongside a dynamic combination of market forces, 
geopolitical issues and build technology.  Demand for oil applied pressure on 
operators to construct bigger and faster tankers.  Geopolitical issues discussed in 
chapter 2 such as the closure of the Suez Canal in 1956 and again in 1973 forced 
tanker around the Cape of Good Hope on journeys from the Gulf to Europe and the 
United States. New tankers built for this route were named ‘Cape sized’300 vessels and 
were constructed to carry more oil as the longer distance meant fewer journeys.  The 
tanker industry adapted well to these challenges but there were a number of 
unforeseen problems that arose in their development, when tanker design failed to 
take into account how new technology can have a detrimental effect when vessels are 
put into service. 
 
Typical design and construction considerations 
 
Designers learn from past experience and each new ship tends to be a development 
of a previous successful design. This is because of the extremely complex interaction 
of the many variables that affect the stresses in the structure of a ship at sea for 
example:301 
 
• structural design: plate thicknesses, local stress concentrations, stiffness and 
proper transmission of loads 
• construction quality—for instance, alignment, local imperfections, the quality of 
steel and welding  
• distribution of the cargo weight in the ship  
• static and dynamic forces of the sea and waves resulting from heaving, pitching, 
rolling and possibly slamming  
• vibration from machinery  
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301 No author, Comparison of Single and Double Hull Tankers, Australian Maritime Safety Authority: 
https://www.amsa.gov.au/forms-and-
publications/Publications/Comparison_of_single_and_double_hull_tankers.pdf 
193 
 
• random corrosion   
• the complex internal distribution of stresses between primary, secondary and 
tertiary structures  
 
Legislation -v- industry conflict of interests 
 
The Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince William Sound in 1989 acted as a catalyst for 
replacing single hull tankers with double hull tankers.302  The subsequent 1990 US Oil 
Pollution Act called for a gradual phase in of double hulled tankers – effectively 
banning single hull tankers from entering US ports.303  Further spills by single hulled 
tankers in European waters, such as the Erica which ran aground off the Brittany coast 
of France in 1999304 and the Prestige which suffered a structural failure off the northern 
Spanish coast in 2002, pressured Brussels into passing EU law for the phase out of 
all single hulled tankers entering EU ports and to replace them with doubled hulled 
vessels before 2015.305  
 
Double hull design 
 
Prior to the late 1980’s tankers were constructed in a ‘single hull’ design but recent 
legislation has pushed operators into building ‘double hull’ tankers in a bid to increase 
safety and environmental concerns A single-hulled tanker carries oil directly within the 
hull structure, while a double-hulled tanker has separate tanks within the hull structure 
(See diagram below).   
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304 Devanney, Jack, Op cit, p. 62. 
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Fig 6.1 Single hull tanker diagram 
In a double-hulled tanker, the cargo space that carries oil is surrounded by a ballast 
water space, which provides a buffer between the oil storage container and the outer 
hull.  In order for a double-hulled vessel to spill oil from its containers, both the outer 
and inner hulls must be punctured or damaged. 
 
Fig 6.2 Single hull/Double hull tanker comparison diagram 
 
A double-hull design may provide an additional safety benefit over a single-hull design 
during certain types of accidents, because with double hulls there are two layers of 
enclosures that must be punctured before oil can be released into the 
environment.  Double hulls alone however cannot prevent gigantic oil spills.  The Oil 
Company International Maritime Forum (OCIMF) and a spokesman from Lloyds both 
argue that double hulled tankers are not the panacea for Ocean security. They require 
a lot more maintaining and additional surface area to inspect.306 
                                                 
306 Various, Double Hull Tankers: High Level Panel of Experts Report, 03/06/2005 
http://www.seas-at-risk.org/1mages/EMSA%20DH%20high%20level%20experts%20report.pdf 
195 
 
The transition has not been without criticism.  One industry commentator described 
members of the US congress as suddenly becoming ‘naval architects’307 in passing 
the 1990 Oil Pollution Act, given that little consultation had taken place with the tanker 
industry over such a far reaching policy change.308 A further consideration has to be 
applied to tanker owners.  From their conception tankers were owned by major oil 
companies who ran huge shipping departments and on whose reputation the tankers 
rested. As of the 1970s, tanker ownership switched to the private hands of small fleet 
owners or individuals. Individual owners often employed ‘ships managers’ to oversee 
the day to day running of operations, to the point where an ‘owner’ could be a pension 
or private equity fund. In such cases the ‘owners’ were purely interested in the financial 
benefits. This said, major oil companies did own enough tankers to tip the balance but 
the conflict of interests among owners during the transition from single to double hull 
tankers is described, rather bluntly, by former tanker owner Jack Devanney, 
 
When the Exxon Valdez occurred, the environmental community was understandably 
ignorant on these matters. It saw an honest chance to make a difference for the 
environment and immediately called for double hulls. 
 
The industry response was interesting. The shipyards jumped at the idea. They could care 
less about the environment or killing tankermen. But they loved the new business. 
 
Tanker owners were split. Few cared much about the environment or killing tankermen. 
The calculus was based on how the new regulation would trim tanker supply and push 
rates up. If an owner felt he would come out ahead in the phase out process — an owner 
who had a young fleet — he supported it. If not — an owner who had lots of old ships — 
he opposed it. 
 
The divided owners had nil impact on the political process. The only momentary 
questioning of double hulls came from the oil companies’ marine departments. At the 
time, the marine departments still had enough technical smarts and professionalism to 
realize there were safer alternatives, which would spill less oil. They mounted a campaign 
to put those alternatives before the US Congress, asking for less prescriptive legislation. 
But the oil company marketing types realized this was a loser. It would just piss off the 
customer, at a time when the public were already ranking oil companies below lawyers. 
When Conoco broke ranks with the “clapping seal” ad, showing all manner of animals 
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happily applauding Conoco’s new double hull VLCC, the marine departments knew they 
were dead. Oil company opposition to mandating double hulls evaporated. In fact, the oil 
companies jumped on the double hull bandwagon.309 
 
As far as the tanker industry was concerned legislation would have its day regardless. 
The transition did however have one major shortcoming. At this point most of the 
analysis regarding the benefits of double hull tankers was theoretical. Double hull 
tankers had not been involved in enough incidents to draw a comparison. As the 
majority of following case studies reveal, single hull tankers have been responsible for 
the world’s major tanker disasters. 
 
Double hull: an unknown quantity 
 
Notwithstanding the traditional threats of weather, structural failure, military ordnance 
and disastrous practice and procedure which have previously claimed oil tankers, post 
9/11 strategic discussion brought tankers into the fold as possible terrorist targets. As 
pressure mounts within the Gulf between Iran and its detractors tankers may yet again 
come under fire, as they did during the ‘Tanker War’, should conflict break out in the 
region.  Following the Bayesian approach, in order to answer the question as to 
whether double hull tankers will fare any better or worse than single hull tankers when 
under attack, a number of case studies will be examined. The case studies have been 
chosen to reveal the nature, behaviour and resilience of modern day oil tankers, and 
will endeavour to, in part, dispel the myth among recent academic thought that they 
are a ‘soft target’ despite appearing so.310 However, if double hulled oil tankers do 
appear to be more susceptible to bomb or missile damage would they be specifically 
targeted by terrorists or opposing military powers? 
 
Case studies 
 
The case studies draw together a series of diverse internal and external threats which 
have not only sunk or destroyed oil tankers but have also induced, or attempted to 
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induce, change within the tanker industry through legislation, prosecution, working 
practice or reviewing operational practices. The case studies focus on the technical 
nature and behaviour of oil tankers involved in incidents. The political and military 
motives will be discussed further in the thesis. The case studies will examine tanker 
explosions involving: 
 
• Tank cleaning (internal explosion) 
• Cargo leakage (internal explosion) 
• Offloading (internal explosion) 
• The ‘Tanker War’ (internal and external explosion) 
• M.V. Limburg incident (external explosion) 
 
The case studies will end with a technical analysis of the facts surrounding the 
causation of oil tanker disasters, as opposed to issues concerning the political and 
legal processes that accompany such disasters.  The technical analysis will also 
include commentary from two members of the shipping industry; Mr. A Thonayan of 
the National Shipping Company of Saudi Arabia311 and Professor Martin Stopford, 
Director of Research at Clarkson's Shipping Company Limited.312 
 
Tank cleaning and the ‘electrostatic charge’ phenomenon 
 
Tankers have for years been vulnerable to explosions caused by their own cargos. 
After several journeys transporting crude oil, a large waxy deposit forms on the inner 
surfaces of the vessels holding tanks.  The crust is washed off using a well proven 
procedure involving a slowly rotating high speed water jet which physically impounds 
the surface. With the introduction of super tankers, larger more powerful jets were 
used. In 1969 three super tankers operated by Shell, the SS Megara, Mactra and Kong 
Haakon VII all exploded while undergoing tank cleaning exercises. Only the Kong 
Haakon VII survived.313 
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The cause was attributed to sparks from static electricity generated within the vapour, 
igniting the oil/water mix. After these incidents, tank cleaning was undertaken in an 
inert atmosphere whereby exhaust fumes from the engine are pumped into the cargo 
tanks during the cleaning operation. The overarching reason why static electricity was 
generated in the tanks lay in the tank size. All three vessels were new build 
constructions of a much larger size to existing tankers. There was therefore no 
previous experience regarding tank cleaning and the increased size of the tanks 
produced a sufficient environment to charge a static cloud.314 
 
A further study by the US Coast Guard still blamed static electricity for the loss of five 
oil carrying barges between 1984 and 1988.315 The oil and shipping industry has 
worked together to solve the static electricity problem to the point where to all intent 
and purposes it has been overcome. In some cases crude oil is used as a cleaning 
agent thereby further reducing the opportunity for an explosive mixture to occur. 
 
Cargo leakage 
 
In 1975 the Berge Istra sank without a trace followed by the Berge Vanga in 1979.316 
The ships were both ‘oil and bulk’ carriers able to carry oil or bulk ore.  Their 
disappearance has been put down to cargo leakage as stated by Jack Devanney 
 
The problem was that oil was leaking into the double bottom ballast tanks from cracks in 
the cargo tanks.  In those days, the way a cargo surveyor checked for oil in the ballast 
tank was to use a mirror to send a shaft of sunlight down the ullage hatch.  An experienced 
eye can tell if there is an oil, even a sheen lying on the top of the ballast water far below 
by the reflection.  The crews in the Istra and Vanga were having so much difficulty keeping 
oil out of the double bottoms that they resorted to putting big buckets of water under the 
hatches.  The cargo surveyor’s mirror would see only the pail of clean water.  This 
subterfuge cost them dearly.  It was only a matter of time before the vapours in the double 
bottom were combined with a source of ignition.317  
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Cargo leakage has been attributed to a number of losses including The Surf City, ABT 
Summer, Castillo De Bellver, and Khark 5.318  Ironically in the case of The Surf City 
and ABT Summer, the explosion occurred when the Chief Mate was inside the ballast 
tank checking for leaks. The industry has imposed more rigorous and stringent 
inspections in areas where leaked oil can ‘pool’ in the hull of vessels. The incidents 
involving the Vanga and Istra put an end to operations involving dual oil and ore 
carrying vessels. 
 
Major unloading incidents 
 
Probably the worst terminal incident occurred at Whiddy Island, Eire in 1979. The 
French flagged Betelgeuse exploded while offloading at the Gulf Oil terminal killing all 
forty two crewmen and seven people on the shore.319  A high level of corrosion in the 
cargo tanks compounded the incident causing the tank walls to successively blow out 
as the explosion gathered momentum. 
 
The salvage operation took nearly two years to complete and the terminal was closed 
permanently afterwards. The Irish government appointed a tribunal to investigate the 
incident, presided over by Justice Declan Costello. This tribunal took a year to hear 
evidence and prepare a 480 page report.320 The report indicated three main factors 
that had contributed to the incident. 
 
It was determined that a faulty unloading operation had unbalanced the vessel, 
causing it to break its back and thereby rupturing several empty ballast tanks. Vapour 
from the ruptured tanks had escaped into the vessel and exploded in a fireball.321 
However, the Costello tribunal's findings were never accepted by Total.  
 
Subsequent information regarding the tragedy revealed that the Classification Society, 
which passed the ship as fit for being insured, were aware that the vessel’s owners 
Total Oil were about to sell the ship. Total had neglected to maintain the vessel, but 
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as Total were a big customer of the Classification Society certain key aspects, such 
as the corrosion in the cargo tanks, had been overlooked. Directly after the disaster 
Total were praised for being a large employer which had invested heavily in the area 
and ultimately avoided prosecution for manslaughter.322 
 
A similar accident occurred to the M.V.Haven in 1991. Ironically the vessel was the 
sister ship to the ill-fated Amoco Cadiz and also a veteran of the tanker war. It exploded 
during an internal transfer of oil and burnt for three days at the Multedo floating 
platform in Genoa harbour. The wreck was then towed inland to shallow water where 
it was sunk at a place where the vessel posed no further danger to shipping. Sinking 
the tanker put the fire out and limited any pollution to the shore area. The incident 
prompted Italian prosecutors to charge the vessels owners with manslaughter.323 
 
At the centre of the case was the allegation that the vessels owners had kept the ship 
in such disrepair that it blew up. According to news items it is also alleged that the 
tanker was scrapped after being hit by an Exocet missile during the Iran–Iraq War and 
should not have been put back into operation. Prosecutors had asked for seven-year 
sentences for manslaughter. In 2002 the owners were eventually acquitted of any 
wrongdoing.324 
 
The ‘Tanker War’ 
 
The effect of military ordnance on oil tankers is surprisingly benign.  Missiles, rockets 
and sea mines are designed to inflict damage on military naval vessels, the design 
and construction of which as vastly different to that of a tanker.  Tankers have thick 
hull plates ranging from 25mm to 31mm compared to only 8mm for a warship.325  This 
disparity in hull thickness alone has proved to be too much of a barrier for ordnance 
to be effective when tankers have been targeted in past conflicts.  The reason why 
tankers are so resilient is also explained in their Spartan composition.  The hull of an 
oil tanker is constructed from steel plate held together by a lattice work of structural 
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upright and cross members.  Aside from this assembly the hull is hollow apart from the 
individual tank walls.  Only the superstructure, living accommodation and engine room 
at the stern contain enough material for which rockets and missiles are effective, as 
they were designed to incapacitate warships with dense interiors.326 An oil tankers 
resilience to sinking should not be understated.   
 
Conditions in the Gulf 
 
The anti-shipping campaigns of Iran and Iraq known as the ‘tanker wars’ were to be 
the most sustained assaults on merchant shipping since the Second World War.  
Between 1982 and 1986 two hundred and thirty nine tankers were targeted in the Gulf, 
killing one hundred and sixty crewmen.327  The vast majority of tankers fell prey to air 
to surface missiles fired by Iraqi or Iranian Air Force jets.  Pilots had the additional 
problems of detecting targets due to: the volume of traffic in the Gulf, the thick heat 
haze that hung over the surface of the water during daylight hours and poor command 
and control facilities.328  In a few cases tankers hit mines laid in the shipping lanes but 
whether the damage was caused by rockets or mines it became apparent that tankers 
were very difficult to sink.329  The underlying reason for this was that in almost all cases 
damage occurred on or above the ships’ waterline.  Tankers hit during the tanker war 
can be split into two distinct categories: tankers hit while in ballast (empty of cargo) 
and tankers loaded with oil. 
 
Tankers ‘in ballast’ 
 
The most destructive ‘in ballast’ incidences occurred when missiles ignited the air/oil 
vapour mixture inside the product tanks.  If the tank had not been inerted by the 
vessels exhaust gasses then the resulting explosion blew the tank hull wall out.  A 
further danger lay in shrapnel igniting the vessel’s bunker fuel.330  The Iraqi and Iranian 
Air Forces held a strategic interest in only attacking loaded tankers, therefore reducing 
their adversaries export capability.  Empty tankers in ballast were usually hit when 
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opposing sides encountered each other in aerial dogfights.331  In such a situation pilots 
often picked a random target so they could jettison their payload in order to gain speed 
and manoeuvrability in the air and outwit their adversary.  There was however a distinct 
advantage to firing the missile at short range. 
 
An Excocet is packed with a 165kg fragmentation warhead which was compounded 
by any unused propellant (150kg when fully fuelled).332  Missiles that struck the hull 
punched their way through the steel plate and exploded inside empty tanks or tanks 
containing ballast water.  The explosion either buckled the internal tank walls or tore 
through the upper, deck damaging pumps and loading hatches.  In twenty three 
reported cases Excocet missiles punched through the hull wall but the delayed 
action/proximity fuse failed to detonate.333  These missiles were defused in situ by US 
military personnel as the tanker steamed north into the Gulf to load oil. 
 
Loaded tankers 
 
Crude oil is very difficult to ignite and tended to absorb the explosion.  Where a missile 
did penetrate into the tank and explode, the shock wave would rupture the tank and 
pour oil into the hull’s internal structure where the fumes would mix with air often 
provoking a secondary explosion. However when oil is ignited inside a tanker, a crust 
forms on top of the crude which can eventually contribute to a so called ‘boil over’ 
effect. The fire causes the heavy crust to sink down into the cooler oil below and further 
fuels the fire.  If the crust sinks even deeper it reaches a water layer. The water is 
instantly vaporized and a boil over occurs, causing flames and boiling oil to spurt from 
the vessels open vents.334 
 
Ironically, salvage engineers found that tankers tend not to explode once they have 
started burning. Salvers further discovered that tankers, unlike cruise liners and 
passenger ferries, do not capsize from the weight of water flooding onto the decks 
during fire-fighting activities, therefore opening the use of copious amounts of 
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seawater to flood the deck of a burning vessel. Under certain conditions however 
tanker fires were be left to burn out naturally rather than endanger lives fighting the 
fire. In one case, the Cypriot, Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC), W. Enterprise bunker 
fuel burned for five days causing the accommodation block to ultimately collapse into 
the hull.  This amount of structural devastation did not prevent salvage engineers 
saving the cargo and the hull, which was later sold, re-fitted and re-launched. A marked 
example of the astonishing systematic ingenuity often attributed to the shipping 
industry.335   
 
The M.V. Limburg incident 
 
The last case study concerns the only example of a double hull tanker. The French 
flagged VLCC Limburg suffered intense fire damage but remained afloat after it was 
hit by al Qaeda terrorists in October 2002. The tanker was waiting off the coast of 
Yemen for a pilot to assist loading at the nearby Nexen Ash-shihr offshore export 
terminal when it was hit by a speedboat packed with explosives. Tanks one, two and 
four were already loaded with Arabian Heavy crude from Saudi Arabia. The blast made 
a hole in the number 4 starboard tank which started a ferocious fire. Had the impact 
been only a meter more to the right then the explosives would have instead holed an 
empty tank full of inert gas causing far less damage than was actually achieved.336 
The fire was put out, and four days later the Limburg was towed to Dubai, United Arab 
Emirates. The damage to the tanker was around $45 million. The fact that the Limburg 
remained afloat greatly assisted its removal by salvage tugs. This point is often 
overlooked in literature concerning the probability that a burning tanker will 
automatically block a narrow waterway. Yemen, the country from where the threat 
originated, suffered due to insurance underwriters quickly increasing premiums by 300 
percent on vessels entering Yemeni ports. The increase had an immediate detrimental 
effect on the Yemeni economy as it effectively paralysed the country’s seaborne import 
and export trade, not to mention $13.1 million a month in port revenues.337 
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Technical analysis of the facts 
 
Analysis of the case studies determines that internal explosions as opposed to 
external explosions are the greater risk to oil tankers.  The threat comes in the form of 
a suitable environment for an oxygen/oil mixture to form and ignite. Other contributing 
factors point to personnel and unloading malpractice, the condition of the vessel and 
in the case of the ‘Tanker War’ the effectiveness of military ordnance. 
The al-Qaida attack on the M.V Limburg probably failed to have the desired effect, 
prompting a change in strategy as reported after documents were sized during the 
May 2nd 2011 US Navy SEAL raid in Pakistan which killed al-Qaida’s leader Osama 
Bin Laden 
 
[The] FBI and the Homeland Security Department said that al-Qaida sought information 
on the size and construction of oil tankers, and determined that blowing them up from the 
inside would be easiest due to the strength of their hulls. Al-Qaida recommended test runs 
of the plot.338 
 
The hull forms the key to the formation of an explosive mixture, either by leakage or a 
crack in the cargo tanks while unloading oil.  When asked whether a double hull tanker 
could potentially react in the same was as a single hull tanker in that it could provide 
a suitable space for oil to pool and be inspected against such an eventuality A. 
Thonayan of the NSCSA stated 
 
[A]l of the steelworks in these new designs it’s a bit complicated because it’s a very 
narrow area and a very congested area, especially when it’s around the bends, around the 
keel and around the bottom of the ship.  That area is going to be very difficult for 
surveying.  That’s the way I see it.339 
 
Professor Martin Stopford felt that the sophisticated design of double hull tankers 
would only fair worse than a single hull should a major incident occur  
 
I mean double hold tankers have done well in low impact groundings basically.  That’s 
where they’re at the best, because you breach the outer skin, you don’t breach the inner 
skin...if you breach both skins, you’re worse off with a double hold, because they sit 
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higher in the water...If in fact you actually make a hole in both of your tanks, then you’re 
going to be worse off with a double hold tanker because you spill more oil.340 
 
When asked about the prospect of double hull oil tankers being targeted in any future 
conflict Professor Stopford stated 
 
[I]n military terms – I mean the Gulf proved not to be a major problem during the war in 
the 80’s, I don’t believe the generally available of weapons have changed all the much, so 
one assumes that modern tankers could cope with a degree of hostilities, as they did 
then.341 
 
As the risk of an internal explosion and the threat of an explosive mixture forming in 
the hull are transferable between single and double hull tankers, it can only be 
assumed that new build double hull tankers will unfortunately succumb to similar 
accidents involving single hull tankers. The severity of any such future accident is likely 
not to rest solely to the double hull design but will involve other natural, material and 
human factors as well.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Legislation will dictate the introduction of double hull oil tankers however the design 
will not lessen the risk or threat of accidents. The conditions required to produce 
optimum damage to double hulled tankers are too difficult to reproduce on an 
individual basis by terrorists or an opposing military power. But should such an event 
occur the impact on the shipping industry would have no measurable effect on supply. 
Random acts of terrorism may still pose a minor threat but can be insured against. 
Wharton Business School argue that a market for terrorism insurance will only be 
created if buyers and sellers carry out a more systematic analysis of the relationship 
between the price of protection and the implied risk of terrorism.342 Implied risk aimed 
at tankers could well be any unsubstantial, improbable and perceived threat that 
would, at best, only replicate a previous accident or casualty of war involving an oil or 
gas tanker. As bad as any of the incidents in the case studies involving internal 
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explosions were, it would be very difficult for terrorists to recreate the exact conditions 
needed to repeat the incident. A. Thonayan added further clarity responding to my two 
questions343 
 
Did the attack on the Limburg have very little effect on the shipping industry? 
 
Indeed, very little effect. 
 
If double hull tankers prove to be more susceptible than single hull tankers, do 
you think that this would prompt terrorists to attack them more often? 
 
No, because terrorists don’t know whether it’s double hull or single hull, 
they cannot tell. 
 
Mr. Thonayan’s rather ‘over the shoulder’ final rejoinder could well hold water. 
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Strait of Hormuz 
 
The Strait of Hormuz is a principle area of international concern. The end of the Cold 
War significantly reduced the number of strategic target areas where interference by 
East and/or West would frustrate each other’s policies. The security of the Strait has 
remained key during and after this process.    
 
Previous academic investigation is universally conclusive that Iran does not possess 
the capability to close the Strait of Hormuz.  Regardless of whether Iran could close 
the Strait or not there has been a lack of modelling concerning the resulting world 
position arising from an effective closure of the Strait, should Iran develop its existing 
capability.  The syllogism may well be theoretical but it is certainly not an exercise in 
‘blue sky thinking’.  If analysis is upheld by technical accuracies and Bayesian 
evidence concerning earlier disruptions, a robust model can be constructed.  
 
In order to answer the above question it will be assumed that Iran can close the Strait 
by 1) a single blockade scenario 2) a series of closures involving Iran and its allies. 
The discussion will begin with the importance that Washington has afforded the Strait 
of Hormuz in terms of supply and developing foreign policy.  An up to date political 
and economic geography of the Straits will then highlight the waterway’s strategic 
position in the oil supply chain.  Tehran’s possible future nuclear threat will be 
discussed, reinforced by commentaries on the operating status of oil tankers, 
insurance companies, the media and traders, should a crisis occur.  Discussion will 
then turn to the probable effect of a single and then extended closure of the Strait on 
the shipping industry and its residual effect including alternative export routes.  Finally 
the stigma attached to such a disruption will be considered followed by a conclusion.  
In order to add further weight to the thesis the pragmatic opinions of Professor Martin 
Stopford, Director of Research at Clarksons Shipping Company will be incorporated 
into the assessment.344       
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One way in – one way out 
 
Roosevelt was also aware that the only practical and economic route for Saudi Arabia 
to export oil was by tanker through the Strait of Hormuz.  In 1945 it would have been 
inconceivable to think that a military force other than the US could close the Strait of 
Hormuz.  A major tenant contributing to the ongoing success of US-Saudi relations 
since the Great Bitter Lake meeting has been maintaining the free and unhindered 
flow of tanker traffic through the Straits of Hormuz. 
 
To date, and regardless of being labelled a ‘chokepoint’,354 the Straits of Hormuz have 
remained constantly open to maritime traffic. However, over these same years 
transiting the Straits has become somewhat taken for granted.   The importance of the 
waterway to US-Saudi relations has therefore been gradually underestimated, often 
by other more immediate and pressing concerns surrounding Gulf security. 
 
The US however does not solely depend upon oil imports from Saudi Arabia.  In order 
to preserve the dollar as the world’s reserve currency, America also depends on OPEC 
oil fulfilling market demand and physically reaching customers so that dollar 
transactions can be completed.  If the Straits had been susceptible and succumbed to 
blockades or closures, the US-Saudi relationship would have most probably veered 
along a different course to the one held today. 
 
The sustained opening of the Straits also gave tanker operators the confidence to build 
larger vessels which are so big that they cannot berth at small loading terminals in 
many other exporting countries.  In short the physical roll the Straits of Hormuz have 
played by remaining open to traffic come what may has silently but deeply not only 
underpinned US-Saudi relations but has also proved to be a stealth dependability 
during subsequent presidential terms. 
 
Washington initially secured the supply source but as the US economy steadily grew, 
US industry and American citizens have dictated demand not only in terms of oil 
consumption but also in the sustained strength of the dollar resulting from OPEC 
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revenues.  As such, successive US Republican and Democratic Party Presidents have 
been forced to uphold the security of supply for fiscal, commercial, economic and 
lifestyle reasons, the success of which is assumed to be a key tenant for keeping them 
in power. 
 
As US industrial growth and lifestyle expectations have increased, so has the need for 
ongoing US security and intervention in the Gulf, although despite the strategic nature 
of the Strait of Hormuz there has never been a permanent US military presence 
stationed in or along the shores of the waterway. Despite the continuity the Straits 
have afforded the supply chain they have in the past been threatened with closure.  
However, so far the only threat of closing the Straits has come from hollow soundings 
made by Iran during the Iran-Iraq war which have been subsequently repeated on 
several other occasions.   
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Geography of the Strait of Hormuz 
 
 
Fig 6.3 Strait of Hormuz map 
 
The Strait is roughly forty five kilometres miles wide at its narrowest point.  Depending 
on demand approximately two thirds 17m b/d of total world oil trade transit the Strait 
of Hormuz, representing 40% of world daily demand.355  In tanker terms this equates 
to a combination of between twelve to fifteen loaded Very Large Crude Carriers 
(VLCC) and Ultra Large Crude Carriers (ULCC) exporting oil.  In order to fulfil later 
lifting’s just as many tankers steam ‘in ballast’ (empty) into the Gulf to replenish those 
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that have departed.  A few smaller Aframax and Panamax tankers may also steam out 
through the Strait with reduced consignments destined for ports that cannot 
accommodate VLCC or ULCC vessels.  The inbound and outbound shipping lanes 
marked on the map above are three kilometres wide each with a three kilometre buffer 
zone between them.  As such the shipping lanes and the distance between the lanes 
is the same as those applied to shipping lanes in the open sea.   
 
The northern shore is occupied by Iran in what is, apart from the port of Bandar Abbas, 
a remote region of the country with a poor logistical infrastructure.  The southern shore 
is shared by Oman and the United Arab Emirates who collectively cannot defend the 
waterway.  The Strait generally does not fall prey to storms or unpredictable weather 
conditions and to the main remain calm, although there is often a blanket of heat haze 
covering the surface. 
 
At the western mouth of the Straits sit Greater Tumb, Lesser Tumb and Abu Musa 
Island.356  Sovereignty of the islands has been disputed between the United Arab 
Emirates and Iran, with Iran now occupying the islands.357  Intelligence suggests that 
Iran has stationed and tested surface to ship missiles on the islands358, the 
questionable effectiveness of which are discussed in the thesis.359  Martin Stopford 
sums up the possible risk as  
 
The transit in military terms – I mean the Gulf proved not to be a major problem during the 
war in the 80’s, so I don’t believe the generally available weapons have changed all the 
much, so one assumes that modern tankers could cope with a degree of hostilities, as 
they did then.360 
 
Previous evidence discussed in this thesis, and Stopford’s rather dismissive wave at 
the effects of available conventional weapons on oil tankers, detracts somewhat from 
the vast industry academics have created in this area.361  Regardless of the 
effectiveness of available weapons the current assumption is that Iran does not 
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possess the ability to close the Strait of Hormuz utilizing an arsenal of conventional 
weapons for any sustained period.362  A closure would mean exposing a large 
proportion of its navy to retaliation, and stationing troops on the remote southern 
shores of the Strait and on the Tumbs and Abu Musa islands would again expose 
these troops to retaliatory forces.  Such a venture would undoubtedly leave Tehran 
with inventory losses that would be impossible to replace due to sanctions, not to 
mention a list of needless deaths to explain.   
 
Could Iran close the Strait of Hormuz? 
 
Could Iran physically close the Strait of Hormuz?  Academically yes if Tehran received 
no retaliation.  However no retaliation would be highly unlikely in the case of Hormuz, 
but the ‘no retaliation’ situation is not unknown.  Egypt after all received no retaliation 
when Nasser closed the Suez Canal in 1967 for eight years. A blockade of the Strait 
would only be effective if all shipping were to recognise the blockade and cease 
steaming in and out of the Gulf.  Iran conducts regular naval exercises in the Strait.  In 
May 2010 Tehran conducted the Velayat 89 consisting of  
 
[A]ir, land, and sea forces exercise in the Gulf – including the Strait of Hormuz – and the 
Indian Ocean. According to IHS Jane’s, “[…] the eight days of exercises included mine 
clearance and detection; torpedo and missile simulation; mobile support and command-
and-control exercises; simulation of radar and missile units; and special operations 
deployment into the naval area of operations.363 
 
America responded by stationing the fifth fleet nearby and was sufficiently worried by 
Tehran’s actions to counter any threat posed by the combined Iranian armed forces, 
should the exercise manifest itself into a reality.  Washington would appear to think 
Iran could close the Strait although only for a limited short period given the firepower 
in place to prevent a blockade.  However even a short term blockade could potentially 
have far reaching consequences.  Returning to Bayes theory, a blockade of any length 
would alter the status quo, as the Strait of Hormuz has never been completely closed 
to all vessels.  One possible reason that prevented international action from re-opening 
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Suez in 1967 was the likelihood that the canal would be closed shortly afterwards 
again by the Egyptians. The ‘stigma’ attached to a change in the status quo that a 
closure of the Strait could do is discussed later in this chapter. The closure itself would 
depend upon any retaliation defeating the Iranian armed forces.  The effectiveness of 
a blockade rests on Iran’s resilience, although from Tehran’s perspective the damage 
is done when the blockade is officially recognised as successful, as from that point 
forth the closure cannot be undone leaving the only doubt hanging over the Strait of 
Hormuz. 
 
Is a closure of the Strait of Hormuz within Tehran’s interest? 
 
Logic would determine a closure of the Strait of Hormuz as being financially disastrous 
for Iran, but cannot be completely ruled out. Indeed if Tehran demonstrated enough 
interest in doing so, and insurance underwriters felt that conflict would occur, then the 
rise in insurance premiums for vessels attempting to transit the Strait may be enough 
to cause an ‘on paper’ blockade based on risk as opposed to a physical blockade.  
 
The loss of Iran’s export oil and the revenue earned from it serves as the predominant 
factor discouraging Tehran from making a serious bid to close the Strait. However, the 
loss of revenue by neighbouring exporting states would be far higher. That said, 
Tehran are unlikely to close the Strait on the grounds of spiting their neighbours. If 
anything the reason would be in response to sanctions. From Tehran’s point of view 
the sanctions placed on Iranian oil exports could be said to have the same effect as a 
blockade, leaving Iran with little to lose financially if the Strait is open or closed. During 
‘Velayat 90’ the follow up exercise to Velayat 89 mentioned above, Tehran issued the 
following statement  ‘[i]f sanctions are adopted against Iranian oil, not a drop of oil will 
pass through the Strait of Hormuz.’364 The statement did not prevent sanctions being 
imposed in a measure which led the US Treasury to announce  
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Sanctions have effectively terminated international access for most Iranian banks...Today, 
the Iranian government is relegated to the backwaters of the international financial 
system, and they know it.365 
 
It would appear that the international community, led by the US, are confident enough 
that Tehran will not execute the threat to close the Strait on the grounds of sanctions 
alone. Clearly Tehran’s loss of oil revenue is insufficient a reason for Iran to attempt a 
possible closure. The sufficient reason will therefore lie within situations unknown in 
the future, but to say never may well turn out to be hubris.   
 
In 1984 the Canadian made film ‘Countdown to Looking Glass’366 chronicled the 
events after (the now Soviet backed) Oman placed a toll on oil tankers sailing through 
the Strait of Hormuz. Although the film was fiction the following course of events were 
enacted as if a war game. The thesis has previously argued that Iran does not currently 
have the available force to close the strait or a good enough reason to do so. However, 
to say Iran or any other nation will never close the strait is a risk in itself. Just because 
there has not been a closure of the strait does not rule a closure out in the future. 
 
Hooton and Navias State that in September 1980, during the Iran-Iraq war, the British 
and American governments were consulting on actions should the straits close.367 In 
October 1983 the Iranians threatened to close the straits again.368  US President 
Reagan replied that a closure of the strait would not be tolerated and America would 
not rule out military action in a war they were not directly involved in yet.369 Saudi Oil 
Minister Yamani stated that even if the Iranians closed the strait it would take one or 
two weeks to open it again.370 Similar threats have resonated through the years. In 
June 2006 for example Iran reminded the US that any ‘mistake’371 aimed at Tehran’s 
nuclear project would jeopardise the flow of oil from the region372. Saudi’s Prince Turki 
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warned the US that such a move could increase the price of oil to over $200 a barrel.373 
Later in January 2008 an incident in the strait involving the Iranian and US Navies 
prompted Walter Posch at the EU Institute for Security Studies to affirm that this 
incident, as with previous incidents, ‘illustrates that the risk of escalation following 
misunderstandings or accidents [in the Strait of Hormuz] remain high’.374 These 
examples draw attention to the high level interest and determined action should a 
closure of the straits take place. The response has not changed for over 30 years. The 
potential for any closure of the Straits of Hormuz still tops the Gulf Security agenda.  
 
The Iranian threat 
 
Since 9/11 the threat from Tehran has marginally increased.  The threat of terrorism 
has entered the theatre, as has the range of possibilities open to Tehran should Iran 
succeed in developing a nuclear weapon. Terrorism has so far only produced a single 
incident in the Strait which will be discussed later in the thesis.  Joe Barnes and Amy 
Myers Jaffe state on Tehran’s position regarding Iran’s current and future threat to the 
Strait of Hormuz 
 
Iran would more likely bar passage of ships from specific countries or merely threaten to 
do so.  This would carry much more weight with exporters and shippers were Tehran to 
possess nuclear weapons, by raising the stakes should Washington or any of its allies 
choose to challenge any Iranian threats...In short, a nuclear Iran could pose a substantial 
threat to the free flow of oil from the Persian Gulf by raising the stakes of any serious 
conflict with Iran on any matter, even unrelated to oil. 375 
 
The statement is certainly realistic but given the amount of tankers registered to ‘flag 
of convenience’ countries, calls into question which specific countries Iran would 
possibly bar passage to? 
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Flag of convenience 
 
The shipping industry and with it the strategic importance of oil in transit is generally 
in the hands of private owners.  These owners can register their vessels under a 
different flag to the one they operate from and trade without much interference from 
government regulation.  Flag of convenience states such as Monrovia, war torn Liberia 
and the remote Marshall Islands may offer an alternative to the high operating costs 
and enhanced regulations of the owner’s domicile country, but provide little by way of 
protection during politically motivated conflict.376  Such is the importance of the oil 
market to the US that it would be left for Washington to decide whether they would 
adopt and provide protection for tankers flying a flag of convenience.   To its credit 
though, the shipping industry has maintained its independence and has adapted well 
to work alongside the commercially driven chattel like trading culture of the oil market.  
Morris Adelman describes the relationship as thus   
 
Whether a supplier loves or hates a customer (or vice versa) does not matter because, in 
the world oil market, a seller cannot isolate any customer and a buyer cannot isolate any 
supplier.377 
 
 Given the complexities of defining exactly which countries to bar, and even if Tehran 
did execute a ban, it is unlikely that the ban would impact on the chosen target country 
due to the fluidity of the relationship fostered by the combined oil and shipping 
industries, 
 
Earlier discussion has revealed just how little of the Saudi Arabia oil supply chain is of 
Saudi origin.  Furthermore the oil supply chain has been ‘serviced’ by non-Saudi 
personnel for some time, so much so that it has become the status quo for external 
foreign goods and services to maintain the oil supply, and the privately owned tanker 
shipping industry to export crude oil. For oil exporting states in the Gulf maintaining an 
unhindered export route has always been the key factor. Conversely, the materials, 
equipment and parts needed to service and maintain the oil supply are imported via 
the same route – through the Strait of Hormuz – making the Strait not only vital for the 
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sale of oil but also the ongoing running of the physical oil supply chain infrastructure, 
and development of new projects. 
 
Insurance concerns 
 
Before a closure took place it is highly probable that there would be a build up to the 
event.  In such a case insurance companies could take a view that the Straits of 
Hormuz posed an increasing risk to shipping and would therefore command a 
premium to vessels in the area.  During the Iraq-Iran ‘tanker war’ insurance premiums 
were imposed by latitude.  The geographic limits were determined by the amount of 
hostility provided by Iraqi and Iranian Air Force sorties in the Gulf.378  However, oil 
tankers were not attacked in the Strait of Hormuz during the ‘tanker war’.  Iraqi fighter 
jets simply did not have the range to complete sorties and Bagdad was far more 
concerned with attacking vessels in the Kharg Island area in the northern Gulf. 
 
Consideration must therefore be placed on the availability of tankers prepared to enter 
the Strait under such circumstances.  The shipping industry during the ‘tanker war’ 
was in a far different position than it is today.  The current tanker market is a lot ‘tighter’ 
than it was during the 1980’s when owners could benefit from a large second hand 
market as described by Stopford       
 
[T]he tanker war coincided with a period when the tanker industry was on its knees 
financially and therefore no one had any money, nobody really paid much attention to the 
industry, it was just a destitute business.  A lot of the tanker owners during the war 
wouldn’t insure their ships, the chances of sinking a ship with the weapons they had then 
was not that great.  On the whole what tended to happen is that the ones that went up the 
Gulf were the old ones, and people like the Troodos Shipping Company would pick up 
these ships for three, four million dollars, trade them at the Gulf, take their chances and 
then they scrapped them when the market got back to normal.379 
 
Nevertheless, despite sending old tankers into the Gulf, Saudi Oil Minister Yamani 
commented that if Lloyds of London ceased to insure tankers in the Gulf it would be 
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‘Equal to closing the Strait of Hormuz’.380  Insurance premiums could rise to a point 
where the price would preclude any available tankers from entering the Strait even if 
they were prepared to do so, although Stopford concedes that, ‘the charterers would 
simply not accept an uninsured tanker, unless they were desperate.  So if there was 
a shortage and nobody would go up the Gulf, then they’ll take anything.’381 
 
Media coverage 
 
There is also the question of media coverage and the political and public impact it 
could create.  Media companies have become increasingly influential on public and 
political thought during conflict.  The apparent ease by which journalists are able to 
accompany troops has led to a culture by which news reports from ‘embedded’ 
journalists can be aired in almost ‘real time’ by satellite links.  The impact on the 
viewing public and the relationship between the military and media companies is often 
called into question.  Some commentators have accused the media of broadcasting 
misleading propaganda, while coverage has raised many journalists to celebrity status 
whose fame alone can influence opinion.  Media pictures of burning tankers during the 
‘tanker war’ were mainly provided by still photographs taken by crew members.  The 
action took place in the middle of the Gulf making this an inaccessible location for 
journalists and photographers alike.  The same situation is unlikely during a closure of 
the Strait of Hormuz.  Journalists could resort to sailing with salvage teams, reporting 
on board naval vessels and tankers or chartering aircraft to report on events. 
 
Qatar is now the home of Al Jazeera.  Al Jazeera often broadcasts a differing 
perspective to those held by conservative State run Gulf media stations.  The station, 
well known for its often dissenting views, would be well placed to report on events in 
the Gulf and thereby create weighted discussion and conflicting opinion among 
neighbouring Arab states.  However some footage could be taken out of context.  For 
example should an oil tanker be hit and catch fire this would provide quite spectacular 
footage, but may not project a realistic perspective on the whole event.  Once again, 
as with insurance companies the media could further impact, disproportionately in 
certain situations, on the full extent of a closure.  Recent events in Tunisia, Libya, 
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Egypt, Bahrain and Syria have proved that social media web sites are effective 
platforms on which civil society can demonstrate and eventually depose heads of state 
during a crisis.382  Media coverage of a crisis in the Strait of Hormuz could in turn prove 
to be a catalyst for wider issues within the Gulf to be addressed.     
 
The probable effect of a closure of the Strait of Hormuz 
 
A closure of the Strait of Hormuz would cause a termination of revenue, trade and trust 
as Stopford argues 
 
The Middle East I think would be left with a major stigma and it would of course have 
massive effects for them...I think the loss of Middle East oil supply would cause a very 
major international crisis...there isn’t an alternative supply that could take up the slack 
that you’d lose there. 
 
I mean you’re in a war situation.  If somebody closes the Gulf, you’re in a war situation 
and it’s about the most abusive thing that you can do.  It strikes right at the heart of the 
Western and Eastern economies, so I would have thought there would be crisis measures. 
 
The rule of thumb in the industry is that you do well out of wars at least initially, just 
because it disrupts things and when things get disrupted, tanker owners find they’re going 
to the wrong place, they’re hanging around, there’s congestion, there’s storage, all of 
these things.383 
 
Of primary importance would not only be the lack of oil but the equally damaging loss 
of dollar revenue which would not only affect the economies of effected export states, 
but also the currency, stock and futures markets worldwide. 
 
The fate of empty and loaded tankers trapped in the Gulf  
 
Oil production within exporting states would continue only until the storage facilities 
were full.  After this point it’s highly probable that empty tankers trapped in the Gulf 
would be hired to create additional storage.  The situation surrounding any tankers 
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that have already loaded oil for export would be, according to Stopford, far more 
severe 
 
[I]f you’ve got a closure like this, then you have to assume that there’s been a degree of 
nervousness before.  And if so then the price of oil would have gone up and therefore 
you’re sitting on two million barrels of oil and a VLCC, which if it’s a 100 dollars a barrel, 
two million barrels, 200 million dollars of capital, so the question I would think you ask is 
how do companies caught in that way, deal with funding the working capital on oil that 
they have purchased and can’t sell and would the insurance companies cover them and 
what would be the consequences from that point of view and I think that would be 
commercially disastrous for people, if it was anticipated this would be a lengthy period.  
the first thing you do is check out where the ship is as quickly as you can and make sure 
you get it into a jurisdiction where you’ve got some sort of legal control and Saudi is 
usually the example that’s given of one of the countries where you want to avoid if 
possible.384 
 
Companies and traders caught with a huge mortgage for the cargo may face 
repossession by the lender.  In such a case the vessel could be ‘arrested’ in port 
although as argued by Stopford this can be problematic in a Saudi port.  Due to Saudi 
adopting the principle of Sharia Law and the difficulties involved in translating Sharia 
into international law, as Martin Stopford put it ‘[I]t is rule number one that you do not 
arrest a ship in Saudi Arabia’.385  Stopford further adds regarding the legal process 
 
The process of enforcing a mortgage involves taking it to a court, which recognises the 
sort of legal system used by the banking industry, which is mostly British, a derivative of 
British Maritime Law and that’s what most of the flag states use and you would have to 
have a regime that could, that would enforce that and as I understand it, you know a Saudi 
court wouldn’t enforce it.386 
 
Another complication would be that trapped tankers would look towards their ‘flag 
state’ for protection which would invariably include a mixture of western and ‘flag of 
convenience’ states, all offering differing levels of commitment.  During the ‘tanker 
war’ the US allowed Kuwait to ‘reflag’ eleven of its tankers and fly the American 
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flag.387  Such an act would be unlikely immediately before or during a closure of the 
Strait of Hormuz.  Acts of aggression by Iran against reflagged American tankers 
could force Washington to be drawn into numerous incendiary situations that may 
be seized upon by Tehran and used to escalate conflict to a higher level. 
 
Worldwide tanker shortage 
 
Tankers trapped in the Gulf would also create a shortage of available tonnage.  
Tankers arriving in the Indian Ocean hoping to enter the Gulf at a rate of twelve to 
fifteen a day would have to weigh anchor, resulting in the loss of yet more available 
tonnage although the charterer could still be bound to pay the agreed daily rate for the 
duration of the disruption.  During the ‘tanker war’ as many as forty tankers sat empty 
waiting to enter the Gulf.  For the industry as a whole the immediate priority would be 
to find alternative suppliers.  Refineries around the globe would still be running and 
trying desperately to avoid a costly shut down. However, many alternative smaller 
producers’ loading terminals cannot accommodate large tankers. So even though 
spare large tankers were available for charter, they would not be able to load 
elsewhere to ease the shortage, prompting Martin Stopford to comment that in such a 
situation ‘I would rather have a small ship than a big one’.388  Furthermore, if the 
closure took place after 2015 then any spare single hull tankers could not be chartered 
on journeys ending in EU or US ports due to environmental regulation banning their 
entry.   
 
Empty tankers approaching the Gulf may therefore be diverted to alternative suppliers 
wherever possible.  Vessels that could find alternative loads would, due to the lack of 
available tankers be able to command a higher freight rate.  Loaded tankers that left 
the Gulf narrowly missing the closure would be contractually bound to honour the set 
freight rate although the fate of the cargo would fair differently  
 
People would probably start storing oil as much as they could at sea, you know people 
tend to hoard when prices go up, because the price of oil would go to an undetermined 
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level, so the speculators would come in and start storing oil and that might very well result 
in stocks being held at sea.389  
 
It would most probably be the case that such hoarding would immediately affect the 
price of oil as opposed to the actual shortage caused by a lack of exports from the 
Gulf.  To the market the shortage would therefore appear amplified which would 
corrupt price stability. 
 
The reaction of oil traders 
 
Trading during past crises has seen cargo’s change hands on the open sea as much 
as fifty six times before discharging the oil.  Trading would typically become just as 
volatile in a closure scenario if left to its own devices.  Available oil could be bid over 
until it was left in the hands of high risk taking traders.   Importing governments would 
be faced with a situation where the market would be left to determine the severity of 
the situation.  Stopford argues that one way to stabilize prices would be for 
governments to take control the markets by regulating all oil at sea.  
 
I mean basically if you’ve got a major stand-off...you’d have panic.  Would it be left to the 
market?  Or would they say this is such a serious thing, that we’re going to basically 
nationalise all oil at sea?  Then those ships would become under the control of the 
Governments, as they have done in wars previously.   
I think basically you would have massive oil instability...this isn’t oil that’s owned by big 
responsible oil companies, it’s oil that’s owned by traders all sorts of people and it may 
be that there would be some sort of intervention.390 
 
It would not only be oil importing states that would suffer.  Iran, although a major 
producer, does not have its own refining capacity.  Iran imports finished product from 
over forty countries.  Whether Iran could make an undertaking to satisfy domestic 
demand and write off any potential export revenue during a closure would no doubt be 
a major factor in Tehran’s decision to close the Strait of Hormuz in the first place. 
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Preparing for the unthinkable 
 
The full impact of a closure of the Strait of Hormuz is likely to be determined by the 
length of the closure, as opposed to any oil lost as a result of hostilities, during the 
disruption to supply.  If Tehran were to develop a nuclear capability and design a rocket 
with which to deliver a nuclear weapon then as further affirmed by Barnes and Myers 
Jaffe ‘A nuclear Iran would be in a much stronger position to assert its geographic 
leverage over the Strait of Hormuz’.391  Should the threat take place in this context – 
a Bayesian shift away from conventional to nuclear weapons – then as argued by 
Stopford the effect should not be underestimated 
 
I mean basically if you’ve got a major standoff, which looked as though it was going to 
drag on and people are notoriously bad at judging these things, I mean nobody really 
knows – I mean you’d have panic.  We’ve seen it in the recent crisis, you saw it in the 1956 
crisis, that people panicked and the belief of the oil companies, well documented belief of 
the oil companies after the Suez canal closed in 1956, was that it would be closed for four 
years, because they didn’t believe that Egypt was capable of actually managing the canal 
and clearing it.  While in fact you know it turned out that Egypt cleared it by the following 
April, so it was no sweat and people lost very heavily on that.392 
 
Whereas Egypt managed to clear the Suez Canal of trapped vessels, in order to 
determine the full effect of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz there has to be an 
investigation, however remote the probability, into the seemingly improbable position 
where Iran is able to hold and sustain a closure for an undetermined time, Stopford 
again  
 
You’ve got a complete nightmare scenario and anyway you’ve got no money coming in 
and every day you don’t sell anything, so if it goes on for a year, you’re going to have a 
siege economy in the Gulf I would think. 
 
I mean if you want to explore this one, look at the cash flow of these oil states.  They all 
have big budgetary commitments and you know Saudi export six million barrels a day of 
oil, seven, eight million barrels a day of oil and if that stops, then from the day it stops, 
they stop getting any money in.  So suddenly the Gulf is without any visible means of 
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support.  It can’t export from its – you’ve got Saudi with its chemicals, you can’t export 
your chemicals, you’ve got your oil refineries in the Gulf, which can’t export, which are 
relying on that, you’ve got no containers coming in, so you can’t repair your cars, because 
you’ve got no spare parts.  
 
The food supplies into the Gulf, man cannot live on oil alone and so there’d be no 
container ships in there and so basically you would be subjecting the Middle East to the 
– except possible Saudi bringing stuff through the Red Sea, to the same sort of crisis that 
you had by putting sanctions on Iraq, only worse really.393 
 
Stopford quite rightly points out that Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab 
Emirates rely on the Strait of Hormuz for trade and supplies that maintain the 
infrastructure, economy and lifestyles of their respective inhabitants. 
 
The plight of the smaller Gulf States 
 
Qatar and the UAE in particular are no longer sleepy backwaters and have far more 
at stake now than a decade ago.  Their rise on to the world stage has been meteoric.  
Doha, Abu Dhabi and Dubai have become recognised hosts for international sporting 
events.  They also provide tax havens, luxury accommodation, property and business 
investment opportunities for hedge funds and the worlds rich and famous.  Collectively 
they rely on regular ‘just in time’ imports to sustain a seamless 24/7 lifestyle choice for 
those who can afford it.  Left without access to their respective Gulf ports these states 
would be dependent upon overland supplies via Saudi Arabia.  However, given the 
bureaucracy, strict controls and general lethargy attached to processing vehicles at 
Saudi Arabia’s overland borders, not to mention the lack of infrastructure to 
accommodate a sudden increase in trucks, supplying the smaller Gulf States via Saudi 
Arabia may cause unwelcome friction.  The other alternative would be to supply the 
isolated Gulf States by air as was the case with Berlin during the ‘Berlin Airlift’.  
However, considering that all export revenues would cease, the cost of such an 
operation would be prohibitive over any prolonged period.  
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More worryingly Qatar and the UAE may be more inclined to sympathise with Iran if 
Tehran offered to treat them more favourably.  Tehran could offer Iran as a transit land 
bridge.  Seaborne supplies for the Gulf States could land at Chah Bahar Iran’s main 
Indian Ocean port, travel overland through Iran then sail again from Iran’s Gulf ports.  
Such an agreement may give the smaller Gulf States the confidence to break away 
from any reliance on Saudi Arabia as an alternative supply route.  If Tehran could offer 
Qatar and the UAE independence from Saudi Arabia then the power of opinion, 
concerning for example lifting any sanctions on Iran, afforded to Doha, Abu Dhabi and 
Dubai would increase greatly during a disruption of this kind.  Similarly regarding 
alternative supply routes, Bagdad was given the confidence to invade Iran in 
September 1980 after negotiating with Amman access to the Red Sea port of Aqaba 
in Jordan to supply Iraq during the conflict.394  Conversely in deciding to rely instead 
on Saudi Arabia the Gulf States may feel pressured into following any policy move by 
Riyadh surrounding a closure, again possibly causing friction between respective 
heads of state and Riyadh not to mention at home, where policy could contradict with 
that held by their respective naturalized and ex-pat population.   
 
Pipeline possibilities 
 
The same could be said about oil exports from Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and the UAE.  
To offset any future disruption in the Strait of Hormuz pipelines could be built overland 
from Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and the UAE, through Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea.  
However, the same political arguments over dependency and leverage resound.  
Saudi pumps oil from the eastern oil fields to Yanbo on the Red Sea coast but the 
pipeline is relatively small and does not have the capacity to deliver oil for export on a 
par with Saudi’s main export terminal at Ras Tanura on the Gulf coast.  The 
effectiveness in a rise in traffic at Yanbo would also be dependent on whether the 
SUMED pipeline had the capacity to accommodate the extra volume.  The SUMED 
pipeline pumps excess oil from Suez to the Mediterranean that would, if not removed 
from large tankers, prevent them from transiting the Suez Canal because the extra 
weight would cause the hull to ground out on the bottom of the canal.    Stopford argues 
that pipelines could prove too vulnerable in any respect 
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Anybody who is resolute to close the Strait of Hormuz would probably be able to cope 
with pipelines pretty well too, so on the face of it, I don’t see that being a real solution in 
any sense actually.395 
 
There is also the possibility that if alternative pipeline routes were built to augment 
reliance on the Gulf, it may be seen that a closure of the Strait of Hormuz would not 
be so catastrophic.  At first glance alternative export routes may appear to be a viable 
solution but conversely they could prove to be a grave mistake.  As the Strait of 
Hormuz is the sole main export route on which so much rests it allows Washington a 
single platform on which to concentrate security.  The addition of several other export 
routes would multiply the probability of a disruption and by default stretch not only 
Washington’s military resources but those of the tanker industry as well.   
 
Russian roulette – a multiple closure scenario 
 
The final ‘worst case scenario’ assumes that Iran possesses the required leverage to 
conduct a naval exercise or series of exercises that would effectively close the Straits 
of Hormuz to tanker traffic on a number of unpredictable occasions.  The situation is 
thickened by Iran inviting an oil exporting ally, for example Russia, to join the exercise.  
The Scenario includes Russia agreeing to make available surplus oil for export during 
the duration of the exercise in order to fulfil market demand, which would be payable 
in several currencies not only dollars.   
 
As far as examples go, this scenario would be a well-planned strategic insult to US 
interests – while at the same time fulfilling the demand of other major importing 
countries.  The addition of Russia would reduce the possibility of conflict, the oil market 
would be fulfilled and dollar exchanges could fall.  But the scenario fails on the count 
of supply.  In order for tankers to lift oil at Russia’s main Black Sea loading terminals 
it requires them to navigate the Bosporus Strait.  Tankers negotiating the Bosporus 
Strait are limited in size to vessels under 300 meters long.396  This being the case, the 
Bosporus could not accommodate any spare VLCC’s chartered on regular Gulf 
                                                 
395 Interview with Martin Stopford 08/03/2010.  See appendices p. 339. 
396 http://www.arkas.com.tr/en/straits_navigation.html 
227 
 
sailings that would become surplus during the exercise.  So, even if Russia produced 
enough oil to cover that lost during the exercise there would not be enough spare 
tankers of the right size to lift and export it to the open sea via the Bosporus.  The 
scenario therefore further emphasises the strategic nature of the Gulf to the shipping 
industry.  Without the Gulf, shipping companies are left with empty vessels on their 
books that they cannot charter to alternative destinations because they are simply too 
big to be accommodated along divergent transit routes or in exporters loading 
terminals.   
 
The stigma attached to a closure 
 
The ultimate cost of a long term sustained closure of the Strait would be borne by 
exporters and consumers alike.  The stigma attached to Gulf exporting states could 
spread doubt among consumers.  This stigma may well extend to doubt concerning 
any future investment in the region.  Regardless of proven reserves and the ability to 
produce oil the doubt would fall on producers being able to export consignments on a 
reliable, regular basis.  As discussed above, a curtailment of oil lifting’s from Gulf 
export terminals would seriously disrupt tanker movements, the repercussions of 
which would greatly impact on the oil market.  If it becomes apparent that Iran will 
definitely acquire the capacity to close the Strait of Hormuz, Saudi Arabia and other 
exporting states could consider the possibility of increasing their own security by 
inviting major consumer states to take ownership of their gathering (pipeline) systems 
and export terminals. 
 
If producer states were to privatise their respective oil infrastructures allowing 
consumer states a stake in the physical supply chain then the new consumer owners 
would be bound to protect these assets and therefore feel entitled to keep them 
productive.  The impetus for upholding this entitlement would come from the weight 
that oil plays on consumer economies and the stability transactions contribute towards 
keeping the dollar stable.  However this may not be enough to secure the need for a 
confrontation with Iran. 
 
If it were perceived that Tehran would retaliate with a nuclear strike on Israel for 
example then there could be a stalemate or ‘who blinks first’ stand-off similar to the 
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one experienced by Moscow and Washington during the Cuban missile crisis – with 
the Strait of Hormuz possibly playing piggy in the middle.    The backdrop for any 
favourable outcome regarding a closure to the Strait of Hormuz may ultimately rely 
upon the position participants take in other unpredictable events happening elsewhere 
in the world at the same time as the closure.  
 
Conclusion 
 
There is currently a very low probability of a closure of the Strait of Hormuz taking 
place.  However, should Iran succeed in developing the potential to apply leverage on 
the Strait then a closure could become a reality.  Analysis has also underscored the 
vulnerability with which the oil market is exposed to potential disruptions and 
shortages, purely due to the size of available tankers.  Winston Churchill stated that 
’safety and certainty in oil lie in variety, and variety alone.’397  With hindsight he could 
also add that this not only includes producing states but the size of oil tankers as well. 
 
At best a closure of the Strait of Hormuz would be devastating for Gulf oil exporting 
and consumer States and any foreign investments in the same producing countries, 
possibly leading to a long-term decline of market confidence in Gulf oil.  The ‘ripple 
effect’ resulting from a closure would have far reaching social and economic 
consequences.  At worst the closure of the Strait of Hormuz could trigger a nuclear 
standoff. 
 
Interwoven within a decision to retaliate against Iran would be a mêlée of public opinion 
fuelled by media comment, speculation and exposés.  Never, in the history of the 
United States have Washington’s decisions been analysed, criticised and 
demonstrated against by the American public more than since the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq.  Should the US clash with Iran over the Strait of Hormuz the outcome could well 
force the hand of the incumbent President to struggle against elected policy.  Tehran 
may yet again play an unwelcome role in deciding whether the Democrat or 
Republican Party wins the post event Presidential election. 
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Terrorism 
 
Prior to 9/11 the Gulf oil supply had been predominantly disrupted by war or issues 
regarding transit tax.  Actual physical damage to the oil infrastructure was rare but not 
unknown, three notable examples being in 1970 when Syrian construction workers 
damaged the Tapline while laying a telephone line, a fire in 1977 at the Abqaiq 
pumping centre in Saudi Arabia, and the destruction of the Kuwait oil fields by 
retreating Iraqi troops in 1991.398  Given the secrecy within the Gulf States there is 
also the distinct possibility that other accidents took place that remain unreported.  
However, the fact remains that physical damage to the oil infrastructure has generally 
been a threat as opposed to reality during inter-state conflicts in the region. This 
position is both a blessing and a curse in that importing States have grown accustomed 
to a regular supply during conflict, while on the other hand if it were to be proved 
necessary, protecting the vast infrastructure would be costly and problematic for all 
concerned. 
 
The prospect of post 9/11 terrorism in Saudi was the first time the Kingdom has been 
faced with political violence from its own citizens.  The Kingdom’s response however 
was far from lacklustre.  Saudi counter terrorism experts continued to thwart attacks, 
and the Kingdom’s Armed Forces turned en masse to protect the Kingdom’s oil 
infrastructure.399  The Washington Institute went as far as to say that ‘In theory, Saudi 
oil facilities are among the best guarded installations in the kingdom. The state owned 
company, Saudi Aramco, employs what is effectively a private army to provide 
security.’ Riyadh fulfilled its obligations and the actions of the Saudi security forces no 
doubt helped restore circumspect Saudi – US relations. 
 
Initially though from a geopolitical context the situation was far from settled.  The 
hysteria which followed in the wake of 9/11 questioned existing confidence in Saudi 
Arabia as a safe place to do business.  Projected analysis placed the Kingdom 
squarely at the centre of terrorism aimed at the oil industry.400  In 2002 the Washington 
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based Institute for the Analysis of Global Security released a synopsis of the potential 
threat from Al-Qaeda 
 
Particularly vulnerable to oil terrorism is Saudi Arabia...Al Qaeda is well aware that a 
successful attack on one of the kingdom's major oil facilities would rattle the world and 
send oil prices through the ceiling...Whereas land targets are relatively well protected, the 
super-extended energy umbilical cord that extends by sea to connect the West and the 
Asian economies with the Middle East is more vulnerable than ever.. a single burning 
supertanker and its spreading oil slick could block the route for other vessels...Worse yet 
would be several such attacks happening simultaneously in multiple locations 
worldwide.401  
 
The alarming statement, along with many other similar predictions proved over 
subsequent years to vastly overstate the potential for terrorism in the region402.  
Analysis failed to take into account the operational ability of terrorists, the resilience of 
oil tankers and the wider oil infrastructure, and more importantly, the extent of any 
damage caused by terrorists that would interrupt the oil supply. 
 
In December 2004 Osama Bin Laden delivered a message which affirmed Al-Qaeda’s 
commitment to disrupting the Saudi oil exports, reminding followers to ‘be active and 
prevent them from reaching the oil, and mount your operations accordingly, particularly 
in Iraq and the Gulf, for this is their fate.’403  Bin Laden’s appeal drew scant support.  
Such a call was a massive undertaking for his followers to take up and make any 
significant impact on supply.  By the time of writing this thesis Al-Qaeda had mounted 
successful attacks aimed at industry personnel, which will be discussed later in the 
thesis, and one unsuccessful land based operation targeting the Kingdom’s Abquiq 
pumping facility404.  Al-Qaeda was also held liable for damaging the MV Limburg oil 
tanker anchored off the Yemeni coast.405  Despite the infrequency and random nature 
of attacks expert opinion continued to favour an increase in terrorism.    
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Even as late as 2006, a Centre for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy 
report commissioned by the UK Economic and Social Research Council stated that 
terrorism would be a ‘high probability’ cause of future disruptions.406  Given the lack of 
terrorist operations in the previous five years the question of methodology behind 
these, and other claims must be questioned.  The oil industry did not see terrorism in 
quite the same light.  Oil majors like BP, Shell and Texaco mentioned the threat of 
terrorism in an annex at the rear of their Security and Exchange Commissioning filings.  
With this in mind the role of lobbyists offering scenarios and their impact on policy is 
examined later on. 
 
It could also be said, some may say rather cynically, that the continued threat of 
terrorism in the region had lucrative commercial interest.    The atmosphere of fear did 
manage to generate a lasting fear in the region, and beyond, which became known as 
the ‘Terrorism Industry’.407 The terrorism industry was fuelled by private security firms 
hired to train personnel, guard critical infrastructure, write practice and procedure 
manuals and audit ongoing domestic and internationally agreed security codes and 
practices, all be it against an apparently benign threat.   
 
Resilience and methodology: lessons learned from the past 
 
In a similar exercise to that applied earlier in the thesis while analysing the resilience 
of oil tankers, a great deal of insight can be gleaned by examining the circumstances 
surrounding major industrial accidents.  What becomes apparent through the case 
studies, as was the conclusion with oil tankers, is that internal failures produce the 
most destructive results than damage sustained from an external force.  Furthermore, 
as with tankers, the circumstances preceding the blast would be extremely difficult to 
replicate by a determined saboteur.  A key contributing factor being that explosions 
occur after a single part has failed within the facility which in turn applies pressure to 
the whole system.  Let us not forget at this point that oil industry personnel often work 
in extremely hazardous conditions with highly inflammable substances that would to a 
layman appear too dangerous to work in.  The difference being that well trained and 
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risk aware personnel are attentive to any possible hazards whereas a layman can only 
rely on limited technical knowledge and their imagination.   
 
The following dramatic and lethal incidents aim to exemplify the difficulty a terrorist 
would face replicating a similar attack.  In 1974 the Nypro UK owned chemical plant 
at Flixbourgh exploded.408  A pipe carrying cyclohexane ruptured and released enough 
gas to form a cloud which ignited and killed 28 workers.  Nature contributed to the 
devastating effect in that the release happened on a calm day and therefore the wind 
did not disperse the cloud.  A single pipe caused the Flixbourgh disaster in an area of 
the plant that was difficult to reach and would have required time, specialist tools and 
technical knowledge to detach.  A part failure also caused the Piper Alpha gas platform 
to explode in 1988 killing 162 workers.  The part in question, a valve, had been blanked 
off during maintenance.  However, due to a misunderstanding at a critical shift change 
gas continued to be pumped through the valve until pressure backed up through the 
system and caused an explosion.409  Incomprehensibly neighbouring platforms 
continued to pump gas to the stricken Piper Alpha as shutting the system down would 
incur a heavy cost and therefore a fear of disciplinary action to those concerned.  As 
with Flixbourgh optimum damage resulted from defective parts and in the case of Piper 
Alpha human failure. 
 
Oil refineries have suffered a similar fate.  Explosions at Grangemouth, Scotland in 
1976, Milford Haven, Wales in 1996 and the 2005 US Texas City refinery were all 
caused by parts failure.  Typically, in all three cases flammable vapour ignited; in the 
case of Texas when a worker tried to start his car and move it to safety.410  There is 
no definitive answer as to whether a terrorist could replicate a similar incident but the 
evidence points to a pattern involving a small part failure which the system further 
exasperates with pressure, resulting in an explosion.  Terrorism did enter the equation 
in 2005 though after the huge explosion and subsequent fire at Total Oil’s Buncefield 
storage depot in Hertfordshire UK.  The fire came at a time of heightened alert, but 
terrorism was very quickly ruled out after it became apparent that due to a faulty gauge 
petrol overflowed from vents in a storage tank and formed an explosive air/vapour mix 
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which ignited from an undetermined source.411  Again, the cause of the incident was 
relatively subtle as opposed to the drama associated with terrorism. 
 
The information held above emphasises in each case the unique set of circumstances 
which contribute to the unfolding catastrophic incidents.  Something that is not 
mentioned above is the plethora of reported near misses and accidents which were 
averted before they became critical.  Paradoxically, when deciding the rationale for 
upholding the security of strategic locations and critical infrastructure, policy makers 
refer to previous accidents as a comparison, omitting the fact that they are worst case 
scenarios and overlook the intricate technical nature behind the disaster.  The 
methodology behind such policy points towards appeasing social anxiety as opposed 
to taking scientific analysis in to account first.  When therefore applying Bayesian 
methodology to terrorism aimed at the Saudi oil infrastructure the result is far more 
conservative than popular opinion predicted.  Two major incidents discussed next that 
Al-Qaeda executed highlight the strength of Bayesian prediction.        
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Fig 6.4 Abqaiq stabilization facility 
 
In February 2006 Saudi security forces foiled an Al-Qaeda suicide attack aimed at the 
Abqaiq stabilization facility in the Eastern Province.  The terrorists managed to 
penetrate through security cordons in two cars laden with explosives before being 
killed by guards.  Both cars exploded but the damage was slight and limited to facilities 
near the perimeter fence.  News of the attack raised oil prices by $2 a barrel.412    
 
As shown in the diagram above Abqaiq is placed in a strategic position in the Saudi 
oil supply chain.  The facility pumps approximately 7 million barrels of crude a day.  A 
previous fire in 1977 caused a production loss of 330,000 barrels a day spread over a 
six month period.  Al-Qaeda chose their target well but in reality even if the attack had 
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been successful, would the impact have been the same?  A build-up of corrosion within 
the system caused the 1977 fire.  As such the damage was widespread, the system 
failing only when parts could no longer cope with the blockage, causing further 
collateral damage ‘down the line’.  A bomb would no doubt destroy part of the facility 
but the blast would impact on the outside of the infrastructure rather than incur damage 
from within.  The $2 price rise is therefore not a clear representation of the risk 
attached to the facility but in effect a geopolitical tax or ‘security premium’ calculated 
purely on fear.413  In this case, win or lose, Al-Qaeda reached their objective.  The 
market amplified the attack.  At ground level it could be said that although individual 
facilities may be vulnerable the infrastructure remains resilient – a sentiment echoed 
by Farzin Nadimi in his treatise of the vulnerability of Kharg Island’s oil production 
facilities during the Iran-Iraq war.414           
  
MV Limburg 
 
Akiva Lorenz was not alone when he forecast that 
 
In the near future we will witness more maritime attempts to disrupt the oil flow in the 
Persian Gulf and against cruise ships...Maritime terrorism is positioned to be their [Al-
Qaeda] method of choice.415 
 
Again, the prediction never quite lived up to expectations.  The suicide attack on the 
MV Limburg discussed earlier in the thesis remains the only example.  The tanker 
industry remained relatively unmoved after the attack.  Taking the wider shipping 
industry into account Martin Stopford argued that ‘[I]t’s a bit like sort of chucking a 
stone at somebody, it’s an irritant.’416  Stopford was far more keen to emphasise the 
rise in piracy but when pressed he summed up his position 
 
The amount of terrorism against merchant ships has been fairly modest, as far as I can 
remember.  I can’t think of hardly any examples actually and all I can think is that given 
your fair point, that this is something that you might very well have expected, then 
probably the explanation is a practical one, that’s when terrorist sit down and think of 
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targets, they look at ships and they think well you know where does this get us...it’s not a 
very elegant way of committing hari kari you know?417 
 
The industry appears to rest its case.  There was however one spurious incident that 
took place in the Strait of Hormuz.  In July 2010 Japanese owned tanker the MV Star 
sustained damage while steaming south through the Strait.418  The United Arab 
Emirates issued a statement blaming a ‘freak wave’.  Further examination by experts 
attributed the damage to explosives, with terrorists identified as the culprits.  Given the 
strategic nature of the Strait the response was curiously muted.  The incident drew 
scant attention from the tanker industry and policy makers alike.  It may be the case 
that when shaping policy real life situations are not enough, and give way to scenarios 
aimed at priming emotions instead.       
 
Scenarios, policy and the ‘terrorism industry’ 
 
The Heritage Foundation modelled a series of scenarios in 2008 and 2010 analysing 
the impact of co-ordinated terrorist attacks.419  The scenarios took place sometime 
after the initial ‘heat’ of any expected terrorist action.  The scenarios are probably best 
described as industrious but highlight the distance between influencing policy and the 
practical constraints faced by a terrorist organisation mounting such attacks.  A 
synopsis of the scenario’s below details the scope.  
 
Al-Qaeda takes 300 pupils hostage at the Ras Tanura Middle School. The next morning 
the hostage-takers begin executing students. 
 
While Saudi security forces are distracted, al-Qaeda launches simultaneous attacks on 
oil-processing and shipping facilities. These are thermobaric explosive attacks on the 
Ras Tanura and Abu Qaiq facilities, destroying parts of each. (Improvised thermobaric 
weapons are containers of fine explosive particles or liquids that burst open the 
container and disperse the contents in a cloud and then ignite, creating a downward 
destructive wave of over-pressure.) 
 
An explosives-laden plane attacks the Saudi Aramco headquarters, destroying the 
Internet facilities there and killing portions of the company's leadership. 
 
Indonesia-based Jemaah Islamiyah begins speedboat attacks on oil tankers crossing the 
Strait of Malacca. 
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Jemaah Islamiyah places EM-52 mines in the Strait of Malacca (near Singapore). The 
mines are coated with polymer to reduce the likelihood of detection. 
 
All oil traffic through the Strait of Malacca is stopped because insurers will not give 
coverage to hydrocarbon cargo. 
 
Al-Qaeda affiliates place mines in the Strait of Sunda to further disrupt traffic.420 
 
After digesting the scope of the attacks it becomes immediately apparent that the 
scenarios lack credibility.  They were simply labelled as ‘preposterous’ by one leading 
academic.421  The enormous amount of data alone required to analyse such an event 
would be enough to bury any worthwhile responses gleaned from the exercise.  To put 
a co-ordinated attack like the one above into the same inordinate context, during World 
War Two ‘Operation Market Garden’ which aimed to secure three strategic bridges in 
Holland involved 42,000 troops and over 4,500 aircraft.  However, the scenario may 
have also understated the resilience of the oil infrastructure.  During the war in 
Chechnya for example it took months of intensive pounding by Russian artillery and 
air force sorties to destroy the oil refinery in Grozny.   
 
Moreover scenarios fail to include a wider geopolitical context.  It is important to 
mention the response of world leaders to an act of terror.  Al-Qaeda’s attacks against 
oil installations in Saudi Arabia were not only operational failures but appear to be 
carried out on seemingly random dates that did not interrupt any planned event held 
by, or including, the Saudi Royal family or for that matter the US President.  The stigma 
attached to terrorism carries such a high political value that world leaders cannot afford 
to ignore reported acts regardless of size. 
 
The response of world leaders, the cancelling of engagements or planned state visits 
can be seen to only amplify the importance of the act in question.  The aftermath often 
leads to resignations, cabinet reshuffles and negative media coverage, which in 
democratic countries can effect elections.  Al-Qaeda failed to synchronise attacks in 
Saudi with major events elsewhere in the world but this was not the case in the UK.  
The July 7th 2005 bombings in London coincided with the G8 summit in Scotland.  UK 
Prime Minister Tony Blair left the summit and returned to London commenting that the 
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attack was in direct response to the G8 meeting he was hosting.  Other commentators 
however argued that the bombers knew that on July 7th the Metropolitan Police were 
short staffed as many officers had been deployed in Scotland to act as security to G8 
summit delegates.422  Whether the attack was in response to the G8 summit or not, 
the terrorists benefitted from reduced police vigilance in London. 
 
A further scenario oversight is the behaviour of financial and stock markets after acts 
of terror.  The media can spread news of terrorist incidents around the globe in a matter 
of minutes.  Traders can only react if the market they trade on is open.  Given also 
that exchanges keep to strict opening hours trading after such an attack can give a 
false impression as to the magnitude and impact of the damage achieved.  Traders 
who react negatively can find the exchange closes before the market has a chance to 
catch up.  As other markets open around the world and more information regarding 
the terrorist attack is disclosed trading could ease off until ‘normal trading is resumed’ 
at exchanges six or seven time zones away from the first exchange to hear the news.  
The issue then resurfaces the following day when exchanges that closed before the 
full extent of the incident was revealed, open with markets still in the pre-existing down 
position for seemingly no other reason than panic.   
 
The net result of overstating terrorism per se and the accompanying posturing has 
provided a litany of energetic material which, again, is based on assumption and 
implied premise rather than methodology and technically correct analysis.  Lawrence 
Friedman went so far as to say that ‘the development of the field of terrorism studies 
has, in recent years, appeared to outpace the development of actual terrorism’.423  
John Mueller took Friedman’s comment a stage further and called it an ‘industry’,   
 
[T]errorism is a rather rare and, in appropriate context, not a very destructive phenomenon 
as [often] argued...Nonetheless, the most common reaction to terrorism is the stoking of 
fear and the encouragement of overreaction by members of what might be called the 
"terrorism industry," an entity that includes not only various risk entrepreneurs and 
bureaucrats, but also most of the media and nearly all politicians. Thus, a problem with 
getting coherent thinking on the issue is that reporters, bureaucrats, politicians, and 
terrorism experts mostly find extreme and alarmist possibilities so much more appealing 
than discussions of broader context, much less of statistical reality. 
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Stephen Flynn, like others in the terrorism industry, likes to begin articles with such 
dramatic lines as "the United States is living on borrowed time--and squandering it," and 
end them with "the entire nation...must be organized for the long, deadly struggle against 
terrorism." He also admits that he often has to "fight back a sense of despair" and of 
"dread," and suggests that officials "must assume that our enemies will soon launch far 
more deadly and disruptive attacks" than those of 9/11 for which "the potential scenarios 
are almost unlimited.424 
 
It is not only academic institutions that overreact.  George Bush Jnr’s hastily 
assembled Homeland Security Department began its printed manifesto by announcing 
that "Today's terrorists can strike at any place, at any time, and with virtually any 
weapon."425  The dramatic opening statement hides the fact that with almost limitless 
potential targets and so few active terrorists the likelihood of geographically being in a 
place that leaves you a victim of terrorism is diminutive.    
 
Counter measures strayed in to the bizarre.  In a bid to be ‘ready for anything’ the US 
Congressional Research Service produced a report titled ‘Port and Maritime Security: 
Potential for Terrorist Nuclear Attack Using Oil Tankers’.  The fact that a report was 
even commissioned on such an extraordinary subject is measure enough that the ‘fear 
factor’ regarding Middle East based terrorism was deeply entrenched in the US 
political psyche.  The technical and logistical requirements alone are inscrutable given 
the operational capabilities of any leading terrorist organisation, the narrative is eye 
opening    
 
To stage a nuclear attack using a tanker, terrorists would need to acquire a nuclear 
device and smuggle it (or key components) onto the ship. Their ability to accomplish 
this latter task would likely depend on their ability to infiltrate, bribe, or otherwise 
work around local security; on the reliability of security personnel in oil-exporting 
countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Algeria; and on the reliability of the 
ship’s officers and crew. Terrorists might seek to place a nuclear device inside one 
of a tanker’s oil tanks, which would require sealing and cushioning the bomb and 
possibly attaching it to the tank wall; or in a dry space on the ship; or in a blister 
attached to the ship underwater. Remotely detonating a bomb inside an oil tank or 
underwater might be difficult: it might not be possible to attach wires leading out to 
dry spaces, or to send an electromagnetic signal (e.g., a cell phone call) through water 
or oil to the bomb. Detonating the bomb with a timer would run the risk of the ship 
not being at the target at the specified time. Overcoming these challenges might be 
within the ability of a terrorist group resourceful enough to acquire an atomic bomb. 
Terrorists might also smuggle a bomb onto a ship at sea.426 
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The report later states that the intended destination of a potential nuclear bomb would 
probably be the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port (LOOP), eighteen miles off the US coast, 
limiting somewhat the damage any device might be expected to inflict on the area.  
Terrorists infiltrating crews is another contentious point.   
 
Crews are predominantly comprised from citizens of third world maritime countries 
such as the Philippines and Indonesia.  They are a close knit community with 
vacancies being filled by references provided from existing crew members who recruit 
from their own towns and villages.  When the US government wished to replace the 
existing crew ‘log book’ with a universal seafarers ID card, seafarers unions pointed 
out that a log book was much harder to forge than it would be to ‘clone’ a new ID card.  
The seafarers ID card was subsequently dropped as a replacement to the log book. 
Seafarers are often exempt from requiring visas as the log book provides proof enough 
of their reason for entry and also as a means of additional ID when sending money to 
their home countries via wire transfer offices.  Regardless of these points the 
Congressional report avoids the elephant in the room in that any terrorist organisation 
that had acquired a nuclear weapon would be unlikely to chance delivering it to the 
intended target via an oil tanker.  There would no doubt be a number of alternative 
ways and means for terrorists to explore before resorting to remote offshore targets 
and oil tankers to deliver their message.  
 
The desperate search for solutions became almost comical when the Department for 
Homeland Security paid for research to be carried out on honey bees to determine 
whether they could be employed as ‘sniffer dogs’ to detect weapons and explosives.427  
Although novel, the act can also be considered confusing in that traditional methods 
are just not enough anymore and the establishment is turning to even more audacious 
measures to ensure success.  In a final point regarding extreme measures in 2005 
private security firm Aegis Security acted as consultants to Lloyds.  After consultation 
Lloyds declared the pirate infested waters of the Strait of Malacca in South East Asia 
a war risk zone.428  The decision attracted huge derision resulting in the War risk status 
being dropped.  The episode prompted one shrewd commentator to point out    
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[I]t is a gross generalisation and a blunder to bundle the low-risk, high-impact event such 
as a terrorist attack with high-risk, low-impact act of piracy, especially when the likelihood 
of their nexus is...remote.429 
 
Due to the confused input of such organisations it is almost certain that policy 
makers have spent more time and energy analysing ‘implied’ threats than actual 
incidents.  Implied threats fed by organisations to lobbyists can well be accused as 
promoting political strategies as opposed to widening the practical understanding 
of threat analysis.  This tendency leaves a lingering expectation that Al-Qaeda in 
particular will punch way above their weight.  The prompt being that national 
security requires the cooperation of the international community to succeed, which 
translates to individual governments funding private companies to implement global 
security projects – regardless of how effective the projects may be. 
 
A good example of state funded private enterprise was the immediate and costly 
implementation of the International Ports and Ship (ISPS) Code after 9/11 which 
ultimately stood to prevent terrorists shipping a nuclear device in a sea going 
container.  At a London ISPS conference in 2006 defence manufacturer QinetiQ 
unveiled a device that would send an alarm to a central control room should a 
container be opened in transit.  A delegate then pointed out that shipping companies 
often cheat clients by selling them a single container for a single consignment only 
then to open the same sealed container at a warehouse and fill it with other goods 
bound for the same destination.  There are hundreds of thousands of sea going 
containers in circulation so the probability would be that managing the alarm system 
would be a greater task than preventing a nuclear device from ever being shipped.  
Nonetheless private security services extol the need for the ISPS Code to continue 
as explained in this quote from London based Hart Security Services  
 
Hart has trained over 2,000 Ship, Company and Port Facility Security Officers and has 
conducted more than 400 ship and port facility security assessments and developed 
their plans. We have advised numerous international ship and port operators on ISPS 
Code implementation including ongoing audit and maintenance.430 
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The motivating word for commercial purposes here is ‘ongoing’.  Regardless of the 
ISPS Code’s effectiveness in order for port or ship owners not to fall fowl of the law, 
the facility or ship needs constant checks and lucrative monitoring by a company 
like Hart431.  Ironically Saudi Arabia is yet to implement the ISPS Code as it requires 
conversion into Sharia Law, therefore neutralizing the protection the code offered. 
In this form the security against terrorism offered by private security companies 
should not be confused with preventing individuals from becoming terrorists.   
 
In summary Al Qaeda's perceived threat failed to materialise except for occasional 
isolated incidents which left little or no damage to the oil infrastructure.  Any 
resulting long term impact on the political stage or financial markets was therefore 
lost to the organisation too.  However, this state of affairs leaves a stark paradox.  
With so little reported action in the Kingdom since 9/11 it is quite astonishing that a 
‘terrorist industry’ has grown from a bed of implied threat, and well respected 
organisations such as the Heritage Foundation choose to run and promote 
scenarios and exercises which hold practically no resemblance to the current scope 
and means of terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaeda. 
 
Ex-pats 
 
Overview 
 
Oil revenue has encouraged Saudi Arabia to maintain a high dependency on ex-pat 
labour.432  Although the ex-pat community may appear an unlikely threat to the KSA 
oil supply chain, such are their collective roles and sheer size of the community that 
the potential they hold should not be immediately discounted.  Ex-pats are for the most 
part annexed from Saudi society and, in the case of domestic and migrant workers, 
generally poorly treated.433  These issues alone are prone to causing resentment.  The 
marginalisation of social groups in Northern Ireland, Israel, Turkey, Iraq and Spain has 
after all produced long running bitter feuds.  The situation in Saudi Arabia differs in 
that the ex-pat community is invited to live and work in the Kingdom.  Ex-pats based 
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in the KSA play no part in Saudi political decision making, have few rights or tangible 
support from the international community regarding their welfare.434 
 
Saudi Arabia depends on a mixture of high and low skilled ex-pat labour employed in 
posts that are unattractive, too highly skilled or too expensive for Saudi nationals to 
fill. While not ignoring the plight of migrant workers or the lifestyle of Saudi nationals, 
the question this thesis asks does not concern the legitimacy of the treatment ex-pats 
receive but whether the actions of ex-pat workers could disrupt the oil supply.  At first 
glance the locus of domestic and manual migrants in particular would encourage 
conflict.  But, as the following analysis will reveal, regardless of their actions, skills and 
population the likelihood of ex-pat workers causing a disruption to the oil supply is 
currently very low indeed.   
 
Growth of the ex-pat community 
 
In 1963 ex-pats numbered 115,000 or 14% of the labour force.435  By 1970 the number 
had risen to 320,000 or 27% of the labour force.436 In the 1970’s ex-pats were imported 
to carry out the ‘middle class’ indoor roles such as schoolteachers, doctors, nurses 
and accountants.437  Manual and domestic migrant workers were also imported on a 
lesser scale than present.  The situation changed after the 1973 oil price rise.  Post 
1973 industrialization encouraged employers to import technically competent foreign 
workers because they commanded a lower salary than Saudi applicants who held an 
exaggerated idea of their own value.438  By 1979 ex-pat labour increased to 1,347,000 
or 53% of the labour force.439  Today the figure stands at approximately 7,000,000 or 
just under one third of the Kingdoms population.440 
 
The majority of ex-pat labour currently residing in Saudi Arabia is provided by migrant 
workers from South East Asia and the Indian Sub-Continent.  The posts held by 
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migrant workers are not the ‘middle class’ roles of the 70’s.  Today’s migrant workers 
are employed in roles such as construction labourers, trash collectors, gardeners, taxi 
drivers and factory hands.441  The treatment and social condition of migrants have for 
some time been internationally condoned for deplorable breaches of human rights.   
The status and salaries migrants command has been enough to dissuade Saudi 
nationals from competing for their jobs.   Hertog and Niblock argue that this division 
has resulted in Saudi Arabia being a country without a national working class.442  The 
Kingdom’s continuing welfare subsidies have increased social dissonance in this area.  
Antoinette Vlieger describes cheap migrant workers as providing Saudi nationals with 
‘[W]ealth and luxury, which keeps their citizens fairly content.’443        
 
Dynamic of the ex-pat community 
 
The extent on which the Saudi dependency on migrant workers lies is shared among 
three basic strata of ex-pat labour.  Ex-pats from the West provide expertise in areas 
such as oil field support and technical services, construction and business 
management, academia, healthcare and banking.444  Military training and consultancy 
also benefit from ex-pat labour.  The US Vinnell Corporation trains portions of the 
Saudi Arabian National Guard.445  The posts are attractive as they often guarantee tax 
free earnings on a legally binding contract of employment from the workers home 
country, private healthcare and the freedom to return back to the workers home 
country if required.  Western ex-pats are generally housed in compounds where they 
have little contact with Saudi society.446  This relationship works two ways.  
Compounds keep the reality of tribal and segregated Saudi Arabia away from 
Westerners while shielding Saudi society from ‘Western decadence’.  Despite the 
seemingly separatist living conditions overall Western ex-pats are respected as they 
work in important valued roles.  There is one rather congenial anomaly to the rule.  
Due to the rather restrictive living conditions in Saudi many ex-pat oil workers live in 
the more relaxed environment offered by Bahrain and literally ‘commute’ to work.447  
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Not only does the arrangement work but freedom of movement afforded to these 
workers does not extend to the vast community of lower status ex-pats.      
 
Domestic and manual migrant workers 
 
The following two groups of ex-pat workers are both classed as ‘migrant workers’.  The 
first group are commonly referred to as ‘domestic workers’ who are both male and 
female.448  The second group consists of ‘manual migrant workers’ who are exclusively 
male.449  Both groups of migrant workers originate predominantly from the Far East 
and Indian Sub-Continent.  Domestic workers are recruited from Indonesia, the 
Philippines and Nepal.  Manual migrant workers are recruited predominantly from 
India, Pakistan and Bangladesh although cross-over recruitment does exist.450  
Recruitment takes the form of sponsorship by an employer in Saudi Arabia and is 
facilitated through an agent.  In the case of migrant workers, the home governments 
are complicit in their recruitment.  Government bureaucracies not only assist 
applications but also rely on the fees for income.  Once in Saudi Arabia the welfare of 
domestic workers is left to their employer who retains their passport.451 
  
From a Saudi point of view the difference between Western ex-pats and migrant 
workers is so vast that the two groups are incomparable.  Western ex-pats are 
discreet, affluent and valued.  Migrant workers on the other hand are a constant 
reminder of the positions and jobs that are seen as demeaning.  The role of a migrant 
worker may be collectively vital to Saudi society but one that, due to privilege, Saudi 
citizens see as being one they personally are not responsible for filling.453  The 
apparent key role that ex-pats of all nationalities and abilities hold raises the question 
of their collective power in the Saudi State.  The question can in part be answered if 
the circumstances of migrant workers in the West are compared to those of Saudi 
based migrants.  In the European Union for example migrant workers are active in the 
civil society of their host country.  Migrants can among other things claim residency, 
vote in local elections, introduce ethnic media, schools and businesses.  In Saudi 
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Arabia migrants do not have these opportunities.  Overall the terms and conditions 
applied to migrant employment make it almost impossible for Saudi nationals to 
consider working in the same roles.                
 
Migrant workers and the social trammel         
 
Abram de Swaan contests that the welfare of the poor in Europe came into existence 
when the poor began to cause problems for the more powerful part of society.  De 
Swaan states that the poor in Europe were perceived as a threat by the upper class 
because they could become beggars or gangs of criminals.454  The poor also spread 
disease.  The diseases seemingly did not differentiate between class and a healthy 
poor increased productivity.  The poor occasionally became angry about their fate and 
started strikes or uprisings which threatened the interests of their employers.  The final 
reason posited De Swaan was the development of labour laws that were introduced 
during the industrial revolution to create equal competition and a level playing field in 
the emerging market.455  The above reasons are not exhaustive but collectively they 
do provide a robust model to which the position of Saudi based migrant workers can 
be compared. 
 
Health 
 
The reluctance to provide healthcare alone removes a huge responsibility away from 
Saudi society not only by way of treatment and aftercare but also in the implementation 
of prevention policies.  For example there is no basic standard to which migrant 
workers are housed or afforded access to water and sanitation.  The ability to deport 
sick migrant workers and quickly replace them displaces the need for a welfare state 
that supports migrant workers.  A further point to consider is that although workers 
may fall ill, the probability is that they will not all fall ill at the same time.  This being 
the case, due to the limited amount of sick workers being deported at any one time, 
the authorities manage to contain and process sick individuals efficiently enough for 
diseases contracted by migrant workers not to affect Saudi society.       
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Goods for services 
 
There would appear to be a growing case for migrant workers to complain against their 
treatment.  However, there are several factors which prevent migrants from raising 
complaints.  Domestic migrant workers are generally not allowed out of their 
employer’s house.458  Even if they manage to escape to a ‘safe houses’ run by the 
embassy of their home country a migrant can find themselves being returned to their 
employer or prevented from leaving the country because their employer has retained 
their passport.459  Regardless of the many cases of trauma embassies deal with, 
embassy staff can only offer limited assistance.  The link between a migrant worker’s 
home country and Saudi Arabia is very strong as Vlieger explains 
 
[G]overnments of labour-sending countries are more concerned with employment and 
remittances, which constitute a very large portion of their GNP.  Moreover the IMF and 
World Bank apparently use remittance flows in their calculations of sustainable loans, and 
credit rating agencies such as Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Finch do the same for 
their decisions on certain bond ratings. The governments of labour-sending countries do 
not want these remittances to diminish and therefore do not make a strong stand for their 
overseas workers.460 
 
Similarly Western countries concerned with Saudi Arabia’s human rights record are 
also the same countries that supply the Kingdom with arms and technology.  Such 
exports are so important to the economy that human rights concerns come second to 
securing business in the Kingdom.  Under the circumstances the treatment, however 
poor, of domestic workers and the subsequent action of the domestic worker or home 
government is likely to have no affect at all on the oil supply if current conditions in the 
Kingdom prevail.   
 
Civil unrest 
 
Manual migrants may have more freedom but Sharia law prevents public 
demonstrations from taking place.  At worst troublesome migrants are jailed and 
deported.  Antoinette Vlieger argues that since communism is no longer viewed as an 
attainable ideal Saudi society is less wary of the danger posed by radical labour 
                                                 
458 Vlieger, Antoinette, Ibid, p. 341. 
459 Vlieger, Antoinette, Ibid, p. 341. 
460 Vlieger, Antoinette, Ibid, p. 172. 
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movements.461  Saudi Arabia does have labour laws but in a rather truculent about 
turn, the law does not extend to domestic migrant workers as they are seen to not 
produce goods or services that contribute to the economy.462  Even if civil unrest 
became an option the logistics required to mount a demonstration would be 
insurmountable.  Regardless of non-existent civil society to promote and encourage 
participation, migrant workers cannot travel freely or rely on a functioning public 
transport system to deploy demonstrators around the Kingdom on.  With regard to oil, 
the vast majority of migrant workers are based in the Hijaz and Najd provinces 
servicing the high population centres of Mecca, Jeddah and Riyadh.  The KSA security 
forces would not only be likely to suppress any demonstrations but also prevent the 
momentum from spreading to the eastern oil fields.  A further intrinsic factor, 
mentioned earlier, is the need for the migrant worker to keep on working in order to 
send remittances home to their family.463  However difficult their plight, migrant 
workers may feel that they would have too much to lose personally by attempting to 
influence Saudi society.  After all it is no secret that affluent and politically correct 
Western ex-pats are aware of the Saudi’s treatment of migrant workers but do or 
indeed can do little the alleviate their suffering.464 
 
Civil society 
 
Vlieger and Niblock point to a lack of civil society as to the reason why migrants cannot 
express themselves.  Vlieger states that ‘[Saudi Arabia] does not allow for the 
development of civil society.  As there is no freedom of expression, not enough people 
become aware of a problem to ignite collective action, and to the extent that there 
would be enough people, they do not enjoy the freedom to unite.’465  Niblock adds that 
as migrant workers play no part in the Saudi political process it would be difficult for 
them to cohere together and become a politicised Saudi working class.466  Niblock 
also argues that the same conditions prevent migrant workers from becoming 
religiously radicalised.467  There has been much speculation regarding this issue 
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466 Niblock, Tim, Ibid, 2006, p. 55. 
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migrant workers being a fertile ground for radicalization.  The recruitment by terrorists 
of a migrant worker featured in the 2005 film Syriana, although there is currently little 
evidence to point to migrant workers turning to terrorism.  As to how big a factor 
migrant workers play in Riyadh’s decision not to develop civil society is speculation.  
But it would appear that Saudi society is willing to forfeit civil society in favour of 
retaining luxury and privilege at the expense of migrant workers.            
 
Ex-pats reaction to 9/11 
 
Prior to 9/11 Saudi Arabia was viewed by skilled Western ‘white collar, middle class’ 
ex-pats as a tax free high earning career move.  9/11 and the aftermath dramatically 
changed this view.  At this time there were reportedly 30,000 UK ex-pats and 40,000 
US ex-pats living in fortified compounds.468  The wave of domestic Al-Qaeda terrorism 
that swept through Saudi Arabia from 2003-2007 claimed sixty three (mostly male) ex-
pat casualties.469  The deceased were employed by among others the Vinnell 
Corporation, Halliburton, BAE Systems and Marconi. 
 
One infamous event that took place in June 2004 involved BBC journalist Frank 
Gardener who was shot six times while reporting in Riyadh.  The incident received 
global publicity and left Gardener severely wounded.470  A week later American Paul 
Johnson, a technician working for Lockheed Martin was kidnapped and later 
beheaded.  The killing of Paul Johnson proved to be the trigger for an exodus of ex-
pats.  So many ex-pats left that the occupancy inside guarded compounds fell by 
15%.471  Western embassies advised ex-pats to leave Saudi Arabia to mixed 
responses.  Ex-pats are under no illusion that Saudi Arabia has been a potential 
trouble spot for some time.  However, as a career move Saudi offers a huge affluent 
market for cutting edge goods and services.  Ex-pat roles offer responsibility and the 
opportunity to maintain and foster future contacts.  Undoubtedly employers were keen 
to meet the obligation of safety and security of their employees but as is well 
understood, the psychology attached to ‘staying in post’ would also attract the 
promoting qualities of loyalty and resilience to any employee who endured. 
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For those ex-pats that chose to leave Saudi, Western companies attempted to 
rebalance the flow by increasing wages, relocating staff and extending holidays.  
Despite the expectation that the Saudi economy would suffer due to the reduction of 
skilled ex-pats a measurable decline failed to register.  The combined action of Saudi 
and international intelligence and security forces almost brought Al-Qaeda operations 
to a close in the Kingdom.  Although Saudi Arabia is still seen as a danger zone, 
business leaders called for extra security that the Saudi government was quick to 
provide. The extra security and a heightened awareness of the threat among ex-pats 
appear to have retained the vast majority of ex-pat employees. 
 
Given that unlike domestic and manual migrant workers Western ex-pats were free to 
choose whether they left or not during this quite intense period of terrorist activity, 
aimed specifically at them, not enough ex-pats left to impact on the oil supply.  Under 
the circumstances it may be that the ‘critical mass’ required to leave and create such 
an impact would occur only if residing ex-pats were expelled en masse by the Saudi 
government or collectively recalled simultaneously by every employer.  The conditions 
surrounding such a decision would be extreme to the point of being fanciful in the least 
due to the perceivable damage it would do to the Saudi economy.  Such a flight of ex-
pats is therefore not just highly unlikely but inconceivable in the near and distant future. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Saudi Arabia’s ex-pat community forfeit their potential to cause trouble for a number 
of conflicting reasons.  Affluent ex-pats represent businesses that reward them 
financially and just as importantly in future career opportunities if they fulfil their roles, 
however dangerous.  The businesses do have a certain amount of influence with the 
Saudi government regarding the treatment and lifestyle of their employees.  Migrant 
workers on the other hand are a source of income to their individual families who have 
no influence concerning their welfare.  The home government of a migrant worker has 
a greater interest in the overall economic gain received from providing migrant workers 
to the KSA and therefore accept and do little to prevent the ill treatment of ex-pat 
citizens as part of the process.  
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Domestic and manual migrant workers who make up the vast majority of the ex-pat 
community are denied the ability to generate long-term grievances.  The Saudi right 
to deport sick and troublesome employees also removes cases where one individuals 
plight becomes a catalyst for mass protest.  The key forfeit for all strata of ex-pat 
worker is the lack of civil society through which they can communicate.  Whereas 
Saudi society could be regarded as being hierarchical and dysfunctional in its 
treatment towards ex-pat workers, the denial of civil society is universal.  Around the 
vacuum of civil society the KSA has been able to construct a system whereby 
generations of ex-pat workers are attracted to working in the Kingdom for economic 
reasons, but hold few rights or means for redress while working there.  The passive 
nature of the Saudi based ex-pat community is likely to endure until the oil revenues 
sink to a depth where Saudi businesses and citizens can no longer stay afloat with ex-
pat workers still on board.      
          
Executive Summary of the Second Prior Distribution 
 
The second prior distribution consisted of six relevant risk factors, technology, 
terrorism, ex-pat workers, tanker design, the Strait of Hormuz and Saudi domestic 
instability that could potentially disrupt the Saudi oil supply chain.  The dynamic 
capabilities of these factors are collectively wide and range in likelihood from ongoing, 
in the case of counterfeit Chinese oil field service products, to unlikely, in the case of 
a closure of the Strait of Hormuz.  Nevertheless, between these two extremes there 
lie a number of important issues to address, for example, regarding the magnitude of 
potential disruptions, dispelling myths and approach to threat reduction which serve to 
highlight the broad scope of potential threats aimed at the oil supply chain. 
 
Earlier detailed examination of each of the six risk factors has argued the contribution, 
if any, that each individual risk factor could pose.  This final analysis will serve as an 
executive summary drawing together the ‘top end’ threats and offer suggestions as to 
the content of a third prior distribution.    
 
The role of oil tankers featured heavily.  The rather arcane world of shipping is often 
misinterpreted by Political science and International Relations scholars who stumble 
over the subject and overlook important technical data.  The thesis raised questions 
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concerning the new double hull design and concluded that new build ships will 
probably react in a similar fashion to the older single hull design if targeted in a combat 
or terrorist operation. This transition differs from previous technical adaptations.  After 
the Suez Crisis tankers were extended to carry larger payloads via the Cape of Good 
Hope which caused some tankers to explode during tank cleaning exercises.  For this 
reason an investigation into the new double hull design had to take place, although 
after taking into account the result it is unlikely that this element would feature in any 
future prior distributions. 
 
By far the most alarming disclosure went to Martin Stopford’s scenario if the Strait of 
Hormuz were to close.  Such an incident would be unique.  Any foreign powers and 
stakeholders, whether that be importing states, aggressors, the oil and shipping 
industry, will have plans to avert the situation. However, there is no tried and tested 
method of bringing a closure to an end that would maintain the pervious status quo.  
How importing states would control the shipping industry to their advantage is another 
matter for concern, given that oil tankers are for the majority owned by private 
individuals or independent shipping companies.   
 
The loss in revenue could pose a risk to the internal stability within the Kingdom, if the 
Saudi people were denied the benefits they usually expect from oil sales.  A further, 
wider question mark could be placed over future large scale investment in Saudi and 
other Gulf oil fields by existing western technology providers if export cannot be 
guaranteed as has always been the case.  A closure of the Strait of Hormuz however 
short in time would be a serious statement, in that however swift a resolution, doubt 
would remain as to how long traffic would flow before another closure.    
 
The Gulf could once again face a huge environmental catastrophe from spilled oil.  
The shipping industry would not have the collective means to pay for a clear up 
operation so it would fall to the international community to bear this cost, and the cost 
of increased insurance rates.  The consumer would also pay for increased shipping 
costs during the time that damaged ships were repaired or new vessels built, as a loss 
of tonnage would further tighten the shipping market.  A closure of the Strait of Hormuz 
would be by far the largest disruption to the oil supply chain although the current 
likelihood is low.  The event would require a mobilization of forces that would not go 
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unnoticed and would just as likely be resolved at a diplomatic level than the 
deployment and engagement of opposing forces in the Strait’s. 
 
One area of concern that raised an unanticipated paradox is the relationship between 
terrorism and counterfeit Chinese oil field service products.  Saudi Arabia has invested 
a great deal towards the security of its oil wells and supporting installations in order to 
prevent an attack.  However, counterfeit Chinese products have contributed to 
incidents that are just as damaging to the oil infrastructure as any planned terrorist 
attack could hope for.  The fact that counterfeit products enter the market via an 
existing supply chain that appears to be relatively unchecked by Saudi Customs 
Agents has laid open an Achilles Heel in the Kingdom’s Security apparatus.  If results 
are anything to go by, Chinese exporters could be said to have almost done the 
terrorists job for them – rubber stamped by the Saudi Authorities. 
 
The situation is further compounded by the fact that western technology will continue 
to prevail, as there are no other trusted brands to replace them.  One unfortunate 
consequence for western manufacturers is that their products will continue to be 
targeted by Chinese counterfeiters, slowly eroding their good name.  Western 
technology will endure, but unless the Saudi Authorities actively pursue counterfeiters, 
unnecessary accidents will continue in the field.  Fortunately or unfortunately the 
severity of these incidents will not be high enough to disrupt the flow of oil for any 
significant length of time.  This factor alone may hold the key to Saudi’s passive 
approach towards quality control of imported products.  Technology will certainly be 
an area to watch but can be removed from any future prior distribution, unless the 
situation changes significantly.  
 
Terrorism had a greater impact on the skilled western ex-pat community than any other 
sector.  Given the amount of casualties, criticism could be aimed at the Saudi Security 
Forces for not protecting western employees.  This would be unfair.  Western 
employers have been well aware of the facts and growing acts of terrorism.  In many 
cases families were recalled but employees remained in post, supplying terrorists with 
potential targets.  Employers and employees obviously felt the risk was justified in 
staying.  Equally the Saudi government did not order its skilled ex-pat labour force to 
leave the Kingdom.  One obvious reason is that skilled ex-pat employees could not be 
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replaced by Saudi nationals.  This disequilibrium provided a constant stream of victims 
that frustrated the Security Services with constant criticism from the international 
community.  Whether continuing generations of ex-pat employers and employees will 
choose to remain in post is unknown.  Just as unknown is whether the same deaths 
will prompt the Saudi government to remain dependent on foreign ex-pat employees.    
 
Non skilled and migrant workers were relatively untouched.  In the case of construction 
workers, maids and domestic workers they are all but unseen in daily life and had no 
choice but to weather the storm.  It would be easy to dismiss the role of ex-pat workers 
be it skilled or migrant workers from any future investigation.  This would be a mistake 
as people are often the first barometer of change.  So far the Saudi government has 
repressed any show of defiance but the fact that defiance is visible points to it being 
monitored.  The effect of any possible threat to the oil supply chain should also be 
charted in relation to foreign and domestic nationals in Saudi Arabia.  However, the 
overall impact of ex-pat workers could be subsumed into the panoptic challenge posed 
by instability within the Kingdom. 
 
Underpinning the above is the stability of the Kingdom.  The importance of oil cannot 
be understated.  The Saudi Royal Family can only distribute revenues to pacify the 
Saudi people for as long as the King controls the Saudi oil industry.  Therefore any 
challenge to the supply chain is a priority.  The Saudi government can to varying 
degrees control technology, the safety of ex-pat employees and terrorism.  Where the 
Saudi government has less influence is marine transportation and controlling the sea. 
 
Regarding marine transportation, as an exporting state, Saudi relies on importing 
states to arrange and provide security for transportation; calculating that importers 
depend on oil and are prepared to place their own dependency on imports over the 
Saudi Royal Family’s dependency on exporting oil in order to remain in power.  
Hypothetically speaking, if Saudi was unable to find a buyer for its oil the Kingdom 
would slowly disintegrate.  However this is unlikely to happen for two reasons.  Firstly 
there are enough importing states that have it in their own interest to import Saudi oil 
regardless of the revenues supporting the Royal Family.  Secondly, the international 
community cannot afford to gamble that if the Saudi Royal Family were to lose power, 
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the replacement regime would be any more beneficial or cooperative that the current 
one.     
 
The dependency theory encompasses the security of the Strait of Hormuz.  Importing 
states are aware that a closure of the Straits would not only result in a shortage of oil 
to the market but also weaken the Saudi Royal Family as less revenue would be 
distributed among the Saudi people potentially causing unrest.  Free moving marine 
traffic has not only provided constant revenue for the Kingdom but also payments 
which have sustained loyalty from the Saudi people to the Royal Family.  It would be 
difficult if not impossible to separate the two and expect a functioning supply chain to 
remain.  A further prior distribution would have to incorporate stability within the 
Kingdom in order to assess risk to the oil supply chain.   
 
Of the six prior distribution risk factors two remain.  Double hull tanker design and 
technology have been discounted.  Of the remaining two the closure of the Strait of 
Hormuz can be labelled an orbiting threat to the Saudi oil supply chain.  The second 
remaining risk factor, Saudi instability has absorbed terrorism and ex-pat workers into 
its universal canon of potential threats.  Both of these issues pose a latent threat to 
the supply chain, but as previously mentioned the geopolitics of oil are rarely static.  
The future will no doubt introduce new as yet unknown threats.  Even if these threats 
are identified they cannot be fully understood until their impact is analysed in relation 
to possibly disrupting the Saudi oil supply chain. 
 
Research for this thesis was undertaken before the momentous events in Syria and 
the rise of the Islamic State movement.  These two events have reignited the 
complexities surrounding the Sunni/Shia divide.  A future prior distribution would 
benefit from closer analysis of this situation and could extend to the reintroduction of 
boundary disputes.  One of the primary strengths of Bayes theory is that factors can 
be discounted and then reintroduced if they resurface during the movement of time. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Conclusion 
 
The risk assessment of the Saudi Arabian oil supply chain has been analysed and 
explained. The Bayesian risk assessment reduced, implied and perceived risks down 
to a list of six threats namely technology, terrorism, ex-pat workers, tanker design, 
Strait of Hormuz and Saudi domestic instability that could realistically disrupt the Saudi 
oil supply chain. At first glance it would appear that the KSA oil supply chain has 
maintained its resilience as it did when faced with previous historic threats. 2001-2010 
was an extraordinary decade. The passing of 9/11 2001 and subsequent focus on 
wider Middle East security provides an appropriate platform to discuss the KSA oil 
supply chain’s strengths, weaknesses and future survival.   
 
The immediate aftermath of 9/11 poured fear along the KSA oil supply chain. However, 
the physical infrastructure incurred only minor damage that reduced production. This 
was due to the high quality of service provided by predominantly US and European 
engineering, maintenance and technical crews. Positions in these support services 
are still however viewed by potential Saudi workers as unattractive careers to follow. 
Previous incidents along the KSA oil infrastructure have been reserved for accidents. 
This did not prevent several misplaced think tank scenarios’ involving terrorism aimed 
at the oil infrastructure generating implied risk for political ends. The supply chain can 
be said to have been a political tool for such purposes during this period. 
 
The oil infrastructure is difficult to damage effectively but the targeting of western ex-
pat workers was not. The actions of threatened KSA based western personnel were 
quite striking. Ex-pats often ignored advice to leave and chose to remain in post. 
Employers had the advantage of offering financial incentives to employees based in 
the KSA. This and the kudos they would gain if they stayed behind became factors in 
the ex-pats’ own contradictive risk assessment. Fear that Saudi would import terrorism 
via its ex-pat domestic workers failed to materialise. Any extremism tended to be 
exported. It cannot be denied that the Saudi security forces reduced the incidences of 
terrorist attacks on the oil infrastructure and ex-pat workers, thus preventing a 
potentially disastrous exodus of key professionals from the Kingdom.   
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Probably the most serious random damage that challenged production came from 
China. The rise of China on the world scene carried counterfeit parts into the oil field 
service industry. The War on Terror appeared to be quite accepting of seemingly 
legitimate Chinese parts and machinery that have the potential to cause successive 
disruptions. The impact of counterfeit Chinese products into the oil field supply 
inventory accentuates the concern held by many established manufacturers that the 
Saudi government is not initiating enough customs control procedures to prevent 
counterfeit items entering the supply chain. Admittedly, some technical data was 
simply not available due to it being commercially sensitive.  However, oil field service 
personnel were curious and enthusiastic about academic research being conducted 
in their area of expertise. Recent unpublicised incidents in the KSA oil fields may have 
eased their willingness to discuss this subject. 
 
If custom checks and quality control procedures do not improve then the continued 
acceptance of counterfeit parts will over time damage the reputation of established 
providers.  This in turn could remove some manufacturers completely from the market. 
Counterfeit products will continue to cause catastrophic failures in the field of a 
magnitude and precision that terrorists could only dream of. 
 
The land based risks were relatively simple to evaluate when compared to the 
complexities of the risks facing oil tankers. KSA oil exports depend on a regular flow 
of oil tankers to distribute crude. Previous activity during the 1988 tanker war that had 
targeted oil tankers in the Gulf required updating. The tanker war involved military 
action that had destroyed or damaged single hull tankers. The new upgraded double 
hull tankers are a relatively unknown combat entity and therefore required further 
analysis. 
 
The resulting study, although never entirely conclusive is favourable. If hit by a missile 
double hull tankers can be expected to react in a similar fashion to single hull tankers. 
However, the intricate double hull design may cost more to repair. The comparison 
was not wasted. A similar estimate is missing from current literature. The primary risk 
for oil tankers servicing the KSA oil supply chain involves transiting the Strait of 
Hormuz. Modern double hull tankers are more expensive to insure. A growing legacy 
of the Iraq war are private security companies. Private security companies aim to 
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provide an armed escort to offset insurance risks incurred by tankers transiting the 
Strait during a crisis. Just how deep these new private armies will penetrate the 
shipping industry remains to be seen.  
 
Iran has constantly threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz. Although the thesis did 
not set out to explain precisely how, why and when Tehran may choose this option, 
some examples were offered. Previously during the Iran-Iraq war Tehran did not 
execute its threats. Regardless, it became apparent that scholars were both confident 
and keen to point out that any closure of the Strait of Hormuz would be dealt with 
swiftly and the Strait reopened to traffic shortly afterwards.  This theory may well prove 
to be true, although little or no attention is played to the collateral risk such a closure 
would pose to the tanker shipping industry. In as much as Tehran has not realistically 
attempted to close the Strait, the threat still remains live.  
 
Of greater value in the thesis is the analysis of how the oil tanker industry would react 
to a closure of the Strait. Martin Stopford exclaimed that he had never made his 
thoughts on the question of a closure of the Strait of Hormuz public before. Stopford 
further confided that such questions came before him in nightmares and are simply 
not discussed openly within the shipping industry. Clearing the blockage may be swift 
and victorious but a pyrrhic victory when set against the stigma a closure could cause. 
Stopford indicated that a closure of the Strait may result in the United Nations 
nationalising shipping. He then remarked that some oil tankers are so big they cannot 
load oil anywhere else but inside the Gulf, rendering them useless during a closure. 
 
The evaluation Stopford gave in this thesis is again significantly missing from current 
literature. Given the importance of understanding the damage a potential threat can 
cause, the omission of any explanation regarding a closure of the Strait of Hormuz is 
one current political scientists successfully omit from their theories. Would, for 
example, a closure of the Strait be a watershed moment? The Strait would no longer 
be a dependable waterway that had never closed before. Instead the Strait could not 
be fully relied upon. A future study would not be out of place to determine whether a 
closure would realistically result in a long-term loss of confidence in Saudi oil and if so 
how the loss of confidence would affect large scale investment, research and 
development in KSA oil field operations.    
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The area where the land and sea based KSA oil supply chain combine is maintaining 
Saudi internal stability. The importance of Saudi oil exports contributing to Saudi 
economic stability cannot be overstated.  The Saudi Royal Family control business in 
the kingdom. They utilise revenue from the international sale of oil to improve the 
lifestyles of their subjects and in doing so make the Saudi people dependent on regular 
welfare payments. This dependency has caused concern among Saudi’s allies, 
particularly the state sponsorship of religious education among young Saudi men. The 
teachings invariably transmit fundamentalism which is further encouraged by the 
somewhat self-serving influence from the US. 
 
So far, the Royal family has managed this delicate balance with regular oil sales.  If 
the Saudi government is prevented from exporting oil this could lead to a weakening 
respect towards the King and turn instead towards other systems of rule. Between 
2001-2010 Political thought rarely had time to establish itself before further change 
swept it aside.  Throughout this often-violent period Saudi Arabia exported oil.  The 
resilience of the supply chain infrastructure and surety of exports maintained stability 
for the King’s subjects.   
 
Any future energy policy which aims to vastly reduce the market share of Saudi oil 
should also consider who or what could fill the void. Maintaining revenue via 
international oil exports may well be propping up the problematic Kingdom, but any 
policy that aims to interfere with the status quo may have to accept that not only could 
the Saudi Royal Family collapse on top of it but from the dust may emerge a regime 
that attracts the wrong sort of attention from the international community. A community 
who may then choose to neutralize it and re-install the monarchy on the proviso that 
the liberators run the Kingdom’s oil industry. 
 
Far from being fantastical the above is a policy that US President Richard Nixon first 
mooted in 1973.  The spectre of regime change has run parallel with Saudi oil 
production for over 40 years. To date, the spectre’s policies have allowed the 
monarchy to keep one step ahead. When the resilience of the KSA oil supply chain is 
considered, the Royal Family will continue to rule, and by default invest heavily in the 
Kingdom’s decisive oil supply chain. 
 
260 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDICES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
261 
 
INTERVIEWEE ‘A’ 
 
 
Transcription of Interviewee ‘A’ 18/11/2008 
 
 
Duration of Interview: 00:13:44 
 
 
[Beginning of File] 
 
Good morning, could you please introduce yourself. 
 
My name is A, and I’m the regional manager for AA, a small SME based in Scotland. 
 
Could you tell me please what product you market? 
 
We market a suite of down the hole service products that go into the oil wells. 
 
Is there an intellectual property right issue with those? 
 
Yes, yes there is. 
 
Where does the expertise in your product lie? 
 
The expertise in our product lies within the design, the design and the operability of 
the product in the well. 
 
Does it also rely on the quality of the materials that make the product? 
 
Yes definitely. 
 
The raw materials? 
 
Most definitely, yes. 
 
Could I ask roughly what percentage of your business is in Saudi Arabia? 
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Oh gosh, in Saudi itself there’s probably only about ten percent of our business just 
now, but we’re planning to grow that over a number of years ahead of us. 
 
Are you aware of any copies of your product being made? 
 
Not to date.  Not to date. 
 
Do you think that Chinese manufacturers can produce the right grade of steel 
to manufacture a product at a competitive price at the moment? 
 
At the moment I don’t believe so, no.   
 
Do you think that may change in the future? 
 
I think so, I think with proper quality controls and measures put in place, the potential 
is for them to do that, yes. 
 
Do you think it would help their quality control, the Chinese quality control if 
they were to work side-by-side with large European and American 
manufacturers? 
 
Yes I believe it would, yes. 
 
Do the Chinese respect, in your opinion, do the Chinese respect intellectual 
property right, copyright? 
 
No.  Definitely not. 
 
Do you have any particular reason why that is so? 
 
Well they’re certainly world renowned for taking products and copying them and 
putting them back out to market. 
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Do you consider that to be a cultural issue within China or something that they 
are using it to their advantage to gain more market share?  Is the government 
turning a blind eye to it in your opinion, the Chinese government? 
 
I believe they are, I believe the Chinese government are turning a blind eye to it, yes. 
 
So something that would aid your own, the furthering of your own company and 
its product would be a tidying of regulations regarding copyright? 
 
Most definitely, yes. 
 
Would you ever sell any of your equipment directly to the Chinese? 
 
No. 
 
So will you go into partnership with a Chinese company? 
 
Possibly, but not right now. 
 
Are you keeping, are you monitoring how other companies who have gone into 
partnership with Chinese are performing? 
 
Well we’re certainly keeping an eye on it, yes. 
 
To your knowledge are some people having mixed experiences or? 
 
I believe so, yeah, I think there’s been a number of manufacturers gone into China, 
some have landed lucky, done well, but others have not been so fortunate. 
 
Is there any particular previous case or case study that you can think of that 
sums up your own thoughts on doing business with China? 
 
Well there’s been a couple of incidences, one in particular was back in 1997 where I 
was working for a large well head company and we had several blow-outs in the Saudi 
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Arabian marketplace that caused field fires and subsequently the Red Adair crew had 
to come in and assist by putting the fires out.  The investigation took place and found 
out that there was non-OEM, original equipment manufactured products and seal 
equipment or components were being used in those blow-out preventers.  
Subsequently the investigation found that those products were being bought from 
China. 
 
What would, in your opinion, have been the difference in cost between buying a 
copy and buying the real thing? 
 
I couldn’t possibly put an actual figure on it, but I think it may well have been about 
fifty percent dearer. 
 
And the actual cost of the blow-out, of the disruption to production? 
 
Well several millions.  Several millions. 
 
And within the oil industry is such a stoppage or such a blow-out or accident, 
is it every equated to a similar disruption that could have been caused say by a 
terrorist or is it classed as something that happens within the manufacturing 
process, the production process?  It causes the same disruption but by a 
different … 
 
By different means, yes, yes. 
 
Is that viewed differently, is it a production risk involved with the production of 
oil? 
 
Yeah it is, it’s viewed differently, but I think the oil companies have to stand, to take a 
stand of what they’re buying and make sure that they’re buying quality products 
because as a prime example of buying cheap put a lot of lives at risk. 
 
Do you think you will be able to survive without involving yourself with the 
Chinese market? 
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Yes I think we could, yes. 
 
Is there any particular reason for that? 
 
We’re well established in the marketplace, we’ve got a good quality product and the 
performance of the product speaks for itself, and there’s no particular need I think at 
this stage to go into manufacture in the Chinese market unless we get into mass 
production. 
 
Do you think that one of the strengths of your company is that you have 
longstanding ties and relationships with customers in Saudi Arabia? 
 
I think so, yes, yes. 
 
And that’s nothing that the Chinese … 
 
Well I think the other factor you’ve got to take into consideration is the oil and gas 
industry was traditionally set up in the west, America and North Sea were leaders of 
technology, we’re always advancing our technology, we’re thinking out of the box and 
better ways of working, and unfortunately there’s other areas of the world are taking 
our lead.  Unfortunately, China had decided to just take our products and copy it rather 
than … 
 
Do you equate by any way not involving China, but did this rise in their interest 
in the market share happen after nine-eleven? 
 
Pretty much yeah, I would have to say yes, they’ve always been an oil and gas 
producer but not in a sort of global scale that a lot of areas are. 
 
But they had room after nine-eleven? 
 
To do that yes. 
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And do you think that if you decided to take an isolationist’s stance where you 
decided that you wanted nothing to do with China, given that China are involved 
in the international oil industry … 
 
Yeah. 
 
… is an isolationist’s policy towards China wise? 
 
I don’t think completely, no, I think they will become a bigger player in the oil and gas 
market and we may at some stage have to embrace them as part of our space. 
 
Do you think it may be beneficial in the long run if Chinese manufacturers 
worked with large, like Schlumberger, Halliburton and whether large companies 
who have the margins would be able to accommodate the training of Chinese 
managers? 
 
Yeah. 
 
Do you think that would be to everybody’s benefit to eventually … 
 
Absolutely.  Absolutely, they’ve got a certain – the Blue Chip service companies have 
a bit of surplus if you like to assist with the growth and education of the Chinese 
market. 
 
It’s been put to me at the exhibition that if a product could be made in China 
cheaper than it could be made in the UK that’s acceptable to do so, what do you 
think the UK will lose if this expertise is taken out of the UK? 
 
We’re going to lose a lot of business, we’ve got some specialist engineering services 
in the UK that supply the global oil and gas marketplace and I think it would be 
detrimental to the UK business if it was, if certain aspects were to be taken out of the 
UK. 
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And there is within the press a lot of resentment towards Saudi Arabia, having 
worked here yourself, do you feel that there is conflicts between people who 
work in the oil industry and the general population within Saudi Arabia? 
 
This is a difficult one, I don’t think so no, no the Saudi population are pretty much open 
to learning, to understanding oil and gas, they’re very much open to taking on new 
technology, so I don’t think there’s a resentment there. 
 
Do you think it might have been more beneficial if the factories were actually 
built in Saudi Arabia to be used by, to be staffed by China and the States rather 
than moving into China, do you think there’s a need to bring the Saudi nationals 
into the oil industry in a larger, greater way than they are at the moment? 
 
From a manufacturing perspective I don’t believe so, no. 
 
You would prefer to work with the expertise where it’s traditionally come from? 
 
Yes, yes. 
 
How many Jewish people do you know who work in Saudi Arabia on the oil 
industry? 
 
None, I don’t believe I know any. 
 
But there is a great Jewish, there is a great Israeli lobby that influences the press 
in the States, there is a right wing press which influences, do you notice in Saudi 
Arabia any of the conflict between Israel and Palestine spilling out over into your 
work here? 
 
No. 
 
It doesn’t affect it? 
 
It doesn’t affect it at all, no. 
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But you don’t find at the coalface as it were … 
 
No. 
 
… that you’re working face-to-face with or you’re working alongside people who 
are Jewish? 
 
If there were Jewish there, there’s mixed nationalities we work with and we all work in 
harmony with the oil and gas industry and we’re all in the same boat, we’re working 
with Saudis, Filipinos, Pakistanis, Indians, Brits, Americans and we all work very well 
together, so. 
 
Okay and at the moment if I was to sum up I would say that you’re prepared to 
work with the Chinese when their standards are at the same level as your own? 
 
Yes. 
 
And one of the ways for them to reach that is to work alongside or under the 
sort of – with a large American company shepherding them? 
 
Not necessarily American, but certainly a larger organisation that has high standards 
of quality, yes, yeah, shepherd them along. 
 
Okay and your own company doesn’t have that ability, doesn’t have that 
margin? 
 
No. 
 
Financial sort of margin to do that? 
 
No, not at all. 
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So in many ways now you’re reliant on the standards that they adopt from the 
partner of large companies? 
 
Larger companies, yes. 
 
To move forward and are you confident that the standards will remain as high 
as they are and that they won’t drop to accommodate Chinese malpractice? 
 
There’s always a risk of that.  There’s always a risk of that happening and I would hope 
they wouldn’t drop because it’s putting a lot of people’s lives at risk if they were to drop 
because we’ve learned, we’ve been very fortunate in the oil and gas industry, we’ve 
learned over decades of time that what’s good and what’s not and we’ve learned 
through our experiences, I don’t have to mention Piper Alpha some years back, ten 
years back, we’re still learning from those experiences, and unfortunately there are 
other oil and gas areas in the world haven’t had that experience in oil and gas to learn 
from it. 
 
If I was to look at the amount of work and investment that’s going on in Saudi 
Arabia and oil at the moment, would I be misconceived to say that there is so 
much technology and there’s so much investment in new technology that it’s 
because the fields are actually depleting and that there is more technology 
needed to get remaining oil out more economically? 
 
Yeah, there’s a part of that, yes, some of the larger fields have been around for a long 
time so increasing technology to get it out a lot cheaper, but there’s new fields coming 
on stream and they want to apply the high end technology to maximise the efficiency 
of that field. 
 
Well I think that’s just about it, actually, thanks. 
 
I appreciate that, David. 
 
That’s the lot, I can thank you. 
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Thank you very much. 
 
[End of File – 00:13:44] 
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INTERVIEWEE ‘B’ 
 
 
Transcription of Interviewee ‘B’ 18/11/2008 
 
 
Duration of Interview: 00:16:37 
 
 
[Beginning of File] 
 
Thank you for offering to give me this interview.  If I could ask you please what 
product do you market? 
 
We market several products that are sub-sea and surface intervention systems.  We 
started with our core product of a well tractor which conveys logging tools and coil 
tubing out into high angle and horizontal wells.  I mentioned sub-sea because that’s a 
new focus for us, and we’re trying to become a sub-sea intervention specialist. 
 
So off-shore work? 
 
Yeah. 
 
Are there intellectual property right issues with your products? 
 
Yes there are, we have at this show a company that has been a fast follower and you 
could almost say a copycat of the technology, we have a couple of other companies 
that have tried to enter this business and which we had at least a three to four year 
head start in and so I would say that the technology has caught on, it’s becoming 
mainstream as far as the conveyance, but when it comes to the mechanical 
intervention services it’s brand new, we’re still taking the lead on that but again there’s 
some fast followers. 
 
Can I ask you then where does the expertise in your product lie? 
 
It’s in the quality and the design of the technology as these are electro-hydraulic 
devices, the tolerances are extremely high they’re in the order of a couple of microns 
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of moving parts.  We have several metal to metal seals because elastomer seals 
create too much friction and make the equipment less efficient.  And well you think 
that we have a best in class technology of this kind and that’s why we’re the market 
leader. 
 
So what percent of your business is actually in Saudi Arabia? 
 
A very small percent, we’re just getting started in Saudi, we’ve actually had people 
here on the ground for, I’m going to ask my colleague, here is it, have you and 
Mohammed been here even a year? 
 
Colleague: One year, yeah. 
 
One year?  Okay, so we’ve had some people on the ground for one year and we’re 
looking for opportunity to set up a base of operations. 
 
How much R and D went into this particular product? 
 
Well it took a couple of years of a Master’s thesis from the founder, Jorgen Hollenbeck, 
he came up with the concept of tractoring and it was initially a coil tubing tractor to be 
able to extend the reach of what coil tubing can do in high angle wells.  But the, I forgot 
the question? 
 
I said what percentage of business is in Saudi Arabia and then I said … 
 
About the technology what was the next question? 
 
Yeah I said [pause] the R and D, how much R and D went into it? 
 
Sorry, Wow I spaced out, so how much R and D, I’d say in the initial product of the 
well tractor there’s a few years of R and D that went into the electric motor that’s a 
patented device, the hydraulic pump with its two systems, the compensation system, 
the wheel drives which are little hydraulic motors, very small miniature hydraulic 
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motors in each wheel.  There’s quite a bit of R and D that went into that and there’s 
continuous R and D going into all the mechanical services that we’re doing now.   
 
Are you aware of any copies being made of your product? 
 
Not exact copies since the tractor, the tractor has been copied, we’ve had a couple of 
lawsuits about it, there was some friendly courts that allowed a lawsuit to – there was 
some payment, they were allowed to continue under certain conditions using the 
copycat technology and that’s what’s sitting across the way. 
 
Was that in a western court or was that anywhere else? 
 
It was in a western court, it was in the home country court of the copycat, it was a 
favourable decision for that copycat.  Is it good to call it a copycat? 
 
Yeah that’s fine.   
 
Alright. 
 
To your knowledge, are the Chinese able to produce the grade of materials and 
machining to make your product? 
 
I’m sure they could eventually but I think it would take them several years to get all the 
processes down to get the tolerances so that it would be as efficient and create the 
power and speed that these tools can deliver right now, I don’t think they could do that 
in the timeframe that they’re used to copying technology. 
 
Do you think that the Chinese will continue to ignore copyright? 
 
Yes I believe that they have an official policy of technology transfer that’s what I was 
told when I was there that they want to take western technology and bring it in the 
country and that’s why they do not have laws against taking and stealing copyright 
and patents. 
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And does the state turn a blind eye to that or even encourage it in your opinion? 
 
They encourage it, it’s may – that’s in my opinion because just the conversations I had 
with the people in the industry there, it seems it’s not just a blind eye, it seems like 
they encourage technology transfer in this manner. 
 
There are literally hundreds of thousands of graduates coming out of European 
and American universities who have done engineering degrees, at that level do 
you think that there was enough emphasis put on regulation within the 
engineering industry so that recent graduates, recent Chinese graduates would 
go back to China with an understanding that regulation was important? 
 
I think they realise that but if they’re going to go and get a job back in their home 
country and then, which is what they all want, and that company has a practice of 
doing technology transfer as we were calling it, then they will continue that, even 
though they might know that it’s wrong by western standards, they know that it’s 
acceptable in their culture. 
 
Do you think if Chinese manufacturers work hand-in-hand with very large US 
and European concerns do you think eventually they will have to embrace the 
regulation, the regulatory power of copyright and also of ISO standards? 
 
I think the western Europeans, the North Americans, the countries, even Brazil now, 
has quite a few new technologies and they are interacting more and more with the 
Chinese, they have to insist, I think it’s, I don’t think it’s going to be a government 
solution, I think it has to be, well it probably has to be at all levels, but certainly the 
corporations have to insist that there is equal, mutual protection for the IP, their 
technology’s going to be protected.  Eventually China is going to come up with some 
of their own stuff and they’re going to want that protected. 
 
Would you sell your product directly to the Chinese? 
 
No, we have no intentions of selling any of our technology to the Chinese. 
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Would you in any way go into a partnership with a Chinese company? 
 
Yes, but it would only be under very strict controlled conditions and we’ve already 
discussed how that might work, but we have a lot of anxiety about that. 
 
Do you think in the long-term you will be able to survive without involving 
yourself with the Chinese and the Chinese sort of market? 
 
Yes we’re growing quite quickly, we haven’t even dented our potential, we think we’re 
at about point two percent of the potential market for what we’re doing, so it’ll be 
several years before we get to the point where we feel we have to have Chinese 
business to grow any more.  We are looking at China, it’s just it doesn’t appear to be 
right, the right climate for us to go in there at this time. 
 
Do you think in the future it will be possible to survive if you take in isolation 
this stance towards China completely? 
 
Well again I’d say we probably have five to ten years of just good organic growth in 
the current industry, the non-Chinese industry to reach our potential and I would, at 
some point in the next two to three years we will probably start getting serious about 
working in China, and that means we will have a very good trusted partner to work 
with from there. 
 
Would I be right in thinking at the moment the risk in joining China in the market 
is in the fact that you cannot rely on their product and you cannot rely on their 
quality and they are also open to copying your product and marketing it 
themselves? 
 
That’s probably an accurate statement, because the latter part of your statement is the 
biggest concern to us is that we will find our equipment disappear for a while and then 
it’ll maybe even show back up, but there will be copycats all over. 
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From your own experience within the oil industry, can you think of any case 
studies that have emphasised China’s, the negative aspects of China being 
involved in copying parts of equipment that have failed in the field? 
 
That have failed in? 
In the field. 
 
Of their? 
 
Or have been passed off as originals that have failed in the field? 
 
Not in the oil industry, I know that they’ve done some copying of some of 
Schlumberger’s technology and I know that they’ve been working with a couple of 
western companies out of Houston making some copies of other companies’ 
technology, not just Schlumberger, so I know that they – but I’m not aware of failures, 
any like higher failure rates.  All technology is less than perfect if it’s, the higher the 
technology, the more problems that can happen.  So I just don’t have any statistics to 
make a comment on that. 
 
Would you class the company that you work for as a large, medium or small 
company? 
 
Service company, a small service company. 
 
And [pause] which area of manufacturing would you say would be most at risk, 
would it be high volume, small products that are easier to clone or would it be 
expensive one-off products that you can really cut down the margin if you skimp 
on the quality and? 
 
It’s my impression that the low technology, high volume product manufacturing would 
be at risk, I don’t see the one-offs and the very large items being something that would 
be a serious threat at this point of time in this industry. 
 
Colleague: Sorry, can I have a business ref? 
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Yeah.  Here’s a couple more just in case. 
 
Yeah.  Last question to ask, it’s been put to me that if a product can be made in 
China cheaper than it can be made in western European or an American country, 
that is acceptable, if that’s the case, eventually what do you think that European 
and American manufacturers will lose to the Chinese? 
 
Well I’d say that we have no intention, our company, if you’re talking about our 
company Welltech or in general? 
 
In general, I’m taking a case study from the Japanese car industry which sold 
very poor quality cars and then all of a sudden moved its quality controller and 
people started to buy Japanese cars on a large scale and of course England lost 
its car industry … 
 
Yeah, so could that happen in China? 
 
… I’m seeing whether, whether China with its - not only the product but the 
technology and the manpower eventually. 
 
Right, ‘cause they can do things so much … 
 
So much cheaper. 
 
… less expensive and so that is possible, they have several years to go in terms of 
the oil industry getting their technology, being able to manufacture and have all the 
skills that have taken years for some of these companies, these western companies 
to develop the knowledge and I don’t think they’ll be able to do that in the short-term.  
But I’m not surprised if they start making inroads into that area. 
 
I get the impression from looking at the kit that you’ve got here, you don’t 
manufacture rubbish, as somebody who has been in the oil industry for the 
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length of time that you have, how do you see the Chinese, do you resent the fact 
that they’re taking the approach that they to this market? 
 
No I don’t, I honestly don’t blame them for the way they’ve been operating up till now, 
but I think it is time that they joined the rest of the world in supporting the patent laws, 
copyright laws and all the protections for people’s technology ‘cause I think they’re 
going to, if they don’t, they’re going to have a more and more difficult time at becoming 
partners, nobody will trust them.  So I think it’s time that they changed their business 
model. 
Is that something that could be done at state level, do you think that … 
 
Oh yes, I … 
 
… diplomats could be doing a lot more in China to get the point across that it’s 
the quality and the goods that they’re exporting that needs to be checked? 
 
Well yeah certainly it’s, but you mean the diplomats from the western countries? 
 
Yeah. 
 
Yes but I think you would think that they would realise this, the handwriting’s on the 
wall, they have to change, they have to start having protection for this if they want to 
be an equal partner because otherwise they’re always going to be considered one of 
these outsiders that you can’t trust and so I would like to think they’re intelligent enough 
and that they’ll do it on their own but maybe not, maybe they see that they’ve been 
successful so far why change? 
 
Do you not think though that producer states who import crates of equipment 
that they were once importing from Scotland with the same mark are now 
importing it from China, it looks the same but they know it’s a copy? 
 
So what’s the question? 
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Well do you think that producer states could do more as well to regulate the 
quality of product that’s coming into the, if it is a copy? 
 
Could they do more to regulate the? 
 
The amount that’s being imported? 
 
Yeah, I think yes I think some of the governments have been turning a blind eye to 
some of the cheap imitation copies of things that have come in, I think there could be 
a lot more done there. 
Okay, that’s all, thank you very much. 
 
Okay, you’re welcome. 
 
[End of File – 00:16:37] 
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INTERVIEWEE ‘C’ 
 
 
Transcription of Interviewee ‘C’ 18/11/2008 
 
 
Duration of Interview: 00:28:23 
 
 
[Beginning of File] 
 
Thank you very much for giving me the chance to interview you on these set of 
questions. 
 
You’re welcome. 
 
Could I ask what product do you market? 
 
We sell software for the upstream oil and gas industry and that software helps 
companies be more efficient and more productive in producing, finding and producing 
oil. 
 
Is there an issue of intellectual property rights? 
 
Of course, with software there’s always intellectual property rights that you’re 
concerned about protecting, you’re always have, think you have a unique and 
patentable IP, and in the United States obviously for us that’s a big concern. 
 
Where does the actual expertise in your product lie? 
 
The expertise lies in that the software we have is very focused on specific operational 
and intelligence issues within oil and gas companies, so that’s where some of it lies 
and then also in our expertise of many years of providing services and software to 
specifically to the upstream industry. 
 
How much percentage of the business is research and development? 
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I would say probably thirty to forty percent of our business is research and 
development. 
 
Are you a large, medium or small manufacturer? 
 
We’re a small company. 
 
What percentage of your business is here in Saudi? 
 
At the moment it’s a small percentage of our business, but over the next couple of 
years it should become up to twenty percent of our business. 
 
Are you aware of any copies of your product being made? 
 
You mean illegal copies or? 
 
Just turning up in the market or anywhere. 
 
At the moment some of our software is not unique in what it does, but the software 
that’s interesting to Saudi Arabia is unique and we don’t see any copies of it yet. 
 
Do you think that the Chinese have the capability to produce your product at a 
competitive price? 
 
I would say that the nature of software is if you continuously develop your software, 
any company has the capability or any country has the capability of reproducing what 
you do, but they’ll always be behind you.  And if they’re only copying what you do, 
they’ll never exceed what your product so.  So yes, they have the capability of 
reproducing it, but they’ll always be a year or two behind us because we’re always 
innovative and they’re just trying to catch up. 
 
Do you consider that the Chinese manufacturers in general are making copies 
of western oil field equipment? 
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Yes, me personally I believe there are companies, I’m not sure if there is any stance 
one way or the other, but we are concerned about the Chinese actually trying to 
replicate our intellectual property.  So yes I believe that they can. 
 
Do you think that the Chinese will continue to ignore copyright? 
 
Yes there’s no reason, there’s nothing that I know of that would keep us from believing 
that. 
 
Would you go into partnership with a Chinese company? 
 
Would we?  [Pause]  I think it would be considered under certain circumstances, yes. 
 
Do you think the Chinese will benefit regarding their regulation of copyright by 
working side-by-side with some of the larger engineering concerns? 
 
I don’t know, that’s an interesting question whether they would benefit or not.  Once 
again, you can’t make a judgement about an entire people across the board, so some 
companies or some individuals within China may benefit from that, but as a country 
it’s an unknown to me.  I don’t think so, but I don’t know. 
 
If American firms heavily invest in China and regulate the quality of their own 
products leaving Chinese factories, do you think that may have an impact on 
Chinese manufacturers? 
 
Well it certainly could because then there’s the chance that just through association 
they would learn new techniques and be able to do a better job and quality would 
improve and perspectives would improve, so it’s possible. 
 
Will you be able to, will companies of your size do you think be able to survive 
without involving yourself in the Chinese markets in the future? 
 
Yes I think we could survive without having anything to do with the Chinese market. 
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Do you think that goes for people who are actually making components for the 
oil and gas industry that could be easily … 
 
That’s a great question ‘cause obviously there’s a tremendous amount of potential for 
manufacturing out of China at lower costs and such so they could probably survive, 
would they be more efficient or make more money?  Could be. 
 
Let’s say I have a product which relies on intellectual property rights and also 
the quality of the grade of raw materials that go into that product and I take an 
isolation stance from China, do you think I can survive? 
 
I think that a company can survive in the short-term, in the long-term, you’re talking, 
with the isolation that’s thought right off at the beginning that obviously is going to be 
a problem because more people could take advantage of the fact that you’re not using 
the Chinese but there’s the issue of is my IP protected? 
 
I have often been quoted as I’ve walked down the different stands that the same 
situation happened with Japanese cars, do you think that any of the lessons 
learnt from that and the loss of manufacturing base after the Japanese took over 
can be saved this time round? 
 
Well you would certainly hope so, you would hope that we would be able to learn from 
those lessons.  I think the real lessons with the Japanese were that we didn’t take 
them seriously in their ability to produce a quality product and so for years and years 
we ignored it, and if the same thing were to happen in China, I don’t believe that we 
would ignore it nearly as long or I think we would take it more seriously. 
 
Do you think that China lacks in research and development? 
 
No I think they probably do … 
 
[Long announcement] 
 
Okay, lessons learnt from Japan and R and D. 
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Yeah, right so for the Chinese are they?  Okay, so I believe the Chinese actually are 
very capable of R and D and are spending time and effort on it, now it may be 
misdirected, so maybe R and D need to try and replicate someone else’s products 
rather than going off in their own direction, but the evidence is they’re trying to do 
space exploration, they’re trying to do satellites, and you can’t, that’s not indications 
of trying to replicate someone else’s product but trying to actually be innovative, using 
other people’s research possibly, which is, we would do the same thing, but they are 
trying to be innovative.  So they are actually spending time and effort I believe in doing 
those things. 
 
With so many Chinese students attends European and American universities, 
do you think it would be beneficial particularly in engineering and technology 
based degrees to increase the amount of emphasis on the need for regulation 
in those degrees? 
 
Well it certainly would be beneficial I believe in the long run, yeah. 
 
But there again do you think that the decision to adopt this sort of transfer of 
knowledge is something that’s coming from the state rather than from the will 
of the people involved? 
 
Yeah. 
 
Is the Chinese government turning a blind eye to it? 
 
Yes, I believe the Chinese government should think about regulating it a lot more with 
the transfer of knowledge and the students as you said in Europe and other, outside 
of China, they’re certainly going to see the importance of regulation but is regulation 
necessary?  More regulation necessary?  Absolutely, and more self-policing by the 
Chinese government. 
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Do you think that the western embassies in China could do more to put pressure 
on the Chinese government to regulate their copyright with intellectual property 
issues? 
 
Could they do more?  Absolutely.   
 
With that change being at a more ministerial level? 
 
Absolutely, yeah, there has to be in any country that should and wants to respect other 
countries’ intellectual property it has to come from the top to make sure that everyone 
understands this is what we will do as a nation, yes. 
 
A producer state like Saudi Arabia, if it imports crates of equipment which is 
coming from China but which is marked up as being a western brand, do you 
think the producer states could do more to filter out any counterfeit equipment? 
 
I don’t know that they’re not necessarily doing what they should be doing, but if that’s 
the case then I think it’s the responsibility of the producing states to actually try to 
make sure that the organisation that claims to be making it is actually making the 
product and that the dollars that are being spent actually go to the people who actually, 
who own the intellectual property and producing it.  So they do have a responsibility 
to do that. 
 
Do you have any particular case study that you’ve heard on within your industry 
either positive or negative about Chinese, about doing business with China?  
Any anecdotes or? 
 
Yeah, not case studies but anecdotal stories where in meetings we’ve had, well there 
have been people that I’ve been associated with that have been in meetings, that were 
very, very careful about disclosing any kind of intellectual property in any way just 
because of the fact that the reputation has been and practical experience has shown 
if you leave something with the Chinese, six months later there’ll appear a copy of it, 
and so there have been stories about that. 
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So how would you sum up the threat that China poses to US and European 
technology at the moment? 
 
Well, at the moment it’s a mild threat to a medium threat meaning there is concern in 
doing business directly with China, introducing anything that you want to protect into 
China it’s presumed that it will be copied in a relatively short period of time using 
reverse engineering techniques, and so that’s, to any company that wants to do 
business directly in China that’s a concern.  Outside of China where Chinese 
organisations exist that becomes a mild threat that if you leave anything with them that 
can be copied the thought is they will attempt to do that, send it back home and have 
it, have that intellectual property copied or mistakenly taken. 
 
Okay, if I could change the focus of the interview now over to the Arab/Israeli 
conflict, can you see any way that the Arab/Israeli conflict affects oil production 
in Saudi Arabia with European and US technology and ex-pats? 
 
Can I see any way that it’s affected?  I think that number one, since no person of 
Jewish background is allowed into the Kingdom to begin with, that number one impacts 
your ability to have the most efficient, most productive methods available.  It’s not 
necessarily that the Israeli people as a whole are that much smarter, but if you reduce 
the knowledge base available in any industry then you’re cutting yourself off, so that’s 
number one, you’re reducing the possible knowledge base.  But the fact that the dislike 
each other so much probably has a lot to do with what drives certain individuals within 
the Kingdom, not necessarily from the top, but there’s going to be this distrust and this 
constant conflict and so not being able to bring in your most, from Europe and the 
States, not being able to bring in your most productive, your most intelligent people 
and all of that because they’re of a particular race can have an impact.  Now for me 
personally I know individuals that are Jewish and that are not able to do business here 
in the Kingdom and that is, that doesn’t necessarily hurt me personally but it does slow 
down sometimes my capabilities in performing all of the duties that maybe need to be 
performed. 
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Do you think that the media in the States particularly the right wing media which 
is often funded by very pro-Israeli groups is particularly accurate in its portrayal 
of the policies in Saudi Arabia towards the rest of the world regarding oil? 
 
That’s a good question, I don’t necessarily know that what your original premise that 
it’s all funded by Jewish, you know, right wing … 
 
Heritage Foundation for example. 
 
… yeah, I don’t, I personally don’t necessarily know that that’s true, obviously you have 
more research, but Heritage Foundation absolutely.  But the media itself tends to have 
a very negative view of what happens in Saudi Arabia and oil and just the Middle East 
in general.  If I had not been in the oil industry for so long and all I took was what the 
media produced specifically on the conservative right wing side of the house then I 
would believe that probably one hundred and eighty degrees of what actually happens 
in the oil industry in the Middle East obviously the Middle East is the Arab/Muslim 
culture has a tremendous impact on what happens in the Middle East, they own a lot 
of the oil, everything that we need in the United States for oil production is extremely 
dependent on this area, but yet the view is they’re backwards, they’re unintelligent that 
they’re mean and nasty and they hate us and all of those things from the media 
perspective, and so yes that’s obviously impacted by the Jewish perspective. 
 
Is it, to your knowledge, are there any Jewish CEOs in any of the larger major 
oil companies? 
 
Not to my knowledge. 
 
Is it an industry which is dominated by the will of the producer states or the 
ethics of the producer states because there is quite a disparity within American 
culture that people, Israelis or Jewish people cannot involve themselves on the 
hands-on, coalface side of the oil industry, or given the amount of money there 
is involved, finance, they can’t involve themselves on a boardroom level of the 
decisions. 
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That’s an interesting question [pause] yeah I don’t know, it certainly has an impact and 
once again back to what I was saying, if you give, if you completely eliminate one 
segment of your intellectual pool because they’re of a certain background that’s not 
good.  But in the States for all that I really can talk about from a long history, there are 
Jewish, there’s Jewish involvement from individuals, right, there’s a lot of Jewish 
people do like the oil industry, are they impacted as far as promotion and ability to 
have strong position within these organisations?  Probably because the producing 
states say, number one, you’re not going to get field experience, you’re not going to 
be able to be here, but there is a lot of experience that actually occurs outside of the 
Middle Eastern states, a lot in Latin America, Central America, North America, 
tremendous amount of experience that a lot of the Jews as a whole can have 
experience with. 
 
To your knowledge have the Jews in America ever become politically active in 
that area, have they ever had a demonstration, have they ever caused any unrest 
because they can’t get involved in what is the world’s largest global industry? 
 
Yeah, to my knowledge no. 
 
I mean that in itself seems to contradict many people’s feelings towards … 
 
Sure does, yeah.  Yeah it is kind – you would think that if it were such a big deal that 
they would protest about.  Now, I don’t know that I can really remember a lot of Jewish 
protests necessarily about anything, they tend to be a little bit more active politically 
behind the scenes rather than coming straight out and protesting in general, you don’t 
see them as an organisation or as a group necessarily do that. 
 
But given that the only way that Jews can influence the oil industry is through 
the media … 
 
Yeah. 
 
… is there not a responsibility, are they also not responsible therefore for being 
more moderate in the way that some of their arguments are put across, or given 
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that the media is the only tool that they have to influence, is that why they can 
be seen as being very right wing and very antagonist towards Arab states?  
Does their non-involvement, sorry, in the oil industry mean that their 
involvement in the media is all the more stronger? 
 
Yeah that’s probably absolutely true because they, that if that’s your only means of 
influence then obviously you have to push where you can push and you have to be 
able to try to, well, try to misdirect whenever you can. 
 
If there were to be peace between Israel and Palestine and that peace was to 
sustain, do you think that there may be a softening of attitudes within the oil 
producing nations towards Jews and Israelis becoming more involved in the oil 
industry? 
 
I think there’s an opportunity if that were true that there actually were sustainable 
peace and the Palestinians had the state that they wanted and everyone was happy 
and it was true peace between ‘em, yes they would have, I think there would be a 
softening of positions over time. 
 
But it is far too fanciful and far-fetched to say that the Jews are hoping for a 
resolution to Arab and Israeli conflict solely so they can get involved in the oil 
industry. 
 
Oh absolutely, absolutely.  No obviously if you’re surrounded by your enemy and your 
enemy’s always yelling and throwing rocks and that type of stuff, your number one 
concern is to make sure that they don’t invade, number one, and try to overrun you, 
but if there – that would be their main focus is to be able to live in peace in their own, 
what they believe is their given land, so I don’t think that has anything to do with we 
get more in the oil industry obviously. 
 
It would just be one opportunity to work on afterwards. 
 
It would be a great consequence, right. 
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Is it not therefore ironic that during the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights 
when the trans-Arabian pipeline was pumping oil over the occupied land that 
the Saudis allowed oil to be pumped over Israel territory saying that in actual 
fact it wasn’t Israeli territory, it was occupied land? 
 
Exactly, yeah, you can say what you want right, the reality is that they possessed it. 
 
And within the States how much bankable or invested petro-dollars will go 
through the hands of Israeli and Jewish bankers? 
 
Ah, quite a bit, quite a bit obviously. 
 
So really there is only the core issue of really being able to work in Saudi Arabia 
that’s preventing Israelis or Jews from actually being involved in the – whereas 
- in the oil business, whereas all the other supplementary industries like the 
money that is made from it is quite happy to be used through their systems? 
 
Absolutely.  Absolutely, right.  So what is the one thing, the one problem that they 
have, they don’t, the Israelis don’t have control over any oil and so what are you going 
to complain about?  I mean they get everything else, you’re absolutely right, they get 
to touch and control some of the other aspects of it, so, quite interesting. 
 
It’s interesting for me as well because after the ’67 war they acquired a large part 
of the Sinai Desert with their own oil fields. 
 
Uh-hmm. 
 
And they gave them back to the Egyptians. 
 
Yeah and that’s something. 
 
Was that because it was so difficult for them to work in the oil industry? 
 
No, no I don’t think so. 
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That was just part of the big deal? 
 
Yeah. 
 
Because they got, because the Egyptians agreed then to provide them with a 
certain amount of … 
 
Exactly, right and to leave them alone basically that’s what they were after. 
 
So the Israelis were able to run and produce their own wells? 
 
Yeah, absolutely, they know how, right, they have experience from other areas, it’s 
just they don’t have it in that particular area.  So if they really needed the expertise 
they could bring them in and utilise and then of course there’s always mercenaries 
that would gladly come in and help. 
 
So really if – no, there’s no point in asking that, okay, thank you very much. 
 
[End of File – 00:28:23] 
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[Beginning of File] 
 
Good morning and thank you for the interview, could you tell me whether the 
product that you manufacture has Intellectual Property Right Issues? 
 
Yeah, we have a product range that covers nine or ten different products and we have 
both product and process property knowledge. 
 
Could you please tell me where the expertise in your product lies? 
 
Two areas, the first area is design, the products have to be gas tight that in itself needs 
certain 3D design elements. 
 
What amount of research and development goes into actually making the 
product? 
 
Our annual budget is roughly ten percent of our net profit margin every year, so our 
company typically makes fifteen, sixteen million net margin every year and typically 
one and a half to two million goes back in R and D. 
 
What percentage of that business is in Saudi Arabia? 
 
At the moment it’s quite small, Saudi Arabia is probably only fifteen percent of our 
business. 
 
Are you aware that the Chinese are producing any copies of your own product? 
 
Yes, we’ve been to China and actually seen our own drawings in Chinese factories. 
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How has that differed from dealing with any other new manufacturer in the 
market? 
 
It really hasn’t made a lot of difference to us, the Chinese products we saw when we 
went to China were very poor quality, very low pressure and quite honestly without the 
intellectual property knowledge, experience, time, if they could catch up it would 
probably take them ten years to understand the intellectual property knowledge locked 
into our products. 
 
Do you think the Chinese manufacturers if they work together with large western 
manufacturers will eventually be able to reach the quality standards of your own 
product? 
 
The answer is yes and no.  Yes they will over a timeframe, what that timeframe is, is 
well beyond my lifetime.  My experience with Chinese is that on anything low 
technology, low knowledge they can learn, they can develop. 
 
Do they have the same networking skills as western manufacturers do? 
 
Do, the two big problems they have is the culture within China, it’s still very much a 
secret society, so when people, businesses, do get hold of any property knowledge 
they do not share it, they like to keep it very much within their own. 
 
Is the oil service industry a club?  Is it a difficult club to go in or are China 
outsiders because of their culture or because they’re relatively unknown? 
 
The oil industry it’s not really a club, the difficulty with the oil industry is that a lot of 
money goes into R and D and if you don’t manage it properly you can do a lot of 
damage, so the Chinese won’t be ostracised for anything other than they just want to 
steal that knowledge and try and use it and the effects will be catastrophic. 
 
Do you think that the Chinese will continue to ignore copyright issues? 
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Of course yeah. 
 
Do you think it would have been helpful during the education of the next 
generation of Chinese in western universities, in UK universities, if engineering 
degrees had incorporated a large amount of regulatory teaching, the importance 
of regulation? 
 
Then you’re into a different topic, again, yes it would be better, but you have to realise 
the background and culture they come from.  So how you change that mind-set is 
probably more important than what you teach them, and one thing I found on my many 
visits to China is you can teach them, you can tell them, they’ll agree, they’ll sign 
contracts, but at the end of the day their culture is very much they will do what they 
want to do anyway.  And that’s not necessarily because they’re bad people, I found in 
general they’re quite honest, quite open and quite genuine, but their culture is copying 
is not a bad thing. 
 
Are you prepared to go into partnership with the Chinese? 
 
Oh we have no problem going into partnership with the Chinese, there’s two big 
problem, the trend at the moment is to go into partnership with many and then control 
the intellectual property knowledge yourself because still there is a culture on, in 
China, the rich are getting richer, the poor are getting poorer and that’s this cultural 
divide that I find all the time that no matter how hard I try, how many deals I make, 
how many people I see, there is still this background of the guy’s in there, he will make 
money, a get out.  There’s no appreciation for their own culture, their own people. 
 
Do you think that manufacturers of oil industry equipment in the west will be 
able to survive without involving themselves directly with the Chinese? 
 
Yeah I think so, I think again if you look back over time which is always a good indicator 
we probably heard it with the Japanese and the motor industry, their culture is such 
that they now understand western ways, western cultures, they are now demanding 
western salaries and western comforts.  So by and large there are new motorcycles, 
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new car industries picking up all the time, the only thing we did was managed it badly 
with Japan.  We will manage it better with China. 
 
Because we’ve learnt from the past experience? 
 
Because we’ve learnt from the past experience. 
 
Do you think that Chinese personnel who work on the actual fields will be able 
to work in Saudi Arabia no differently than US and European workers, is there 
culture up to that? 
 
Yeah, as you travel around oil fields, you’ll see Chinese people everywhere.  But again 
the difficulty that you find is they can work with Europeans no problem, they can learn 
how to do the job, but the difference is there is no loyalty, their whole culture is money 
driven and when you see the culture in China you understand why.  But these guys 
will quite happily leave an oil field, leave a site and move within a week or two for a 
few hundred dollars a month. 
 
Is there much transfer of Chinese labour over from Chinese companies to 
European companies? 
 
No, the Chinese labourer tends to be working for Chinese companies and these 
Chinese companies tend to get brought in when there is nothing else, it’s a last resort. 
 
So whereas you could get a European worker going to work for an American 
company, there is this transit of employment of the labour? 
 
It tends to be economy of scale, so you’ll find now when everybody’s drilling, probably 
more prevalent a few months ago when the oil price was way up, the companies with 
a lot of knowledge, a lot of experience pay a lot of money, take the best guys and then 
it just floods, it just floats down the chain.  So what happens is everybody sees the 
opportunity to make more money, they move up the ladder one rung, the bottom of the 
ladder is empty, so then the Chinese companies come in with their Chinese workers 
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but they tend to be in the countries that don’t pay so well.  So as you travel around 
some of the more … 
 
I know what you mean. 
 
… yeah, what’s the? 
Say for example the Sudan they’d go to? 
 
Yeah, the Yemen, the Sudan, Algeria, places where it’s … 
 
The more politically challenged and socially challenged countries. 
 
That’s right yeah, yeah. 
 
And my last question is what bothers you more, is it a Chinese cheap copy of 
your equipment failing and your reputation being affected by that, or the overall 
possibility of China beginning to maintain its own standards and competing with 
you on a more level playing field? 
 
I think all the people I talk to in the oil and gas world and we all meet, it is a club, we 
all meet.  Yeah so we all meet on our travels, we all meet for shows, it’s a club in that 
sense, we all have these discussions, but I think there are very few people I talk to 
that have a problem with the Chinese culturally.  The problem we have is that they 
won’t respect the equipment and their copies – the two things they do is they’re quite 
happy to do a one hundred percent copy including the label and the name, and the 
second thing is the quality control is so poor in some areas that one day there will be 
an accident and it will be our job to prove it’s a Chinese copy.  We try and say to people 
there is enough business out there to do it properly and to do it professionally and this 
is the trouble with the Chinese, the culture in a lot of cases, the last five years I’ve 
been travelling to China, I’ve seen the divide getting bigger and bigger and bigger, the 
rich are definitely getting richer, the poor are getting poorer. 
 
So people are going to more desperate measures to maintain their standard of 
living? 
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Oh yeah, they absolutely do not respect this professionalism and I don’t even see it in 
the young people coming through that they don’t see anything wrong in getting to the 
political issue, you can’t challenge them because the Chinese authorities don’t see 
anything wrong in it.  I’ve been to so many companies in China where companies I 
know, I’ve seen them badging their products with other people’s badges to sell.  But I 
think if they did it professionally, there wouldn’t be a problem, there’s enough business 
out there in this macroeconomic climate. 
 
Does it make it any harder that many of the countries that import oil equipment 
for the field themselves don’t have strict enough import rules to regulate what’s 
coming in, if they traditionally know the pumps come from Scotland but they 
see them arriving in a crate from China, is it not their job to question that? 
 
Yeah I should think it is, yeah, and by and large people we see are very aware, in the 
early days, maybe ten years ago, they turned a bit of a blind eye to Chinese products.  
What we’ve seen over the last ten years is some very, very big accidents that by and 
large don’t get reported.  So whichever country you go into and there’s some of these 
countries they just maintain radio silence, they’re banned by governments from 
printing stuff.  But we know within the industry what’s happening and there’s been 
some pretty horrific stories going around.  And people are becoming more aware now, 
so. 
 
Can you think of any particular case study that you can sum that up with, has 
there been a particular incident? 
 
Well I think the most recent one was in Algeria where the first - one of the drilling rigs 
broke some very – it was a Chinese copy, it had very poor quality control and the 
hydraulic hoses broke on the top drive, the hydraulic oil sprayed all over the rig 
including the hot diesel generators and a fire broke out. 
 
So you had a well fire? 
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We had a well fire, what we heard was that rig was then repaired by a reputable 
company, they weren’t allowed to do all the safety checks they wanted to, they 
repaired the hoses with very professional hoses, they looked as close as they could 
and inspected what papers they had, but the other thing you find and we’ve got first-
hand experience the documents from China are not worth the paper they’re printed 
on, they repaired the top drive, they started drilling, the hydraulic pressure came on, 
but this time instead of the pipes breaking, the power transmitted to the rig and it just 
twisted the frame of the rig and the rig fell over, and this is not untypical.  We’ve had 
first-hand experiences where we have had certificates of conformity stamped, 
witnessed by reputable bodies, these people have quality control certificates from 
quality organisations.  And if you look on any website you’ll see the Chinese 
advertising they have all these quality standards and certificates but when you get it 
back into your factory and do an investigation, we’ve seen pieces with holes in them 
that could never have passed a pressure test where we have a certificate stamped 
and signed to say it did. 
 
Is there anything that the trade missions within European embassies could do 
to put pressure on receiving countries to prevent your own products from being 
tainted by this? 
 
I think it’s one of these things, the problem is so big and the political or the economic 
environment drives it to a point it can’t be controlled.  I can remember not so many 
months ago when everybody was drilling at two hundred dollars a barrel, one hundred 
and fifty dollars a barrel, everybody wanted people, there’s a distinct shortage, we 
have our own rig fleet in Europe and to get qualified personnel for us is very difficult.  
We only use qualified people, we have to pay a lot of money, but we get a lot of 
companies further down the chain that report to us that well okay we know the guys 
from China and National Drilling, we know he’s only been on the rig three months but 
that’s the best we’ve got.  And this is the market drives it and I don’t think anybody has 
the power to stop it. 
 
So the highest time for risk in this business given the shortage of manpower is 
when there is a high demand at a high price? 
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Yeah, high demand, high price, high requirements, high risk. 
 
Dropping the quality of labour used? 
 
Yeah and that’s a knock-on effect … 
 
They use Chinese labour? 
 
… we deal primarily with all the major players around the world and they understand 
the need, high pressure is a bomb waiting to go off.  And this is the problem when you 
talk to the big oil companies, the Exxon Mobils, the Shells, the BPs, they have all their 
environmental policies in place, they have all their health and safety which is their 
number one and we have to conform to that.  And we believe in it because quite simply 
I do not want to knock on somebody’s door and tell them that their husband or wife 
has been killed.  But further down the line companies that maybe don’t have such 
exacting standards as the big companies relax to a point where the bottom of the 
chain, they’ll use whatever they can get and if that oil price is at a hundred and fifty 
dollars, they don’t care, they’ll take anything. 
 
Do you think it may have helped if the larger companies who went into 
partnership with Chinese companies or built factories in China, would it have 
helped matters if they’d have built them in Saudi Arabia and had Saudi nationals 
working in there? 
 
I think you’re then into, yeah, more political discussions, yeah, I think maybe the 
attitudes in Saudi are certainly different, we’re certainly looking around the Middle East 
to do joint ventures.  We have another factory in the Middle East now, we don’t really 
have any problems, we’re happy to share the information, the technology, the people 
we deal with, they want to learn for the right reasons and they know it’s going to take 
time, but that’s an attitude you won’t get in China. 
 
Okay, so there’s quite a distinction, my very last question is it’s been put to me 
that if a product can be made in China a lot cheaper than it can do in the UK 
that’s acceptable by a lot of people, but what will the UK lose by that? 
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What?  It will lose a lot of jobs.  What will it lose?  It’ll lose credibility because if you’re 
not careful, maybe making ballpoint pens and plastic rulers is acceptable providing 
you make sure that the higher technical infrastructure is behind it to follow.  But what 
I see is more and more people pushing the boundaries to see how far they can go with 
cheap Chinese products.  And there will be a point where China is perfectly acceptable 
for making products that don’t have any implication for health and safety, but that 
means – we put a lot of money into R and D, and that when I listen to the news and 
the companies, it’s really self-destructing because the more product that goes away 
to China, the less profit there is for R and D.  So there comes a point where you have 
to make a distinct choice either more R and D and develop your products or risk going 
out of business. 
 
So where is the main threat as you see it from China? 
 
I think the main threat is going to be at the low end of the technology scale, I think the 
high end technology they’re starting to learn that their products are being banned 
around the world because they are just not safe.  So I think what we’ll see is a 
development back to basics, they’ll start I think trying to learn what to do, but how long 
does it take to change a culture?  That’s why I say I don’t think I’ll see it in my lifetime. 
 
Thank you very much. 
 
[End of File – 00:18:55] 
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Good afternoon. If you could please introduce yourself, your name and your 
company? 
 
Yeah, my name is [inaudible 00:11] ‘E’ and I’m the Area Sales Manager for ‘EE’ Middle 
East for Middle East and North Africa region. 
 
Could I please ask whether your company considers Chinese manufacturers to 
be a friend or to be a business challenge or enemy? 
 
Well, I think there’s no–one as enemy, I can say is a threat. 
 
A business threat? 
 
Yeah, but at Sulzer Chemtech we realise that China is a very important market, it has 
certain benefits for us to also take away from them.  Sulzer Chemtech basically is a 
Swiss based company, we have a manufacturing base in Switzerland and Poland and 
Mexico, India looking at the opportunities in China itself which I mean the refining 
operations where we can supply our own internals and benefits which we have make 
it as a source for manufacturing. 
 
We have also put up a manufacturing base in China and we’re capitalising on that.  As 
of now to supply in the Asian region we’re not getting into the Middle East and North 
Africa as we speak except for certain components like [inaudible 01:26] which come 
from China, otherwise the majority of our products for GCC in the Middle East, North 
Africa, I’m talking, we are supplying from Poland, Switzerland and Asia. 
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If Sulzer had decided not to go into partnership with China, what do you think 
that would have done to the company in Saudi Arabia? 
Well, as I said, the market in Saudi Arabia is not catered by China fabrication but I 
would say China was a good opportunity just like India is and together, as I say, AP 
upper region, Australia, the Asian region, to cater to that area China is becoming a 
very good focal point for us.  If we were not there, well we would have not been so 
competitive and the market competitors would have gone way ahead of us because if 
you’re sourcing from Europe to cater to Asia it’s not going to happen. 
 
Do you think that large companies who decide not to go into partnership with 
China face the prospect of being isolated not only from the Chinese market but 
from the markets where China has come into partnership with foreign 
companies.  For example, if you don’t trade with China is it any harder to trade 
with the US? 
 
Yes, I would say yes.  If you are not trading with China you will not be competitive in 
the international market unless you are catering to a niche area.  If you’re a global 
corporation I think I fully agree we need it but, if you are only working to say American 
market or some other regions say only European market, then you have a choice of 
being isolated from China. 
 
Do Sulzer have any niche areas that they are not sharing with the Chinese? 
 
No, we are sharing everything with the Chinese, there’s no niche areas where we are 
not sharing.  Only for the geographical reasons we are not using China as a base for 
Middle East and North Africa as we speak. 
 
Are you aware of the suspicion within Western manufacturers that China can 
produce very cheap copies of Western technology? 
 
Yes, we are aware of that but at Sulzer Corporation we have seen quality HSE 
procedures which we are using at Winterthur, Poland, India, Mexico and in China so 
we adhere to same quality standards worldwide. 
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Has a copy of a Sulzer component ever been brought to your attention that was 
made by somebody, a counterfeiter? 
 
Not really, not to my best of knowledge. 
 
And would you say that Switzerland has gained a benefit from Sulzer being in 
partnership with a Chinese company? 
 
It’s not a partnership but it’s a whole fabrication base so that’s what I meant.  You 
know, our fabrication in China, India or Poland or in Winterthur Switzerland is identical, 
the same machines, same HSE, same quality procedures, same testing procedures. 
 
But will the Chinese in Switzerland, the Chinese Embassy, will it be easier for 
trade negotiations because Sulzer has a factory in China? 
 
It will, yeah. 
 
It will benefit in the more diplomatic areas of trade and performing relationships.   
Was trust ever an issue with Sulzer when they went over to China? 
 
No, not really. 
 
Do you think that it makes a difference the size of your company who are a huge 
large manufacturer, is it easier to go to China? 
 
Well that’s a difficult question to answer but from my point of view I’d say yes it makes 
a difference.  If you are a large corporation you have better procedures in place 
whether it’s legal, it’s contractual, it’s technical and we have the same systems picked 
up from Europe and taken into China, with some modifications obviously, and we have 
the Chinese management also which has grown very successful, doing an excellent 
job in technical sales and research and process design and we’re doing a good job.  
So far it’s been very successful for us. 
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So in all, when China came into the market it was always seen as an opportunity, 
it was never seen really as a threat by Sulzer? 
 
No never, we just saw it as a big opportunity for us and we capitalised on that, putting 
up our own fabrication site there and we catered to the Chinese market first and now 
we’re extending it to the other locations. 
 
How do you find the quality of steel that is being manufactured in China? 
 
Well, we have our own procedures to qualify the mills from where we take our raw 
material and there are certain customers who do stick to European customers 
especially or American customer, they stick to European source of steel and we have 
no problem with that.  We give them the [inaudible 07:08] anyhow at Sulzer we take it 
internationally, wherever we get the best price and the best quantity which we are 
looking at a particular time. 
 
And China is part of that, are they? 
 
Sure. 
 
They can produce steel of good quality? 
 
Yes they do.  I would just like to make this point, China or any other Asian country for 
that matter, even India, we have good and bad companies like anywhere else in the 
world and you as a company have to decide to get the good companies.  We can go 
and do our own audits, our own test and random checks and them to qualify a 
company from there we are taking raw materials. 
 
Can I ask you if there was anything else with Sulzer’s relationship with China 
which was unexpected or came as a surprise? 
 
Not really, we were well prepared actually, now in this day and age we can get all the 
information we want.  There are some handicaps if you go to any of these countries, 
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one is language problem and there were a few issues which were there but we were 
well prepared and we didn’t have any surprises in this area. 
 
How did you find the culture when dealing with the Chinese? 
 
Yes, the culture, as I say, when you go to a foreign land you have to get used to that 
culture whether it’s China or India so you have to get used to it, you have to work with 
their culture and [inaudible 08:49] of China comes Middle East, comes Saudi Arabia, 
we have to live with their culture, talk to them in their language and we do the business 
for them here. 
 
Thank you very much. 
 
 
[End of File – 00:08:59] 
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[Beginning of File] 
 
Thank you for giving me your time for the interview. 
 
My pleasure. 
 
Could I ask whether you have any concerns regarding the new design and new 
build of double hulled tankers when compared to the old design of single hulled 
tankers regarding their overall safety and whether you think that a change from 
a single hull to a double hull tanker was appropriate for the Gulf region? 
 
Well, from my point of view as an ex–sea farer, the main reason behind having the 
new design for a [inaudible 00:37] which is a double hull just for closure, nothing else. 
It doesn’t concern the marine environment, the sea life or the particular ship, it’s just 
for closure, just to make two double sides. 
 
Do you think that the structure within the hulls will be harder to survey and 
regulate against corrosion than was previously the case? 
 
Yes, indeed, but if you go on board one of the new design ships which is a double hull, 
the main idea is that the cargo tanks are in the middle and all of these cargo tanks are 
surrounded by double hull.  These hulls, they put the ballast water inside these tanks 
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when the ship is the [inaudible 01:26] on board the ship so to stabilise the ship they 
put the water inside these tanks which is in the double between the two sides. 
 
From a stability point of view it’s not as good as the old design which is one single hull 
and that all of the steelworks in these new designs it’s a bit complicated because it’s 
a very narrow area and a very congested area, especially when it’s around the bends, 
around the keel and around the bottom of the ship.  That area is going to be very 
difficult for surveying.  That’s the way I see it. 
 
Is it possible that due to the price of steel and the extra expense in making 
quality steel that new build tankers will suffer from inadequate steel in the 
future? 
 
As I told you before, they were using two types of steel, high tensile steel and mild 
steel.  I believe if man was taking the mild steel, which is the thick one, and the high 
tensile steel which is the thin one, they are all having the same strength but the 
wastage rate is the same so sometimes maybe it’s better to have the mild steel instead 
of the high tensile steel but let’s say it’s a commercial point of view to reduce the weight 
of the ship and have more cargo instead of steel.  I don’t think you would have any 
different steel, it’s all the same because the thickness must be the same. 
 
Is the infrastructure within the tanker inerted in the same way that it was inerted 
in a single hull tanker? 
 
Exactly, yes. 
 
So the whole structure is inerted? 
 
Yes.  When the ship is loaded the ballast tanks don’t have to be inerted but when the 
ship is in ballast and all of the cargo tanks are empty the old design used to inert only 
the tanks by the side, not the centre tanks, but in the new design they may need to 
inert the cargo tanks because it’s double hull so even if you have a gash, if there is a 
little possibility to have hydrocarbon leaks from the cargo tanks to the ballast tanks, 
that’s the main item. Sometimes it costs you money to inert all of the tanks because 
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the consumption for the tanker is going to be high so let’s say to inert all of the tanks 
after [inaudible 04:09] it’s going to be maybe ten thousand dollars for [inaudible 04:11] 
tanks. 
 
Is there more possibility for products to leak into the internal structure of a 
double hull tanker because there are more spaces and for those leaks then to 
create fumes which could ignite at a later stage? 
 
Well, any leaks are going to be hazardous whether it’s on a single hull or a double hull 
but if you’re talking about a crude oil tanker and product tanker then I’d say the only 
difference is the flashpoint of the flammability for the accident. 
 
During the 1980s there was a tanker was in the Gulf – 
 
Yes. 
 
– do you think double hull tankers will react any differently in that situation if it 
was to happen again? 
 
No, the missiles are becoming stronger and stronger than before so even if you have 
a catastrophic attack on-board a ship whether it’s single or double hull it’s going to be 
catastrophic. 
 
But will it cost more to insure or repair a double hull tanker? 
 
Yes indeed because the steelwork and sophistication on board the double hull is more 
than single hull. 
 
So there is a chance that vessels could be easier to make a certified total loss 
with a smaller damage because it costs more to repair? 
 
Yes, more likely. 
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How would you envisage the Classification Societies and the Insurers would 
react if there was large scale targeting of oil tankers in the Gulf again? 
 
Well, if we’re talking about Classification Society, they all have the same opinion about 
explosion so they have to follow the IM Organisation, the International Maritime 
Organisation for the safety of life at sea.  If the Classification Society does not comply 
with these regulations they will not exist so they have just to [inaudible 06:15].  It’s 
mainly for [inaudible 06:18].  [inaudible 06:19] for the double hull [inaudible 06:22], 
nothing else. 
 
Has Saudi Arabia adopted the port state control for double hull tankers? 
 
Well, as far as I know, we have some sophistication with the Saudi law because in 
Saudi Arable we are following the Sharia law so sometimes it’s like the contract State 
[inaudible 06:45] rules or [inaudible 06:46] rules, Saudi Arabia maybe has accepted 
these rules but not classified them yet. 
 
Would you say that from a seafaring point of view Sharia law is in conflict with 
International Maritime law? 
 
No, I wouldn’t say that because Sharia law is very simple but the problem here is with 
the people who are understanding the other laws so, if sometimes they are having 
difficulties to analyse what do they mean by this and that.  So sometimes they say to 
be on the safe side just stay away from it.  But it’s not like that, Sharia law is very 
simple but the main difficulty is for the people to understand how to interlink between 
the Sharia law and international laws. 
 
What would happen to your business if the Iranians blocked the Strait of 
Hormuz? 
 
Well, to be honest with you, for our company we are just shipping company so the 
company is owned by a government twenty eight percent but we are shipping 
company so we are a profit making company.  We don’t need to ship from Saudi 
Arabia, we can ship from anywhere else.  You know, sometimes we do the shipping 
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from West Africa to the States or from West Africa to the Far East but, if you have 
problem with the loading ports, Ras Tanura with regard to Saudi Arabia, we can load 
from Yanbu or we can load from [inaudible 08:26]. 
 
Do you think Yanbu is a realistic alternative to Ras Tanura? 
 
More likely but, you know, the main difference between Ras Tanura and Yanbu is the 
capacity so sometimes the ships may have to wait some three to four days to wait for 
their cargo but in Ras Tanura cargo is already over there so maybe that’s the only 
reason.  And we have five berths at Yanbu and one berth in Arabia and at Ras Tanura 
we have four berths, Sea Island, and five SPMs so let’s say they have nine loading 
berths and at Yanbu we have five. 
 
Are there any other risks in the region of Yanbu to take into consideration? 
 
Well, not really.  All the way to [inaudible 09:32] there is no risk. 
 
What about in the Gulf around Ras Tanura, there is a universal understanding 
that the export of oil is beneficial to the economy of the countries involved in 
the Gulf producing States – 
 
Yes, indeed. 
 
– Is that the case around Yanbu? 
 
In the Red Sea the only port for oil is Yanbu, nowhere else.  In Egypt, in [inaudible 
10:05] we discharge the oil we are loading from Yanbu in [inaudible 10:09] and it’s 
being carried by pipes all the way to [inaudible 10:12] on the other side in the Chinese 
sea.  There is no loading port in the Red Sea other than the Yanbu. 
 
How do you see the realistic possibility of terrorism affecting the oil tanker 
business? 
 
Well, terrorism is hitting everywhere, even it is hitting the refineries, the storage farms, 
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so I believe the security in Ras Tanura is higher than the security in Yanbu because 
Ras Tanura is the backbone of Saudi Arabia. Yanbu is just a loading port but the size 
of the tanker farm is not comparable to the size of the farms in Ras Tanura. 
 
How about piracy? 
 
Piracy in the Red Sea, minor. 
 
Even though it gets the headlines, in actual fact it is a small risk, you see it as 
being a small intermittent threat? 
 
I see it as small risk in the Red Sea but around the Somalian coast and around the 
Gulf [inaudible 11:26] and around the Kenyan coast it’s high risk and one of these 
ships has been hijacked recently. 
 
One of your own ships? 
 
No, one of the other ships. 
 
Do you think that the threat of piracy and even when it happens is used by the 
media and is amplified? 
 
Yes, it’s always like that by the media.  The media sometimes talk when they want to 
talk and they talk the way they want to express their own personal view and sometimes 
though they listen to what they want to listen to not what is there. 
 
So I wonder why it is, and you may help me, after the terrorist attack on the 
Limberg off the coast of Yemen, why this wasn’t repeated again later on? 
 
Yeah, that’s why I’m telling you maybe it’s not a terrorist attack, maybe it’s political 
issues and tensions between governments.  You remember when the Americans 
planned to invade Iraqi, some countries were against that, one of them Russia, China 
and France, so maybe that’s linked to the accident with the Limberg. 
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Or could it be that the attack on the Limberg had very little effect on the oil 
industry? 
 
Indeed, very little effect. 
 
Now I have some questions which they may even be yes or no answers.  If I said 
if Iran closes the Straits of Hormuz and the Iranian forces target oil tankers, will 
this affect Aramco’s operation? 
 
Yes, it will. 
 
If the Straits of Hormuz were to close how would Aramco react, would they have 
to shut down their business, their production, and would their tank farms 
become full? 
 
No, because the main reason Aramco wouldn’t be affected is because the tank farms 
and the oil fields are around the Arabian Gulf so if they have to extract oil and do more 
exploration in that area all of the oil has to be pumped somewhere else, to Riyadh 
farms or to Yemen farms and kept there.  They may have to limit the capacity of oil 
being stored in Ras Tanura or in [inaudible 14:20] because if Iran target the shipping 
industry they may target the oil industry itself and their finance. 
 
If double hull tankers are proved more susceptible to damage than single hull 
tankers, do you think this knowledge would make Iran specifically target? 
 
No, because as I told you before, from my point of view, from my little experience, it’s 
going to be the same between single hull and double hull. 
 
If double hull tankers prove to be more susceptible than single hull tankers, do 
you think that this would prompt terrorists to attack them more often? 
 
No, because terrorists don’t know whether it’s double hull or single hull, they cannot 
tell. 
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Would it make much difference if they did? 
 
No. 
 
How would you say currently the oil tanker market is reacting to the change in 
direction for oil instead of going to the Western consumers but moving to the 
East, is the tanker market adapting to that well? 
 
There is a high demand from China and Korea for crude oil and there’s a high demand 
from America for the Saudi crude oil so sometimes we do the shipping for African oil, 
from West Africa to China, but America is always interested in the Saudi oil away from 
the Arabian Gulf so I think the trading pattern has been always there whether it is to 
the West or to the East. 
 
Is it not my fate that the Gulf is ideally placed to serve both Western customers 
and Far Eastern customers as well? 
 
Yes, the location of the Arabian Gulf is very strategic for East and West. 
 
So, therefore, does that not make Yanbu even less likely to be developed 
because it’s between the Suez and the Gates of Tears, Bab–el–Mandeb? 
 
Well, if you are talking about the [inaudible 16:54], Ras Tanura is going to be at risk 
from the Iranians but Yanbu is not going to be at risk from anyone, the only risk is 
coming from Somali coast but not nearby Yemen.  If you are talking about closing the 
Suez Canal. 
 
No, I’m just saying that once you have gone through the Straits of Hormuz you’re 
in the open sea – 
 
Yes. 
 
– when you load at Yanbu you either have to go through the Suez and through 
the Mediterranean or straight down to Bab–el–Mandeb. 
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Let me tell you one thing, if a ship is fully loaded by crude oil from Yanbu she cannot 
go through the Suez Canal, it’s very deep.  The ship drops, it’s about twenty one 
metres which is not enough for these ships to go through the Suez Canal so they have 
to discharge at least half of the cargo and cross the Suez Canal or they have to 
discharge the whole cargo in [inaudible 17:56] and some other ship will take it from 
other end but, if a ship has to go through the Bab–el–Mandeb she has no problem. 
 
My last question.  In the past, regardless of the disruption in oil production to 
Gulf producer States, oil tankers have always been able to export oil from the 
Gulf – 
 
Yes. 
 
– even, for example, when Kuwait was invaded by Iraq there was extra oil 
production in Saudi Arabia and the tankers were always able to go through the 
Straits of Hormuz and out into the sea.  Do you think over the years that the fact 
that tankers have always been able to export oil has added to the instability 
within the region? 
 
And I say this because no matter how hard people try to harm each other’s 
country by stopping their oil supply they have never yet managed to do it and, 
for as long as oil reaches the consumer States, mainly in the West, the consumer 
States are very unlikely to get heavily involved in the internal politics of the 
producer countries as long as their oil is coming out. 
 
Yes, that’s correct. 
 
So do you see the continued export of oil with oil tankers as being detrimental 
to the political stability within the region? 
 
In the Arabian Gulf, if any state decides to affect the security in that area she is – as I 
say, it’s [inaudible 20:20] rules so they have to cooperate and maybe next five year 
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behind having another loading port in Saudi Arabia which is why they have built a huge 
pipeline from the east of Saudi Arabia all the way to the west. 
 
But I say again, from the point of view of the consumer countries, as long as 
they are having their oil, does that regulate how much they will get involved in 
the internal politics of Saudi Arabia?  They will not, for example, they will try 
very hard in other countries to create democracy – 
 
Yes. 
 
– but in Saudi Arabia, as long as they get their oil they will allow the country to 
remain? 
 
Yes, that’s true.  If they have an interest they have to make sure that everything is 
stable there and they don’t want to interfere with their business.  We get our oil, we’re 
happy.  That’s why sometimes if you see any news about the tension between the 
Iranians and the Americans the price of oil is going up so as long as the West are 
getting their oil. 
 
Do you think the Iranians could close the Straits of Hormuz? 
 
No. 
 
What do you think the probability of that happening is, on a very large going all 
the way down to very small? 
 
Let’s say fifty fifty.  I don’t think they would close the Straits of Hormuz as long, as 
there is no war between the Americans and Iranians they won’t close the Straits of 
Hormuz. 
 
And Iran would come under tremendous pressure from the producing countries 
in the Gulf not to close the Straits of Hormuz? 
 
But will they listen?  No. 
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Would they have the capability to stand their ground? 
 
You know, after the Iraqi war between Iraq and Iran most of the Gulf States were 
supporting Iraq so, in my opinion, I believe from that time Iran is having an attitude 
from the Gulf States. 
 
Having an attitude? 
 
Yes. 
 
Are you worried about Iran becoming a nuclear power eventually?  Let’s say for 
example they did, would this bother you? 
 
From my personal point of view, no. 
 
You don’t think they would use their nuclear ability in a threatening manner 
towards the rest of the Gulf States? 
 
Because if they use that nuclear power it’s the end of the world, in my opinion, because 
where oil comes from, from the Gulf area, and if there is war there the whole world will 
have to be to war. 
 
 
[End of File – 00:23:34] 
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[Beginning of File] 
 
Interview with Mr Martin Stopford, Clarkson’s on the 8th of March 2010.  My first 
question is where do you feel the main risks are for the tanker industry, 
operating in the Gulf today? 
 
The, well the biggest single risk obviously is the closure of the freights, [inaudible 
00:25] for some reason, that would be number one simply because that terminates the 
trade.  Second major risk is the escalation of piracy, which has been going on, on an 
increasing scale and one which is more than academic in convenience now and has 
become quite a sizeable business and you know the fact that you’ve got two unstable 
territories on both sides of the Gulf and that clearly there’s no political ability to deal 
with it very well at the moment, so I’d say that was number two.  The transit in military 
terms – I mean the Gulf proved not to be a major problem during the war in the 80’s, 
so I think one – and I don’t believe you know the generally available weapons have 
changed all the much, so one assumes that modern tankers could cope with a degree 
of hostilities, as they did then, so those are the three that occur to me. 
 
Okay, thanks.  Would the tanker industry benefit from Gulf oil producing states 
building additional loading terminals, outside of the Gulf area?  In the same way 
that the Tapline took Gulf oil up to Lebanon? 
 
Well the first thing to say about that is that you know Tapline proved to be extremely 
vulnerable in itself.  Pipelines on the whole are the most vulnerable parts of the oil 
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transport system, because they go on [inaudible 02:12] and steam out of port you 
know.  So I think you know if your objective is to improve security, I would have thought 
that pipe lines would be a difficult solution.  I mean all of the pipe lines have a difficult 
history, look at the Turkish pipe line. 
 
Yeah. 
 
Turkish transit, pipe lines have to go through somebody’s territory and on the whole, 
the territory that they would go through to get to the Indian Ocean is not really a more, 
is pretty unstable politically and I think to be honest, the same is true on the 
Mediterranean, you know.  So I wouldn’t put pipe lines all that high on my list of 
strategies for resolving the issues, you know. 
 
Would it benefit the industry though, if there were extra loading terminals, by 
way of hiring ships at sort of cycles of – or would it complicate matters? 
 
Well it makes a difference, I mean it’s very expensive to ship oil long distances by land 
and it’s a goodly distance.  If you wanted to take a pipeline from Saudi, then I guess 
you could ship to the Red Sea, that’s a – I mean they already do have pipelines over 
to the Red Sea, so possibly building more pipelines in the Red Sea is you know – 
that’s one way round.  But as I say, anybody who is resolute to close the freights of 
[inaudible 04:07] would probably be able to cope with pipelines pretty well too, so on 
the face of it, I don’t see that being a real solution in any sense actually. 
 
Okay.  My third question, the Iranians often threaten to close the straights of 
[inaudible 04:29], how would you expect the tanker industry to react if such a 
closure were to happen? 
 
Well if the [inaudible 04:38] close, then you’d have two consequences, the first is that 
no oil would come out, I mean that’s the first one.  The second one is that a certain 
number of tankers would be trapped in the Arabian Gulf, how many I couldn’t guess, 
but there would be some loss of tonnage.  So for the oil industry as a whole, the 
immediate priority would be to find alternative supplies and so you know you’ve got 
refineries running.  I think the loss of Middle East oil supply would cause a very major 
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international crisis and I think that no doubt major importers would slam on restrictions 
on their end initially, to try to dampen down oil demand as much as possible in crisis 
measures, to ration the use of gas and that sort of thing and at the same time, the oil 
companies would search for alternative supplies, but there isn’t an alternative supply 
that could take up the slack that you’d lose there. 
 
So I guess temporarily you would still be in a rather strange situation, because on the 
one hand you’d have a great surplus of tankers, which would normally be carrying oil 
from the Middle East to the North Atlantic to Asia and these are the longest haul, so 
it’s a lot of the capacity and they’re very big tankers.  At the same time the oil 
companies would be searching around for any possible supply of oil that they can get 
from anywhere else at all, at any price and to a large extent, that might cause a 
shortage of small tankers, because you know many of the short haul suppliers don’t 
accommodate the very biggest tankers easily.  So if you took out the Middle East, you 
might find there are imbalances from that point of view.  
 
So I mean those – in terms of how that panned out for the tanker owners, generally I 
mean the third thing that would happen is people would probably start storing oil as 
much as they could at sea, you know people tend to hoard when prices go up, because 
the price of oil would go to an undetermined level, so the speculators would come in 
and start storing oil and that might very well result in stocks being held at sea. But 
again it’s a trade-off between the fall in supply, the lack of fall in demand, you know 
will there be enough oil to stock pile?  I can’t tell you but you’d have a very complicated 
situation would develop and my guess is that on the whole, owners would probably do 
okay out of it, that the price of the freight rates would probably shoot up and in that 
situation, I’d rather have a small ship than a big one. 
 
Okay.  I have two questions from that, firstly would people begin to invest in 
shipping companies short term, as a result of that?  The city for example? 
 
I think probably – I mean it’s such a difficult question to answer because of the facts 
that – I think probably if that happened, given the size that Middle East supplies, which 
I forget exact how much it is, but it must be 15 or 18 million barrels I reckon.  Tell you 
what, hang on, if you hang on, I’ll tell you what it is. 
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I think you’re about right. 
 
It’s 18 million barrels is it? 
 
It’s about, yes it is. 
 
Yeah well look I mean we consume 86 million barrels a day, you take out 20% of oil 
supplies, you’ve got you know hardly any inventory.  You know, you’ve got the strategic 
inventory and you’ve got some at sea, so we have a problem of cutting back world oil 
demand by about 20% instantly.  It doesn’t sound all that unmanageable and so I think 
the answer to your question is how people perceived the closure.  I mean if it was 
perceived that whoever is the powers that be would send in a military force and clear 
the whole thing within three weeks, then it may be people would be reluctant to invest 
too much in tankers. 
 
Would the nuclear element come into that then? 
 
I mean I think there’s a lot of other things you might look at, in terms – I mean nuclear 
– are you talking about…? 
 
Iran, yeah.  Iran’s nuclear programme basically.  Would they have a greater hold 
on what was going to happen or how long they were going to close the straights 
for example? 
 
You mean if they closed it by dropping a nuclear bomb in the middle or something? 
 
Or threatened to or just the fact that they have… 
 
Well I think if you got – I mean basically if you’ve got a major stand-off, which looked 
as though it was going to drag on and people are notoriously bad at judging these 
things, I mean nobody really knows – I mean you’d have panic.  We’ve seen it in the 
recent crisis, you saw it in the 1956 crisis, that people panicked and the belief of the 
oil companies, well documented belief of the oil companies after the [inaudible 10:40] 
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canal closed in 1956, was that it would be closed for four years, because they didn’t 
believe that Egypt was capable of actually managing the canal and clearing it.  While 
in fact you know it turned out that Egypt cleared it by the following April, so it was no 
sweat and people lost very heavily on that. 
 
So I think a big factor in this is the behavioural factor, how people perceive the crisis 
and if they took a very dim view of it, which they might if there was nuclear issues.  But 
you’ve got to remember that you close the straights of [inaudible 11:20], you shut off 
all supplies to – Iran doesn’t have its own oil refinery capacity, it brings it in from all 
over 40 different countries, all over the place.  The food supplies into the Gulf, you 
know man cannot live on oil alone and so you know there’d be no container ships in 
there and so basically you would be subjecting the Middle East to the – except possible 
Saudi bringing stuff through the Red Sea, to the same sort of crisis that you had by 
putting sanctions on Iraq you know, only worse really. 
 
Is it something that you worry yourself over Greg? 
 
In the great spectrum of things, I wouldn’t say that – I find I’ve plenty of things to worry 
about, but I mean my policy is not to worry about what hasn’t happened.  So I mean I 
think that the Middle East has proved itself to be an unstable place for very good 
reasons, there’s a lot of money out there, they’re small populations, they’re potentially 
unstable populations, because of the way they [inaudible 12:43], so it’s a very, very 
difficult situation and I think on the whole we’ve been lucky to manage it as well as we 
have so far.  Having said that you know, it probably would do the world no harm at all 
to have a crisis and cut the oil demand by 20%, to be quite honest.  I mean in terms 
of – you know it’s a bit like saying if you got stuck on a desert island with no cigarettes 
and you were a chain smoker, you could say this is terrible, but actually… 
 
It’s doing you a lot of good. 
 
It’s probably doing you a lot of good and I think that in the end, the real sufferers of 
something like that would be the Middle East oil states, because I do believe under 
sufficient pressure, the world could manage on 60 million barrels a day quite easily.  It 
couldn’t manage with the lifestyle it had, but you know it’s a pretty profligate lifestyle, 
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you don’t need to have a cottage in the South of France and go there every weekend 
on Easyjet you know.  That’s just something that’s grown up, you don’t need to drive 
to 80 miles an hour, you can drive at 40, you can go on the train and you don’t have 
to turn your central heating up to 70 degrees all the time.  There are lots of ways I think 
that it could – whereas the people who – so I think the west in the end, it would be 
very, very painful but you know the world could adjust. 
 
The Middle East I think would be left with a major stigma and it would of course have 
massive effects for them, because they are not a self-sufficient economy in any – the 
Gulf States are not self-sufficient in any sense and so – and so I think it could be quite 
difficult actually. 
 
If I can go back to what would happen actually if there were to be a closure and 
if I can talk about what would actually happen to the tankers in their individual 
different positions.  In relation to how they may be utilised, or what may happen 
to them regarding trading and if I say what would happen to any empty tankers 
that were trapped in the Gulf? 
 
I mean perhaps I should have said at the beginning and I’ll say it now since you’re 
recording this, that you know I’m giving you my best estimate.  I’ve been around a long 
time, I’ve followed the thing a long time, but these are difficult questions and so I’m 
giving you top of the head answers, not carefully considered and researched and 
answers and I hope you’ll take them on that basis. 
 
Yes, most certainly. 
 
What was the question again? 
 
It’s what would happen to any empty tankers that were trapped in the Gulf? 
 
Well they would be left there basically and probably taken to a port, laid up. 
 
Used as storage for example? 
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Well I think you might charter them for storage, I don’t know whether they would – I 
think that would be a logical thing to do, if it was felt to be a short term event.  I mean 
militarily somebody might arrest them.  When the [inaudible 15:53] canal was closed, 
there were [inaudible 15:56] caught in, I don’t know they were 10 or 12 years in the 
sea of whatever it is, in the middle of the canal and you know ships caught in transit 
and they just had to leave them there.  So I assume that their ownership and 
sovereignty would be respected, I mean those ships are actually [inaudible 16:22] their 
little islands of the flag state. 
 
Of course you might also find there’s a bunch of American warships up there, which 
is another – or British warships, or French warships you know? 
 
Yeah. 
 
So what do you do then?  I suppose they could support those, so I mean I think there’s 
a whole dynamic about what happens there, but I would assume that the Gulf state, 
or at least one or two of the Gulf states would honour… 
 
Honour the sovereignty of the vessel? 
 
Honour the sovereignty of the vessels, somewhere like Abu Dhabi for example and 
say you may lay them all up in Abu Dhabi you know. 
 
I suppose we could say the same for the loaded tankers, but what I’d like to ask 
is would there be any trading on the oil that was in the tankers during this time?  
Would the oil become any more valuable if it was trapped in the Gulf or? 
 
Well I mean – I think given that you can’t get it out, you have a major – well I think 
probably the way to look at that is to say okay, you’ve put – I mean if you’ve got a 
closure like this, then you have to assume that there’s been a degree of nervousness 
before.  It seems unlikely that it would. 
 
Right, yeah. 
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And if so then the price of oil would have gone up and therefore you’re sitting on two 
million barrels of oil and a VLCC, which if it’s a 100 dollars a barrel, that’s a lot of 
money you know.  You’re talking what is it, two million barrels, 200 million dollars of 
capital, so the question I would think you ask is how do companies caught in that way, 
deal with funding the working capital on oil that they have purchased and can’t sell 
and would the insurance companies cover them and what would be the consequences 
from that point of view and I think that would be commercially disastrous for people, if 
it was anticipated this would be a lengthy period.  On the other hand you could well 
find that if you found a secure anchorage and you could take a gamble that it was not 
going to go on long and you could go and load up with a load of dirt cheap Kuwaiti oil, 
because the Kuwaitis would perhaps be keen to get some money, because they of 
course… 
 
Wouldn’t be able to export? 
 
Well yeah I mean basically, I mean if you want to explore this one, look at the cash 
flow of these oil states.  They all have big budgetary commitments and you know Saudi 
export six million barrels a day of oil, seven, eight million barrels a day of oil and if that 
stops, then from the day it stops, they stop getting any money in and people will no 
doubt you know, some would be difficult about payments.  So suddenly these guys, 
the Gulf is without any visible means of support.  It can’t export from its – you’ve got 
Saubic with its chemicals, you can’t export your chemicals, you’ve got your oil 
refineries in the Gulf, which can’t export, which are relying on that, you’ve got no 
containers coming in, so you can’t repair your cars, because you’ve got no spare parts.  
 
You know you’ve got a complete nightmare scenario and anyway you’ve got no money 
coming in and every day you don’t sell anything, so if it goes on for a year, you’re going 
to have a siege economy in the Gulf I would think.  I mean maybe Saudi would build 
motorways from the Red Sea and maybe you could bring stuff in across Turkey into 
Iraq.  Iran I suppose I would have taken measures, but how long could Iran, how could 
Iran operate as a siege economy?  You’ve got Pakistan on the other side, I mean you’d 
immediately block aid, I mean I imagine there would be some sort of blockade on all 
the possible over land troops if it was a military situation. 
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So it seems to me a very problematic situation from an economic point of view you 
know? 
 
Yeah especially if you happen to be the Iranians? 
 
Well as a sustainable thing, it’s going to be difficult and in the end, if it came to – I 
mean I would have, at first shot I would say if it came to a bare knuckle fight and you 
know people knuckled down for the long haul, then massively painful though it would 
be, so much of the oil say in the States is tied up in land transport, which in the end 
you can drive less.  You know, you can just half your mileage, you just don’t go and 
see your in-laws, which is actually probably an absolute wonderful thing you know.  So 
and people share cars, people go on trains, people stop flying and you save your 20% 
and you pump up your production in other areas and whereas you know, but you still 
have the benefits of the global supply system.  Anybody the other side of the straights, 
it’s only what you can fly in and are you going to – what happens to the air services?  
If you close the straights [inaudible 21:55], are you still going to be able to fly planes 
in you know? 
 
Yeah, yeah okay and empty tankers bound for the Gulf, we’ve already discussed 
that they would probably be re-routed somewhere. 
 
Yeah they’d definitely go somewhere else yeah. 
 
And any loaded tankers that have just escaped the blockade, there would be a 
bidding war you think, between the traders on the price of the oil that was 
coming out? 
 
Yeah, I think basically you would have massive oil instability, which would lead to 
hoarding and all sorts of stuff, because the traders and you know the traders – this 
isn’t oil that’s owned by big responsible oil companies, it’s oil that’s owned by all sorts 
of people and it may be that there would be some sort of intervention, I don’t know.  I 
mean these are scenarios that need thinking about and in fact I wouldn’t mind a 
transcript of this if you ever did one. 
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Yes it will be. 
 
Because it’s, because we have a customer who is quite interested in this sort of thing 
actually.  So yeah I think that you’d have a very market orientated situation and the 
big question is would actually you get military intervention?  I mean would you get 
state intervention, to say nationalise all oil supplies in some way, or bring oil, if it was 
that serious, you know. 
 
Right, yes I see what you mean, it would get to that… 
 
Would it be left to the market or would they say this is such a serious thing, that we’re 
going to basically nationalise all oil at sea and the United Nations will you know, United 
Nations has a crisis meeting and they authorise Naval Task Force to… 
 
Would that have an impact on the shipping industry? 
 
Well yes of course, then those ships would become under the control of the 
Governments, as they have done in wars previously.  I mean you’re in, basically you’re 
in a war situation.  I mean if somebody [inaudible 24:12] closes the Gulf, you’re in a 
war situation and it’s about the most abusive thing that you can do.  I mean it strikes 
right at the heart of the Western, well Western and Eastern economies, so I would 
have thought there would be crisis measures and quite how that’s handled, I don’t 
know. 
 
Well I mean for me to sum up those first four questions, we’re almost half way 
by the way so. 
 
Good. 
 
Then what I would say is I was looking at to see whether any disruption would 
have a knock on effect that would actually effect the shipping industry and not 
the Gulf Oil industry, but in a dramatic way and it would seem that if the crisis 
in the straights was to get too bad, you might end up with as you’ve just said, a 
nationalisation of the shipping industry. 
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Or some sort of… 
 
Some sort of measure that would be that dramatic. 
 
If they were successful and I don’t know what it takes to close it off, but if they were, 
yes. 
 
We’re just looking at if really, at the moment. 
 
Yep, yep. 
 
Half way question, if there were to be a present day replay of the tanker war 
situation during the Iran, Iraq war in the Gulf, how would you expect the tanker 
industry to react, with specific regard to the insurance premiums, crew human 
rights issues, that have – human rights has come to the fore just recently, new 
media coverage and also the reflagging of tankers? 
 
Well I think the first point is that the whole media situation is totally different today.  In 
other words, in the 80’s, things went on and they were reported next day or two days 
later as photographs in the press and maybe a bit of newsreel if you were very lucky.  
Today the media is more effective, though still getting out into the war zone, at sea not 
so easy.  You know, you need a big helicopter to get out there, it’s massively 
expensive. 
 
Well with the salvage engineers? 
 
And when you, yeah and when you get there, all you see is something burning you 
know.  So maybe yes, but you never know where these things are going to strike and 
it may well be dead news by the time the salvage engineers get there you know. 
 
So it would be quite a dramatic coverage though wouldn’t it, if something did go 
up? 
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Yeah, I mean there’s a much higher profile – I mean there are still great pictures taken 
of these ships in the Gulf war.  The industry, you know the Gulf war coincided with a 
period when the end of shipping, the tanker industry was on its knees financially and 
therefore no one had any money, nobody really paid much attention to the industry, it 
was just a destitute business and you know people – a lot of the tanker owners during 
the Gulf war would take their ships, so they just wouldn’t insure and the ships, I don’t 
know about the cargos, I think probably the owners may well have insured the cargo, 
but as it turned out, you know the chances of sinking a ship with the weapons they 
had then was not that great.  I mean [inaudible 27:39] didn’t actually do that much 
damage. 
 
On or above the water line wasn’t it mainly? 
 
Yeah, they tended to hone in on the engine or the pump, to the stern of the ship and I 
think even if they went into the cargo tanks, I don’t think it… 
 
No it didn’t make… 
 
It exploded the oil that much. 
 
Very few. 
 
So the insurers might be quite, you know quite relaxed about that.  There are much 
more environmental issues today, but if you’re in a war situation, I don’t know.  I mean 
you know if you pollute the coast of Dubai, well as happened in the 90’s in Iraq, I mean 
Iraq coast and Kuwait, there was enormous, you know when Sudans turned on all the 
taps and that didn’t seem to cause too much hassle.  I just don’t know what the answer 
to that is really. 
 
So but in the 80’s, some of the shipping companies were running in there 
without insuring the ships, because they were? 
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Yeah, I mean the ships were cheap, they weren’t worth insuring.  I mean if you go in 
with a 160 million dollar VLCC, I expect or even one re-priced at 80, I expect you would 
want to insure it now. 
 
Is that because there are more new build tankers now with double hold sort of 
re-phasing? 
 
It’s just the prices are still higher you know.  I mean we’ve had a period of very high 
prices, so I don’t – I think you still have new ships, old ships and on the whole what 
tended to happen is that the ones that went up the Gulf were the old ones, so they’d 
pick up the ships and people like Trudos would pick up these ships for three, four 
million dollars, trade them at the Gulf, take their chances and then they scrapped them 
when the market got back to… 
 
Yeah.  Do you have anything to say on the issues with crewing, that may have 
changed over the years? 
 
Well crewing – I mean people are more aware of the crewing issue, there is probably 
slightly more of a shortage of crews, whether that would affect the willingness.  I mean 
I suppose you’d have to pay them a bit more, I just don’t know.  I don’t see an obvious 
issue. 
 
Issue with that? 
 
I don’t quite see how that one would go. I mean if you’re going to send your ship up 
uninsured, perhaps people today would be much less willing to do it and probably 
you’d get more whistle blowers you know, if indeed that’s an issue.  Going into port 
without insurance, it’s a port issue really, I mean the amazing thing – I think possibly 
you would find in today’s environment that there’s so many more inspections and 
things, that you couldn’t do it, because the charterers wouldn’t simply not accept an 
uninsured tanker, unless they were desperate.  So if there was a shortage and nobody 
would go up the Gulf, then they’ll take anything. 
 
It would be a [inaudible 30:59]? 
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Yeah. 
 
And finally the reflagging the tankers, could you see a situation where tankers 
would be possibly reflagged? 
 
Well it’s an old tradition, you reflag under the American flag, as they did in the 80’s. I 
mean hopefully you get covered by convoys there.  Yeah to some extent it might 
happen. 
 
Okay and this is a rather technical question, but I would still appreciate your 
view on it please?  In your opinion, would a double hold tanker be more resilient 
to bomb damage than a single hold tanker? 
 
Well in principal, I mean double hold tankers have done well in low impact groundings 
basically.  That’s where they’re at the best, because you breach the outer skin, you 
don’t breach the inner skin.  Anything which – so really if ironically, if you breach both 
skins, you’re worse off with a double hold, because the level of the [inaudible 32:11] 
is higher on a double skin tanker, so the oil will flow out, more oil will flow out with the 
double skin tanker, which has a higher [inaudible 32:23] because of the – in other 
words you know to compensate for – because oil has a specific gravity close to one, 
if you have a single skin tanker, you’re going to have a very low [inaudible 32:37] 
because you’re loading – the ship is full of oil.  If you have a double skin with a lot of 
air inside, you have to low it higher, load it higher and that means that when you, if you 
pierce both skins, you’re going to lose more oil. 
 
So I think the answer is that if you have a slight collision, if you have a hold, but not – 
it only holds, it doesn’t hold the cargo tanks, it only makes a hold in the outer tank, 
then you’re going to gain definitely with your double hold tanker, because you’ve got 
no outflow of oil.  If in fact you actually make a hold in both of your tanks, then you’re 
going to be worse off with a double hold tanker. 
 
Okay. 
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Or with a, yeah. 
 
And why do you think the terrorists have not targeted oil tankers more 
frequently than has been the case? 
 
As opposed to – yeah there’s a novel about this isn’t there?  It was a [inaudible 33:45] 
did you read that novel?  There’s a novel about someone who hijacks a VLCC.  I think 
it’s by Wilbur Smith actually, it’s quite a good book. 
 
Oh right I thought you were going to say that it was – if it’s been, yeah well it 
might be interesting. 
 
Yeah it’s a good book, it was written in the sort of late 70’s, I think it was also a million 
ton tanker that got high jacked.  Well I don’t know, I suppose it’s because there are 
easier targets you know.  I mean I guess if you, you know tankers don’t move very far, 
so you get on board on your tanker, you know so you call somebody up and say we’ve 
high jacked your tanker.  The Pirates, I mean basically what the Pirates are doing are 
high jacking tankers. 
 
Okay. 
 
Taking them to port and they ask for a few million dollars and they get it, 18 million 
dollars in the case of Saudi, that’s, I mean that’s a terrorist attack.  I mean the fact that 
they don’t, that they do it, that they’re honest enough to say we want the money for 
ourselves, not for some cause, is a mere bagatelle. 
 
I was thinking, it was about the Lindbergh as well, that was hit off the coast of 
Yemen.  
 
Oh yeah. 
 
It didn’t begin a sort a flurry of attacks on tankers or? 
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Well I mean it’s you know, it’s a bit like sort of chucking a stone at somebody, it’s an 
irritant.  I don’t quite know what point it made or what good it did, it dropped a bit of oil.  
I think you know number one, tankers are quite big and quite difficult to damage, 
number two with all terrorist attacks, it has to be the fear of the threat and I suppose 
you know to do – you would have to threaten to I suppose take, to beach your tanker 
somewhere where it would pollute the beaches, but you’ve got to get there. 
 
Right. 
 
And of course you’ve got to take it in and you’ve got to get off.  In other words, if you’re 
a bunch of terrorists, you know it is going to be a suicide attack, but there’s a very high 
chance that you will be caught alive, because you know and number three, you know 
since they don’t go very fast, Naval Forces can come and surround you and put 
helicopters on board and you know it’s a little bit – I mean if I was choosing ways to 
highjack something, a tanker is not a very attractive one you know I’d have thought.  I 
mean I have – your guess is better than mine. 
 
Okay, okay it’s just in academic literature there was an awful lot of activity 
regarding the possibility of tankers being hit, but the reasoning behind it was 
often done because there was no technical input and no technical insight into 
how the tanker industry actually works. 
 
Yeah I mean there’s – well an even better example of that, of the LNG tankers, which 
for example they wouldn’t even let them into Boston, but in fact you know anybody will 
tell you that it’s very difficult to blow up an LNG tanker, because it doesn’t ignite when 
the gas comes out, it needs to mix – it needs to be blended with Oxygen to blow up. 
 
Yeah, yeah, nearly finished.  How important is the security provided by Gulf 
based U.S Armed Forces to the safe passage of oil in the Gulf? 
 
I really – I don’t know the answer to that.  I mean there’s – if you’d said piracy, you 
know there’s a specific answer to that, in the sense that various states are providing 
war ships that are patrolling and there are legal problems over what rights those people 
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have got.  I mean I’m – at the moment we’re not in a state of war, there isn’t a state of 
threat, so… 
 
Does it help though that the fifth fleet are there in Bahrain? Do you think to 
yourself oh good, that’s sort of covered, we don’t need to worry about that in 
the short term? 
 
I think probably one of the – I always felt myself that there was an unspoken agenda 
with all of the stuff in Iraq and everything else, was that it gives you a foothold in this 
very, very strategically important area and it gives you a reason to be there and 
because I can’t think of any other reason for doing it and that I always thought that 
possibly that was the hidden agenda behind the invasion of Iraq. 
 
But if that was true and I don’t know if it is, then by the same token, keeping a fleet – 
you know some sort of sea forces out there is important. 
 
In a roundabout way, do you ever think that the ease by which tankers do go in 
and out of the Gulf, has contributed towards that instability within the oil 
producing states? 
 
You mean if you couldn’t get the oil out by sea? 
 
Yeah there would be either an alternative or they would adapt to something 
new?  They way that they live their lives or? 
 
Well I think as you’ve said, the amount of – I mean piracy has been very substantial, 
but outside of the piracy, the amount of terrorism against merchant ships has been 
fairly modest, as far as I can remember.  I can’t think of hardly any examples actually 
and all I can think is that given your fair point, that this is something that you might 
very well have expected, then probably the explanation is a practical one, that’s when 
terrorist sit down and think of targets, they look at ships and they think well you know 
where does this get us?  You know if you’re flying around over the east coast USA 
with 300 civilians on board, you’ve got – you know you’re going to make a massive 
statement.  If you highjack a tanker with a crew of 30, mostly from you know third world 
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states, who don’t even know they’re there and you know you’ve got to – you know 
what sort of threat have you got?  You’re not going to – I mean killing people isn’t a 
very – if you want to kill 30 people , you might as well shoot them or blow them up in 
the streets.  If you want to pollute the oceans, then of course you can do that, but 
you’ve got to manoeuvre your tanker into a position to do that and then you’ve got to 
get away you know?  It’s – you know I don’t – it’s not a very elegant way of committing 
harry carry you know? 
 
Going back to what you said earlier, not with reference to Abu Dhabi, but to what 
extent of coos, political violence, revolutions among and within Gulf oil 
producing states and changes of heads of State, affected the tanker industry?  I 
mean have these happened and the tanker industry, just carried on regardless, 
it’s not really had much of a…? 
 
No, I think you know the tanker industry is not a very old industry, I mean it really hardly 
existed in the 30’s and it didn’t become a significant part of the world economy until 
globalisation in the 50’s and so I think that the – and during that time we’ve had a 
pendulum swinging from a position where it was predominantly driven by the oil 
companies.  I mean 80% of the business was owned and controlled by the oil 
companies, to a position where today 20% is owned and controlled by the oil 
companies and that pendulum swings back and forwards, depending on strategic  
factors and so forth and so I’ve forgotten what the question was now. 
 
The question was to what extent of coos, political violence, revolutions, what 
would happen? 
 
Yeah I mean so… 
 
In the Gulf area really? 
 
I think probably the oil industry, now that it’s reached a large and mature state, the oil 
industry for the most part is of the view that you leave the risk of these very expensive 
assets to these independent investors, who seem to always build plenty of them, 
there’s hardly ever a shortage. 
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Okay. 
 
And you rely on the market place to provide the transport and of course that leaves 
you sometimes vulnerable to anything which curtails supply in some way and some 
sort of political crisis could do that and has done frequently and ship owners have 
made money during the crisis, but it’s never lost it all. 
 
Okay, so it’s actually to some extent, these things have been beneficial to the 
industry, as regarding… 
 
Generally the… 
 
As opposed to being disruptive to it? 
 
Yeah I mean the sort of, you know the rule of thumb in the industry is that you do well 
out of wars at least initially, just because it disrupts things and when things get 
disrupted, you know tanker owners find they’re going to the wrong place, they’re 
hanging around, there’s congestion, there’s storage, all of these things. 
 
If you don’t mind me asking, would you call the straights of [inaudible 44:17] a 
checkpoint? 
 
Well the US Navy certainly does. 
 
But does the shipping industry class something that’s 42 miles wide a 
checkpoint? 
 
Well I mean the straights of [inaudible 44:29] you know there’s a number of these sort 
of difficult straights.  I mean to be quite honest, the English Channel.  I mean the 
English Channel is not that much different from the straights of [inaudible 44:41].  I 
seem to remember I – in fact it’s even less than 14 miles isn’t it? 
 
Well the Channel is, but I think the [inaudible 44:52] is 42 miles. 
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The Channel and both you know the English Channel, you can’t take the biggest 
tankers through fully loaded. 
 
Right. 
 
So I would have thought that you know that in this case you’re… 
 
The Channel is, but [inaudible 45:08], I mean has it ever been, has it ever got 
choked up, if you want to put it that way?  When there hasn’t been a war… 
 
No, not that I’ve, not that I’m aware of. I  mean I’m not sure – you see it’s a small 
enough area to [inaudible 45:25].  This comes back to the fact of you know closing the 
[inaudible 45:28] canal is one thing, closing the straights of [inaudible 45:32], you know 
to all tankers because you might stick a couple of big ones in the middle of the 
Channel, but small ones can go round the side.  I just don’t know anything at all about 
– I’ve never navigated through there, but on the face of this, you know blocking a 
seaway 40 miles wide is – you know you can do it with mines, but then people put out 
minesweepers and you know there’s quite a lot of minesweeping capacity… 
 
Yeah, a huge undertaking basically? 
 
Mmm? 
 
It’s an unprecedented undertaking really? 
 
Yeah I mean I don’t know how you’d do it.  That would be the trick really wouldn’t it, 
would be to find the way to do that? 
 
That’s enough. 
 
Good, okay. 
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Sorry, just of that question, what impact on the tanker industry are the Chinese 
having in the Gulf? 
 
My impression is that the Chinese Government is very, very sensitive about energy 
policy.  It’s most important issue that they feel rather uncomfortable with the Gulf and 
hence have tried to diversify their oil supplies as much as they can, so they have 
pipelines from Kazakhstan, they have all this investment in Angola, they have you 
know sort of this ongoing relationship with the rations, which is sort of you know not, it 
comes and goes, but they keep trying.  So I think basically the Chinese use the Gulf, 
would prefer on the whole to be not too dependent. 
 
Okay, this is my last question, it’s probably going to be a – I think I know what 
the answer is going to be already.  Saudi Arabia often has difficulty in acting 
international law, because international law must first be converted to Sharia 
Law.  Have you ever come across a situation where the issue of Sharia Law has 
impacted on operations? 
 
I have no idea.  You [inaudible 47:44] secretary, Elema, she’s doing a course in Sharia 
Law, a degree in Sharia Law at the moment, so she could probably tell you. 
 
But you’ve never come across anything where it’s happened? 
 
Well of course, well the absolutely number one rule in shipping is that – I mean in 
shipping there’s 180 maritime states and there are some where you really, if you say 
have a [inaudible 48:11] over a ship and you want to arrest it, there are some states 
where you would never go and Saudi is absolutely one that you would never arrest a 
ship in Saudi Arabia.  If you could avoid it, you know there are a number of friendly 
states where you can enforce your rights, but in Saudi, it is very difficult. 
 
What would be a very brief – what would happen as a result of arresting a ship 
in Saudi? 
 
Well you… 
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You would just get caught up in the… 
 
Well there isn’t – because all of the process of enforcing a mortgage involves taking it 
to a court, which recognises the sort of legal system used by the banking industry, 
which is mostly British, a derivative of British Maritime Law and that’s what most of the 
flag states use and you would have to have a regime that could, that would enforce 
that and as I understand it, you know a Saudi court wouldn’t enforce it. 
 
It would be very difficult, yeah. 
 
And so you’d, your ship would sit there and sit there and I don’t know what would 
happen.  That’s not true, in Dubai for example it’s less problematic, still problematic, 
but definitely I can tell you that you know Saudi is the one that’s always given of, you 
know if you’re going to arrest a ship, the first thing you say if you’re know in default on 
a loan is – the first thing you do is check out where the ship is as quickly as you can 
and make sure you get it into a jurisdiction where you’ve got some sort of legal control 
and Saudi is usually the example that’s given of one of the countries where you want 
to avoid if possible. 
 
Okay, thanks.  Is there anything you’d like to add on this sort of topic area, that 
you think might be relevant? 
 
No, I would like to know a bit more – you said why would I worry, did I worry about 
this?  Well I suppose I didn’t, because it seems a bit like high jacking super tankers, 
it’s something you could do, but it’s a very clumsy thing. 
 
Yeah, sounds better than it actually is? 
 
Well 40 miles, if you find out a neat way to do it. 
 
Well I think mainly the discussion is between Iranian political parties you see, 
who keep saying we will close the straights.  It’s not actually something that’s 
done to – with actually any feeling that it’s going to actually physically happen, 
it’s just it’s sparring amongst the Iranians. 
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Well and I think you know if you did it too effectively, then you know you put the Gulf 
at enormous risk. 
 
You put yourself at enormous risk I think really, because you – it’s almost like 
discovering an alternative to oil really. 
 
Well they of course would – well I think you know it seems to me that we’re getting 
down this road I don’t – whatever happens I think you know oil demand, we have to 
take a difficult step to move away from the – you know we’ve had energy on tap, 
because it’s quite interesting at the moment I’m just doing up a farmhouse, which 
doesn’t have gas and it is a completely different world, from which we are technically 
unprepared. I mean I go home, turn up the thermostat, all the house gets warm within 
half an hour.  You try to put in place say a wood fire heating system, it costs four times 
as much, you’ve got to keep 50 tonnes of wood handy, it doesn’t – it will heat in the 
morning, but it’s far more complex and people don’t understand it.  So I think we need 
to go down and the answer like so many things is that you don’t try to replicate the – 
the conclusion I came to is it’s a great mistake to try and replicate a gas – I mean for 
a gas heating system, you just stick in one boiler, you heat the whole house, what I’ve 
done is I’ve split it into three different heat sources and put in an integrated system 
that uses all of them and you will probably never use the – you know you just keep a 
sort of emergency Christmas day capability to heat the whole house.  But in reality, 
you work on the assumption you never do heat the whole house at the same time.  
You know you heat downstairs when you’re downstairs, you heat upstairs in the 
evening and you just, but you need the controls to do that and I think these are whole 
areas of both awareness and technology, which aren’t there.  I mean practical 
technology isn’t there, you know it’s all sort of geeky stuff, you know you go to sort of 
enthusiasts running things out of a garage in Devonshire. 
 
Yeah and we have enough of those.  Well thanks very much. 
 
You’re welcome. 
 
Thank you very much. 
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Field Trip Report 
 
Introduction 
 
On 14-16 November 2008 I attended the first Saudi Arabia Oil and Gas Exhibition 
(SAOGE) in Dammam, KSA.  My aim was to interview company representatives about 
their views on the recent arrival of China as a supplier of goods and services to 
Aramco.   
 
My aim was to collect reliable data from industry experts on the subject of Chinese oil 
industry technology during recorded interviews.  In the report below is listed the 
methodology I adopted to make contact with prospective interviewees, my approach 
for information, ethical considerations and a detailed list of the questions I asked 
during interview.  The results of the data are analysed and presented in a summary 
table.  As discussed earlier the full extent of the data is displayed later in Chapter 6.       
 
Methodology 
 
I expected to collect qualitative data.  I also wanted to collect data from a wide range 
of service providers from Small/Medium Enterprises (SME) to large global industries.  
My aim was to secure interviews with representatives (reps) and record their 
comments. 
 
Contact 
 
The SAOGE Exhibition was scheduled to start on November 15th 2008.  I planned to 
attend on November 14th as this was stated as being a ‘setting up day’ during which 
company reps were receiving samples display equipment, literature and constructing 
their stands.  Reps and delegates were also mingling with each other and my 
impression was that among this ‘group’ there was a great deal of familiarity and 
previous contact among one another.  I used this informal setting to select potential 
interviewees and explain my motives. 
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Approaching potential interviewees 
 
My hopes at interviewing a Chinese service provider were halted when a spokesman 
politely but firmly refused my approach.  When I turned to Aramco a spokesman for 
the company described Aramco as ‘an Ocean’ out of which I would never get an 
answer.  However the spokesman kindly introduced me to the Operations Manager 
(OM) of a key Aramco oil field service provider. (OM) agreed to an interview but only 
on condition of anonymity and that the conversation was not recorded.  These two 
conflicting developments could be seen as disappointing although I did feel that the 
data would benefit from the input of willing but anonymous interviewees with a vested 
interest in participating.  I was careful thereafter to select companies from Europe and 
the US that had English speaking reps who were keen to assist me in recording their 
views and opinions. 
 
I orientated around the Exhibition and marked off potential companies to approach on 
the Floor Plan in the SAOGE program.  During this process my aim was to choose a 
range of products and services that could potentially be challenged by Chinese 
technology.  I was assisted in my choices by my own knowledge and experience 
earned during previous employment as an engineer.  For this reason I was able to 
exclude display stands that offered services such as customs clearance, transport, 
accommodation and wholesale distributors.  Instead I concentrated on companies that 
manufactured and marketed their own products or services.  I was also aware that my 
own knowledge allowed me to discuss technical issues at some depth which gave 
reps room to discuss their product more deeply as opposed to explain rudimentary 
processes. 
 
My initial orientation provided fortunate opportunities where I engaged in conversation 
with various reps and delegates.  During these conversations I generally received a 
very positive response as the subject of Chinese technology was a contentious topic 
among established industry providers.  Reps were eager to discuss their views and 
many added that the SAOGE was an excellent place to gather information.  In 
comparison to other bigger oil and gas exhibitions with over 1,000 companies trading, 
SAOGE only had 207 display stands.  This was partly due to SAOGE being Saudi’s 
first exhibition and secondly because the logistics of visa’s, personnel and shipping 
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equipment is fraught with difficulties.  Reps informed me that only manufacturers 
already established in KSA were attending the exhibition.  After digesting this 
information I felt secure in that any data I gathered would come from a reliable source. 
 
I was further supported by the fact that I was not buying or selling a product.  In general 
the reps appeared impressed that my academic studies extended to the future security 
of their goods and services.  In turn I felt that the reps business ethic viewed me as 
non-threatening and impartial to their views and opinions.  My informal chats often 
moved away from China and on to other relative topics such as Health and Safety, 
navigating foreign bureaucracies and the safety of ex-pat workers in hostile 
environments.  There were occasions during my conversations when a Chinese rep 
or delegate would blatantly photograph items on the display stand of the rep I was 
talking to without the photographer introducing them self.  This left me in a decidedly 
auspicious position where the astonished rep commented on the photographers 
‘cheek’ which appeared to only re-enforce my request for an interview.    
 
Securing an interview 
 
Once I had completed a list of potential companies to interview I produced a strategy 
to request an interview.  The strategy consisted of the following points 
 
1. My identity 
2. My associate university 
3. The qualification I am studying for 
4. The subject of my enquiry 
5. Ethical issues      
 
I approached reps on stands towards the close of the day when they were not engaged 
in conversation or attending to organizational duties.  In some cases the rep had 
approached me during earlier conversations to approach them in order to arrange an 
interview.  At this point I presented the rep my business card and explained the subject 
and scope of my enquiry.  As discussed earlier I chose the reps that had a vested 
interest in the subject of Chinese technology as it potentially challenged their own 
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products.  I was fortunate therefore that the subject matter was not viewed as a fringe 
or inconsequential aspect of their business.    
 
Ethical issues 
 
The issue of ethics did present a problem that was overcome by anonymity.  It became 
apparent, due to the ‘sensitive nature’ of the questions I proposed to ask that if I were 
to have a frank discussion on the subject any interviewees would have to remain 
anonymous.  The ‘sensitive nature’ encompassed the identity of the reps position in 
the company, details of their product and the reps comments about Chinese 
technology being attributed to their employer.   I was fortunate however in that the reps 
who agreed to an interview wished to voice their opinion about China’s entrance to the 
market so anonymity afforded them the ability to speak.  As reps their opinion was that 
they could not be seen to ‘comment on behalf of their company’ or be held to 
comments that could have a negative impact on their business in the future.  I had 
approached a number of reps and not all of them had a negative view of Chinese 
technology so my instinct was that the interview data would project a balanced view 
on the topic. 
 
Conducting the interviews 
 
I arranged to conduct five recorded interviews with small, medium and large service 
providers whose identity would remain anonymous.  I was aware that the scope of my 
questioning would have to take into account the technical content of the reps subject 
area which may fade in respect to wider geopolitical issues.  I decided to structure the 
interviews with specific questions that would produce data relative to my enquiry and 
‘open’ questions that would allow the interviewee to offer a personal and often more 
philosophical response.  The list of questions below is representative of a typical 
interview and includes sections on Chinese products, Chinese partners and the 
geopolitics of oil field technology.     
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Introduction 
 
1. Could you tell me please what product you market? 
 
2. Where does the expertise in your product lie? 
 
3. Does it also rely on the quality of the materials that make the product? 
 
4. Could I ask roughly what percentage of your business is in Saudi Arabia? 
 
5. Could you tell me please what product you market? 
 
6. Is there an intellectual property right issue with those? 
 
7. Where does the expertise in your product lie? 
 
8. Does it also rely on the quality of the materials that make the product? 
 
9. Could I ask roughly what percentage of your business is in Saudi Arabia? 
 
Chinese products 
 
10. Are you aware of any Chinese copies of your product being made? 
 
11. Do you think that Chinese manufacturers can produce the right grade of steel 
to manufacture a product at a competitive price at the moment? 
 
12. Do you think that may change in the future? 
 
13. Do you think it would help Chinese quality control, if they were to work side-by-
side with large European and American manufacturers? 
 
14. Do the Chinese respect intellectual property right, copyright? 
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15. Do you consider that to be a cultural issue within China or something that they 
are using it to their advantage to gain more market share?  Is the Chinese 
government turning a blind eye? 
 
16. So something that would aid your own, the furthering of your own company and 
its product would be a tidying of regulations regarding copyright? 
 
Chinese partners 
 
17. Would you ever sell any of your equipment directly to the Chinese? 
 
18. So will you go into partnership with a Chinese company? 
 
19. Are you monitoring how other companies who have gone into partnership with 
Chinese are performing? 
 
20. To your knowledge are some people having mixed experiences? 
 
21. Is there any particular previous case or case study that you can think of that 
sums up your own thoughts on doing business with China? 
 
22. What would, in your opinion, have been the difference in cost between buying 
a copy and buying the real thing? 
 
23. Do you think you will be able to survive without involving yourself with the 
Chinese market? 
 
24. Do you think that one of the strengths of your company is that you have 
longstanding ties and relationships with customers in Saudi Arabia? 
 
The geopolitics of oil field technology 
 
25. Did China’s entry to the market happen after 9/11? 
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26. And do you think that if you decided to take an isolationist’s stance where you 
decided that you wanted nothing to do with China, given that China are involved 
in the international oil industry … 
 
27. Is an isolationist policy towards China wise? 
 
28. Do you think it may be beneficial in the long run if Chinese manufacturers 
worked with large, like Schlumberger, Halliburton and whether large companies 
who have the margins would be able to accommodate the training of Chinese 
managers? 
 
29. It’s been put to me at the exhibition that if a product could be made in China 
cheaper than it could be made in the UK that’s acceptable to do so, what do 
you think the UK will lose if this expertise is taken out of the UK? 
 
30. And there is within the press a lot of resentment towards Saudi Arabia, having 
worked here yourself, do you feel that there is conflict between people who 
work in the oil industry and the general population within Saudi Arabia? 
 
31. Do you think it might have been more beneficial if the factories were actually 
built in Saudi Arabia to be used by, to be staffed by China and the States rather 
than moving into China, do you think there’s a need to bring the Saudi nationals 
into the oil industry in a larger, greater way than they are at the moment? 
 
32. If I was to look at the amount of work and investment that’s going on in Saudi 
Arabia and oil at the moment, would I be misconceived to say that there is so 
much technology and there’s so much investment in new technology that it’s 
because the fields are actually depleting and that there is more technology 
needed to get remaining oil out more economically? 
 
33. And within the oil industry is such a stoppage or such a blow-out or accident, is 
it ever equated to a similar disruption that could have been caused say by a 
terrorist or is it classed as something that happens within the manufacturing 
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process, the production process?  It causes the same disruption but by a 
different means? 
 
Once the five interviews were completed I was able to introduce ‘overall perspective’ 
to the subject by interviewing the Operations Manager (OM) mentioned earlier.   ‘OM’ 
procured goods and services for Aramco and as such viewed China in both positive 
and negative lights.  I was able to discuss my results with OM about the impact of 
China on the industry as a whole as opposed to the impact on the reps individual 
companies.   
 
Results 
 
I conducted five in depth interviews with representatives A, B, C, D and E.  Reps A to 
D were all employed by US or European based Small/Medium Enterprises (SME).  A 
summary of their answers can be found in tabulated form in table (fig 3.2).  As 
discussed earlier in this chapter the full extent of the data in the table is presented later 
in Chapter 6.      
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 Common questions 
 
 
 
Interviewees 
Percentage 
of business 
in Saudi 
Arabia 
Product 
expertise 
Are your 
Intellectual 
Property 
(IP) rights 
important? 
Do you feel 
the Chinese 
respect IP? 
Reliance 
of quality 
of raw 
materials 
Could the 
Chinese 
match the 
quality of 
your 
product? 
Are you 
aware of 
any 
Chinese 
copies of 
your 
product? 
If not, will the 
Chinese be 
able to in the 
near future? 
Would 
you sell 
your 
product 
directly to 
the 
Chinese? 
Are you 
monitoring 
joint 
ventures 
with 
Western/ 
Chinese 
companies? 
Will joint 
ventures 
improve 
Chinese 
quality 
control? 
Will your 
company 
enter into a 
joint venture 
with a 
Chinese 
company? 
Will your 
company 
survive 
without 
entering 
the 
Chinese 
market? 
A (SME) 
 
UK 
10% Design and 
operability 
Yes No and the 
Chinese 
government 
turn a blind 
eye to it 
Yes Currently 
no 
No Possibly No Yes Yes Possibly in 
the future 
Yes 
B (SME) 
 
Denmark 
small design Yes No, and it 
appears to 
be ‘official 
policy’ to 
transfer 
technology 
Quality 
of 
machine 
tools 
Eventually Some 
parts 
Eventually No Yes Yes Only under 
strictly 
controlled 
conditions 
Yes 
C (SME) 
 
US 
30-40% Operational 
and 
intelligence 
(geological) 
issues 
Yes Yes, the 
Chinese 
need more 
regulation 
and self-
policing 
n/a Yes as a 
straight 
copy 
No Yes No Yes Yes Only under 
certain 
circumstances 
Yes 
D(SME) 
 
UK 
15% Design  Yes No.  They 
ignore 
copyright 
issues 
Quality 
of 
machine 
tools 
Some 
Chinese 
companies 
are trying 
to 
Yes.  
We’ve 
seen our 
own 
drawings 
in 
Chinese 
factories 
Yes Yes Yes Only on low 
end 
technologies 
Yes The 
company is 
currently 
working 
with the 
Chinese 
E (Global) 
 
USA 
Varies Fabrication Yes The 
company is 
aware of the 
IP issues 
concerning 
China 
Yes. 
Raw 
steel 
Yes No Chinese are 
manufacturing 
our products 
Yes The 
company 
has a joint 
venture in 
China 
The 
company 
controls the 
Chinese 
quality 
control to 
western 
standards 
The company 
has a 
manufacturing 
base in China 
The 
company is 
surviving in 
partnership 
with the 
Chinese 
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Analysis 
 
The field trip achieved the expected key objectives.  I felt I was conducting my enquiry 
to the right people, at the right time and in the right place.  The quality of the data 
gathered during the field trip was very high.  The SAOGE Exhibition was the first 
occasion where individual suppliers were able to market their products to Aramco as 
opposed to Aramco approaching the supplier.  This environment provided a great deal 
of choice among suppliers for me to approach for interviews.  The suppliers 
themselves were particularly open to my subject matter as the introduction of China 
into the oil field service sector was met by a degree of emotions ranging from 
scepticism to opportunity.  The SME suppliers tended to view China as a threat to the 
long-term future of their product due to China’s flagrant breach of copyright.  This view 
changed among larger suppliers who saw China as a prospective partner, all be it a 
partner that would have to adhere to stricter quality control standards.  Due to the 
nature of the industry it is understandable that reps wished to remain anonymous.  I 
was reminded that regardless of a reps opinion their employer could choose to involve 
China in their business in the future.   
 
The reps I interviewed all held advanced technical knowledge of their product.  Many 
of the reps were also former oil industry engineers which gave me the opportunity to 
discuss the safety of ex-pat employees.  Due to the geographic location of the world’s 
oil reserves they were used to working in hostile environmental and social conditions.  
When asked about conditions in Saudi Arabia reps tended not to discuss political 
issues but instead compared the level of danger to threats they had encountered 
elsewhere.  The general consensus was that the reps employer decided where and 
when it was safe to work.  The final word being that the majority of the world’s oil 
companies are state owned concerns so a supplier merely offered a contract service 
as opposed to a stake in the venture.  In this situation the safety of the individual came 
before the contract.  The exhibition therefore provided me with unexpected additional 
data.   
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Conclusion 
 
The SAOGE Exhibition was an excellent choice of venue to collect quality data.  It 
would be very difficult to reciprocate the amount of choice and freely available 
knowledge available in any other setting.  The only concession I had to make was to 
assure the anonymity of the reps I interviewed.  I was assisted in my aims by the fact 
that I was gathering data that was of interest to the industry in general and on a topic 
that I did not hold a pre conceived bias.    
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